Most people who have considered the matter have concluded that machines cannot be moral agents. Responsibility for acting on the outputs of machines must always rest with a human being. A key problem for the ethical use of AI, then, is to ensure that it does not block the attribution of responsibility to humans or lead to individuals being unfairly held responsible for things over which they had no control. This is the “responsibility gap”. In this paper, we argue that (...) the claim that machines cannot be held responsible for their actions has unacknowledged implications for the conditions under which the outputs of AI can serve as reasons for belief. Following Robert Brandom, we argue that, because the assertion of a claim is an action, moral agency is a necessary condition for the giving and evaluating of reasons in discourse. Thus, the same considerations that suggest that machines cannot be held responsible for their actions suggest that they cannot be held to account for the epistemic value — or lack of value — of their outputs. If there is a responsibility gap, there is also a “testimony gap.” An under-recognised problem with the use of AI, then, is to ensure that it does not block the attribution of testimony to human beings or lead to individuals being held responsible for claims that they have not asserted. More generally, the “assertions” of machines are only capable of serving as justifications for belief or action where one or more people accept responsibility for them. (shrink)

Concerns around Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in higher education have so far largely centred on assessment integrity, resulting in fundamental questions about students’ broader engagement with these tools remaining underexplored. This paper reports on the findings of a survey that forms part of a wider study, comprising the first empirical investigation of GenAI use by university students as a method of engaging with their academic readings. Our survey of 101 students shows that over half of all students surveyed used GenAI (...) to some degree as a method of engaging with their unit readings. Our findings suggest that students turn to these tools in response to time constraints and conceptual difficulties, while maintaining complex attitudes toward their use: most welcome their availability, yet few report trusting or relying on GenAI-generated interpretations or summaries of texts. Importantly, our data reveals substantial demographic variations in usage patterns, with international students and those taking subjects as electives showing significantly higher rates of AI use to assist with reading. This suggests GenAI tools may be serving as important mediators for attempting to overcome epistemic barriers to learning, particularly for students who face additional linguistic or disciplinary challenges. (shrink)

Although the concept of ‘true infinity’ is undoubtedly central to Hegel's philosophy, the Anglophone rehabilitation of Hegel as a post-Kantian critical philosopher has avoided any sustained interpretive confrontation with the concept. In this paper, I provide a revisionary reconstruction of Hegelian true infinity by engaging with Martin Hägglund's argument in This Life (2019) for the centrality of finitude to Hegel's philosophy. For Hägglund, Hegel's philosophy effects a ‘secular reconciliation’ with finitude by demonstrating that our mortality is not a negative condition (...) to be overcome; rather, mortality is constitutive of rational social agency or ‘spiritual life’. While Hägglund's interpretive emphasis on finitude prima facie occludes a consideration of the concept of true infinity, I show that Hägglund's understanding of spiritual life in terms of the dynamic of self-maintenance implicitly articulates a revisionary understanding of true infinity as instantiated in and through the activity of finite living rational beings. More specifically, I show that Hägglund's understanding of finitude as constitutive of spiritual life is grounded in three closely interrelated Hegelian meta-concepts, all of which Hegel derives in the second chapter of the Logic (‘Existence’): (a) the distinction between abstract and determinate negation; (b) the form of individuality as constituted through determinate negation; and (c) true infinity as the form of individuality understood in explicitly processual terms. I thus ground a deflationary interpretation of true infinity in Hegel's logical account of determinate individuality, and at the same time, contribute to This Life's ongoing critical reception by articulating its Hegelian logical infrastructure. (shrink)

The advent of ChatGPT, and the subsequent rapid improvement in the performance of what has become known as Generative AI, has led to many pundits declaring that AI will revolutionize education, as well as work, in the future. In this paper, we argue that enthusiasm for the use of AI in tertiary education is misplaced. A proper understanding of the nature of the outputs of AI suggests that it would be profoundly misguided to replace human teachers with AI, while the (...) history of automation in other settings suggests that it is naïve to think that AI can be developed to assist human teachers without replacing them. The dream that AI could teach students effectively neglects the importance of ‘learning how’ in order to ‘learn that’, that teachers are also role models, and the social nature of education. To the extent that students need to learn how to use AI, they should do so in specialized study skills units. Rather than creating a market for dodgy educational AI by lowering their ambitions about what they can offer, universities should invest in smaller class sizes and teachers who are passionate about their disciplines. To flourish in the future, just as much as they do today, societies will need people who have learned to think and not—or not just—intelligent machines. (shrink)

This commentary considers Robert Pippin's treatment of Hegel’s attempt to overcome Kant’s account of the distinction between (and necessary togetherness of) conceptual and intuitional representation. Pippin reads Hegel as committed to Kant’s discursivity thesis, namely, that thought is mediate and general, and thus reliant on sensible intuition for singular immediate contents – a position broadly in line with Wilfrid Sellars’ famous portrayal of Hegel as “that great foe of immediacy.” It is suggested, however, that such a reading makes it difficult (...) to provide an account of the concept/intuition distinction in Hegel that is not, at bottom, Kantian. Attention to the preservation of a certain Schellingean moment in Hegel’s mature thinking—the maintenance of a form of intellectual intuition—perhaps provides resources for an understanding of Hegel’s distinctively post-Kantian understanding of the relation between immediacy and mediation. In my view, intellectual intuition understood as the immediacy of thought is central to the Science of Logic’s attempt to generalise Kant’s distinction between (and claim for the togetherness of) concept and intuition as a logical relation, not one limited to sensibly conditioned cognition. (shrink)

This paper employs Axel Honneth’s recognition theory to interpret ‘quiet quitting’ – the practice of limiting work efforts to contracted requirements – as a strategic response by workers facing misrecognition in their work environment. Honneth argues that misrecognition in any one of three social spheres (the family, political society, and the workplace) constitutes disrespect and causes psychological harm. While Honneth contends that experiences of disrespect tend to motivate collective “struggles for recognition,” we suggest that quiet quitters present an alternative response (...) to disrespect, individually seeking recognition in other social spheres rather than engaging in collective action. Further, we draw on Honneth to suggest that the contemporary “entrepreneurial” work ethic – the widespread expectation that workers invest emotionally in their work role – can in practice undermine workplace recognition, contributing to quiet quitters’ compensatory emphasis on recognitive relations outside of work. This recognition-theoretical approach extends current discussions around quiet quitting and yields valuable insights for management theory and practice regarding the critical role of genuine employee recognition in promoting individual well-being and meaningful work experiences. (shrink)