The contrast between the two approaches alluded to in the title has gained a certain prominence in our own day. With the knowledge of hindsight it will be of interest therefore to study its incidence in an earlier period, in the writings of Whewell and Mill, Which may thus yield added significance for a later generation. Right at the start there is a difficulty. Not all inductivists agree on their principles, or their interpretation of the logic of scientific reasoning, and (...) the same is true of deductivism, and the differences can therefore be discussed only in connection with individual writers. When this is done, we do find moreover some considerable variations in the treatment of their respective doctrines by the members of each of our two schools. To define these differences, we need a finer structure of elements of classification, indicative of criteria for the acceptance of scientific hypotheses. (shrink)
A demarcation between kant's general metaphysics (transcendental principles) and his special metaphysics is attempted, through a discussion of kant's three accounts of lawlikeness, 'transcendental', 'empirical' and 'metaphysical'. the distinctions are defended via a number of 'indicators' in kant's writings, and the 'looseness of fit' between the different types of lawlikeness is discussed.
Gerd Buchdahl; XIV—The Relation Between ‘Understanding’ and ‘Reason’ in the Architectonic of Kant's Philosophy1, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume.
I. Reputed shortcomings of Descartes as philosopher of science.II ‘Knowledge’ in mathematics and in physics. The ‘ontological’ postulates of Descartes's philosophy and philosophy of physics.III. The ‘foundations of dynamics’: ‘Newton's First Law of Motion’ and its status.IV. Descartes's conception of ‘hypothesis’: the competing claims of the ideal of the a priori in physics and the conception of retroductive inference. V. Descartes's notion of ‘analysis’. The distinction between ‘procedure’ and ‘inference’. The notion of ‘induction’ and ‘understanding through models’: ‘Snell's Law of (...) Refraction’. (shrink)
Kant maintains that in face of the failure of the traditional arguments for the existence of God it is necessary to provide an entirely fresh centre of gravity for the notion of religious consciousness. To explicate Kant's critique this paper develops, as a special hermeneutic device, the idea of a kind of Husserlian reduction and realization', in terms of which the various uses of Kant's concept of thing' or object' are given a new interpretation,using this to provide a novel approach (...) to the whole structure of the Kantian world. (shrink)
