Math difficulties manifest across various domain-specific and domain-general abilities. However, the existing cognitive profile of MD is incomplete and thus not applicable in typical settings such as schools or clinics. So far, no review has applied inclusion criteria according to DSM or ICD, summarized domain-specific abilities or examined the validity of response time scores for MD identification. Based upon stringent clinical criteria, the current meta-analysis included 34 studies which compared cognitive performances of a group with MD and a group without (...) MD. Criteria according to DSM and ICD were applied to identify MD. Effect sizes for 22 abilities were estimated and separated by their level and type of scoring. A cognitive profile of MD was identified, characterized by distinct weaknesses in: computation, number sense, and visual-spatial short-term storage [AC]. No particular strength was found. Severity of MD, group differences in reading performance and IQ did not significantly moderate the results. Further analyses revealed that effects are larger when dealing with numbers or number words than with quantities, MD is not accompanied by any weakness in abilities typically assigned to reading, and weaknesses in visual-spatial short-term storage emphasize the notion that number and space are interlinked. The need for high-quality studies investigating domain-general abilities is discussed. (shrink)

This Element provides a comprehensive introduction to contemporary theories of mental content. After clarifying central concepts and identifying the questions that dominate the current debate, it presents and discusses the principal accounts of the nature of mental content (or mental representation), which include causal, informational, teleological and structuralist approaches, alongside the phenomenal intentionality approach and the intentional stance theory. Additionally, it examines anti-representationalist accounts which question either the existence or the explanatory relevance of mental content. Finally, the Element concludes by (...) considering some recent developments in the debate about mental content, specifically the “explanatory turn” and its implications for questions about representations in basic cognitive systems and the representational character of current empirical theories of cognition. (shrink)

Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher-level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower-level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher-level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. Some (...) truthmaker theorists—most prominently David Armstrong—have tried to solve this puzzle by arguing that these entities are ‘an ontological free lunch’, i.e. real existents that are still ‘no addition of being’. This answer is prima facie attractive, but I argue in this paper that the standard approaches to truthmaking—modal theories and grounding theories—are unable to vindicate the doctrine of the ontological free lunch, and thus fail to solve the problem of higher-level entities. Fortunately, there is a non-standard account of truthmaking available, the reductive explanation account, which succeeds where the standard approaches fail. (shrink)

Die alte Frage, wie Menschen zusammen leben wollen, muss nach Kopernikus neu gestellt werden. Anthropologie und Kosmologie verweisen aufeinander, und doch fügen sie sich nicht in einen gemeinsamen Erklärungsrahmen. Das zeigt sich unter anderem an den Erörterungen über den freien Willen und der daran hängenden Möglichkeit der Moral. In der Überzeugung, dass wahrheitsfähiges Wissen nur in den Naturwissenschaften zu erlangen sei, überschreitet man deren Grenzen. Dieses Buch will, anknüpfend an Kants Kritik der dogmatischen Denkungsart, einen Beitrag dazu leisten, diese einengenden (...) Vorgaben zu überwinden. (shrink)

Teleosemantic theories of representation are often criticized as being “too liberal”, i.e. as categorizing states as representations which are not representational at all. Recently, a powerful version of this objection has been put forth by Tyler Burge. Focusing on perception, Burge defends the claim that all teleosemantic theories apply too broadly, thereby missing what is distinctive about representation. Contra Burge, I will argue in this paper that there is a teleosemantic account of perceptual states that does not fall prey to (...) this problem, and that we can arrive at this account by combining some of Burge’s insights with a producer-oriented version of teleosemantics. The resulting theory turns out to be attractive and perfectly coherent. By contrast, the coherence of Burge’s own anti-teleosemantic approach becomes quite doubtful under closer examination—or so I will argue. (shrink)

According to standard teleosemantics, intentional states are selectional states. This claim is put forward not as a conceptual analysis, but as a ‘theoretical reduction’—an a posteriori hypothesis analogous to ‘water = H2O’. Critics have tried to show that this meta-theoretical conception of teleosemantics leads to unacceptable consequences. In this paper, I argue that there is indeed a fundamental problem with the water/H2O analogy, as it is usually construed, and that teleosemanticists should therefore reject it. Fortunately, there exists a viable alternative (...) to the water/H2O model which avoids the fundamental problem, while explaining the a posteriori character of teleosemantics equally well. (shrink)

Band 1. Prolegomena -- Band 2. Im Anfang erschafft Gott Himmel und Erde und den Menschen.

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV.

The compatibilism debate revolves around the question whether moral responsibility and free will are compatible with determinism. Prima facie, this seems to be a substantial issue. But according to the triviality objection, the disagreement is merely verbal: compatibilists and incompatibilists, it is maintained, are talking past each other, since they use the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” in different senses. In this paper I argue, first, that the triviality objection is indeed a formidable one and that the standard replies (...) to it are unconvincing. This, however, does not mean that the objection succeeds. Starting with the debate about moral responsibility, I attempt to show that there is an account of moral responsibility which enables us to defend the compatibilism debate against the charge of triviality—namely, the normative conception of moral responsibility. If “moral responsibility” is defined in normative terms, then we cannot distinguish between a compatibilist and an incompatibilist sense of “moral responsibility”, because such a disambiguation would be inconsistent with the essential action-guiding force of normative expressions. Finally, I examine how the normative conception of moral responsibility can help us to defend the free will debate against the triviality objection and draw some general conclusions. (shrink)

Desires, or directive representations, are central components of human and animal minds. Nevertheless, desires are largely neglected in current debates about the naturalization of representational content. Most naturalists seem to assume that some version of the standard teleological approach, which identifies the content of a desire with a specific kind of effect that the desire has the function of producing, will turn out to be correct. In this paper I argue, first, that this common assumption is unjustified, since the standard (...) approach is in fact deeply problematic. Secondly, I propose an alternative account of the content of desires which, while generating plausible and determinate content ascriptions, avoids the main problem that plagues the standard approach, and is also preferable on other grounds. (shrink)

An integrated approach of the topics ‘population’, ‘energy’ and ‘climate’ results in conclusions contrary to public opinion. Population growth will lead to disaster ten times faster than global warming. 2.5 billion people in the poor countries account for a population growth of one billion every 12 years. Fertility rates decrease with increasing gross domestic products (GDPs). Increasing GDPs correlate with increasing energy consumption. Wind power and solar energy are too expensive for the poor countries. Low-price energy can only be produced (...) with coal, gas, oil and uranium. Therefore, many more coal-fired power stations and nuclear reactors need to be built and hopefully population growth will slow down. Once population is stabilized environmental issues can be addressed. (shrink)

In this chapter, I show that there is at least one crucial, non-short, argument, which does not involve arguments about spatiotemporality, why Kant’s subjectivism about the possibility of knowledge, argued in the Transcendental Deduction, must lead to idealism. This has to do with the fact that given the implications of the discursivity thesis, namely, that the domain of possible determination of objects is characterised by limitation, judgements of experience can never reach the completely determined individual, i.e. the thing in itself (...) or the unlimited real, but only objects as objects of possible experience. As such, it can be shown by reference to a key argument from Kant, that Hegel’s famous criticism that Kant is not licensed, on the basis of his core arguments concerning the original-synthetic unity of apperception, to restrict our knowledge to appearances, is mistaken on purely systematic grounds. More specifically, I argue that idealism follows already from the constraints that the use of the categories, in particular the categories of quality, places on the very conceivability of things in themselves. My claim is that, although it is not only possible but also necessary to think things in themselves, it does not follow that by merely thinking them we have a full grasp of the nature of things in themselves, as some important commentators claim we have. We must therefore distinguish between two kinds of conceiving of things in themselves: conceiving in the standard sense of ‘forming the notion of’, and conceiving in the narrow sense of ‘having a determinate intellectual grasp’. So although we must be able notionally to think things in themselves, as the grounds of their appearances, we cannot even conceive, through pure concepts, of how they are in themselves in any determinate, even if merely intellectual, sense. To put it differently, we cannot have a positive conception of things in themselves (this is in line with Kant’s distinction between noumena in the negative and positive senses; cf. B307–9). For support, I resort to a much overlooked chapter in the Critique, concerning the transcendental Ideal, where Kant discusses what it is for a thing to be a thing in itself proper, namely, something that is thoroughly determined. This concerns the real ontological conditions of things, which are not satisfied by the modal categories alone, namely, their existence conditions. I claim that the chief reason why, given Kant’s view of determinative judgement, we cannot determine a thing in itself is because of two connected reasons: (1) a thing in itself is already fully determined and therefore not further determinable and (2) we cannot possibly determine all of the thing’s possible determinations. In this context, I also discuss the notion of material (not: empirical) synthesis—of which Kant speaks in the chapter on the transcendental Ideal—which must be presupposed as the ground of the formal a priori synthesis that grounds possible experience. This material synthesis, which is an idea of reason that defines a thing as thoroughly determined with regard to all of its possible predicates and has mere regulative status, can by implication not be determined by the forms of the understanding, which synthesise only a limited set of predicates. As a result, given this definition of ‘thing in itself’, any object (appearance) as at best44 a limited set of determinations of the thing can never be numerically identical to the thing in itself as thoroughly determined individual. This undercuts a standard assumption about the identity relation between appearances and things in themselves in many contemporary interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism. (shrink)

Within the highly organized nuclear structure, specific nuclear domains (ND10) are defined by accumulations of proteins that can be interferon-upregulated, implicating ND10 as sites of a nuclear defense mechanism.Compatible with such a mechanism is the deposition of herpesvirus, adenovirus, and papovavirus genomes at the periphery of ND10. However, these DNA viruses begin their transcription at ND10 and consequently initiate replication at these sites, suggesting that viruses have evolved ways to circumvent this potential cellular defense and exploit it. Other ND10-associated proteins (...) belong to ubiquitin-related pathways. These findings, together with the accumulation of various overexpressed cellular and viral proteins, suggest that ND10 function as nuclear dumps or as nuclear depots. Consistent with the recruitment or deposition of various proteins and viral genomes adjacent to ND10, ND10 themselves may only be protein accumulations at specific but as yet undefined nuclear deposition sites. The concept of specific nuclear deposition sites may explain the juxtaposition of various nuclear bodies and allows testable predictions about a potential supramolecular regulatory mechanism whereby proteins are selectively segregated or released by global changes induced in nuclear functions such as viral infections, stress, or hormonal induction. BioEssays 20:660–667, 1998.© 1998 John Wiley & Sons Inc. (shrink)

Within the highly organized nuclear structure, specific nuclear domains (ND10) are defined by accumulations of proteins that can be interferon-upregulated, implicating ND10 as sites of a nuclear defense mechanism.Compatible with such a mechanism is the deposition of herpesvirus, adenovirus, and papovavirus genomes at the periphery of ND10. However, these DNA viruses begin their transcription at ND10 and consequently initiate replication at these sites, suggesting that viruses have evolved ways to circumvent this potential cellular defense and exploit it. Other ND10-associated proteins (...) belong to ubiquitin-related pathways. These findings, together with the accumulation of various overexpressed cellular and viral proteins, suggest that ND10 function as nuclear dumps or as nuclear depots. Consistent with the recruitment or deposition of various proteins and viral genomes adjacent to ND10, ND10 themselves may only be protein accumulations at specific but as yet undefined nuclear deposition sites. The concept of specific nuclear deposition sites may explain the juxtaposition of various nuclear bodies and allows testable predictions about a potential supramolecular regulatory mechanism whereby proteins are selectively segregated or released by global changes induced in nuclear functions such as viral infections, stress, or hormonal induction. BioEssays 20:660–667, 1998.© 1998 John Wiley & Sons Inc. (shrink)

This commentary argues that, in discussing the racial and cultural identities of cinematic representations of humanoid AI robots, nuances and differentiations are beneficial. It suggests that the essay on which the present text comments does not sufficiently acknowledge the range of identities found in AI films, in particular in Alex Garland's Ex Machina.

Nietzsche gilt als faszinierender Philosoph, der das Denken zu einer gefährlichen Sache, zu einem Abenteuer erklärt und der den/die Leser*in verlockt, sich auf das Wagnis seines Denkens einzulassen. Philosophie erscheint nicht als abstrakte Angelegenheit, sondern als eine zutiefst persönliche Auseinandersetzung, die das Leben des/der Einzelnen verwandeln soll, selbst um den Preis seiner möglichen Zerstörung. Welche Bedeutung aber hat das gefährliche Moment innerhalb von Nietzsches Philosophie für den/die Einzelne*n - und welche für die Gesellschaft? Und wie weit darf man in Selbst- (...) und Fremdgefährdung gehen? Diesen Fragen geht die vorliegende Arbeit nach, wobei die Interpretation von Nietzsches Denken eingerahmt wird von zwei rezeptionsgeschichtlichen Untersuchungen: Von Beginn seiner Wirkung bis heute wurde Nietzsche als der gefährliche Philosoph par excellence verstanden. Inwieweit er glorifiziert, vereinnahmt oder verurteilt wird, sagt aber nicht zuletzt einiges über die Rezipierenden selbst aus und gibt Antwort auf die Frage, wieviel gefährliches Denken wir in einer Gesellschaft für zumutbar halten. Ein Einblick in die frühe und späte Nietzscherezeption zeigt dem/der Leser*in die Bandbreite an Reaktionen von Verherrlichung bis Verdammung, die Nietzsches Philosophie bis heute provoziert. Die Autorin Natalie Schulte arbeitet am philosophischen Seminar in Freiburg. Sie hat an der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Fach Philosophie promoviert. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Untersuchung ist eine Auseinandersetzung mit der kausalen Handlungstheorie. Der These, dass Handlungen entweder unmittelbar durch einen Akteur oder durch seine mentalen Zustande verursacht werden, wird entgegengehalten, dass bisher keine Handlungstheorie vorliegt, die dieses kausale Verhaltnis zu belegen vermag und dass es auch bisher in der Philosophie des Geistes keinen Ansatz gibt, der erklart wie mentale Verursachung moglich ist. Eine Alternative wird in einer Handlungstheorie gefunden, der eine monistische Ontologie zugrunde liegt. Im ihrem Zentrum steht die Person. Personsein wird (...) als die Erfahrung der Einheit von Mentalem und Physischem im Handeln gedeutet. Das Verhaltnis von Akteur zur Handlung wird daher als ein normatives und nicht als ein kausales aufgefasst.". (shrink)

A response to Lindsay Craig's essay, The So-Called Extended Synthesis and Population Genetics.

Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart invites readers to embark on a new journey into a land of rationality that differs from the familiar territory of cognitive science and economics. Traditional views of rationality tend to see decision makers as possessing superhuman powers of reason, limitless knowledge, and all of eternity in which to ponder choices. To understand decisions in the real world, we need a different, more psychologically plausible notion of rationality, and this book provides it. It is about (...) fast and frugal heuristics--simple rules for making decisions when time is pressing and deep thought an unaffordable luxury. These heuristics can enable both living organisms and artificial systems to make smart choices, classifications, and predictions by employing bounded rationality. But when and how can such fast and frugal heuristics work? Can judgments based simply on one good reason be as accurate as those based on many reasons? Could less knowledge even lead to systematically better predictions than more knowledge? Simple Heuristics explores these questions, developing computational models of heuristics and testing them through experiments and analyses. It shows how fast and frugal heuristics can produce adaptive decisions in situations as varied as choosing a mate, dividing resources among offspring, predicting high school drop out rates, and playing the stock market. As an interdisciplinary work that is both useful and engaging, this book will appeal to a wide audience. It is ideal for researchers in cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology, and cognitive science, as well as in economics and artificial intelligence. It will also inspire anyone interested in simply making good decisions. (shrink)

The well-known proposal to consider the Lüders-von Neumann measurement as a non-classical extension of probability conditionalization is further developed. The major results include some new concepts like the different grades of compatibility, the objective conditional probabilities which are independent of the underlying state and stem from a certain purely algebraic relation between the events, and an axiomatic approach to quantum mechanics. The main axioms are certain postulates concerning the conditional probabilities and own intrinsic probabilistic interpretations from the very beginning. A (...) Jordan product is derived for the observables, and the consideration of composite systems leads to operator algebras on the Hilbert space over the complex numbers, which is the standard model of quantum mechanics. The paper gives an expository overview of the results presented in a series of recent papers by the author. For the first time, the complete approach is presented as a whole in a single paper. Moreover, since the mathematical proofs are already available in the original papers, the present paper can dispense with the mathematical details and maximum generality, thus addressing a wider audience of physicists, philosophers or quantum computer scientists. (shrink)