In July 2000, the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma passed a resolution that would effectively expel a significant portion of its tribal members. The resolution amended the Nation's constitution by changing its membership criteria. Previously, potential members needed to show descent from an enrollee of the 1906 Dawes Rolls, the official American Indian tribal rolls established by the Dawes Commission to facilitate the allotment of reservation land. The amended constitution requires possession of one-eighth Seminole Indian blood, a requirement that a significant (...) portion of the tribe's membership cannot fulfill. The members of the Nation who fail to meet this new membership criterion all have one thing in common: they are black.Descendents of former slaves who came to live among the Seminole Indians of Florida in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the black Seminoles have been officially recognized by the U.S. government as members of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma since 1866. (shrink)

In July 2000, the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma passed a resolution that would effectively expel a significant portion of its tribal members. The resolution amended the Nation's constitution by changing its membership criteria. Previously, potential members needed to show descent from an enrollee of the 1906 Dawes Rolls, the official American Indian tribal rolls established by the Dawes Commission to facilitate the allotment of reservation land. The amended constitution requires possession of one-eighth Seminole Indian blood, a requirement that a significant (...) portion of the tribe's membership cannot fulfill. The members of the Nation who fail to meet this new membership criterion all have one thing in common: they are black.Descendents of former slaves who came to live among the Seminole Indians of Florida in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the black Seminoles have been officially recognized by the U.S. government as members of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma since 1866. (shrink)

Autism is a chronic neurodevelopmental disorder that presents unique challenges to bioethicists. In particular, bioethicists ought to reconsider pediatric consent in light of disparity between beliefs that are held about the disorder by parents and adults with autism. The neurodiverse community ought to be given some consideration in this debate, and, as such, there may be a role for autistic narratives in clarifying this problem.

Karen-Sue Taussig: Ordinary Genomes: Science, Citizenship and Genetic Identities Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s10441-012-9150-8 Authors Sabina Leonelli, Department of Sociology and Philosophy, ESRC Centre for Genomics in Society, University of Exeter, Exeter, Devon, UK Journal Acta Biotheoretica Online ISSN 1572-8358 Print ISSN 0001-5342.

In my essay I consider the imaginary case of a future mother who refuses to undergo genetic alteration on her germline although she knows that her, as yet unconceived, child will have a serious genetic disorder. I analyze the good and bad points of two branches of arguments directed against her decision, consequentialist and rights-based. Then I discuss whether accepting one line of these arguments or the other makes a difference in moral assessment. I conclude that, although from (...) the preanalytical perspective we strongly oppose the refusal of genetic treatment in my imaginary case, it is probably impossible to construct one coherent theory which embraces all possible moral dilemmas triggered by our actions which affect the number and the identity of future people. (shrink)

It has been argued that there can be no person‐regarding reasons for practising genetic therapy, since it affects identity and causes to exist an individual who would not otherwise have existed. And there can be no such reasons for causing somebody to exist because existing cannot be better for an individual than never existing. In the present paper, both of these claims are denied. It is contended, first, that in practically all significant cases genetic therapy will not (...) affect the identity of beings of our kind. This is so irrespective of whether, essentially, we are beings with minds or beings of a certain biological species, the human one. Second, it is contended that, even if genetic therapy were to affect our identity, there could be person‐regarding reasons for conducting it, for existence can be better than non‐existence for the individual. (shrink)

I have outlined two ways of defending the claim that there are so‐called person‐regarding reasons for practising gene therapy on human conceptuses. One is metaphysical and concerns our nature and identity. The upshot of it is that, in cases of most interest, this therapy does not affect our identity, by bringing into existence anyone of our kind who would not otherwise have existed. The other defence is value theoretical and claims that even if genetic therapy were to (...) affect the identity of beings our kind, there could still be person‐regarding reasons for performing it, since we can be benefited and harmed by being caused to exist or not to exist. Robert Elliot has attacked both of these lines, and my present objective is to show how his criticisms can be deflected. (shrink)

It has been argued for example by Ingmar Persson, that genetic therapy performed on a conceptus does not alter the identity of the person that develops from it, even if we are essentially persons. If this claim is true then there can be person-regarding reasons for performing genetic therapy on a conceptus. Here it is argued that such person-regarding reasons obtain only if we are not essentially persons but essentially animals. This conclusion requires the defeat of the (...) origination theory, which says that personal identity is determined by the identity of the foetus from which one originates. It is argued that the origination theory is false in the special case relevant to performing genetic therapy on a conceptus for person-regarding reasons. (shrink)

Within the context of the discussion about value-free science ideal, Heather Douglas claims that in several cases non-epistemic values are needed for good reasoning in science. In this article I aim at recovering her viewpoint in order to examine the research driving to the Genetic Grandparent Inclusion-Probability Index, a crucial element to restitute the identity of children who were abducted during Argentinean dictatorship. Thus, my purposes are to reconstruct Douglas´ main theoretical contributions, specifically her reasons to reject the (...) ideal as well as the distinction between direct and indirect roles for values in science; and to analyze the scientific paper resulting from the “Grandparent-Inclusion Index” research. The main hypothesis is that several decisions of this research, particularly the establishment of what is to be considered sufficient evidence, should be explained by reference to social, ethical and political values. Both because of the non-epistemic consequences of the inquiry related to its inductive risk and because such inquiry is a case in which there is legitimate and necessary integration between epistemic and non-epistemic values and that it is also a case in which Douglas’ criteria of objectivity is reached. By virtue of these reasons, the significance of Douglas’ contribution to the analysis of the relationship between science and politics is emphasized. (shrink)

Within the context of the discussion about value-free science ideal, Heather Douglas claims that in several cases non-epistemic values are needed for good reasoning in science. In this article I aim at recovering her viewpoint in order to examine the research driving to the Genetic Grandparent Inclusion-Probability Index, a crucial element to restitute the identity of children who were abducted during Argentinean dictatorship. Thus, my purposes are to reconstruct Douglas´ main theoretical contributions, specifically her reasons to reject the (...) ideal as well as the distinction between direct and indirect roles for values in science; and to analyze the scientific paper resulting from the “Grandparent-Inclusion Index” research. The main hypothesis is that several decisions of this research, particularly the establishment of what is to be considered sufficient evidence, should be explained by reference to social, ethical and political values. Both because of the non-epistemic consequences of the inquiry related to its inductive risk and because such inquiry is a case in which there is legitimate and necessary integration between epistemic and non-epistemic values and that it is also a case in which Douglas’ criteria of objectivity is reached. By virtue of these reasons, the significance of Douglas’ contribution to the analysis of the relationship between science and politics is emphasized. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this essay is to investigate the meaning of the concept of identity within a framework of the phenomenological theory of ...

The prelims comprise: Introduction: Locke's Distinction between Personal and Animal Identity The Irrelevance of Cloning Personal Identity and Science Notes.

ABSTRACTAs both a geneticist and a Nigerian living in the United States, the author responds to the prospect of African Americans using genetic science to trace their ancestry to the African continent. He articulates concerns about both the limitations of the science to offer satisfying, accurate, and meaningful results, and the ability of individuals to make real, life‐altering sense of these results. However, he notes that given the history and impact of slavery on African Americans, the desire to trace (...) roots to Africa is both real and understandable. (shrink)

As both a geneticist and a Nigerian living in the United States, the author responds to the prospect of African Americans using genetic science to trace their ancestry to the African continent. He articulates concerns about both the limitations of the science to offer satisfying, accurate, and meaningful results, and the ability of individuals to make real, life‐altering sense of these results. However, he notes that given the history and impact of slavery on African Americans, the desire to trace (...) roots to Africa is both real and understandable. (shrink)

Obtaining community consent before conducting genetic research seems to be a way of ensuring that a whole community is not harmed against its wishes—that all Jews, or all African Americans, or all Hutterites are not forced to learn things about themselves they would rather not know, or are not forced into identities they would rather not have. Unfortunately, there are insurmountable problems both in identifying the right representatives of the community and in obtaining their consent.

The Human Genome Project will produce information permitting increasing opportunities to prevent genetically transmitted harms, most of which will be compatible with a life worth living, through avoiding conception or terminating a pregnancy. Failure to prevent these harms when it is possible for parents to do so without substantial burdens or costs to themselves or others are what J call “wrongful handicaps”. Derek Parfit has developed a systematic difficulty for any such cases being wrongs — when the harm could be (...) prevented only by preventing the existence of the individual who would have a worthwhile life even with the handicap, then bringing him into existence with the handicap does not make him worse off and so does not wrong him. I argue that a non “person‐affecting” principle requiring the avoidance of suffering and limited opportunity correctly accounts for cases of wrongful handicaps without requiring that the individuals with the handicap have been made worse off and therefore wronged. It is an advantage, not a difficulty, of this account that it does not imply that the person with the handicap has been wronged or is a victim with a special moral complaint. (shrink)

IntroductionIDIS is a multidisciplinary journal with a focus on identity in the information society. The information society is usually associated with information and communication technologies, such as computers, mobile phones and the Internet, and with information in the form of computer- or human-readable data. In this special issue on genetics, information and identity, however, we focus on a different type of information, namely genetic information. The DNA of the human genome is often called a ‘blueprint’ of human (...) life, containing information that regulates—in various and very complex ways—most of the processes in human life. In this sense, genetics may well be considered an information technology in its own right.Genetic information is becoming ever more important in society, although current knowledge of the human genome and how the genome relates to human life is still limited. Nevertheless, what knowledge we have about the genetic make-up of people—whether in terms of congen .. (shrink)

The Human Genome Project will produce information permitting increasing opportunities to prevent genetically transmitted harms, most of which will be compatible with a life worth living, through avoiding conception or terminating a pregnancy. Failure to prevent these harms when it is possible for parents to do so without substantial burdens or costs to themselves or others are what J call “wrongful handicaps”. Derek Parfit has developed a systematic difficulty for any such cases being wrongs — when the harm could be (...) prevented only by preventing the existence of the individual who would have a worthwhile life even with the handicap, then bringing him into existence with the handicap does not make him worse off and so does not wrong him. I argue that a non “person‐affecting” principle requiring the avoidance of suffering and limited opportunity correctly accounts for cases of wrongful handicaps without requiring that the individuals with the handicap have been made worse off and therefore wronged. It is an advantage, not a difficulty, of this account that it does not imply that the person with the handicap has been wronged or is a victim with a special moral complaint. (shrink)

The controversies over genetically modified crops in India involve what Gieryn refers to as ‘boundary work’ in the ongoing competition for credibility and trustworthiness among claimsmakers with opposing points of view. Discourse about GM crops involves extensive drawing of boundaries by actors including policymakers, technocrats, NGOs, scientists, industrialists, and farmers. The issues raised range from governmental processes to moral and ethical implications, from environmental consequences to integration into the global economy. Those involved in these discussions frequently invoke the idealized notions (...) of farmers and farming in order to situate themselves within the boundary of a particular social category which may lend credibility to their claims. While Gieryn has focused primarily on scientists’ attempts to construct a boundary between science and non-science in order to establish themselves as experts, strengthen the credibility of their claims and avoid political interference in their intellectual activities, this article focuses on a different way in which knowledgeable and influential actors lay claim to trustworthiness by drawing a different kind of social boundary around themselves. This article will especially focus on the ways in which the category of farmers is used in the GM crop controversies by actors who are in a position to influence public policies regarding GM crops, especially in their efforts to justify their policy prescriptions. The thesis here is that GM crop controversies in India reflect elite actors’ attempts to compete for a shared social identity with farmers, thus constructing a context for the particular public policy prescriptions they support. The thesis is supported by a lexical item frequency analysis of discussion related to genetically modified cotton in India which demonstrates that boundary work using social identity of farmers plays a significant role in shaping the discourse surrounding the adoption and governance of GM crops. (shrink)

Despite the potential political impact of industry attempts to influence public policy about genetic modification, little research has focused on critical understanding of industry perspectives. This article explores the rhetorical and discursive construction of public messages about this controversial issue by two major New Zealand export industries. The kiwifruit industry advocates a very cautious public policy position, while the dairy industry has been a strong advocate for the commercial development of genetic modification. We demonstrate that these industries draw (...) on multiple identities and rationalities to negotiate, express, and elaborate their positions on genetic modification, informed variously by discourses of risk, science, the political economy of the marketplace, and images of the ‘natural’ environment. We suggest that exploring how organizations seek to influence controversial socio-political issues through the management of multiple identities may facilitate greater understanding of viewpoints often represented in the media as two distinct polarities; that is as either ‘for’ or ‘against’ the issues. (shrink)

The halal food markets, catering to the dietary concerns of Muslims, have grown worldwide. Literature has discussed growing halal markets, particularly meat, and competing forms of certification to address quality and other concerns of Muslim consumers. Yet, discussions about genetically engineered food in the Muslim world are comparatively new. The GE debates also do not address diversity of opinions in the Islamic world about the halal status of GE food despite efforts to reach a consensus. This paper integrates debates on (...) GE food and halal certification. It focuses on three major issues: The factors that affect the growth of halal markets, different interpretations of GE food in the Islamic world, and the reasons for lack of consensus on the halal status of GE food through a case study of Turkey. It argues that fragmented halal markets, in which diverse actors from the state to the industry have different interests, and the complexity of GE food make it difficult to reach a consensus on the halal status of GE food. Divergence on the halal status of GE food presents further challenges for Muslim consumers who desire to access healthy and religiously proper food in global agri-food systems. (shrink)

In the life sciences, where large data sets are increasingly setting the stage for research, the role of bioinformatics is expanding. This has far-reaching consequences, not only for the way research is done, but also for the way this research affects our understanding of human identity. Using two case studies of practices involving bioinformatics, the software program Structure and the Genome of the Netherlands project, I will argue that bioinformatics and its tools can be understood as ‘infrastructure’ as described (...) by Bowker and Star. A number of value decisions are involved in the development of such tools. However, once the tools are ready for use, these values tend to blend into the background of the research. This may lead to the ‘naturalisation’ and ‘essentialisation’ of value-imbued aspects of population identities such as nationality, ethnicity and race. (shrink)

This book considers all aspects of privacy and security relating to an individual's DNA, with a concentration on fundamental human rights as well as specific cases and examples, in addressing greater security and privacy in the modern world.

Mitochondrial replacement techniques are designed to allow couples to have children without passing on mitochondrial diseases. Recently, Giulia Cavaliere and César Palacios-González argued that prospective parents have the right to use MRTs to pursue genetic relatedness, such that some same-sex couples and/or polygamous triads could use the process to impart genetic relatedness between a child and more of its caregivers. Although MRTs carry medical risks, Cavaliere and Palacios-González contend that because MRTs are identity-affecting, they do not cause (...) harm to an existing human being, and our intuitions otherwise arise from the non-identity problem. Here, I review several attempts to address the non-identity problem, and propose a solution to the problem. Furthermore, I argue that regardless of one’s stance on whether MRTs are identity-affecting, the use of MRTs to pursue genetic relatedness alone falls outside the scope of the medical profession, as they involve substantive medical risk for no medical benefit. (shrink)

Using the two cases of the Icelandic Health Sector Database and Russian initiatives in biobanking, the article criticizes the view of narratives and imaginaries as a sufficient and unproblematic means of shaping public understanding of genetics and justifying population-wide projects. Narrative representations of national biobanking engage particular imaginaries that are not bound by the universal normative framework of human rights, promote affective thinking, distract the public from recognizing and discussing tangible ethical and socioeconomic issues, and harm trust in science and (...) technology. In the Icelandic case, the presentation of the project in association with national imaginaries concealed its market identity and could lead to the commodification of biodata. In the Russian case, framing in terms of "genetic sovereignty" and "civilizational code" offers pretexts for state securitization. Adherence to normative framework of human rights and public discussion of genetics in an argumentative and factual mode can counter these trends. (shrink)

Over the years a number of countries have abolished anonymous gamete donation and shifted toward open-identity policies. Donor-conceived children are said to have a fundamental “right to know” the identity of their donor. In this article, we trace the arguments that underlie this claim and question its implications. We argue that, given the status attributed to the right to know one's gamete donor, it would be discriminatory not to extend this right to naturally conceived children with misattributed paternity. (...) One way to facilitate this would be through routine paternity testing at birth. While this proposal is likely to raise concerns about the conflicting interests and rights of other people involved, we show that similar concerns apply to the context of open-identity gamete donation. Unless one can identify a rational basis for treating the two groups differently, one's stance toward both cases should be the same. (shrink)

For several decades, molecular genetics have given rise to a new order of phenomena, profoundly disturbing the classic ideas that men have of their identity and their place in the universe. What becomes of the classic figure of man when hybridizations permit the systematic crossing of the frontiers between species? What do the possibilities opened by cloning and especially the grafting of foreign genes in mammals mean to us? What happens to the classic structures of relationship when the introduction (...) of foreign genes into the cells of embryos allows us to obtain individuals that are heirs of the genetic patrimony of eight or twelve different parents? The list of all these strange phenomena would be long, and the disquieting nature of the results thus obtained gives spectacular effects that, for the scientific mind, are not satisfactory. It is thus in a different perspective that we must reflect on the rapid irruption of this new order of phenomenality brought about through the genetic approach. (shrink)

While in this paper I focus on adoptees, my argument is applicable to donor-conceived children and children of misattributed paternity. I address some of the noted risks of closed adopted and the benefits of open adoption, which is more in keeping with Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which provides all children with a right to know about their genetic parents and which the Australian government ratified in 1980.

Over the years a number of countries have abolished anonymous gamete donation and shifted toward open-identity policies. Donor-conceived children are said to have a fundamental “right to know” the identity of their donor. In this article, we trace the arguments that underlie this claim and question its implications. We argue that, given the status attributed to the right to know one's gamete donor, it would be discriminatory not to extend this right to naturally conceived children with misattributed paternity. (...) One way to facilitate this would be through routine paternity testing at birth. While this proposal is likely to raise concerns about the conflicting interests and rights of other people involved, we show that similar concerns apply to the context of open-identity gamete donation. Unless one can identify a rational basis for treating the two groups differently, one's stance toward both cases should be the same. (shrink)

Prenatal diagnosis, especially noninvasive prenatal testing, has changed the experience of pregnancy, prenatal care and responsibilities in Israel and Germany in different ways. These differences reflect the countries' historical legacies, medico-legal policies, normative and cultural identities. Building on this observation, the contributors of this book present conversations between leading scholars from Israel and Germany based on an empirical bioethical perspective, analyses about the reshaping of 'life' by biomedicine, and philosophical reflections on socio-cultural claims and epistemic horizons of responsibilities. Practices and (...) discussions of reproductive medicine transform the concepts of responsibility and irresponsibility. (shrink)

When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: what are the criteria for a person's continuing existence? When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception? This book develops accounts of both senses of identity, arguing that both are normatively important, and is unique in its exploration of a range of issues in bioethics through the lens of identity. (...) Defending a biological view of our numerical identity and a framework for understanding narrative identity, DeGrazia investigates various issues for which considerations of identity prove critical: the definition of death; the authority of advance directives in cases of severe dementia; the use of enhancement technologies; prenatal genetic interventions; and certain types of reproductive choices. He demonstrates the power of personal identity theory to illuminate issues in bioethics as they bring philosophical theory to life. (shrink)

The science of genetics is undergoing a paradigm shift. Recent discoveries, including the activity of retrotransposons, the extent of copy number variations, somatic and chromosomal mosaicism, and the nature of the epigenome as a regulator of DNA expressivity, are challenging a series of dogmas concerning the nature of the genome and the relationship between genotype and phenotype. According to three widely held dogmas, DNA is the unchanging template of heredity, is identical in all the cells and tissues of the body, (...) and is the sole agent of inheritance. Rather than being an unchanging template, DNA appears subject to a good deal of environmentally induced change. Instead of identical DNA in all the cells of the body, somatic mosaicism appears to be the normal human condition. And DNA can no longer be considered the sole agent of inheritance. We now know that the epigenome, which regulates gene expressivity, can be inherited via the germline. These developments are particularly significant for behavior genetics for at least three reasons: First, epigenetic regulation, DNA variability, and somatic mosaicism appear to be particularly prevalent in the human brain and probably are involved in much of human behavior; second, they have important implications for the validity of heritability and gene association studies, the methodologies that largely define the discipline of behavior genetics; and third, they appear to play a critical role in development during the perinatal period and, in particular, in enabling phenotypic plasticity in offspring. I examine one of the central claims to emerge from the use of heritability studies in the behavioral sciences, the principle of minimal shared maternal effects, in light of the growing awareness that the maternal perinatal environment is a critical venue for the exercise of adaptive phenotypic plasticity. This consideration has important implications for both developmental and evolutionary biology. (shrink)

Parfit’s (1984) Non-Identity Problem provides a strong line of argument that we cannot be harmed by pre-conception choices or actions. I argue that we can no longer appeal to the Non-Identity problem in order to justify using pre-conception genetic screening and selection techniques as a harmless tool to determine the genetic constitution of future individuals. My criticism of the Non-Identity problem is based on a rejection of the metaphysical foundations of Parfit’s argument - Kripke’s (1980) (...) essentialist arguments for the necessity of origin. I offer an alternative account of modal harms based on counterpart theory such as that offered by David Lewis (1986). On this account, individuals can make legitimate harm claims in regard to pre-conception choices made in determining their genetic constitution by appeal to their counterparts across possible worlds. (shrink)

Parfit’s (1984) Non-Identity Problem provides a strong line of argument that we cannot be harmed by pre-conception choices or actions. I argue that we can no longer appeal to the Non-Identity problem in order to justify using pre-conception genetic screening and selection techniques as a harmless tool to determine the genetic constitution of future individuals. My criticism of the Non-Identity problem is based on a rejection of the metaphysical foundations of Parfit’s argument - Kripke’s (1980) (...) essentialist arguments for the necessity of origin. I offer an alternative account of modal harms based on counterpart theory such as that offered by David Lewis (1986). On this account, individuals can make legitimate harm claims in regard to pre-conception choices made in determining their genetic constitution by appeal to their counterparts across possible worlds. (shrink)

Bioconservative commentators argue that parents should not take steps to modify the genetics of their children even in the name of enhancement because of the damage they predict for values, identities and relationships. Some commentators have even said that adults should not modify themselves through genetic interventions. One commentator worries that genetic modifications chosen by adults for themselves will undermine moral agency, lead to less valuable experiences and fracture people's sense of self. These worries are not justified, however, (...) since the effects of modification will not undo moral agency as such. Adults can still have valuable experiences, even if some prior choices no longer seem meaningful. Changes at the genetic level will not always, either, alienate people from their own sense of self. On the contrary, genetic modifications can help amplify choice, enrich lives and consolidate identities. Ultimately, there is no moral requirement that people value their contingent genetic endowment to the exclusion of changes important to them in their future genetic identities. Through weighing risks and benefits, adults also have the power to consent to—and assume the risks of—genetic modifications for themselves in a way not possible in prenatal genetic interventions. (shrink)

New genetic technologies and their applications in biomedicine have important implications for social identities in contemporary societies. In medicine, new genetics is increasingly important for the identification of health and disease, the imputation of personal and familial risk, and the moral status of those identified as having genetic susceptibility for inherited conditions. There are also consequent transformations in national and ethnic collective identity, and the body and its investigation is potentially transformed by the possibilities of genetic (...) investigations and modifications (including the highly controversial terrains of reproductive technologies and the use of human embryos in biomedical research). The papers in this volume, drawn from an international array of authors, address these issues from a variety of national, disciplinary and empirical standpoints. An informative read for postgraduates and professionals in the fields of sociology, social anthropology, science and technology studies, and environmental studies, the chapters comprise empirically based and theoretically informed discussions of key sociological, anthropological, political and ethical issues. Using the resources of a wide range of social science disciplines to provide a comparative approach to complex issues, this superb collection explores the local and global consequences of the new genetics, and analyzes the social implications of these advances for identity formation in a period of rapid social change. (shrink)

This is a review essay of two books published in 2021 on the history of human heredity-genetics/genomics investigations—in the Middle East. Both books are structured comparatively. Both books grapple with the many uses of biology in nationalizing projects in the Middle East and the unavoidable tension between these particularizing projects and the scientific claim of biology to universality. Furthermore, both grapple with issues of classifications of humans and their uses in biology: the presumably biological human classifications of race, ethnos, and (...) ancestry, and the properly sociocultural ones, such as historical-traditional, by language, by religion. Combined, the two books offer a keen gaze on the complex entwinement of genetics and nationalism in the Middle East from WWI to the present. (shrink)

Bioconservative commentators argue that parents should not take steps to modify the genetics of their children even in the name of enhancement because of the damage they predict for values, identities and relationships. Some commentators have even said that adults should not modify themselves through genetic interventions. One commentator worries that genetic modifications chosen by adults for themselves will undermine moral agency, lead to less valuable experiences and fracture people's sense of self. These worries are not justified, however, (...) since the effects of modification will not undo moral agency as such. Adults can still have valuable experiences, even if some prior choices no longer seem meaningful. Changes at the genetic level will not always, either, alienate people from their own sense of self. On the contrary, genetic modifications can help amplify choice, enrich lives and consolidate identities. Ultimately, there is no moral requirement that people value their contingent genetic endowment to the exclusion of changes important to them in their future genetic identities. Through weighing risks and benefits, adults also have the power to consent to—and assume the risks of—genetic modifications for themselves in a way not possible in prenatal genetic interventions. (shrink)

One of the most difficult issues to sort out morally is our obligation to future generations. Most individuals feel that they do indeed have some kind of obligation, but face difficulty in explaining the exact nature of the obligation. For one, it seems impossible to know the wants and desires of future generations, and furthermore the existence of the persons we are obligated to is entirely dependent upon the choices that we in fact make. In essence, we could shape future (...) generations so that they desire exactly what we provide for them. It seems that no matter what principle we adopt that is based upon these potential individuals we are led to absurd conclusions. Gregory Kavka calls this moral grappling the Paradox of Future Individuals. I believe that the ethical concerns surrounding genetic engineering should be seen as a specific instantiation of this Paradox and that by examining both we may be able to come up with some sort of working solution. Derek Parfit pleads ignorance as to a solution to this Paradox after an extensive exegesis on the issue, but as we may not be that far from shopping a genetic supermarket to determine the characteristics of our children I don’t believe we can settle for that conclusion. We will begin by examining the Paradox and suggested solutions to the Paradox. Next I will address how the Paradox relates directly to genetic engineering and discuss how rights-based arguments aimed against genetic engineering fail because of the nature of identity. Then I will consider how David Heyd’s Genero-centric principle applies to genetic engineering specifically and how a modified version of that principle may guide us out of the Paradox of Future Individuals in general. This solution may not be acceptable to utilitarian sensibilities, but it is because the numbers don’t add up that we may need to appeal to a different principle entirely. (shrink)

The following seems to be a truism in modern day philosophy: No agent can have had other parents (IDENTITY). IDENTITY shows up in discussions of moral luck, parenting, gene editing, and population ethics. In this paper, I challenge IDENTITY. I do so by showing that the most plausible arguments that can be made in favor of IDENTITY do not withstand critical scrutiny. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I document the prevalence of (...) IDENTITY. In the second, I examine a defense of IDENTITY on the basis of genetic considerations. In the third, I examine a defense of IDENTITY that I call gamete essentialism. In the fourth, I return to genetic considerations to wrap up the paper. (shrink)