This paper focuses on the concept of the "intentional arc" in Merleau-Ponty, who maintains that perception comes into play within, and is nourished by, an already established relation between the person and the world. That obscure relation, the intentional arc, is the "genesis" of perception, and this paper argues that in it resides the proper theme of a psychological phenomenology of perception. A study of the intentional arc shows that perception is not a passive, causal, impersonal process. On the contrary, (...) perception is active in that it requires the perceiver's free consent to the solicitations stemming from the world; it is thus only motivated or beckoned, but not caused; and it rests on a personal foundation, which is to say that it depends on the entire psychological life of the perceiver. A subsequent paper will enrich and develop the implications of this thesis by taking up the phenomenology of hallucinations. (shrink)

XVI Psychologists have, however, shown that what we are primarily aware of is not a succession of sense-data but figures-ground phenomena: Wittgenstein's ambiguous duck-rabbit is merely one such example. They have also drawn our attention to the existence of tertiary qualities in perception, such as 'symmetry' and 'elegance' which are just as directly given as are the perceived colours red, green or yellow. It is interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty has made considerable use of Gestalt ideas in his Phenomenology of (...) Perception. One of the commonest reasons given by linguistic philosophers for not making direct use of the results of psychological research (although philosophers are usually willing to accept the first-hand results of physical science) is that philosophical accounts of perception and thinking are concerned with analysing the language in which these reports are made; that is to say, they are second-order enquiries. Often this approach is still more restricted and ordinary linguistic usage is taken as the yardstick against which questions relating to thought and perception are to be measured. The task of the philosopher is then con fined to the analysis of ordinary language. If he is more adventurous, as some writers on philosophical psychology are, he might go on to show how far the language used by psychological researchers falls short of the paradigms of common sense. (shrink)

One of the great difficulties in effecting a synthesis of experience is the contradiction of the apparently mechanical character of the physical universe on the one hand, and the sense of freedom we associate with life on the other. In our own persons, we are told by medical science, or some of it, we are governed by physiological laws which are mechanical, as distinct from vital, in their nature. The best reconciliation of these with freedom, in the writer's opinion, is (...) the philosophy of Samuel Butler. In studying freedom as experienced by human beings Butler pointed out that a large number of practices which are apparently mechanical are really habits that have become stereotyped, and he drew attention to the fact that human actions can be classified as follows:—. (shrink)

One of the great difficulties in effecting a synthesis of experience is the contradiction of the apparently mechanical character of the physical universe on the one hand, and the sense of freedom we associate with life on the other. In our own persons, we are told by medical science, or some of it, we are governed by physiological laws which are mechanical, as distinct from vital, in their nature. The best reconciliation of these with freedom, in the writer's opinion, is (...) the philosophy of Samuel Butler. In studying freedom as experienced by human beings Butler pointed out that a large number of practices which are apparently mechanical are really habits that have become stereotyped, and he drew attention to the fact that human actions can be classified as follows:—. (shrink)

Genetic epistemology analyzes the growth of knowledge both in the individual person (genetic psychology) and in the socio-historical realm (the history of science). But what the relationship is between the history of science and genetic psychology remains unclear. The biogenetic law that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny is inadequate as a characterization of the relation. A critical examination of Piaget's Introduction à l'Épistémologie Généntique indicates these are several examples of what I call stage laws common to both (...) areas. Furthermore, there is at least one example of a paradoxical inverse relation between the two — geometry. Both similarities and differences between the two domains require an explanation, a developmental explanation. Although such an explanation seems to be psychological in nature, it is not merely empirical but also normative (since psychology is both factual and normative according to Piaget). Hence genetic epistemology need not be reduced to psychology (narrowly conceived), but rather should be seen as being both empirical and normative and thus similar to certain types of contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

One of the central arguments given to resist testing currently healthy, asymptomatic children for adult-onset diseases is that they may be psychologically harmed by the knowledge gained from such tests. In this discussion I examine two of the most serious arguments: children who are tested may face limited futures, and that testing may result in damage to the child’s self esteem . I claim that these arguments do not stand up to critical evaluation. In conclusion, whilst I do not suggest (...) that all at-risk children should be tested for adult-onset diseases we ought to listen carefully to some parental requests for such testing because the putative psychological harms may not be as significant or likely as initially thought. This is because parents generally have the best interests of their children at heart and if they are properly supported and educated about predictive genetic testing and the possible consequences, then the risk of psychological harms occurring may be ameliorated. (shrink)

This article sets out to show that Wittgenstein and Freud have exerted a considerable - though narrow - influence on Bourdieu’s sociology. But their influence also pervades the theoretical development of two other currents that have emerged in French sociology in the last few years, and that were developed by L. Boltanski and L. Thévenot on the one hand, and B. Lahire on the other. Although they do not make it explicit, the advocates of these two currents have nevertheless been (...) influenced by Wittgenstein and Freud. Thus Boltanski has drawn on Wittgenstein to develop a sociology which gives primacy to the social actor’s interpretation of his or her situation through lay theorizing. Lahire’s work clearly pays a debt to Freud with his psychological sociology. It would therefore be interesting, in the first instance, to tease out how Wittgenstein and Freud, respectively, have influenced these two systems to demonstrate that they can indeed be used to generate new sociological currents, other than Bourdieu’s own. This would then allow us to explore how they could be used to fill any gaps in Bourdieu’s work, thus giving the latter renewed relevance and staunching its stagnating tendencies. Ultimately, this analysis aims to show how Wittgenstein’s and Freud’s theoretical influences can lead the way towards a theoretical synthesis between Bourdieu’s critical sociology, Boltanski’s social actor theory and Lahire’s psychological sociology. Currently, these three currents operate independently of each other, without any kind of dialogue. And yet, far from being incompatible, these sociologies offer opportunities for exploring how they might complement and mutually enrich each other. (shrink)

We examined the association of parents’ genetic causal beliefs and parenting behaviors, hypothesizing a positive association between parents’ genetic causal beliefs and their use of psychological control. Study 1 (N = 394) was a cross-sectional survey and revealed that parents’ genetic essentialism beliefs were positively associated with their self-reported use of harsh psychological control, but only for parents who reported relatively high levels of problem behaviors in their children. Study 2 (N = 293) employed a 4-day longitudinal (...) design and revealed that parents’ genetic causal beliefs positively predicted the use of psychological control, especially on days when they perceived relatively high problem behaviors in children. Overall, the studies demonstrated that parents’ genetic causal beliefs about character positively predicted psychologically controlling and harsh responses to child problem behaviors, which may ultimately be detrimental to child development. (shrink)

Identifying causal relations from correlational data is a fundamental challenge in personality psychology. In most cases, random assignment is not feasible, leaving observational studies as the primary methodological tool. Here, we document several techniques from behavior genetics that attempt to demonstrate causality. Although no one method is conclusive at ruling out all possible confounds, combining techniques can triangulate on causal relations. Behavior genetic tools leverage information gained by sampling pairs of individuals with assumed genetic and environmental relatedness (...) or by measuring genetic variants in unrelated individuals. These designs can find evidence consistent with causality, while simultaneously providing strong controls against common confounds. We conclude by discussing several potential problems that may limit the utility of these techniques when applied to personality. Ultimately, genetically informative designs can aid in drawing causal conclusions from correlational studies. (shrink)

For the last six months or so, some of us at The Hastings Center have been participating in a kind of short-term book group. Together we have been thinking about the contribution of moral psychology to bioethics. One of our questions is whether bioethics’ understanding of moral values should draw on what moral psychology tells us about moral values. Bioethics tends to look to philosophy for guidance. Can it learn from insights in moral psychology into the biological, (...) environmental, and cultural influences on morality? The question can be taken in many directions. One that I've wrestled with has to do with debates about genetic engineering, where a common concern is that genetic alteration of other organisms, and maybe also of humans, doesn't sit well with the kind of relationship that people want to have to nature. (shrink)

Attempts to explain behavior genetically face two major problems: the application of the concept of genetic coding and the theoretical possibility of decomposing behavior. This paper argues that using the notion of genetic coding is appropriate in explanations of protein synthesis but inadequate and even misleading in the context of explanations of behavior. Genes should be regarded as disparate components of mechanisms that account for behavior rather than as codes for behavioral phenotypes. Such mechanistic explanations, however, presuppose the (...) possibility of decomposing behavioral phenotypes, which is strongly disputed by researchers holding an interactionist view of behavior. It is argued that these researchers fail to distinguish etiological from constitutive decomposition, and that their objections apply to the former but not to the latter kind. Constitutive decomposition might identify genes as disparate components and open up the possibility of explaining behavior mechanistically by isolating causal paths from genes to behavior. Finally, research on the single gene disorder phenylketonuria is introduced to illustrate and test these views. With respect to this disorder it is demonstrated that applying the concept of genetic coding would be inappropriate and misguiding, while nonetheless the phenotype is decomposable and can be explained mechanistically by singling out a genetic causal path.t is demonstrated that applying the concept of genetic coding would be inappropriate and misguiding, while nonetheless the phenotype is decomposable and can be explained mechanistically by singling out a genetic causal path. (shrink)

Rose seems to be arguing against an extreme ultra-Darwinism that probably has no adherents. He incorrectly argues that a number of psychological traits are very difficult to measure. This is not the case. Rose argues that intelligence has no biological correlates. In fact, it is correlated with brain size, EEG evoked potentials, and cerebral glucose uptake during problem solving. Data that Rose should be aware of are omitted when they do not fit the case he is trying to make.

The expanded use of genetic testing raises key ethical and policy questions about possible benefits and harms for those receiving disease‐risk information. As predictive testing for Huntington’s was initiated in a clinical setting, survey research posing hypothetical test scenarios suggested that the vast majority of at‐risk relatives wanted to know whether they carried a disease‐causing mutation. However, only a small minority ultimately availed themselves of this opportunity. Many at‐risk individuals concluded that a positive test result would be too psychologically (...) overwhelming. A substantial literature suggests that individuals are often more resilient than anticipated in coping with many different health‐related stresses. Much of my own work in the field has been through the Risk Evaluation & Education for Alzheimer’s Disease study (REVEAL), a series of randomized clinical trials assessing the impact of genetic susceptibility testing on asymptomatic individuals at risk for Alzheimer’s disease. Our experience in developing and implementing four successive, multisite trials provides some potentially useful lessons for the field. More people will be asking for their personal genetic information. Better understanding will help us decide when access is appropriate and how best to disclose results in a manner that supports adjustment to test findings and promotes use of genetic information to improve human health. (shrink)

I argue that the use of heritable modifications for psychology, personality, and behavior should be limited to the reversal or prevention of relatively unambiguous instances of pathology or likely harm (e.g. sociopathy). Most of the likely modifications of psychological personality would not be of this nature, however, and parents therefore should not have the freedom to make such modifications to future children. I argue by examining the viewpoints of both the individual and society. For individuals, modifications would interfere with (...) their capacity for self-determination in a way that undermines the very concept of self-determination. I argue that modification of psychology and personality is unlike present parenting in morally significant ways. For society, modification offers a medium for power to manipulate the makeup of persons and populations, possibly causing biological harm to the species and altering our conceptions of social responsibility. (shrink)

The scientific discovery of a range of genetic mutations has meant that people with a strong family history of cancer can find out whether they are at risk of developing cancer well before they have any symptoms. Genetic testing has opened up the possibility for otherwise healthy mutation carriers to access prophylactic treatments in order to minimise their risk. These include surgery to remove at-risk body parts, treatment with cancer drugs, medical surveillance strategies, self-surveillance and change in lifestyle. (...) Clinical experience to date has shown considerable resistance to the uptake of medical preventative measures despite their promise of risk reduction. This paper provides a summary review of the available literature on the medical, psychological, counselling and social aspects of genetic testing and the use of risk-reducing treatments by people who have been diagnosed with a genetic predisposition to cancer. It acknowledges what has been learned from these approaches but points to the similarity of the philosophical underpinnings of most of the research. It concludes by tentatively making some suggestions, informed by the literature, about new directions for guiding our understanding the genetically at risk and the factors that influence their decision-making. (shrink)

With the advent of the Human Genome Project there have been many claims for the genetic origins of complex human behavior including insanity, criminality, and intelligence. But what does it really mean to call something 'genetic'? This is the fundamental question that Sahotra Sarkar's book addresses. The author analyses the nature of reductionism in classical and molecular genetics. He shows that there are two radically different kinds of reductionist explanation: genetic reduction (as found in classical genetics) and (...) physical reduction (found in molecular genetics). This important book clarifies the meaning of the term 'genetic', shows how molecular studies have affected genetics, and provides the philosophical background necessary to understand the debates over the Human Genome Project. It will be of particular interest to professionals and students in the philosophy of science, the history of science, and the social studies of science, medicine, and technology. (shrink)

Binmore analyzes the genetic basis of cooperation. Much of the literature doing this supposes that we must explain directly the cooperative tendency, whether by individual or group selection. A more effective way to go is to find something more general and likely more deeply embedded in personal traits that enables and even enhances cooperation. Hume, with whom Binmore claims affinities, long ago proposed a psychological phenomenon now called mirroring, which induces good relations through shared sentiments in a way that (...) is essentially hard-wired. Mirroring indirectly contributes to cooperativeness. There may be other similarly indirect ways to account for human cooperativeness. (shrink)

James Mark Baldwin left a legacy that has yet to be fully examined, one with profound implications for science and the humanities. In some sense it paralleled that of his friend Charles Sanders Peirce, whose semiotics became understood only a century later. Baldwin was trying to make sense of complex biological and social processes that only now have come into the limelight as biological sciences have re-emerged in psychology. Baldwin's focus on development, based on the observation of his own (...) children and extrapolated to his general theoretical scheme, is fully in line with where contemporary biological sciences are heading. This is exemplified by the bounded flexibility of the work of the genetic system. The general principle of persistent exploration of the environment with the result of creating novelty, which was the core of Baldwin's theoretical system, has since the 1960s become the guiding idea in genetics. Contemporary developmental science is rooted in Baldwin's thinking. In his new introduction, Jaan Valsiner shows that Baldwin's Genetic Theory of Reality demonstrates how human beings are in their nature social beings, establishes an alternative conceptualization of evolutionary theory, and formulates a system of developmental logic, all of which serve as the foundation for developmental psychology as a whole. This is a work of social science rediscovery long overdue. (shrink)

Discussions on the concept of Marifatullah as the foundation of belief hold a significant place in theology. There are different opinions among schools of theology regarding whether those who do not receive divine messages must know God. The majority of scholars belonging to the Mu'tazila and Māturīdī schools, including Imam Māturīdī, state that human beings must know God. Although al-Ashʿarī accepts that the most prominent obligatory duties are the methods of reasoning that lead to marifatullah, he states that responsibility in (...) this matter is formed by transmission. However, we can say that whether the human mind is sufficient to reach the knowledge of God, the method of reasoning has reached a different dimension today from the sciences of psychology, genetics, and neurobiology. This study explored whether individuals can achieve marifatullah from a holistic perspective. Whether human beings can be held responsible for this issue has been evaluated through the sciences of psychology, genetics, and neurobiology, and the opinions of schools of theology on this issue have been criticized. When we think in terms of Marifatullah, we can say that man’s psychological sense of obligation to adapt to society leaves him intellectually under the influence of society. In terms of genetic determinism, human personality, behavior, and intellectual adventure are completely determined by genes. Therefore, it is impossible for men to reach marifatullah in the context of their mental abilities. From an epigenetic perspective, we see that human thought structure, behavior, and personality are formed as a result of interactions with the environment. Serious hesitation arises in this idea in terms of intellect being a source of responsibility. Humans are genetically influenced by the environment and society, and they have a suitable nature for this, revealing that their genetic structure is open to environmental influences. In terms of brain plasticity, factors such as the society, environment, and family in which people live can change their brains and enable them to live accordingly. Although life adventures appear to be within the framework of social harmony, there must also be intellectual and religious harmony within social harmony. This reinforces the idea that individuals tend to align more with the thoughts and beliefs instilled by culture given the adaptable nature of the human brain influenced by cultural factors. When the views of the schools of theology are considered considering these evaluations, it becomes clear that the Mu'tazilites and Māturīdīs' belief that the source of the wujūb of marifatullah is intellect is at a point that needs to be reconsidered in terms of human biology and psychology. Although the Asharites emphasize human beings attaining knowledge of God through intellect, their focus on prophethood indicates that a revelation offer appears more accurate concerning human nature in the context of Marifatullah. (shrink)

The concept of innateness is used to make inferences between various better-understood properties, like developmental canalization, evolutionary adaptation, heritability, species-typicality, and so on (‘innateness-related properties’). This article uses a recently-developed account of the representational content carried by inheritance systems like the genome to explain why innateness-related properties cluster together, especially in non-human organisms. Although inferences between innateness-related properties are deductively invalid, and lead to false conclusions in many actual cases, where some aspect of a phenotypic trait develops in reliance on (...) a genetic representation it will tend, better than chance, to have many of the innateness-related properties. The account also shows why inferences between innateness-related properties sometimes fail and argues that such inferences are especially misleading when applied to human psychology and behaviour because human psychological development is especially reliant on non-genetic inherited representations. (shrink)

Several philosophers have questioned the possibility of a genetic epistemology, an epistemology concerned with the developmental transitions between successive states of knowledge in the individual person. Since most arguments against the possibility of a genetic epistemology crucially depend upon a sharp distinction between the genesis of an idea and its justification, I argue that current philosophy of science raises serious questions about the universal validity of this distinction. Then I discuss several senses of the genetic fallacy, indicating (...) which sense of ‘genesis’ is relevant to epistemology. Next I consider the objection that psychology is irrelevant to epistemology, and that since "genetic epistemology" is really psychology, "genetic epistemology" is irrelevant to a real epistemology. Finally, I take up the objection that nothing discovered in genetic psychology could be relevant to a genetic epistemology. These last two arguments are based upon what I claim to be a mistaken notion of the nature of psychology. Suitably interpreted, psychology can assist genetic epistemology precisely in the way that the history of science assists current philosonhv of science. *I owe considerable thanks to Jann Benson, Ken Freeman, Bernie Rollin and Ron Williams for their helpful discussions concerning many of the issues discussed in this paper. I also wish to thank David Hamlyn, John Heil, William Lycan, Harvey Siegel and an anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions. It goes without saying that none of these individuals (especially Hamlyn and Siegel) necessarily agree with me. An earlier version of this paper was read at Colorado State University where the audience's comments were beneficial. (shrink)

David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and nature of brain development show that most ?central? psychological mechanisms cannot be adaptations because the nature of the contribution from the environment on which they are based shows they are not heritable. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that a strong role for the environment is compatible with high heritability as long as the environment is highly stable down lineages. In this paper I support this view (...) by arguing that the discoveries Buller and Hardcastle refer to either do not show as strong a role for the environment as they suggest, or these discoveries show that the brain's developmental process depends in many cases on input from the environment that is highly stable across generations. (shrink)

Psychology in its intellectual context -- The work of integration and a Christian view of persons -- Neuroscience, embodiment and mind -- Behavior genetics and responsible personhood -- Positive and applied psychology and sanctification -- Psychology of religion and truth.

Ruiping Fan (2010), employing a Confucian values framework, appropriately critiques Michael Sandel's (2007) absolutist rejection of genetic enhancement. As described by Fan, Sandel believes genetic...