ABSTRACTThis paper examines Martin Heidegger’s own interpretation of Being and Time in the Black Notebooks. The opening part addresses Heidegger’s singular notions of “thinking” and “questioning” which suggest a critically reflective stance, but involve an initiatory call to surrender to the hidden powers of Beyng. The second part addresses Heidegger’s lament in the Black Notebooks that Being and Time has not produced a “great enemy”, and his critique of the initial existentialist or “anthropological” receptions of his magnum opus. The third (...) part looks at how Heidegger’s thought moves beyond Being and Time, in light of the central role the thinker assigns to the German people in repeating the first “inception” of preSocratic thought, in order to overcome the legacies of Roman universalism, and what Heidegger as early as 1932 was calling “Jewish Christianity”. The final part addresses Heidegger’s conception of “the history of Beyng” as it is developed in the Black Notebooks of the early 1940s, from out of the account of “temporality” in Being and Time: a “history” in which Heidegger’s postulation of a need for the “annihilation“ ” of the essential enemy of the Volk become the lens through which Heidegger can read the Shoah as the “the peak of self-destruction in history”. (shrink)

In this article, I address (1) the anti-academic procedures by which Professor Thomas Sheehan affirms that I “continue” a “scam,” before (2) presenting in a greater detail my work on the notion of being as a code name (Deckname) in Heidegger. In sections 3, 4, and 5, I analyze the way in which Sheehan authoritatively hollows out the state of the debate around the interpretation of Heidegger and the weakness of his philological interpretation. Finally, in the last section, I return (...) to the necessity of the research that Sheehan’s “Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud Into Philosophy?” attempts to discredit. (shrink)

In this article, I address the anti-academic procedures by which Professor Thomas Sheehan affirms that I “continue” a “scam,” before presenting in a greater detail my work on the notion of being as a code name in Heidegger. In sections 3, 4, and 5, I analyze the way in which Sheehan authoritatively hollows out the state of the debate around the interpretation of Heidegger and the weakness of his philological interpretation. Finally, in the last section, I return to the necessity (...) of the research that Sheehan’s “Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud Into Philosophy?” attempts to discredit. (shrink)

L’allergie de Bolzano à l’œuvre de Hegel est un fait souligné dans presque toutes les présentations de sa pensée. Pourtant, conformément à son éthique intellectuelle, il a tenté de se familiariser avec cette philosophie qu’il rejetait plus que toute autre. Il a même, tardivement, reconnu qu’il pouvait s’y trouver des propositions justes. Afin d’affiner la compréhension de la relation de Bolzano à Hegel, on se propose ici de reconstruire la polémique des Trois essais sur Hegel en montrant qu’elle recoupe bien (...) des formes d’anti-hégélianisme devenues canoniques (la critique de la philosophie de l’histoire notamment), mais dans un contexte qui lui est propre et la spécifie. Dans un second temps, on reviendra sur les divergences philosophiques à l’origine de la nécessité pour Bolzano de critiquer un auteur et ses disciples, dans lesquels il voit une forme de régression intellectuelle et sociale, divergences qui imposent et orientent une lecture. Ces divergences sur la compréhension du rôle du langage et de la philosophie, du rapport des représentations au réel, ou sur la définition de l’infini, sont sous-jacentes à la polémique des Trois essais, mais on doit en chercher la formulation dans le reste du corpus bolzanien. (shrink)