In the final year of his long life, eminent Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain prepared a final book for publication: a collection of previously unpublished writings entitled Approaches san entraves, later translated into English as Untrammeled Approaches. That collection, both in its conversational yet reverent tone and in its weighty topics - faith, love, truth, beauty - gives the reader the sense that she is receiving from a great teacher and friend the most important nuggets of wisdom for the next generation. (...) Throughout the book, Maritain shares with his readers, from his heart as well as his intellect, regarding the things that really matter; that book - and those things - are the primary inspiration for the present volume. This volume, comprised of original essays by twenty English-speaking Thomists on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Untrammeled Approaches' first English appearance, explores several of Maritain's still-untrammeled (or at least less-trammeled) themes. While following his unbeaten paths, the contributing authors find and refine hidden treasures at every turn. They develop some of his more speculative ideas regarding the spiritual world - including the last things, the fate of the fallen angels, and a possible angelic role in evolution. They reflect deeply on a few of Maritain's recurring themes: for example, the nature of beauty and intuition. They analyze the implications - positive and negative - of Maritain's philosophy of love, marriage, and sexuality. And they consider and apply his arguments regarding appropriate roles and interactions of Church and state. The volume concludes with big-picture reflections on Maritain, his thought, and his enduring relevance. The contributors to this volume are: Michael Breidenbach, Romanus Cessario, OP, John Conley, SJ, Mario O. D'Souza, CSB, Travis Dumsday, Heather Erb, Lawrence Feingold, Megan Furman, Marie George, James Hanink, Gregory Kerr, William McCormick, SJ, Matthew Minerd, Mark Moes, Michael Novak, Michael Pakuluk, Alice Ramos, Walter Schultz, Michael Torre, Nikolaj Zunic. (shrink)

Combines insights from philosophy, psychology, and the biographies of ordinary people to identify principles to guide our ethical development and provide concrete models for an ethical life.

In a recent article, 1 Riisfeldt attempts to show that the principle of double effect is unsound as an ethical principle and problematic in its application to palliative opioid and sedative use in end-of-life care. Specifically, he claims that routine, non-lethal opioid and sedative administration may be “intrinsically bad” by PDE’s standards, continuous deep palliative sedation should be treated as a bad effect akin to death for purposes of PDE, PDE cannot coherently be applied in cases where death “indirectly” furthers (...) an agent’s intended end of pain relief via medically appropriate palliative care, and application of PDE requires sacrificing common beliefs about the sanctity of human life. I respond by showing that Riisfeldt’s understanding of PDE is seriously mistaken: he misattributes Kantian and Millian reasoning to the principle and conflates acts’ intrinsic properties with their effects. Further, a corrected understanding of PDE can address Riisfeldt’s case-specific objections. (shrink)

As several studies, along with a book and movie depicting the true story of a former clinic director, have recently brought to the public’s attention, fetal ultrasound images dramatically impact some viewers’ normative judgments: a small but non-negligible proportion of viewers attribute increased moral status to fetal humans and even form the belief that abortion is impermissible. I consider three types of psychological explanation for a viewer’s shift in beliefs: increased bonding or empathy, various forms of cognitive bias, and type (...) of cognitive processing involved. I consider the normative implications of each explanation, arguing that in each case the viewer’s judgment is presumptively rational. (shrink)

In this article I argue that, despite my previous strongly held beliefs to the contrary, a focused-theory approach to teaching Introductory Ethics (meaning that one theory or family of theories is the main focus of the course) is a legitimate and effective way to introduce undergraduate students to philosophical ethics. There are at least three advantages to the focused-theory approach to teaching ethics: increased depth of learning, avoidance of relativism (or “theory-relativism”) as a default position, and opportunity for moral education. (...) There are some obvious objections to a focused-theory course—that skipping inter-theoretical controversy lessens opportunity for argument analysis and contemporary application, that lack of exposure to all of the major ethical theories is a disadvantage for grad school–bound students, and that a focused-theory approach amounts to indoctrinating students by teaching one’s favorite theory as though it were the only theory; but each objection can be addressed effectively. (shrink)

In a recent IPQ article, Christopher Kaczor gave a promising argument in which he strove to reconcile the common belief that obstetric craniotomy (the crushing of nearlyborn fetuses’ heads) is immoral with his clear and intuitively attractive account of intention. One of Kaczor’s crucial assumptions is that intentional mutilation is morally impermissible. In this article I argue that Kaczor’s analysis has three potential problems: (1) the mutilating features of craniotomy do not appear to meet Kaczor’s criteria for being intended, so (...) his account doesn’t show craniotomy to be impermissible; (2) some commonly-accepted acts, including voluntary sterilization, are acts of intentional mutilation according to Kaczor’s definition and are thus forbidden on his account; and (3) some acts that intuitively seem to constitute intentional mutilation do not meet Kaczor’s definition of “mutilation” and are not ruled out by his account. I suggest slight modifications to Kaczor’s account that might address these difficulties. (shrink)

In a recent IPQ article, Christopher Kaczor gave a promising argument in which he strove to reconcile the common belief that obstetric craniotomy is immoral with his clear and intuitively attractive account of intention. One of Kaczor’s crucial assumptions is that intentional mutilation is morally impermissible. In this article I argue that Kaczor’s analysis has three potential problems: the mutilating features of craniotomy do not appear to meet Kaczor’s criteria for being intended, so his account doesn’t show craniotomy to be (...) impermissible; some commonly-accepted acts, including voluntary sterilization, are acts of intentional mutilation according to Kaczor’s definition and are thus forbidden on his account; and some acts that intuitively seem to constitute intentional mutilation do not meet Kaczor’s definition of “mutilation” and are not ruled out by his account. I suggest slight modifications to Kaczor’s account that might address these difficulties. (shrink)

While our common sense seems to tell us that intention matters to ethical evaluation, there is considerable disagreement among ethicists regarding why and how it matters. In this article I argue that intention matters to act evaluation in much the way that the principle of double effect implies. First, I identify five propositions—one epistemological and four ethical—that the proponent of PDE holds regarding the ethical relevance of intention. Second, I give two general arguments for the ethical relevance of intention. Third, (...) I offer preliminary arguments for each of the five propositions outlined in the first section. Together, these general and more specific arguments are meant to place the burden of proof on one denying intention’s relevance to act evaluation. Fourth and finally, then, I show that recent critiques of PDE and of the ethical relevance of intention fail to carry that burden of proof. (shrink)

In the decades since Anscombe re-introduced the distinction between intention and foresight into philosophical ethics, supporters and critics of the related principle of double effect (PDE) have displayed disagreement and confusion about its application and scope. The key to correct interpretation and application of PDE, I argue, is recognition of its limits: (1) the principle does not include an account of the goodness or badness of effects; (2) it does not include an account of intention; (3) PDE does not specify (...) a particular action as right or obligatory; and (4) the privacy of intention limits its application in interpersonal and legal contexts. While all four of these features are “limits” in the sense that they are things PDE does not do, I argue that (a) only the fourth is a real limitation or disadvantage of the principle—and (b) none of the limits implies that the principle should be rejected. (shrink)

What effect, if any, can we expect undergraduate ethics courses to have on students’ ethical beliefs, self-concept, and behavior? After a brief discussion of apparent theoretical and practical obstacles to moral education in ethics courses, we explain and discuss our effort to provide preliminary answers to that question via an empirical study of students enrolled in several sections of our university’s Introductory Ethics course. We found modest but statistically significant effects in many areas, which seem to indicate that those who (...) would like to see their ethics courses have a positive impact on students’ moral lives have reason for optimism. We conclude with a discussion of pedagogical implications of our study, along with its limitations and directions for future research. (shrink)

What effect, if any, can we expect undergraduate ethics courses to have on students’ ethical beliefs, self-concept, and behavior? After a brief discussion of apparent theoretical and practical obstacles to moral education in ethics courses, we explain and discuss our effort to provide preliminary answers to that question via an empirical study of students enrolled in several sections of our university’s Introductory Ethics course. We found modest but statistically significant effects in many areas, which seem to indicate that those who (...) would like to see their ethics courses have a positive impact on students’ moral lives have reason for optimism. We conclude with a discussion of pedagogical implications of our study, along with its limitations and directions for future research. (shrink)

Shame is a painful emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain standards, norms, or ideals. The subject feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels watched and exposed. As a result, she feels bad about the person that she is. The most popular view of shame is that someone only feels ashamed if she fails to live up to standards, norms, or ideals that she, herself, accepts. In this paper, I provide support for a different (...) view, according to which shame is about failure to live up to public expectations. Such a view of shame has difficulties explaining why an audience is central to shame, why shame concerns the self as a whole, and why the social rank of someone affects their ability to shame others. These features, I argue, are best explained by reference to the descent of shame in the emotion connected with submission in nonhuman animals. The function of submission—to appease relevant social others—also throws light on the sort of emotion that shame is. From the point of view of other people, a subject who experiences shame at her own failing is someone who is committed to living together with others in a socially sanctioned way. The argument is not that we must understand the nature of shame in terms of what it evolved for, but that its heritage is important to understanding the emotion that shame has become. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Rule of Rescue The Argument from Compassion An External Justification Notes.

We regularly wield powers that, upon close scrutiny, appear remarkably magical. By sheer exercise of will, we bring into existence things that have never existed before. With but a nod, we effect the disappearance of things that have long served as barriers to the actions of others. And, by mere resolve, we generate things that pose significant obstacles to others' exercise of liberty. What is the nature of these things that we create and destroy by our mere decision to do (...) so? The answer: the rights and obligations of others. And by what seemingly magical means do we alter these rights and obligations? By making promises and issuing or revoking consent When we make promises, we generate obligations for ourselves, and when we give consent, we create rights for others. Since the rights and obligations that are affected by means of promising and consenting largely define the boundaries of permissible action, our exercise of these seemingly magical powers can significantly affect the lives and liberties of others. (shrink)

Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown that these four assumptions, taken (...) together, are inconsistent with referentialism, the common view that names are uniformly associated with ordinary individuals as their semantic value. Instead, the view presented here interprets names as context-sensitive expressions, associated in a context of utterance with a particular act of introduction, or dubbing, which is then used to determine their semantic value. Some dubbings are referential, which associate names with ordinary individuals as their semantic values; others are fictional, which associate names, instead, with sets of properties. Since the semantic values of names can be of different sorts, the semantic rule interpreting predication must be complex as well. In the body of the paper, I show how this new treatment of names allows us to solve our original puzzle. I defend the complexity of the semantic predication rule, and address additional worries about ontological commitment. (shrink)

In Commit to Win, Heidi Reeder, PhD, unpacks over forty years of research by psychologists and economists to show that the key to reaching any goal, whether it' to hit the gym more often or to finally quit that dead-end job, isn' motivation, willpower, or determination. It' commitment. Busting the myths most of us believe about commitment, Reeder shows that it all comes down to four variables: treasures, troubles, contributions, and choices. Together, these variables make up a formula that (...) not only measures how committed we are, but also shows which factors we can change to get our commitment level in sync with what we want to do. (shrink)

Having enjoyed more than twenty years of development, feminist epistemology and philosophy of science are now thriving fields of inquiry, offering current scholars a rich tradition from which to draw. In addition to a recognition of the power of knowledge itself and its effects on women’s lives, a central feature of feminist epistemology and philosophy of science has been the attention they draw to the role of power dynamics within knowledge-seeking practices and the implications of these dynamics for our understandings (...) of knowledge, science, and epistemology. Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge collects new works that address today’s key challenges for a power-sensitive feminist approach to questions of knowledge and scientific practice. The essays build upon established work in feminist epistemology and philosophy of science, offering new developments in the fields, and representing the broad array of the feminist work now being done and the many ways in which feminists incorporate power dynamics into their analyses. (shrink)

For over 80 years, the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) has been a leader in the promotion of ethical practice within the field of engineering. One of the Society's greatest contributions is the formation and adoption of the NSPE Code of Ethics. But the code, with its six "Fundamental Canons," is only truly instructive if engineers can bridge the gap between principles and action. Here there is no substitute for personal reflection on the ethical and philosophical issues that underlie (...) the code. If done well, such reflection provides an indispensable basis for moral problem solving. Beyond the Code: A Philosophical Guide to Engineering Ethics is designed to complement the NSPE Code of Ethics by helping readers "go beyond" in their understanding of the philosophical issues bound up in the code. Each chapter addresses one of the Fundamental Canons of the NSPE code, and provides a philosophical analysis of the various parts of each canon by employing contemporary and classical texts. This unique approach to engineering ethics guides students and professionals in their readings of the appended selections to refine their understanding of the code in order to apply it to the practical challenges of today's engineers. Key Features: Is the first introduction to engineering ethics that helps students understand and apply the NSPE Code of Ethics to engineering practice Includes a Preface from Arthur E. Schwartz, NSPE Deputy Executive Directorand General Counsel, and NAFE Executive Director As a hybrid text, includes primary philosophical texts with extensiveintroductions and guided reading questionsfrom the book's three authors Offers case studies from the NSPE Board of Ethical Review, allowing students to see a direct connection between the issues discussed in the text and real-world engineering practice Includes the following pedagogical aids: "Key Terms and Concepts" for each chapter "Preparing to Read" sections before each primary source reading "Guided Reading Questions" after each primary source reading "Going Beyond--Our Questions for a Deep Dive" after each case study. (shrink)

Eye contact is an essential element of human interaction and direct eye gaze has been shown to have effects on a range of attentional and cognitive processes. Specifically, direct eye contact evokes a positive affective reaction. As such, it has been proposed that obstructed eye contact reduces emotional mimicry. So far, emotional mimicry research has used averted-gaze faces or unnaturally covered eyes to analyze the effect of eye contact on emotional mimicry. However, averted gaze can also signal disinterest/ disengagement and (...) censor bars obscure eye-adjacent areas as well and hence impede emotion recognition. In the present study, we used a more ecological valid approach by showing photos of actors who expressed either happiness, sadness, anger, or disgust while either wearing mirroring sunglasses that obstruct eye contact or clear glasses. The glasses covered only the direct eye region but not the brows, nose ridge, and cheeks. Our results confirm that participants were equally accurate in recognizing the emotions of their counterparts in both conditions. Further, in line with our hypotheses, participants felt closer to the targets and mimicked affiliative emotions more intensely when their counterparts wore glasses instead of sunglasses. For antagonistic emotions, we found the opposite pattern: Disgust mimicry, which was interpreted as an affective reaction rather than genuine mimicry, could be only found in the sunglasses condition. It may be that obstructed eye contact increased the negative impression of disgusted facial expressions and hence the negative feelings disgust faces evoked. The present study provides further evidence for the notion that eye contact is an important prerequisite for emotional mimicry and hence for smooth and satisfying social interactions. (shrink)

A useful concept that can be invoked to resolve complex bioethical issues is that of moral status (or, human dignity). In this article, we apply this concept to dead human bodies in order to support our view that research on such bodies is permissible. Instead of drawing from salient Western theories of human dignity that account for it by appeals to autonomy or rationality, we will base our investigation on emerging conceptions in African theories of moral status as articulated by (...) Thaddeus Metz and Munamato Chemhuru. Our conclusion is that neither of these theories of moral status, one secular, and the other religious, can accommodate the intuition that we have direct duties of respect towards such bodies because, in relation to Metz's conception, they lack the capacity to enter into social relationships while on Chemhuru's conception, dead bodies appear not to have any meaningful purpose within the hierarchy that captures the ontological systems that determine such status. Consequently, we argue that our analysis provides support for the use of unclaimed cadavers in training and research in medical institutions. (shrink)

A useful concept that can be invoked to resolve complex bioethical issues is that of moral status (or, human dignity). In this article, we apply this concept to dead human bodies in order to support our view that research on such bodies is permissible. Instead of drawing from salient Western theories of human dignity that account for it by appeals to autonomy or rationality, we will base our investigation on emerging conceptions in African theories of moral status as articulated by (...) Thaddeus Metz and Munamato Chemhuru. Our conclusion is that neither of these theories of moral status, one secular, and the other religious, can accommodate the intuition that we have direct duties of respect towards such bodies because, in relation to Metz's conception, they lack the capacity to enter into social relationships while on Chemhuru's conception, dead bodies appear not to have any meaningful purpose within the hierarchy that captures the ontological systems that determine such status. Consequently, we argue that our analysis provides support for the use of unclaimed cadavers in training and research in medical institutions. (shrink)

In modern urbanized and densely populated societies - such as the contemporary Netherlands, which forms the geographical setting of the present analysis - hunting has lost its meaning as a mode of subsistence to become a symbolic strategy. Hunting is a cultural enclave in which the boundaries between humans and animals are blurred and the relations of dominance and submission symbolically reversed. Hunting challenges the legitimacy of apparently "given" power relations between humans and animals. Hunters construct, reproduce and legitimize hunting (...) by crossing the boundaries between humans and animals. Hunting "for pleasure" is regarded as truly pleasurable only if it allows a reversal of the asymmetrical power relations between humans and animals, attributing almost human characteristerics to the game-species. In theircognitive schemes hunters measure their power and abilities with strong, cunning and preferably male opponents. Game-species share an ambivalent status between the human and the animal realms, the tame and the wild, and between their instrumental and expressive signifccance. Hunting "for pleasure" is justified by this very ambivalence. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an important feature of what is important in survival – having the property of personhood. I offer a theory that can account for this, and I explain how it avoids the implausible consequences of standard psychological continuity theory, as well as having certain other advantages over that theory.

Food media have become a formidable part of adolescents’ food environments. This study sought to explore how and why adolescents use food media by focusing on selectivity and motives for consumption. We conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 31 Flemish adolescents aged 12 to 16. Food media were both incidentally consumed and selectively sought for education, social utility, and entertainment. The levels of selectivity and motives for consumption varied among the different food media platforms. Incidental consumption was more prevalent with TV (...) cooking shows compared to online food media. The dominant motives for TV cooking show consumption were companionship and entertainment, while online food media were used for a more diverse range of motives dominated by information/inspiration and social interaction. Some participants consumed food media to get motivation and inspiration to improve health and fitness while others consumed food media to watch appetizing and aesthetically pleasing food content. The social environment in the form of friends and family as well as existing food preferences were dominant psychosocial factors for both traditional and online food media use. Future research is warranted to explore how incidental exposure and the identified motives for use relate to food media effects. (shrink)

Many previous treatments of voluntary behavior have viewed intentions as causes of behavior. This has resulted in several dilemmas, including a dilemma concerning the origin of intentions. The present article circumvents traditional dilemmas by treating intentions as constraints that restrict degrees of freedom for behavior. Constraints self-organize as temporary dynamic structures that span the mind-body divide. This treatment of intentions and voluntary behavior yields a theory of intentionality that is consistent with existing findings and supported by current research.

Much of the literature concerning epistemic injustice has focused on the variety of harms done to socially marginalized persons in their capacities as potentialcontributorsto knowledge projects. However, in order to understand the full implications of the social nature of knowing, we must confront the circulation of knowledge and the capacity of epistemic agents to take up knowledge produced by others and make use of it. I argue that members of socially marginalized lay communities can sufferepistemic trust injusticeswhen potentially powerful forms (...) of knowing such as scientific understandings are generated in isolation from them, and when the social conditions required for aresponsibly-placed trustto be formed relative to the relevant epistemic institutions fail to transpire. (shrink)

Over the past 3 years, the authors have pursued unique cross-college collaboration. They have hosted a National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH)–funded Humanities Gaming Institute and team-taught a cross-listed course that brought together students from the humanities and computer science. Currently, they are overseeing the development of an NEH-supported social history game called Desperate Fishwives. In the process, the authors have realized that “game” is not the most appropriate designator for the kind of projects they are pursuing. Instead, they propose (...) critical interactives, a term that suggests projects that mobilize ludic methods in order to engage participants in socially and politically sensitive, indeed controversial, subject matter. Their most recent project, Ghosts of the Horseshoe, offers an initial look at how critical interactives are particularly apt at raising awareness about the relations among institutional policy, broader public policy, and the ways that people negotiate the public history of a particular place. (shrink)

Background:Healthcare personnel in the municipal healthcare systems experience many ethical challenges in their everyday work. In Norway, 243 municipalities participated in a national ethics project, aimed to increase ethical competence in municipal healthcare services. In this study, we wanted to map out what participants in ethics reflection groups experienced as promoters or as barriers to successful reflection.Objectives:To examine what the staff experience as promoters or as barriers to successful ethics reflection.Research design:The study has a qualitative design, where 56 participants in (...) municipal healthcare participated in 10 different focus-group interviews.Ethical considerations:The data collection was based on the participants’ informed consent and approved by the Data Protection Official of the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.Results:The informants had different experiences from ethics reflection group. Nevertheless, we found that there were several factors that were consistently mentioned: competence, facilitator’s role, ethics reflection groups organizing, and organizational support were all experienced as promoters and as a significant effect on ethics reflection groups. The absence of such factors would constitute important barriers to successful ethics reflection.Discussion:The results are coincident with other studies, and indicate some conditions that may increase the possibility to succeed with ethics reflection groups. A systematic approach seems to be important, the systematics of the actual reflections, but also in the organization of ethics reflection group at the workplace. Community healthcare is characterized by organizational instabilities as many vacancies, high workloads, and lack of predictability. This can be a hinder for ethics reflection group.Conclusion:Both internal and external factors seem to influence the organization of ethics reflection group. The municipalities’ instabilities challenging this work, and perceived as a clear inhibitor for the development. The participants experienced that the facilitator is the most important success factor for establishing, carrying out, and to succeed with ethics reflection groups. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers of science have been prominent amongst social epistemologists who draw attention to communal aspects of knowing. As part of this work, I focus on the need to examine the relations between scientific communities and lay communities, particularly marginalized communities, for understanding the epistemic merit of scientific practices. I draw on Naomi Scheman's argument (2001) that science earns epistemic merit by rationally grounding trust across social locations. Following this view, more turns out to be relevant to epistemic assessment than (...) simply following the standards of "normal science". On such an account, philosophers of science need to attend to the relations between scientific communities and various lay communities, especially marginalized communities, to understand how scientific practices can rationally ground trust and thus earn their status as "good ways of knowing". Trust turns out to involve a wide set of expectations on behalf of lay communities. In this paper I focus on expectations of knowledge sharing, using examples of "knowledge-sharing whistleblowers" to illustrate how failures in knowledge sharing with lay communities can erode epistemic trust in scientific communities, particularly in the case of marginalized communities. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that Christianity enjoins its followers to practice universal, unconditional forgiveness. But universal, unconditional forgiveness is regarded by many as morally problematic. Some Christian scholars have denied that Christianity in fact requires universal, unconditional forgiveness, but I believe they are mistaken. In this essay, I show two things: that Christianity does enjoin universal, unconditional forgiveness of a certain sort, and that Christians, and perhaps other theists, are always justified in exercising unconditional forgiveness. Though most philosophers treat forgiveness (...) as grounded in our beliefs about the offender's current state, I argue that we might more fruitfully ground forgiveness in hope for the wrongdoer. Christianity's commitment to the existence of an omnipotent God who is concerned about the moral status of His creatures always justifies such hope and thus always justifies forgiveness. (shrink)

In this essay I first provide a brief explanation of the principle of double effect (PDE) and the propositions that it entails regarding the distinction betweenintention and foresight (I/F distinction) and the distinction’s relevance to ethical evaluation. Then I address several recent critiques of PDE and the I/F distinctionby influential ethicists including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, and Jonathan Bennett. I argue that none of these critiques issuccessful. In the process of refuting the critiques, I also give (...) prima facie reason to believe that the I/F distinction is relevant to evaluation of agents and their actions and that PDE is a defensible ethical principle. (shrink)

In this essay I first provide a brief explanation of the principle of double effect (PDE) and the propositions that it entails regarding the distinction betweenintention and foresight (I/F distinction) and the distinction’s relevance to ethical evaluation. Then I address several recent critiques of PDE and the I/F distinctionby influential ethicists including Judith Jarvis Thomson, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, and Jonathan Bennett. I argue that none of these critiques issuccessful. In the process of refuting the critiques, I also give (...) prima facie reason to believe that the I/F distinction is relevant to evaluation of agents and their actions and that PDE is a defensible ethical principle. (shrink)