We explore the intimate connection between spacetime geometry and electrodynamics. This link is already implicit in the constitutive relations between the field strengths and excitations, which are an essential part of the axiomatic structure of electromagnetism, clearly formulated via integration theory and differential forms. We review the foundations of classical electromagnetism based on charge and magnetic flux conservation, the Lorentz force and the constitutive relations. These relations introduce the conformal part of the metric and allow the study of (...) electrodynamics for specific spacetime geometries. At the foundational level, we discuss the possibility of generalizing the vacuum constitutive relations, by relaxing the fixed conditions of homogeneity and isotropy, and by assuming that the symmetry properties of the electro-vacuum follow the spacetime isometries. The implications of this extension are briefly discussed in the context of the intimate connection between electromagnetism and the geometry of spacetime. (shrink)

We suggest possible approaches to point-free geometry based on multi-valued logic. The idea is to assume as primitives the notion of a region together with suitable vague predicates whose meaning is geometrical in nature, e.g. ‘close’, ‘small’, ‘contained’. Accordingly, some first-order multi-valued theories are proposed. We show that, given a multi-valued model of one of these theories, by a suitable definition of point and distance we can construct a metrical space in a natural way. Taking into account that interesting (...) metrical approaches to geometry exist, this looks to be promising for a point-free foundation of the notion of space. We hope also that this way to face point-free geometry provides a tool to illustrate the passage from a naïve and ‘qualitative’ approach to geometry to the ‘quantitative’ approach of advanced science. (shrink)

Tim Maudlin sets out a completely new method for describing the geometrical structure of spaces, and thus a better mathematical tool for describing and understanding space-time. He presents a historical review of the development of geometry and topology, and then his original Theory of Linear Structures.

In this paper we examine the contributions of the Italian geometrical school to the Foundations of Projective Geometry. Starting from De Paolis' work we discuss some papers by Segre, Peano, Veronese, Fano and Pieri. In particular we try to show how a totally abstract and general point of view was clearly adopted by the Italian scholars many years before the publication of Hilbert's Grundlagen.We are particularly interested in the interrelations between the Italian and the German schools (mainly the (...) influence of Staudt's and Klein's works). We try also to understand the reason of the steady decline of the Italian school during the twentieth century. (shrink)

§30. Significance of Desargues's theorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 CHAPTER VI. PASCAL'S THEOREM. §31. ...

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

ArgumentAccording to Hermann von Helmholtz, free mobility of bodies seemed to be an essential condition of geometry. This free mobility can be interpreted either as matter of fact, as a convention, or as a precondition making measurements in geometry possible. Since Henri Poincaré defined conventions as principles guided by experience, the question arises in which sense experiential data can serve as the basis for the constitution of geometry. Helmholtz considered muscular activity to be the basis on which (...) the form of space could be construed. Yet, due to the problem of illusion inherent in the subject’s self-assessment of muscular activity, this solution yielded new difficulties, in that if the manifold is abstracted from rigid bodies which serve as empirical justification of the geometrical notion of space, then illusionary bodies will produce fictive manifolds. The present article is meant to disentangle these difficulties. (shrink)

Geometry defines entities that can be physically realized in space, and our knowledge of abstract geometry may therefore stem from our representations of the physical world. Here, we focus on Euclidean geometry, the geometry historically regarded as “natural”. We examine whether humans possess representations describing visual forms in the same way as Euclidean geometry – i.e., in terms of their shape and size. One hundred and twelve participants from the U.S. (age 3–34 years), and 25 (...) participants from the Amazon (age 5–67 years) were asked to locate geometric deviants in panels of 6 forms of variable orientation. Participants of all ages and from both cultures detected deviant forms defined in terms of shape or size, while only U.S. adults drew distinctions between mirror images (i.e. forms differing in “sense”). Moreover, irrelevant variations of sense did not disrupt the detection of a shape or size deviant, while irrelevant variations of shape or size did. At all ages and in both cultures, participants thus retained the same properties as Euclidean geometry in their analysis of visual forms, even in the absence of formal instruction in geometry. These findings show that representations of planar visual forms provide core intuitions on which humans’ knowledge in Euclidean geometry could possibly be grounded. (shrink)

David Malament, now emeritus at the University of California, Irvine, where since 1999 he served as a Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science after having spent twenty-three years as a faculty member at the University of Chicago , is well known as the author of numerous articles on the mathematical and philosophical foundations of modern physics with an emphasis on problems of space-time structure and the foundations of relativity theory. Malament’s Topics in the foundations of (...) general relativity and Newtonian gravitation theory has grown out of a set of lecture notes on the foundations of general relativity that he has taught for many years. In full agreement with Manchak , it should be pointed out from the beginning that the book neither is and was never intended to be a graduate general relativity a .. (shrink)

Whitehead, in two basic books, considers two different approaches to point-free geometry: the inclusion-based approach , whose primitive notions are regions and inclusion relation between regions, and the connection-based approach , where the connection relation is considered instead of the inclusion. We show that the latter cannot be reduced to the first one, although this can be done in the framework of multivalued logics.

A Paper on the Foundations of Projective Geometry - (Read before the Aristotelian Society, Dec. 13, 1897) is an unchanged, high-quality reprint of the original edition of 1898. Hansebooks is editor of the literature on different topic areas such as research and science, travel and expeditions, cooking and nutrition, medicine, and other genres. As a publisher we focus on the preservation of historical literature. Many works of historical writers and scientists are available today as antiques only. Hansebooks newly (...) publishes these books and contributes to the preservation of literature which has become rare and historical knowledge for the future. (shrink)

The Foundations of Geometry was first published in 1897, and is based on Russell's Cambridge dissertation as well as lectures given during a journey through the USA. This is the first reprint, complete with a new introduction by John Slater. It provides both an insight into the foundations of Russell's philosophical thinking and an introduction to the philosophy of mathematics and logic. As such it will be an invaluable resource not only for students of philosophy, but also (...) for those interested in Russell's philosophical development. Foundations of Geometry consists of four chapters which explore the various concepts of geometry and their philosophical implications, including a historical overview of the development of geometrical theory. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In this paper, I propose the idea that the French mathematician Michel Chasles developed a foundational programme for geometry in the period 1827–1837. The basic concept behind the programme was to show that projective geometry is the foundation of the whole of geometry. In particular, the metric properties can be reduced to specific graphic properties. In the attempt to prove the validity of his conception, Chasles made fundamental contributions to the theory of polarity and also understood that (...) a satisfactory development of projective geometry has to overcome the specificity of that theory itself. In this perspective, he developed his ideas on duality and homography, showing their dependence on the concept that he was going to pose at the basis of geometry: the anharmonic ratio, today called cross-ratio. The conceptual itinerary that starts from Chasles’ studies on polarity and ends with his results based on the cross-ratio represents the itinerary of his foundational programme. I will follow this complex and interesting line of thought, place it in the context of what was then called descriptive geometry, and outline a connection with the later great results of Von Staudt, Cayley, and Klein. (shrink)

Volume 32, Issue 1, March 2019, Page 75-77.

The Cognitive Foundations and Epistemology of Arithmetic and Geometry How is knowledge of arithmetic and geometry developed and acquired? In the tradition established by Plato and often associated with Kant, the epistemology of mathematics has been focused on a priori approaches, which take mathematical knowledge and its study to be essentially independent of sensory experience. … Continue reading The Cognitive Foundations and Epistemology of Arithmetic and Geometry →.

In 1675, Leibniz elaborated his longest mathematical treatise he everwrote, the treatise ``On the arithmetical quadrature of the circle, theellipse, and the hyperbola. A corollary is a trigonometry withouttables''. It was unpublished until 1993, and represents a comprehensive discussion of infinitesimalgeometry. In this treatise, Leibniz laid the rigorous foundation of thetheory of infinitely small and infinite quantities or, in other words,of the theory of quantified indivisibles. In modern terms Leibnizintroduced `Riemannian sums' in order to demonstrate the integrabilityof continuous functions. The (...) article deals with this demonstration,with Leibniz's handling of infinitely small and infinite quantities,and with a general theorem regarding hyperboloids. (shrink)

This book offers a general introduction to the geometrical studies of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and his mathematical epistemology. In particular, it focuses on his theory of parallel lines and his attempts to prove the famous Parallel Postulate. Furthermore it explains the role that Leibniz’s work played in the development of non-Euclidean geometry. The first part is an overview of his epistemology of geometry and a few of his geometrical findings, which puts them in the context of the 17th-century (...) studies on the foundations of geometry. It also provides a detailed mathematical and philosophical commentary on his writings on the theory of parallels, and discusses how they were received in the 18th century as well as their relevance for the non-Euclidean revolution in mathematics. The second part offers a collection of Leibniz’s essays on the theory of parallels and an English translation of them. While a few of these papers have already been published (in Latin) in the standard Leibniz editions, most of them are transcribed from Leibniz’s manuscripts written in Hannover, and published here for the first time. The book provides new material on the history of non-Euclidean geometry, stressing the previously neglected role of Leibniz in these developments. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the problem of ontological foundations of three-dimensional Euclidean geometry. Starting from Bertrand Russell’s intuitions concerning the sensual world we try to show that it is possible to build a foundation for pure geometry by means of the so called regions of space. It is not our intention to present mathematically developed theory, but rather demonstrate basic assumptions, tools and techniques that are used in construction of systems of point-free geometry and topology (...) by means of mereology and Whitehead-like connection structures. We list and briefly analyze axioms for mereological structures, as well as those for connection structures. We argue that mereology is a good tool to model so called spatial relations. We also try to justify our choice of axioms for connection relation. Finally, we briefly discuss two theories: Grzegorczyk’s point-free topology and Tarski’s geometry of solids. (shrink)

This paper is about Poincaré’s view of the foundations of geometry. According to the established view, which has been inherited from the logical positivists, Poincaré, like Hilbert, held that axioms in geometry are schemata that provide implicit definitions of geometric terms, a view he expresses by stating that the axioms of geometry are “definitions in disguise.” I argue that this view does not accord well with Poincaré’s core commitment in the philosophy of geometry: the view (...) that geometry is the study of groups of operations. In place of the established view I offer a revised view, according to which Poincaré held that axioms in geometry are in fact assertions about invariants of groups. Groups, as forms of the understanding, are prior in conception to the objects of geometry and afford the proper definition of those objects, according to Poincaré. Poincaré’s view therefore contrasts sharply with Kant’s foundation of geometry in a unique form of sensibility. According to my interpretation, axioms are not definitions in disguise because they themselves implicitly define their terms, but rather because they disguise the definitions which imply them. (shrink)

I investigate the role of geometric intuition in Frege’s early mathematical works and the significance of his view of the role of intuition in geometry to properly understanding the aims of his logicist project. I critically evaluate the interpretations of Mark Wilson, Jamie Tappenden, and Michael Dummett. The final analysis that I provide clarifies the relationship of Frege’s restricted logicist project to dominant trends in German mathematical research, in particular to Weierstrassian arithmetization and to the Riemannian conceptual/geometrical tradition at (...) Göttingen. Concurring with Tappenden, I hold that Frege’s logicism should not be understood as a continuing a project of reductionist arithmetization. However, Frege does not quite take up the Riemannian banner either. His logicism supports a hierarchical understanding of the structure of mathematical knowledge, according to which arithmetic is applicable to geometry but not vice versa because the former is more general, as revealed by the strictly logical nature of its objects in comparison to the intuitional nature of geometric objects. I suggest, in particular, that Frege intended that foundational work would show the use of geometric intuition in complex analysis, a source of error for Riemann that Weierstrass was proud to have uncovered, to be inessential. (shrink)

In a series of articles dating from 1903 to 1906, Frege criticizes Hilbert’s methodology of proving the independence and consistency of various fragments of Euclidean geometry in his Foundations of Geometry. In the final part of the last article, Frege makes his own proposal as to how the independence of genuine axioms should be proved. Frege contends that independence proofs require the development of a ‘new science’ with its own basic truths. This paper aims to provide a (...) reconstruction of this New Science that meets modern standards and to examine possible problems surrounding Frege’s original proposal. The paper is organized as follows: the first two sections summarize the main points of the Frege–Hilbert controversy and discuss some issues surrounding the problem of independence proofs. Section 3 contains an informal presentation of Frege’s proposal. In section 4 a more detailed reconstruction of Frege’s New Science is set out while section 5 examines what is left out. The concluding section is devoted to a discussion of Frege’s strategy and its significance from a broader perspective. (shrink)

Peg Rawes examines a "minor tradition" of aesthetic geometries in ontological philosophy. Developed through Kant’s aesthetic subject she explores a trajectory of geometric thinking and geometric figurations--reflective subjects, folds, passages, plenums, envelopes and horizons--in ancient Greek, post-Cartesian and twentieth-century Continental philosophies, through which productive understandings of space and embodies subjectivities are constructed. Six chapters, explore the construction of these aesthetic geometric methods and figures in a series of "geometric" texts by Kant, Plato, Proclus, Spinoza, Leibniz, Bergson, Husserl and Deleuze. In (...) each text, geometry is expressed as a uniquely embodies aesthetic activity because each respective geometric method and figure is imbued with aesthetic sensibility and geometric sense (rather than as disembodies scientific methods). An ontology of aesthetic geometric methods and figures is therefore traced from Kant’s Critical writings, back to Plato and Proclus Greek philosophy, Spinoza and Leibniz’s post-Cartesian philosophies, and forwards to Bergson’s "duration" and Husserl’s "horizons" towards Deleuze’s philosophy of sense. (shrink)

The main goal of part 1 is to challenge the widely held view that Poincaré orders the sciences in a hierarchy of dependence, such that all others presuppose arithmetic. Commentators have suggested that the intuition that grounds the use of induction in arithmetic also underlies the conception of a continuum, that the consistency of geometrical axioms must be proved through arithmetical induction, and that arithmetical induction licenses the supposition that certain operations form a group. I criticize each of these readings. (...) More fully, I argue that the justification Poincaré offers for the use of the group notion in geometry appears to extend to set-theoretic notions that would suffice to put arithmetic on a logical foundation, thus undermining his own case for the necessity of intuition in arithmetic. In part 2, I offer an interpretation of intuition’s role on which it justifies the use of group-theoretic, but not set-theoretic, notions. (shrink)

The paper [Tarski: Les fondements de la géométrie des corps, Annales de la Société Polonaise de Mathématiques, pp. 29—34, 1929] is in many ways remarkable. We address three historico-philosophical issues that force themselves upon the reader. First we argue that in this paper Tarski did not live up to his own methodological ideals, but displayed instead a much more pragmatic approach. Second we show that Leśniewski's philosophy and systems do not play the significant role that one may be tempted to (...) assign to them at first glance. Especially the role of background logic must be at least partially allocated to Russell's systems of Principia mathematica. This analysis leads us, third, to a threefold distinction of the technical ways in which the domain of discourse comes to be embodied in a theory. Having all of this in place, we discuss why we have to reject the argument in [Gruszczyński and Pietruszczak: Full development of Tarski's Geometry of Solids, The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 481—540] according to which Tarski has made a certain mistake. (shrink)

Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic (both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”, “permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s “logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, 1972) has proposed a (...) “deontic hexagon” as being the geometrical representation of standard deontic logic, whereas Joerden (jointly with Hruschka, in Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 73:1, 1987), McNamara (Mind 105:419, 1996) and Wessels (Die gute Samariterin. Zur Struktur der Supererogation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2002) have proposed some new “deontic polygons” for dealing with conservative extensions of standard deontic logic internalising the concept of “supererogation”. Since 2004 a new formal science of the geometrical oppositions inside logic has appeared, that is “ n -opposition theory”, or “NOT”, which relies on the notion of “logical bi-simplex of dimension m ” ( m = n − 1). This theory has received a complete mathematical foundation in 2008, and since then several extensions. In this paper, by using it, we show that in standard deontic logic there are in fact many more oppositional deontic figures than Kalinowski’s unique “hexagon of norms” (more ones, and more complex ones, geometrically speaking: “deontic squares”, “deontic hexagons”, “deontic cubes”, . . ., “deontic tetraicosahedra”, . . .): the real geometry of the oppositions between deontic modalities is composed by the aforementioned structures (squares, hexagons, cubes, . . ., tetraicosahedra and hyper-tetraicosahedra), whose complete mathematical closure happens in fact to be a “deontic 5-dimensional hyper-tetraicosahedron” (an oppositional very regular solid). (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss a proposal for reform in the teaching of Euclidean geometry that reveals the symbiotic relationship between axiomatics and pedagogy. We examine the role of intuition in this kind of reform, as expressed by Mario Pieri, a prominent member of the Schools of Peano and Segre at the University of Turin. We are well aware of the centuries of attention paid to the notion of intuition by mathematicians, mathematics educators, philosophers, psychologists, historians, and others. To (...) set a context for Pieri’s proposal, we only seek to open a small window on views of the pedagogical role of intuition, from primary education to university study that may have informed early 20th century efforts to improve the teaching of geometry at the secondary school level. Pieri addressed the topic of intuition in many of his axiomatizations, including those in projective geometry which was his main area of concentration in foundations. We focus here primarily on his axiom systems for elementary geometry, which embraced the transformational approach of Felix Klein’s vision for the subject. Our goal is to convey Pieri’s thoughts on how to integrate two types of intuition, denoted as sensible and rational, in his endeavors to improve the teaching of the geometry of Euclid. We show how Pieri’s views on geometric intuition and pedagogical reform were either ignored or misrepresented in several notable publications at the turn of the 20th century. In particular, we give Pieri a voice in response to specific comments made in the early 1900s by Federigo Enriques, Ugo Amaldi, and Florian Cajori in widely circulated publications inspired by Klein. (shrink)