In contrast to embryo donation, the permissibility of 2PN cell donation is highly controversial in Germany. This article is based on there being a legal loophole with respect to 2PN cell donation, which results from an inconsistency within the Embryo Protection Act on the normative status of 2PN cells. Following that thesis, the article argues that, on the basis of the normative criterion totipotency (i.e. the capacity to develop into a born human being), 2PN cells should also (...) be considered human embryos within the meaning of the Act and thereby be protected by that Act in the same way as embryos. However, the normative assumption that 2PN cells should already be endowed with human dignity and the right to life has absurd consequences. Moreover, the consistent continuation of the Embryo Protection Act, as well as of the underlying ethical position or argumentation (i.e. the potentiality argument), leads to the even more absurd consequence of having to place every human somatic cell under the protection of human dignity and the right to life. As totipotency or the developmental potential therefore cannot delimit entities considered worthy of protection (i.e. human embryos) from entities considered not worthy of protection (i.e. 2PN cells, gametes, hESC, hiPSC and human somatic cells), it is not a suitable normative criterion. As a paradigmatic case, 2PN cell donation demonstrates that by retaining this normative criterion the now obsolete German Embryo Protection (Act) ultimately undermines itself. (shrink)

Ethical conflicts have always been connected with new techniques of reproductive medicine such as in-vitro fertilization. The fundamental question is: When does human life begin and from which stage of development should the embryo be protected? This question cannot be solved by scientific findings only. In prenatal ontogenesis there is no moment during the development from the fertilized oocyte to a human being which could be recognized as an orientation point for all ethical problems connected with the question of (...) the right to dispose of prenatal life (interruption of pregnancy, research on embryos). The protection of an individual human life must be valid for all in the same manner and from the very beginning on. It must not depend on value judgments or on stages of development, so-called grades of humanity, because these would then become selection criteria. Procreated life must have the right to be born. These were the essential ethical arguments which led to the German Embryo Protection Law. (shrink)

Ethical conflicts have always been connected with new techniques of reproductive medicine such as in-vitro fertilization. The fundamental question is: When does human life begin and from which stage of development should the embryo be protected? This question cannot be solved by scientific findings only. In prenatal ontogenesis there is no moment during the development from the fertilized oocyte to a human being which could be recognized as an orientation point for all ethical problems connected with the question of (...) the right to dispose of prenatal life (interruption of pregnancy, research on embryos). The protection of an individual human life must be valid for all in the same manner and from the very beginning on. It must not depend on value judgments or on stages of development, so-called grades of humanity, because these would then become selection criteria. Procreated life must have the right to be born. These were the essential ethical arguments which led to the German Embryo Protection Law. (shrink)

According to the German Embryo Protection Act, PGD has been banned in Germany since 1990; one reason is the legislature’s avoiding to insert a revision clause regarding medical advance into the law. The ruling of the German Federal Court of Justice of July 2010 shows the problems resulting out of this approach and declares PGD to be permitted in certain cases. The article discusses the necessity for, as well as the problems of, an interdisciplinary dialogue in (...) the field of reproductive medicine. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: Recently, ”Dolly” has been confirmed by cloning several other mammals. In January 1999 it was even reported that Korean researchers first of all had cloned the first human embryo. In the following article some basic biological and technical aspects of modern cloning strategies, such as embryo splitting and nuclear transplantation, will be described. Subsequently, a short critical analysis will discuss the ethical problem of cloning human beings. Since the German Embryo Protection (...) Act from January 1991 substantial progress in cloning technology has been made, so that the principal question now is whether the Act is still sufficient to forbid human cloning or whether it should be revised. Arguments and conclusion: With advanced technical progress human cloning now seems to be possible. From the ethical point of view, the cloning of human beings should be rejected, as it offends the fundamental value of human dignity. On the other hand, the German Embryo Protection Act is antiquated and does not provide the required protection. This article may stimulate further discussion in the fields of ethics and jurisdiction, especially regarding to the Embryo Protection Act. (shrink)

On 25 April 2002, the German Parliament has passed a strict new law referring to stem cell research. This law took effect on July 1, 2002. The so-called embryonic Stem Cell Act ( Stammzellgesetz — StZG ) permits the import of embryonic stem (ES) cells isolated from surplus IvF-embryos for research reasons. The production itself of ES cells from human blastocysts has been prohibited by the German Embryo Protection Act of 1990, with the exception of the (...) use of ES cells which exist already. The debate on the legitimate use of ES cells escalated, after the main German research funding agency, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), unexpectedly published new guidelines recommending are stricted use of human ES cells for research. Meanwhile, the debate has ethically dividedsociety, political parties, government and church members into a group supporting and a group rejecting ES cell research. The arguments in favour of such a research can be summarized as arguments derived from a new ethics ofhealing calling for a therapeutic imperative, whereas the arguments against can be summarized as arguments violating the fundamental principle of human dignity as they imply the destruction of human embryos. This article willtry to present and evaluate various ethical arguments founded on the latest biological and medical data on the potential use of stem cell technologies. It will finally come to the conclusion that ES cell research is opposed to human dignity, since the procedures of isolating ES cells require the destruction and instrumentalization of human embryos. Human embryos are human beings at a very early stage of their development, fully possessing the ability of completing their development. At this very early stage, human embryos are extremely dependent and fragile, and thus vulnerable corporealities. Vulnerability and human dignity demand the protection of the embryo's corporeal integrity. Hence, this essay will try to propagate research with adult stem(AS) cells, a procedure which does not require the destruction of human embryos; with regard to the necessary plasticity, it should be emphasized that AS cells very much resemble ES cells. (shrink)

This report presents the current state of research in the debate on embryo protection. On the basis of scientific findings on species membership and the capacity of human embryos to develop properly, the report examines the extent to which these empirical facts influence the debate on the legal status of the human embryo. At the end of the article, the authors present the options for the further discussion with regard to the German Embryo Protection (...) Act. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to the question of normative aspects in which the relation between responsibly acting subjects and manipulable embryos has to be established. It advocates the thesis that “reflexive identity” between acting subject and treated embryonal “object” is the pivotal and starting point of the debate: the acting subject acts towards a form of objective human existence, which it has undergone by itself and therefore recognizes not only itself, but also poses the condition of possibility of its own (...) current sovereignty in acts. Against this background the concept of “Personalism”, which is found in the German “ESchG” (Embryo Protection Act) and “StZG” (Stem Cell Act), can be understood. If there are new questions arising from complex, technically mediated manipulations of the embryo today, as its entire synthetic production has become possible, it leads to the question regarding the normative meaning of “Besonderung” (particularity/particularization) and the identification of species as living individuality as such. Consequently, it raises the question of the normative relevance of corporal self-objectivations of individuals, which never passes over to just material circumstances. This also applies when embryos are obtained from iPS cells where the biotic substrate, as well as its “administration” and “utilization”, is not regarded an anonymous, but biotic substrate that is embedded in individual biographies that are undetachable and never completely lost. “Biopolitics” that place human biotic substrate in the disposition of arbitrary interests already has to be rejected in the interest of maintaining a perspective of reflexive identity as well as in the horizon of interpersonality. (shrink)

This article gives an overview about the ethical dispute on preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), its legal status and its practical usage in Europe. We provide a detailed description of the situation in Germany wherein prenatal diagnosis is routinely applied, but PGD is prohibited on the basis of the internationally unique embryo protection act (EPA) that was put into force in 1991. Both PGD and stem cell research were vigorously debated in Germany during the last four years. As regards (...) the PGD debate specifically, the voices of the ones directly affected were not adequately taken into consideration. We describe the predominant lines of argumentation in this debate and some essential results of our "bioethical field study" of opinions on and usage of PGD in Germany and their implications for the German legislation and ethical theory. (shrink)

Germany since 1990 has one of the strictest human embryo protection laws, yet according to the Stem Cell Act of 2002 allows, under strict conditions, the import and use of human embryonic stem cells (hESC) for high priority research goals. The author tries to show how this is taken to be coherent by the parliamentary majority (though not necessarily by the general public) in Germany. In doing so, he firstly looks into the chronicle of the debate in Germany (...) showing its different stages since 1999, then dwells upon the relation between the law and the role of ethics in this issue, and thirdly presents the two fundamentally different positions of the German debate, that is, that the human embryo created for IVF purposes is a human being and stands from its very beginnings under the constitutional principles of respect for, and protection of, human life versus the position that before being implanted the human embryo may become a human being and therefore belongs to the human species only potentially, so that its right to life protection may be assessable over against other high priority goals, such as research aiming at possible help for patients with life-endangering diseases. In spite of the Stem Cell Act of 2002, the debate of the German general public goes on, especially due to the recent EU 6th Research Framework Program which plans to also fund hESC research. (shrink)

Germany is an interesting case with respect to the governance of reprogenetics. It has a strong profile in the technosciences and high aims regarding the global bioeconomy, yet her regulation of human genetics, reproductive medicine and embryo research has for a long time been rather restrictive. German biopolitical exceptionalism has often been explained by reference to Catholicism and the legacy of the Nazi past. The Germans, so goes the common story, have learnt the lessons of history and translated (...) them into unconditional respect for human dignity, which in turn translates into unconditional protection of human life, including the human embryo, and the firm repudiation of any eugenic distinction between ‘life worth to live’ and ‘life not worth to live’. This, however, is not the whole story. Alongside deontological strictness we find another strand of governing body politics and reprogenetics in Germany, the rule-and-exception model, running from the mid-1970s abortion law via the 2002 Stem Cell Act to the 2011 regulation of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. In contrast to the former, that strongly draws on Kant and his concept of human dignity, the latter bears resemblances to Carl Schmitt's concept of state of exception. The article will show that the rule-and-exception model builds the exception into the rule and transforms the meaning and mandate of ethics, namely from safeguarding ethical standards to deciding about the exception. Given that the exception has now tended to become the rule, the question is whether the lessons of history will govern German reprogenetics for much longer. (shrink)

This article aims at demonstrating that the theory of potency developed by Giorgio Agamben lacks a fundamental aspect. The Italian philosopher has pointed out the amphibious nature of potency. However, his analysis does not cover the act, thus failing to observe its amphibious nature. We will demonstrate that this insufficiency lies at the root of several problems –whether ontological, political, aesthetic, ethical, etc.– found in Agamben’s thinking.

Being a pacifist who refrains from lethal violence is considered a praiseworthy commitment but not morally obligatory. One reason for denying that pacifism is morally obligatory is the high cost that would be implied for agents under attack, who cannot defend their own lives. Thus, pacifists are usually seen as lambs between lions and, therefore, pacifism is seen as morally over-demanding. In this paper, I intend to clarify the over-demandingness objection and to show its limits against pacifism. First, I argue (...) that the cost of an act is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to determine its obligatory nature. Second, arguing from an analogy to Batman, I maintain that there is a plausible moral obligation to never use lethal violence against another human being that arises from adopting a specific social role, namely, the leadership of a pacifist movement. (shrink)

The destruction of an embryo must be justified in law. This is to prevent frivolous wastage and to show the respect afforded by the Warnock Report. For example, embryonic destruction during pregnancy is underpinned by the Abortion Act 1967, and embryonic destruction during fertility treatment is regulated by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. However, following the appeal decision in R v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority [2005] 2 A.C. 561, embryos can now be created for a bone (...) marrow tissue match to a sick sibling under the Human Fertility and Embryology Act 1990 according to the subjective desires of the mother. This opens the door to the first example of embryonic destruction on unique social-eugenic grounds with no clear lawful justification. It is argued that these embryos should be afforded a unique destruction provision under an amended version of section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 in light of their ‘social-eugenic’ nature. This would protect the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority from accusations of undercover eugenic practices and reinstate the respect shown towards embryos in law. (shrink)

This article notes differences in legislation in Germany and Great Britain regarding human embryo research and looks for an explanation in their divergent intellectual traditions. Whereas the German Stem Cell Act invokes an anthropological concept of human dignity to ground its ban on using embryos for research, there is no definition of what it means to be human in either the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act or in the advisory Warnock-Report. After studying the differences and providing some (...) philosophical background, the essay distinguishes two notions that are significant for understanding human dignity. It then proposes from a theological point of view a basic understanding within a relational anthropology, and comes to the conclusion that because of continuity in development and their relational constitution, humans embryos should be accepted as human from the moment of conception. (shrink)

This writing is part of a body of reflections about the ‘researching programs’ and ‘categories’ used in philosophy, philology and linguistics to explain human language. Within this framework, several categories like Modell, Vorbild and Paradigm are covered from a descriptive sense according to the ‘Wittgenstein’ research program. From Russell’s conception of language, there is a treatment to the prescriptive aspects of Plato’s ideas and their relation to universals. Then, the universal category in the predicament act and the denotation act are (...) linked proposing their relation with notions such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’. Therefore some concerns, shared by Russell and Wittgenstein about a philosophical grammar, are pointed out for the expression of human understanding. (shrink)

Innovative techniques of developmental biology facilitate the artificial creation of embryo-like entities. This contribution analyses, first, whether certain artificially created embryo-like entities are ‘embryos’ within the meaning of existing statutory law definitions laid down in the Embryo Protection Act, the Stem Cell Act and the Patent Act. These definitions are non-uniform and their interpretation and application with regard to artificially created embryo-like entities is not always conclusive. Accordingly, the legal definitions of the term ‘embryo’ (...) should be harmonised and, thereby, adapted to the state of developmental biology. Any such legislative efforts need to be in conformity with the constitution, primarily with the guarantee of human dignity (Article 1‍(1) of the Basic Law). However, said provision cannot provide guidance to the legislature because the constitutional status of both embryos and embryo-like entities in vitro is highly disputed. It is held that this irresolvable debate is due to a fundamental lack of a widely shared experience that such entities possess a supreme unique value. This article argues that in such a situation it is, in the first instance, for the legislature (i. e. parliament) to determine the legal status of embryos and embryo-like entities in vitro. This argument is based on a particular doctrinal approach according to which the individual right to respect of one’s human dignity arising from Article 1‍(1) BL depends on recognition of the relevant entity as being a ‘human’ or a member of ‘humankind’ respectively. Such recognition has, hitherto, not been accomplished with a view to embryos and embryo-like entities in vitro. Against this backdrop, for the time being, the legislature may determine the legal status of embryos and embryo-like entities in vitro, lay down rules regarding their creation and particular use, and, especially, define the legal term ‘embryo’, albeit within some outer constitutional limits. The article, finally, analyses several elements of, and submits a proposal for, a new legal definition of the term ‘embryo’. (shrink)

A sudden paradigm shift has resulted in governmental measures that greatly impact the scope in which the ethics committees in Germany can perform their task of providing expert opinions for clinical research. The so-called “revaluation” of the Medical Device Law Deutsches Medizinproduktegesetz—MPG) is, in our opinion, not based on sound political and professional judgment. In accordance with the changed regulations, ethics committees are now seen as being sub-organs of the state medical associations or the medical faculties and are therefore official (...) authorities. It follows that the votes of ethics committees are then “sovereign acts” or authoritative measures! However, equality and justice speak against this misleading conclusion and its resulting consequence that an ethics committee’s vote is a sovereign act. This has, in turn, resulted in the public ethics committees obtaining their long-sought goal of having a state-sanctioned monopoly. The private ethics committees are not recognized as being authoritative bodies, nor are they to be seen as such in the future (i.e. such a status has been denied the Freiburg Ethics Commission International (FEKI) in Baden-Württemberg). This political mistake must be corrected, otherwise, conducting clinical research will become increasingly difficult. (shrink)

Rather than occurring abstractly (autonomously), ethical growth occurs in interpersonal relationships (IRs). It requires optimally functioning cognitive processes [attention, working memory (WM), episodic/autobiographical memory (AM), inhibition, flexibility, among others], emotional processes (physical contact, motivation, and empathy), processes surrounding ethical, intimacy, and identity issues, and other psychological processes (self-knowledge, integration, and the capacity for agency). Without intending to be reductionist, we believe that these aspects are essential for optimally engaging in IRs and for the personal constitution. While they are all integrated (...) into our daily life, in research and academic work, it is hard to see how they are integrated. Thus, we need better theoretical frameworks for studying them. That study and integration thereof are undertaken differently depending on different views of what it means to live as a human being. We rely on neuroscientific data to support the chosen theory to offer knowledge to understand human beings and interpersonal relational growth. We should of course note that to describe what makes up the uniqueness of being, acting, and growing as a human person involves something much more profound which requires too, a methodology that opens the way for a theory of the person that responds to the concerns of philosophy and philosophical anthropology from many disciplines and methods (Orón Semper, 2015;Polo, 2015), but this is outside the scope of this study. With these in mind, this article aims to introduce a new explanatory framework, called the Interprocessual-self (IPS), for the neuroscientific findings that allow for a holistic consideration of the previously mentioned processes. Contributing to the knowledge of personal growth and avoiding a reductionist view, we first offer a general description of the research that supports the interrelation between personal virtue in IRs and relevant cognitive, emotional, and ethic-moral processes. This reveals how relationships allow people to relate ethically and grow as persons. We include conceptualizations and descriptions of their neural bases. Secondly, with the IPS model, we explore neuroscientific findings regarding self-knowledge, integration, and agency, all psychological processes that stimulate inner exploration of the self concerning the other. We find that these fundamental conditions can be understood from IPS theory. Finally, we explore situations that involve the integration of two levels, namely the interpersonal one and the social contexts of relationships. (shrink)

The guarantee of human dignity (article 1 paragraph 1 German Basic Law) requires the protection of the embryo’s identity and – in accordance with further requirements of article 2 paragraph 2 sentence 1 German Basic Law – the protection of its physical integrity. Every human being has, even in his earliest, prenatal stage of development, an unconditional right to be and remain a human being, derived from his dignity. In order to protect his right to (...) species-specific development, the embryo must also be protected from any dehumanization. This categorically excludes any mixing of its genetic material with animal genetic material. The self-purpose of the human being, already embedded in the embryo, makes it impossible to create it artificially for any other reason than to induce a pregnancy. It cannot simply be attributed by a third party to another purpose with a normative effect that negates its self-serving-functionality. If the human development potential of the embryo is reduced or destroyed by manipulation, this constitutes an impairment of its right to life (article 2 paragraph 2 sentence 1 1st alternative of the Basic Law), which can be justified neither by research interests nor by therapeutic long-term goals and which must be prohibited by the state in fulfillment of its duty to protect. In addition, the state must create a normative environment conducive to the developmental potential of the embryo. All human embryos, regardless of how they were created, are human beings who have a right to be given the legally secured chance to be born. To this end, embryo donation and surrogate motherhood, for example, must be legally permitted. All manipulative interventions from the outside into the fertilized human egg cell from the time of the nuclear fusion on, which do not already destroy life or development chances, are to be measured against the basic right of physical integrity (article 2 paragraph 2 sentence 1 2nd alternative of the Basic Law). Only life-supporting interventions or interventions beneficial to the health of the embryo are eligible for consent, and even these only to the extent that risks associated with them can be justified. (shrink)

Many people have moral qualms about embryo research, feeling that embryos must deserve some kind of protection, if not so much as is afforded to persons. This paper will show that these qualms serve to camouflage motives that are really prudential, at the cost of also obscuring the real ethical issues at play in the debate concerning embryo research and therapeutic cloning. This in turn leads to fallacious use of the Actions/Omissions Distinction and ultimately neglects the duties (...) that we have towards future persons. (shrink)

Many people have moral qualms about embryo research, feeling that embryos must deserve some kind of protection, if not so much as is afforded to persons. This paper will show that these qualms serve to camouflage motives that are really prudential, at the cost of also obscuring the real ethical issues at play in the debate concerning embryo research and therapeutic cloning. This in turn leads to fallacious use of the Actions/Omissions Distinction and ultimately neglects the duties (...) that we have towards future persons. (shrink)

In Canada, the Assisted Human Reproduction Act received royal assent on 29 March 2004. The approach proposed by the federal government responds to Canadians’ strong desire for an enforceable legislative framework in the field of reproduction technologies through criminal law. As a result of the widening gap between the rapid pace of technological change and governing legislation, a distinct need was perceived to create a regulatory framework to guide decisions regarding reproductive technologies.In this article the three main topics covered in (...) the new legislation are commented on: cloning, germline therapy, and purchase of gametes and embryos. Some important issues also covered in the new legislation, such as privacy and access to information, data protection, identity of donors, and inspection, will not be addressed. (shrink)

The review system on research with human participants in the Netherlands is characterised as a decentralised controlled and integrated peer review system. It consists of an independent governmental body, the Central Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (or Central Committee), which regulates the review of research proposals by accredited Medical Research Ethics Committees (MRECs). The legal basis was founded in 1999 with the Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act. The review system is a decentralised arrangement since most research proposal are (...) reviewed by the 30 accredited MRECs in the country. It is a controlled system in which the Central Committee is responsible for the accreditation and oversight of the MRECs and can make legally binding directives for these committees. The assessment of research proposals is an integrated peer review process in which all documents of the research file are reviewed by experts in one committee only. A small number of research proposals are assessed by the Central Committee and not by accredited MRECs. These proposals are on specific research categories such as gene therapy, cell therapy and embryo research. The review of research with surplus human embryos is regulated separately in the Embryos Act. The Central Committee provides support to the accredited MRECs and to researchers and sponsors. It is currently developing an internet portal to reduce the bureaucracy and make the review process more efficient and transparent. The Central Committee stimulates confidence on medical research in society by providing a public trial registry with core data on reviewed research proposals. (shrink)

One of the most influential philosophical arguments in favour of the permissibility of abortion is Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, presented in ‘A Defense of Abortion’. Its appeal for pro-choice advocates lies in Thomson’s granting that the fetus is a person with equivalent moral status to any other human being, and yet demonstrating—to those who accept her reasoning—that abortion is still permissible. In her argument, Thomson draws heavily on the parable of the Good Samaritan, arguing that gestating a fetus in (...) some circumstances is what she calls a Good Samaritan act, and claiming that we are not morally required to be Good Samaritans. Here, I argue that Thomson has subverted the parable to justify an action that is the antithesis of its meaning. I contend that Christians are required to be Good Samaritans, and explain that for Christians, this entails abortion is impermissible in all circumstances. Further, I argue that the parable shows the fetus is our neighbour in need of our mercy and assistance, and consequently Christians should be actively involved in helping to ensure the unborn are protected, whether they are fetuses in danger of induced abortion or miscarriage, or surplus frozen embryos. (shrink)

The availability of embryonic stem (ES) cells isolated from human blastocysts may open novel avenues for medical treatment of otherwise incurable diseases. Yet the generation of human ES cells requires the destruction of early human embryos. This confronts us with the moral problem of whether it is justifiable to sacrifice human life in order to treat other human life. This article outlines the development of the German debate about research with ES cells and explicates the arguments that are central (...) to that debate with respect to the aims and means of research with ES cells. With regard to the means, the isolation of ES cells from human embryos raises the question of the moral status of the human embryo. A restrictive position acknowledges the human dignity of the embryo in its very early stage of development and claims that the embryo’s life must be protected accordingly. In contrast, a gradualist position acknowledges human dignity, and therefore the full level of protection, only when the embryo has reached a certain stage of development. In addition, the intentions behind the generation of human embryos, i.e. exclusively for research purposes, and the mode of generating them, i.e. by nuclear transfer technology, have strong ethical relevance in the German debate. Based on these results, the ethical reasoning underlying the draft of a Stem Cell Act recently passed by the German Parliament is outlined. (shrink)

The paper discusses the practice of genetic counseling and elective abortion in the German Democratic Republic. Keywords: elective abortion, embryo transfer, in vitro fertilization, protection of human life, reproductive ethics, German Democratic Republic, bioethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

The present article is aimed at substantiating the differentiation of the criminal procedure involving the disabled persons as well as at assessing some standards of protection of rights of the latter participants of the procedure, established in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. The provisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, given in the present article, enabled generalizing the following two aspects. The first aspect covers the substantiation of the criminal procedure relating (...) to the criminal acts that the physically or mentally disabled persons are suspected (accused) of and application of compulsory medical measures. Specific form of criminal procedure – procedure of application of compulsory medical measures – institution of criminal procedure, covering several closely interdependent legal norms, establishing particular legal specifics of investigation of criminal act and hearing, is established in the separate structural part (Chapter XXIX) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Moreover, though the criminal procedure relating to the acts that the physically or mentally disabled persons are suspected (accused) of is not governed in one place of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is deemed to be a specific form of criminal procedure, since it constitutes particular related legal norms of criminal procedure, determining the exceptions of the general criminal procedure. The second aspect, related to the constitutional doctrine concerning the equality principle, enabled substantiating the specific legal regulation, established and applied to the disabled participants (suspected persons, accused persons, witnesses, aggrieved persons) in the Law on Criminal Procedure. (shrink)

Debates on the moral status of human embryos have been highly and continuously controversial. For many, these controversies have turned into a fruitless scholastical endeavor. However, recent developments and insights in cellular biology have cast further doubt on one of the core points of dissent: the argument from potentiality. In this article we want to show in a nonscholastical way why this argument cannot possibly survive. Getting once more into the intricacies of status debates is a must in our eyes. (...) Not merely intellectual coherence but the standing and self-understanding of current stem cell research might profit from finally taking leave of the argument from potentiality. (shrink)

In their self-understanding, expert committees solely draw on scientific knowledge to provide policy advice. However, we try to show, first, on the basis of material related to the German Radiation Protection Commission that much of their work consists in active model building. Second, expert advice is judged by criteria that diverge from standards used for judging epistemic research. In particular, the commitment to generality or universality is replaced by the criterion of specificity, and the value of precision gives (...) way to epistemic robustness. Third, non-epistemic considerations are included in the reasoning—albeit hesitantly. Manageability and social robustness, understood as compatibility with widespread value attitudes in society, affect the content of the recommendations. (shrink)

By the example of deafness the article examines the ethical problems that arise when preimplantation genetic diagnosis is used for the intentional heredity of genetic defects. In the first two sections the relevant rules of the German Embryo Protection Law and the motives of deaf couples to desire a handicapped child are explained. Subsequently, it is asked whether the positive selection of genetic defects can harm or otherwise wrong the future child. Moreover, a possible duty of prospective (...) parents to prefer an embryo which will most probably experience a higher quality of life is discussed. Finally, the question is raised whether parents have a right to refuse medical treatment that may alleviate their child's handicap. As a result, it is argued that neither a legal ban on the positive selection of handicapped embryos nor compulsory treatment of deaf children are ethically justified. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the availability of financial bounties and anonymous reporting channels impact individuals’ general reporting intentions of questionable acts and whether the availability of financial bounties will prompt people to reveal their identities. The recent passage of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 creates a financial bounty for whistle-blowers. In addition, SOX requires companies to provide employees with an anonymous reporting channel option. It is unclear of the (...) effect of these provisions as they relate to whistle-blowing. Our results indicate that a financial bounty has the potential to increase participants’ propensity to report questionable acts and their willingness to reveal their identities when reporting, but the availability of an anonymous reporting channel does not affect participants’ propensity to report questionable acts. These findings could potentially help corporate management, government policy makers and accounting researchers to assess the effectiveness of their internal compliance programs and help determine if financial bounties in the private sector could encourage whistle-blowing. (shrink)

Ethics and legal design currently seem to be involved in a “vortex of temporality” (Jürgen Habermas), which, according to the understanding of many, integrates them into a modern way of life. Examples are the protection of life (Embryo Protection Act and abortion, reinterpretation of Article 1 of the Basic Law in the Maunz/Dürig commentary by Herdegen), the promotion of plural family forms and sexual relationship worlds (“marriage for all“, life stage partnership), assisted dying (judgment of the Federal (...) Constitutional Court on assisted suicide). Apparently, it is always about the dismantling of traditional taboos and the establishment of legal regulations that are intended to correspond to a new ethical consciousness and plural ideological worlds. The discussion in ethics theory and legal theory in this situation has agreed on a model of the gravitational fields of liberal self-execution, in which cultural development in ethics and law should find its moral support and at the same time its legal ethical dynamics. According to this understanding, a basic consensus is maintained in the execution of liberal debates (also on moral and legal questions). It is articulated in human rights principles, which themselves must be discussed again in open conversation in their meaning, but which at the same time bring themselves to the fore as irrefutable exactly in this social process. Theological ethics maintains a certain distance from this interpretation. The understanding of freedom must then be structured for the lifestyle of society in such a way that the one-sidedness of individualism and abstract overemphasis, even exaggeration, is avoided. The aim is to integrate social integration, reference to natural framework conditions and realistic border awareness in ethics and law. Moral theology can be based in this on the further development of social science. (shrink)

This paper reviews the AWARE(TM) software distributed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). The program is designed to facilitate the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license renewal process for US hydropower installations. The discussion reviews the regulatory, legal, and social contexts that give rise to the creation and distribution of AWARE(TM). The principal legal impetus for AWARE(TM) is the Electric Consumer Protection Act (ECPA) of 1986 that directs FERC to give equal consideration to power and non-power resources during (...) relicensing. The software is reviewed in this paper from several perspectives including those of natural resource economics, systems modeling, and the social context within which FERC licensing decisions are made. We examine both the software and its underlying methodology and find significant problems with each. Because of its flaws, AWARE(TM) does little to further ECPA's equal consideration requirement. We find that the conservation and restoration impact of ECPA for US fisheries could be seriously hampered by the widespread use of AWARE(TM). (shrink)

The Data Protection Act 1998 presents a number of significant challenges to data controllers in the health sector. To assist data controllers in understanding their obligations under the act, the Information Commissioner has published guidance, The Use and Disclosure of Health Data, which is reproduced here. The guidance deals, among other things, with the steps that must be taken to obtain patient data fairly, the implied requirements of the act to use anonymised or psuedonymised data where possible, an exemption (...) applicable principally to records based research, the right of patients to object to the processing of their data, and the interface of the act and the common law duty of confidence. (shrink)

Genetic testing has familial implications. Counsellors find themselves in (moral) conflict between medical confidentiality (towards the patient) and a potential right or even duty to warn at-risk relatives. Legal regulations vary between countries. English literature about German law is scarce. We reviewed the literature of relevant legal cases, focussing on German law, according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines. This article aims to familiarise counsellors with their responsibilities, compare the situation between countries and (...) point out legally unresolved areas.According to the German Genetic Diagnostics Act (Gendiagnostikgesetz) in case of an ‘avoidable or treatable’ genetic disorder, geneticists ought to confine themselves to the obligated advice to the patient. Whether a breach of the duty of confidentiality can be justified in exceptional cases by ‘necessity as justification’ for actively informing relatives at risk remains legally unclear. In case of a ‘neither avoidable nor treatable’ genetic disease, geneticists should also refrain from actively informing relatives as the justifiable state of emergency does not permit to break the duty of confidentiality. (shrink)

The US 1992 Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) strengthens the reach of the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) to US citizens alleging claims of torture and/or extrajudicial killings that occur abroad, but only if the plaintiffs were US citizens at the time of the criminal acts. Should the later-in-time statute, which gives effect to the United Nations Convention against Torture and extends remedies under the ATCA, be amended to apply to those given political asylum in this country from (...) the moment of their entry? Is not the limbo status of victims given haven in the USA but not automatic citizenship, victims who rightly need resolution of brutal facts which occasioned rupture with their country of origin, a situation that cries for more precise remedy? This note explores this issue as raised by the case of Myroslava Gongadze, the widow of slain political journalist Georghy Gongadze in the Ukraine in September 2000. Only three of the perpetrators, policemen who say they followed orders, were put on trial in 2007–2008. Those who allegedly gave the orders for the killing continue to evade justice. (shrink)

Taking its lead from analyses of gift exchange by Marcel Mauss and Marshall Sahlins as well as of contact by Charles Long and Jonathan Z Smith, this article elaborates a theory of the exchange, among dominant social subjects, of representations of their subjected proximate others in order to rectify the crisis precipitated by contact with otherness that threatens their claims to autonomy, authority, homogeneity, and universality. Specifically it situates the polemical exchange of representations of women among Friedrich Schlegel, G W (...) F Hegel, and Karl Gutzkow as exemplary German male bourgeois efforts to rectify the crises to subject formation generated, in part, by the emergence of gender-coded bifurcated bourgeois society and signaled by the Kantian and French Revolutions. The public dissemination of apotropaic representations screened the dependence upon proximate others by, and determined the positions among, exchange participants as well as maintained structures of domination. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAm 1. Februar 2010 ist das Gendiagnostikgesetz in Kraft getreten. Die Debatte um einige Regelungsbereiche, wie beispielsweise das Neugeborenenscreening, reißt nicht ab. Ein Aspekt des Gesetzes ist im Rahmen der Debatte um die Präimplantationsdiagnostik in Deutschland unter neuen Vorzeichen zu diskutieren: Das – international bislang einzigartige – Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik so genannter spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen, die erst nach der Vollendung des 18. Lebensjahres ausbrechen. In diesem Beitrag möchten wir Hinweise zur differenzierten Diskussion dieser in § 15 GenDG bestimmten Verbotsnorm liefern. (...) Obgleich Argumente, insbesondere das Recht auf Nichtwissen des geborenen Kindes, für ein solches Verbot sprechen, kommen wir aufgrund der medizinischen Sachlage und nach einer Analyse der Pro- und Kontraargumente aus ethischer und rechtlicher Sicht zu dem Schluss, dass ein generelles Verbot der pränatalen Diagnostik spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen im Sinne der Zielsetzung womöglich insuffizient ist sowie in der Begründung Inkonsistenzen zum bereits bestehenden Regelwerk aufweist, und lenken daher den Blick auf unter Umständen bessere Alternativen. (shrink)

It is essential to engage the public in conservation measures to conserve insects. We investigate the Protection Motivation Theory, as well as knowledge, attitudes, and sociodemographic variables as predictors of willingness to donate and actual donations to insect conservation for a representative German sample. The PMT subcomponents severity, self-efficacy, and response efficacy, as well as attitudes toward insects, income, and education level, significantly predicted WTD. In contrast, severity, response barriers, age, gender, and the WTD significantly influenced actual donations. (...) Overall, components of the PMT have high predictive power for both dependent variables. Our results suggest that an intention-behavior gap exists between the intention to donate and the actual donation toward insect conservation. Measures to increase WTD and actual donations for insect conservation are discussed. (shrink)

In the German legislation on embryo protection, the scope of protection is defined by its membership to the human species and by the embryo’s inherent potential to develop into a born human being. Both criteria refer to well-known bioethical arguments: the argument from species membership and the potentiality argument. With recent progresses in biotechnology it has, however, become possible manipulate the development potential of human embryos and to blur the boundaries between species. Hence, we must (...) ask, whether both criteria (and with them the arguments) can still hold their ground in bioethics and biomedical law. In my article, I argue, that the aforementioned biotechnological techniques do not require to abandon the arguments from species membership and potentiality. There is, however, a need to clarify what the criteria of species membership and inherent potentiality actually refer to in the relevant laws, i. e. the embryo protection law and the stem cell law. (shrink)