The book analyses moral and legal problems of assisted reproduction providing a pluralistic approach which combines principles of procreative beneficence, procreative nonmaleficence, reproductive autonomy and rationality with the meaning and nature of the parent-child relationship as the main criterion of moral assessment.

Jeremy Williams has argued that if we are committed to a liberal pro-choice stance with regard to selective abortion for disability, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of sex selective abortion. Here, I apply his reasoning to selective abortion based on other traits pregnant women may decide are undesirable. These include susceptibility to disease, level of intelligence, physical appearance, sexual orientation, religious belief and criminality—in fact any traits attributable to some degree to a genetic component. Firstly, I (...) review Williams’ argument, which claims that if a woman is granted the right to abort based on fetal impairment, then by parity of reasoning she should also be granted the right to choose sex selective abortion. I show that these same considerations that entail the permissibility of sex selective abortion are also applicable to genetic selection abortion. I then examine the objections to sex selective abortion that Williams considers and rejects, and show that they also lack force against genetic selection abortion. Finally, I consider some additional objections that might be raised, and conclude that a liberal pro-choice stance on selective abortion for disability entails the permissibility of selective abortion for most genetic traits. (shrink)

Parfit’s (1984) Non-Identity Problem provides a strong line of argument that we cannot be harmed by pre-conception choices or actions. I argue that we can no longer appeal to the Non-Identity problem in order to justify using pre-conception genetic screening and selection techniques as a harmless tool to determine the genetic constitution of future individuals. My criticism of the Non-Identity problem is based on a rejection of the metaphysical foundations of Parfit’s argument - Kripke’s (1980) essentialist arguments (...) for the necessity of origin. I offer an alternative account of modal harms based on counterpart theory such as that offered by David Lewis (1986). On this account, individuals can make legitimate harm claims in regard to pre-conception choices made in determining their genetic constitution by appeal to their counterparts across possible worlds. (shrink)

Parfit’s (1984) Non-Identity Problem provides a strong line of argument that we cannot be harmed by pre-conception choices or actions. I argue that we can no longer appeal to the Non-Identity problem in order to justify using pre-conception genetic screening and selection techniques as a harmless tool to determine the genetic constitution of future individuals. My criticism of the Non-Identity problem is based on a rejection of the metaphysical foundations of Parfit’s argument - Kripke’s (1980) essentialist arguments (...) for the necessity of origin. I offer an alternative account of modal harms based on counterpart theory such as that offered by David Lewis (1986). On this account, individuals can make legitimate harm claims in regard to pre-conception choices made in determining their genetic constitution by appeal to their counterparts across possible worlds. (shrink)

Should nonprejudiced reproducers genetically select embryos for light skin under background conditions of racism and colourism, given that darker skin will be disadvantageous for their child? Many intuit that there are strong moral reasons not to select light skin in these contexts. I argue that existing procreative principles cannot adequately account for this judgement. Instead, I argue that a more compelling rationale for this intuition is that such selection completes an instance of race or colour injustice. Given this, I (...) propose a new, complementary principle—Procreative Justice—which holds that reproducers have strong pro tanto moral reasons to avoid completing race and colour injustices via their selection choices. While these reasons may be overridden by competing considerations, they nonetheless continue to exert normative force. (shrink)

This chapter explores some implications of the view that the woman in the rubella case has a reason to defer conception. It considers its implications for the ethics of genetic selection. Genetic selection involves choosing to bring one child into existence rather than another, based in part on the genetic characteristics of the alternative possible children. The chapter argues that potential parents have reason to pursue genetic selection to avoid having a child with (...) a disposition to a wellbeing-reducing disease or disability, a disposition to other wellbeing-reducing traits, and dispositions that tend to reduce the wellbeing of others. It considers several objections that might be raised against genetic selection. Some people would advance these objections only against the more controversial forms of genetic selection mentioned earlier: selection against non-medical traits, and selection for the benefit of third parties. Others would advance these objections even against the least controversial kind of genetic selection: selection to avoid disease or disability. (shrink)

Is it right to use pre-implantation genetic diagnosis to select an embryo free of the gene for early-onset Alzheimer’s disease?A 30 year old woman with the gene for early-onset Alzheimer’s disease, who seems certain to develop the disease by the time she is 40, has used IVF and preimplantation genetic diagnosis to select an embryo that is free of the mutant gene. The woman, a geneticist, has given birth to a mutation-free child. This marks the first time that (...) preimplantation genetic diagnosis has been used to “weed out” an embryo with the defect.1–3Early-onset Alzheimer’s is an inherited, incurable disease striking people …. (shrink)

Fair skin is often regarded as a beauty ideal in many parts of the world. Genetic selection for non-disease traits may allow reproducers to select fair skin for the purposes of beauty, and may be justified under various procreative principles. In this paper I assess the ethics of genetic selection for fair skin as a beauty feature. In particular, I explore the discriminatory aspects and demands of such selection. Using race and colour hierarchies that many (...) would find objectionable, I argue that selection for beauty that is underpinned by such hierarchies is not a trivial selection. Given this, I claim that we should not make such selections. (shrink)

I note with interest the Controversy regarding a baby born free of an inherited predisposition to early onset Alzheimer’s disease through the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis .1,2 As the medical geneticist for the PGD programme for single gene disorders in Melbourne, Australia, I have seen many couples who have considered PGD for a wide range of genetic conditions. My observation is that many couples look to PGD for “milder” conditions and adult onset conditions for which they are (...) not comfortable to have traditional prenatal diagnosis and termination of pregnancy.An example of this is that in the last 11 years our unit has undertaken 13 prenatal diagnoses for Huntington’s disease from nine couples, whereas in the two years that we have been offering it we have had six requests for PGD for Huntington’s disease and three couples …. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn 2001, Julian Savulescu wrote an article entitled ‘Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children’, in which he argued for the genetic selection of intelligence in children. That article contributes to a debate on whether genetic research on intelligence should be undertaken at all and, if so, should intelligence selection be available to potential parents. As such, the question of intelligence selection relates to wider issues concerning the genetic determination of behavioural traits, (...) i.e. alcoholism. This article is designed as an engagement in the intelligence selection debate using an analysis of Savulescu's arguments to raise a series of problematic issues in relation to the ethics of parental selection of intelligence. These problematic issues relate to wider assumptions that are made in order to put forward intelligence selection as a viable ethical option. Such assumptions are more generic in character, but still relate to Savulescu's article, concerning issues of genetic determinism, private allocation and inequality, and, finally, individual versus aggregate justice. The conclusion focuses on what the implications are for the question of agency, especially if intelligence selection is allowed. (shrink)

The dominant view in bioethics is that embryo selection is in general morally preferable to gene editing because the latter involves risks that are absent in the former. What is less widely appreci...

The essays in this collection examine developments in three fundamental biological disciplines--embryology, evolutionary biology, and genetics--in conflict with each other for much of the twentieth century. They consider key methodological problems and the difficulty of overcoming them. Richard Burian interweaves historical appreciation of the settings within which scientists work, substantial knowledge of the biological problems at stake and the methodological and philosophical issues faced in integrating biological knowledge drawn from disparate sources.

The following is dedicated to promoting a version of the disability critique of negative genetic selection while navigating claims that launching such a critique threatens reproductive liberty or is unavoidably antichoice. I highlight problematic conceptual assumptions regarding genetics and choice made by proponents and opponents of selection alike and bring out the underlying ableist values of the prevailing conversation. Ableism is discrimination against persons on the basis of perceived disability. I conclude that the existing social and institutional (...) milieu surrounding genetic selection threatens persons who experience difference with stigma and its accompanying political and social disadvantages. My .. (shrink)

The disability critique of negative genetic selection is frequently accused of threatening reproductive liberty. This paper describes the disability critique and defends it against that objection. It also contends that the critique can work to deflate belief in genetic determinism. Recognizing the influence of genetic determinism helps advocate for existing persons in the disability community and protects reproductive liberty. The disability critique can point to genetic determinism but does not suggest a ban or obstacles to (...) the choice of negative genetic selection; therefore, it is not antithetical to reproductive liberty, as has been charged. (shrink)

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis allows the detection of genetic abnormalities in embryos produced through in vitro fertilization. Current funding models in Australia provide governmental subsidies for couples undergoing IVF, but do not extend to PGD. There are strong reasons for publicly funding PGD that follow from the moral principles of autonomy, beneficence and justice for both parents and children. We examine the objections to our proposal, specifically concerns regarding designer babies and the harm of disabled individuals, and show why (...) these are substantially outweighed by arguments for subsidizing PGD. We argue that an acceptance of PGD is aligned with present attitudes towards procreative decision making and IVF use, and that it should therefore receive government funding. (shrink)

A seleção genética de embriões humanos algumas vezes é criticada porque se considera que de alguma maneira ela possa prejudicar os portadores de deficiências que já existem. O artigo defende que essa crítica é injustificada. A primeira seção apresenta as questões morais colocadas pelos portadores de deficiências. Em seguida, são apresentados os três argumentos contra a seleção de embriões baseados nos direitos dos portadores de deficiências – o Argumento do Apoio Social, o Argumento da Diversidade e o Argumento da Ofensa. (...) Dentre eles, o terceiro foi considerado o mais consiste e, por isso, a terceira seção é dedicada a sua análise, cuja conclusão é de que a seleção de embriões é consistente com o respeito aos direitos dos portadores de deficiências. (shrink)

A seleção genética de embriões humanos algumas vezes é criticada porque se considera que de alguma maneira ela possa prejudicar os portadores de deficiências que já existem. O artigo defende que essa crítica é injustificada. A primeira seção apresenta as questões morais colocadas pelos portadores de deficiências. Em seguida, são apresentados os três argumentos contra a seleção de embriões baseados nos direitos dos portadores de deficiências – o Argumento do Apoio Social, o Argumento da Diversidade e o Argumento da Ofensa. (...) Dentre eles, o terceiro foi considerado o mais consiste e, por isso, a terceira seção é dedicada a sua análise, cuja conclusão é de que a seleção de embriões é consistente com o respeito aos direitos dos portadores de deficiências. (shrink)

A seleção genética de embriões humanos algumas vezes é criticada porque se considera que de alguma maneira ela possa prejudicar os portadores de deficiências que já existem. O artigo defende que essa crítica é injustificada. A primeira seção apresenta as questões morais colocadas pelos portadores de deficiências. Em seguida, são apresentados os três argumentos contra a seleção de embriões baseados nos direitos dos portadores de deficiências – o Argumento do Apoio Social, o Argumento da Diversidade e o Argumento da Ofensa. (...) Dentre eles, o terceiro foi considerado o mais consiste e, por isso, a terceira seção é dedicada a sua análise, cuja conclusão é de que a seleção de embriões é consistente com o respeito aos direitos dos portadores de deficiências. (shrink)

Since the introduction of mathematical population genetics, its machinery has shaped our fundamental understanding of natural selection. Selection is taken to occur when differential fitnesses produce differential rates of reproductive success, where fitnesses are understood as parameters in a population genetics model. To understand selection is to understand what these parameter values measure and how differences in them lead to frequency changes. I argue that this traditional view is mistaken. The descriptions of natural selection rendered by (...) population genetics models are in general neither predictive nor explanatory and introduce avoidable conceptual confusions. I conclude that a correct understanding of natural selection requires explicitly causal models of reproductive success. *Received May 2006; revised December 2006. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Kansas State University, 201 Dickens Hall, Manhattan, KS 66506; e‐mail: [email protected] . (shrink)

This article analyzes the main reasons offered by the literature in relation to the question of whether pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and selection should be allowed in the context of assisted reproduction techniques to avoid the birth of children with disabilities. The bioethical literature faces a challenge from the disability discourse. When the oppressive social dimension of disability is taken into account, it results in a series of questions that could challenge the most settled conclusions of the bioethical debate. (...) However, the social model has not been without criticism and one of them, the underestimation of the importance of biological traits origin against a disability of social origin, resonates particularly in the debate on preimplantation genetic selection. (shrink)

In its recent statement 'Sex Selection and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis', the Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine concluded that preimplantation genetic diagnosis for sex selection for non-medical reasons should be discouraged because it poses a risk of unwarranted gender bias, social harm, and results in the diversion of medical resources from genuine medical need. We critically examine the arguments presented against sex selection using preimplantation genetic diagnosis. We argue that sex (...) class='Hi'>selection should be available, at least within privately funded health care. (shrink)

abstract Criminal behaviour is but one behavioural tendency for which a genetic influence has been suggested. Whilst this research certainly raises difficult ethical questions and is subject to scientific criticism, one recent research project suggests that for some families, criminal tendency might be predicted by genetics. In this paper, supposing this research is valid, we consider whether intervening in the criminal tendency of future children is ethically justifiable. We argue that, if avoidance of harm is a paramount consideration, such (...) an intervention is acceptable when genetic selection is employed instead of genetic enhancement. Moreover, other moral problems in avoiding having children with a tendency to criminal behaviour, such as the prospect of social discrimination, can also be overcome. (shrink)

We report here on recent developments in Israel on the issue of sex selection for nonmedical reasons by preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Sex selection for medical reasons is generally viewed as uncontroversial and legal in European and American law. Its use for nonmedical reasons is generally illegal in European countries. In the United States, it is not illegal, although in the opinion of the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, it is problematic. This position is (...) undergoing reconsideration, albeit in a limited way. (shrink)

Anti-selection occurs when information asymmetry exists between insurers and applicants. When an applicant knows they are at high risk of loss, but the insurer does not, the applicant may try to use this knowledge differential to secure insurance at a lower premium that does not match risk.

The debate on whether insurance companies should be allowed to use results of individuals’ genetic tests for underwriting purposes has been both lively and increasingly relevant over the past two decades. Yet there appears to be no widely agreed upon resolution regarding appropriate and effective regulation. There exists today a gamut of recommendations and actual practices addressing this phenomenon ranging from laissez-faire to voluntary industry moratoria to strict legal prohibition. One obvious reason for such a variance in views and (...) approaches is that there are competing bases for evaluating the outcomes of restricting insurers’ use of such information. For example, an outright ban on the use of genetic test results may seem the best method for protecting against unfair discrimination, while allowing their use may seem to be the best way to foster efficiency in the market for insurance. However, there is also a lack of understanding about how restricting the use of genetic information would play out in the market through the so-called phenomenon of adverse selection. Using economic analysis, we discuss how the type of adverse selection that occurs in insurance markets affects various arguments both in favour and against an outright ban on insurers’ use of genetic tests for pricing insurance. We review arguments based on moral principles . Practical concerns from the insurance industry based on actuarial principles and economic efficiency are also compared. Each perspective is shown to lead to a range of conflicting recommendations about how genetic information should be regulated and these conclusions depend critically on whether one conducts the analysis from the ex ante temporal perspective , from the interim temporal perspective , or from the ex post temporal perspective. (shrink)

By using preimplantation haplotype diagnosis, prospective parents are able to select embryos to implant through in vitro fertilization. If we knew that the naturally-occurring (but theoretical) MoralKinder (MK+) haplotype would predispose individuals to a higher level of morality than average, is it permissible or obligatory to select for the MK+ haplotype? I.e., is it moral to select for morality? This paper explores the various potential issues that could arise from genetic moral enhancement.

Advances in reproductive genetic engineering have the potential to transform human lives. Not only do they promise to allow us to select children free of diseases, they can also enable us to select children with desirable traits. In this paper, I consider two clusters of arguments for the moral permissibility of reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Perfectionist View and the Libertarian View; and two clusters of arguments against reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Human (...) Nature View and the Motivation View. I argue that an adequate theory of the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering should take into account insights gained from these views. (shrink)

In the scientific literature on religious evolution, two competing theories appeal to group selection to explain the relationship between religious belief and altruism, or costly, prosocial behavior. Both theories agree that group selection plays an important role in cultural evolution, affecting psychological traits that individuals acquire through social learning. They disagree, however, about whether group selection has also played a role in genetic evolution, affecting traits that are inherited genetically. Recently, Jonathan Haidt has defended the most (...) fully developed account based on genetic group selection, and I argue here that problems with this account reveal good reasons to doubt that genetic group selection has played any important role in human evolution at all. Thus, considering the role of group selection in religious evolution is important not just because of what it reveals about religious psychology and religious evolution, but also because of what it reveals about the role of group selection in human evolution more generally. (shrink)

Recent scientific advances in the field of gene editing have led to a renewed discussion on the moral acceptability of human germline modifications. Gene editing methods can be used on human embryos and gametes in order to change DNA sequences that are associated with diseases. Modifying the human germline, however, is currently illegal in many countries but has been suggested as a ‘last resort’ option in some reports. In contrast, preimplantation genetic diagnosis is now a well-established practice within reproductive (...) medicine. Both methods can be used to prevent children from being born with severe genetic diseases. This paper focuses on four moral concerns raised in the debate about germline gene editing and applies them to the practice of PGD for comparison: Violation of human dignity, disrespect of the autonomy and the physical integrity of the future child, discrimination of people living with a disability and the fear of slippery slope towards immoral usage of the technology, e.g. designing children for specific third party interests. Our analysis did not reveal any fundamental differences with regard to the four concerns. We argue that with regard to the four arguments analyzed in this paper germline gene editing should be considered morally as acceptable as the selection of genomes on the basis of PGD. However, we also argue that any application of GGE in reproductive medicine should be put on hold until thorough and comprehensive laws have been implemented to prevent the abuse of GGE for non-medical enhancement. (shrink)

Recent research into human origins has largely focused on deducing past events and processes from current patterns of genetic variation. Some human genes possess unexpectedly low diversity, seemingly resulting from events of the late Pleistocene. Such anomalies have previously been ascribed to population bottlenecks or selection on genes. For four species of matrilineal whale, evidence suggests that cultural evolution may have reduced the diversity of genes which have similar transmission characteristics to selective cultural traits, through a process called (...) cultural hitchhiking. Cultural evolution is characteristic of human societies and so should be considered as a potential determinant of human genetic diversity. A stochastic simulation of gene and cultural dynamics in an array of hunter-gatherer tribes shows that cultural selection has the potential to severely reduce genetic diversity if: inter-tribe gene flows are reasonably low (<~0.6-15 genes/tribe/generation); cultural evolution changes fitness by >~0.3-3%/generation; and fitness is changed more by cultural innovation within a tribe than cultural assimilation from neighboring tribes. Thus cultural hitchhiking may explain low diversity and short coalescence times in mitochondrial and, especially, Y-linked human genes. (shrink)

Congenitally infertile woman such as those with Turner syndrome or Mayer Rokitansky-Kuster-Hauser syndrome have available the technologies of oocyte harvestation, cryropreservation, in-vitro fertilization, and gestational surrogacy in order to have genetically related offspring. Since congenital infertility results in a variety of experiences that impacts on nearly every aspect of a person’s life, in the future it is possible that these women might desire a congenitally infertile child through the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis so as to share this common (...) bond. While infertility results in a relatively normal quality of life, it is morally wrong to necessitate the future use of infertility services with its variable success rate on a child. Also, whereas the woman has fundamental reproductive autonomy, she lacks the substantive autonomy regarding the specific characteristics of her child. Finally, the infertile community does exhibit a strong presence, but it lacks characteristics that define it as a culture. (shrink)

We consider whether intervening in the criminal tendency of future children is ethically justifiable. We argue that, if avoidance of.

Social Values and Research in Human Embryology ROBERT G. EDWARDS and DAVID J. SHARP E 125 Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization: Unethical Experiments ...

The prelims comprise: Introduction Better Alternative Than Abortion? The Morality of Prenatal Diagnosis Prenatal Genetic Testing as Prevention The Line‐drawing Question Conclusion Note.

Recent research with human embryos, in different parts of the world, has sparked a new debate on the ethics of genetic human enhancement. This debate, however, has mainly focused on gene-editing technologies, especially CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats). Less attention has been given to the prospect of pursuing genetic human enhancement by means of IVF (In Vitro Fertilisation) in conjunction with in vitro gametogenesis, genome-wide association studies, and embryo selection. This article examines the different ethical (...) implications of the quest for cognitive enhancement by means of gene-editing on the one hand, and embryo selection on the other. The article focuses on the ethics of cognitive enhancement by means of embryo selection, as this technology is more likely to become commercially available before cognitive enhancement by means of gene-editing. This article argues that the philosophical debate on the ethics of enhancement should take into consideration public attitudes to research on human genomics and human enhancement technologies. The article discusses, then, some of the recent findings of the SIENNA Project, which in 2019 conducted a survey on public attitudes to human genomics and human enhancement technologies in 11 countries (France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and United States). (shrink)