This book presents a selection of David Gauthier's writings on Thomas Hobbes and the theory of political contractarianism. The essays cover topics including Hobbes on law, social contract theory, and public reason.

Ce recueil réunit des articles qui s'interrogent, depuis un ensemble de perspectives philosophiques des plus diverses, sur le rapport entre nature et éthique.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

I THE NATURE OF MAN To understand morals and politics, understand man. Leviathan , 'that mortal god, to which we owe under the immortal God, our peace and ...

The Logic of Leviathan The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes.

This rich collection will introduce students of philosophy and politics to the contemporary critical literature on the classical social contract political thinkers Thomas Hobbes , John Locke , and Jean-Jacques Rousseau . A dozen essays and book excerpts have been selected to guide students through the texts and to introduce them to current scholarly controversies surrounding the contractarian political theories of these three thinkers.

The revival of interest in contractarian theories of morals and politics may encourage us to enquire into the prospects for a contractarian theory of law. Such a theory would be normative, aiming, not at the best explanation or justification of our actual legal practices and institutions, but rather at a rational reconstruction of those practices and institutions from the perspective of agreement among maximizing individuals. It would offer a secular and instrumental rationale for law that requires no dubious assumptions about (...) the objectivity of values or the existence of moral order in the universe. Of course, such a reconstruction might fail, leading to a skeptical conclusion. Rational individuals, in a position to decide on their terms of interaction, might reject any structure that we should recognize as a legal framework. But this must seem unlikely. We may compare law with morality, recognizing that both have arisen in a framework of teleological and theological understandings that are themselves no longer plausible to us, without supposing that either must therefore be wanting from the perspective of rational agreement. (shrink)

In his recent paper, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” John Rawls makes use of a footnote to disown what to many readers must have seemed one of the most striking and original underlying ideas of his theory of justice, that it “is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice.” That Rawls should issue this disclaimer indicates, at least in my view, that he has a much clearer understanding of his theory, and its relationship (...) to rational choice than he did at the time that he wrote A Theory of Justice. As I note in Morals by Agreement, Rawls does not show that principles of justice are principles of rational choice. Hence, in appropriating the idea, I can claim diat I am undertaking a pioneering enterprise. No doubt Thomas Hobbes would have undertaken it had the resources of the theory of rational choice been at his disposal, but I do not intend to pursue counterfactuals in a search for historical antecedents. Moral theory as rational choice theory is, I claim, a new venture. (shrink)

Ce livre est une présentation de la philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin en confrontation avec le défi de la modernité. L’A. est bien placé pour cet acte à deux effets : présenter la pensée de saint Thomas, car sa formation dominicaine et la fréquentation assidue du Docteur angélique l’y ont préparé ; la présenter au défi de la modernité, puisqu’il a écrit d’autres ouvrages : Questions de la modernité (Paris, Fac éditions, 1985), Histoire et connaissance (Fribourg, Éd. universitaires, (...) 1997), s.. (shrink)

The overall objective of my current researches is to formulate and defend a variant of contractarian moral and social theory. Only a contractarian theory is, I claim, compatible with—and indeed required by—the theory of rational choice. I say “a variant” of contractarian theory because, for reasons I sketch in my paper “The Social Contract as Ideology”, there is a deep danger inherent in contractarian theory, the danger that it may be supposed that all human relationships are to be rationalized as (...) contractual. The prevalence of this view—and it is, I believe, increasingly prevalent—would return us to the natural condition of humankind envisaged by Thomas Hobbes, the war of all against all. But this is contractarianism carried to excess; I want to argue, although assuredly not here, that satisfaction of a contractarian requirement is not only rationally necessary, but also necessary if our moral and social practices are to yield that true and complete human sociability integral to any life worth living, and fundamental to a community of free and equal persons. (shrink)

The book provides an affirmative answer to the question whether there is a "philosophical ethics distinct from moral theology". Situating the question within the famous debates among Thomists over the existence and nature of Christian philosophy, McInerny engages the views of Gilson, Maritain, and Gauthier.

t. 1: 1. ptie. Introduction. 2. ptie. Traduction.--t. 2. Commentaire. (2 v.).

Reason, egoism, and utilitarianism, by H. Sidgwick.--Is egoism reasonable? By G. E. Moore.--Ultimate principles and ethical egoism, by B. Medlin.--In defense of egoism, by J. Kalin.--Virtuous affections and self-love, by F. Hutcheson.--Our obligation to virtue, by D. Hume.--Duty and interest, by H. A. Prichard.--The natural condition of mankind and the laws of nature, by T. Hobbes.--Why should we be moral? By K. Baier.--Morality and advantage, by D. P. Gauthier.--Bibliographical essay (p. 181-184).

In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.

This volume brings together for the first time a significant number of Reid's manuscript papers on natural history, physiology and materialist metaphysics. An important contribution not only to Reid studies but also to our understanding of eighteenth-century science and its context.

Dans ce recueil, j'ai voulu regrouper des textes publiés en français et en anglais dans les vingt dernières années; ces textes font écho à mes recherches dans le domaine des fondements de la logique, des mathématiques et de la physique dans une perspective constructiviste depuis un demi-siècle. C'est donc un parcours fondationnel sur la longue durée que j'ai voulu reproduire sans négliger la dimension critique des enjeux scientifiques de la logique, des mathématiques et de la physique avec la vigilance philosophique (...) qui remet aussi bien en question la philosophie traditionnelle dans ses retranchements métaphysiques. Cet assemblage n'est pas un florilège, mais plutôt un pot-pourri de textes parus dans des revues qui ne sont pas facilement accessibles pour les papers en anglais qui composent un medley d'articles scientifiques sans musique, mais avec un leitmotiv et des thèmes majeurs récurrents.J'ai ajouté des commentaires introductifs pour chacun des articles pour les situer dans le temps de leur publication et dans les débats actuels touchant le savoir scientifique."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

En littérature comme en peinture, le brouillage des hiérarchies est aussi constant que leur formulation, tant l'acte créateur se confond avec leur transgression et leur déplacement. L'importance théorique des genres paraît disproportionnée au regard de leur influence réelle sur la création littéraire et artistique. En revanche, leur impact se fait bien plus ressentir sur la réception des oeuvres, car ils fournissent des critères de jugement et permettent d'instaurer dans le système des beaux-arts une manière d'ordre politique. La transgression des hiérarchies (...) est bien souvent involontaire, et quand elle est volontaire, elle apparaît comme un geste iconoclaste, mais ce geste lui-même n'est pas loin de devenir institutionnel. S'il est aujourd'hui banal d'étudier la transgression des frontières génériques, le présent volume interroge la fascination que les hiérarchies ont toujours exercée, envers et contre toute réalité, et la séduction paradoxale des genres mineurs"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Loudness is the magnitude of the auditory sensation that a listener experiences when exposed to a sound. Several sound attributes are reported to affect loudness, such as the sound pressure level at the listener's ears and the spectral content. In addition to these physical attributes of the stimulus, some subjective attributes also appear to affect loudness. When presented with a sound, a listener interacts with an auditory object and can focus on several aspects of the latter. Loudness appears to differ (...) depending on how listeners apprehend this object, notably whether they focus on the sound that reaches their ears or that is produced by the source. The way listeners focus on the auditory object may depend on the stimulus itself. For instance, they might be more likely to focus on the sound emitted by the source if the latter is visible. The instructions given by the experimenters can also explicitly direct the listener's focus on the sound reaching the ears or emitted by the source. The present review aims at understanding how listeners focus on the auditory object depending on the stimuli and instructions they are provided with, and to describe how loudness depends on this focus. (shrink)

Feminist critics of the stigmatization of prostitution such as Martha Nussbaum and Sybil Schwarzenbach argue that the features of the practice do not, or at least need not, differ essentially from those of other more respected sorts of labor. I argue that even the least degraded forms of the current practice of prostitution remain objectionable on feminist grounds because patrons demand a semblance of sexual self-expression that engages discriminatory beliefs about women's sexuality.

아리스토텔레스의 작품들에 대한 토마스 아퀴나스의 주해의 의도는 최근 수 십 년 동안 제이퍼(H. V. Jaffa), 고티에(R. A. Gauthier), 브래들리(D. J. M. Bradley), 도이그(J. C. Doig), 엘더스(L. Elders) 등과 같은 여러 학자들 사이에서 종종 논쟁거리가 되어 왔다. 그 중에서도 용기라는 덕은 아리스토텔레스와 토마스 아퀴나스 사이에 있었던 논쟁들 중의 핵심적인 요소였다. 예를 들면, 드용(R. K. De Young)은 토마스 아퀴나스가 전쟁터에서의 용기보다는 오히려 순교자의 용기의 주요한 행위로서 인내만을 강조함으로써 아리스토텔레스의 용기 개념으로부터 갈라섰다고 주장한다. 이와 같은 그녀의 토마스 아퀴나스의 순교자의 인내에 관한 충실한 (...) 이해는 여러 관점들 안에서 성격상 철저하게 신학적이라는 것을 부정할 수는 없다.BR 그러나 드용의 주장과는 달리, 헤르트(J. A. Herdt)와 라이히버그(G. M. Reichberg)와 같은 학자들은 토마스 아퀴나스의 용기에 대한 설명이 더 광범위한 신학적인 전통들을 배경으로 하여 지속됨에도 불구하고, 가장 두드러진 것은 그의 용기에 관한 설명들이 아리스토텔레스로부터의 벗어남 또는 이탈이 결코 아니라고 주장한다. 그들은 그가 어떤 의미에서 아리스토텔레스에게 의존하고 있는 순교자의 용기의 주요한 행위로서 인내라는 전형을 주장하는 것 이외에도, 전쟁터 용기에 대한 아리스토텔레스의 분석을 거부하는 것이 아니라 오히려 아리스토텔레스를 능가하는 방식을 취하고 있다고 주장한다. 또한 그들은 그가 “은총은 자연을 완전하게 만든다.”라는 원리를 받아들임으로써 이러한 두 가지 형태들, 즉 후천적으로 획득된 용기와 주입된 용기 사이에 존재할 수 있는 다양한 관계들에 주의를 기울이고 있다고 주장하고 있다.BR 이 연구에서는 먼저, 연구자는 토마스 아퀴나스의 순교자의 용기와 인내에 관한 드용의 입장을 검토해보고자 한다. 이 방법의 일환으로서, 연구자는 드용이 지적한 내용들, 즉 순교자로서 인내와 신의 은총으로서 인내를 살펴볼 것이다. 그리고 나서 드용의 주장들에 대한 반론으로서 첫째, 연구자는 헤르트의 주장들을 중심으로 하여 토마스 아퀴나스가 신의 은총 없이도 시민의 덕으로서 인내를 가지는 것이 가능하다는 것을 분명하게 보여주고 있다는 것을 드러낼 것이다. 둘째, 본 연구자는 라이히버그의 주장을 중심으로 하여 토마스 아퀴나스는가 아리스토텔레스의 군대의 용기 또는 전쟁터에서의 용기를 대담함과 인내라는 두 가지의 정념들의 적절한 균형을 통하여 아리스토텔레스의 용기의 개념을 발전적으로 변용시켰다고 주장할 것이다. 결론적으로, 연구자는 토마스 아퀴나스가 아리스토텔레스의 용기의 개념을 단순히 그리스도교의 순교 또는 인내와 관련되어 있는 용기의 개념으로 변형시키려고 한 것이 아니라 아리스토텔레스의 부분적인 진리를 더 완전한 진리 쪽으로 나아갈 수 있는 지를 보여주고자 한 것임에 분명하다는 것을 제시하고자 한다. (shrink)

This is the first in a series of occasional volumes of original papers on predefined themes. The Mind Association will nominate an editor or editors for each collection, and may join with other organizations in the promotion of conferences or other scholarly activities in connection with each volume. This collection, published to coincide with the 400th anniversary of Thomas Hobbes's birth, focuses on central themes in his life and work. Including essays by David Gauthier, Noel Malcolm, Arrigo Pacchi, (...) David Raphael, Tom Sorrell, Francois Tricaud, and Richard Tuck, the book testifies to Hobbes's enduring importance as a major philosopher and helps to unravel those aspects of his intellectual biography that are relevant to a proper appreciation of his philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave1 David Gauthier Hume's account in the Treatise ofthe artificial virtues, their obligation and motivation, resists easy interpretation. Two passages, taken from his discussion of promises, will introduce, the problems I propose to examine. First: No action can be requir'd of us as our duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive, capable of producing the action. This (...) motive cannot be the sense of duty. A sense of duty supposes an antecedent obligation: And where an action is not requir'd by any natural passion, it cannot be requir'd by any natural obligation; since it may be omitted without proving any defect or imperfection in the mind and temper, and consequently without any vice. Now 'tis evident we have no motive leading us to the performance of promises, distinct from a sense of duty. If we thought, that promises had no moral obligation, we never shou'd feel any inclination to observe them.... But as there is naturally no inclination to observe promises, distinct from a sense of their obligation; it follows, that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that promises have no force, antecedent to human conventions.2 Ignore for the present the last sentence quoted. Hume seems clearly to be claiming that (1) an action can be a duty only if there is some motive to perform it other than a sense of duty, and (2) there is no motive to perform an act of promise-keeping other than a sense of duty. From (1) and (2) we may infer that (3) an act of promise-keeping can not be a duty. But since the sense of duty motivates an action only ifit is apprehended to be a duty, then from (2) and (3) we may conclude that (4) there is no motive to perform an act of promise-keeping that does not involve the mistaken apprehension that it is a duty. And the second passage: Afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs with interest, and becomes a new obligation upon mankind.... The difficulties, Volume XVIII Number 2 401 DAVID GAUTHIER that occur to us, in supposing a moral obligation to attend promises, we either surmount or elude. For instance; the expression of a resolution is not commonly suppos'd to be obligatory; and we cannot readily conceive how the making use of a certain form of words shou'd be able to cause any material difference. Here, therefore, we feign a new act ofthe mind, which we call the willing an obligation; and on this we suppose the morality to depend. But we have prov'd already, that there is no such act of the mind, and consequently that promises impose no natural obligation. (T 523) This time, ignore for the present the first sentence. The remainder would seem to confirm my reading ofthe first passage. Hume claims that (5) there is no natural obligation to perform an act of promise-keeping, but (6) we feign the willing of such an obligation. If, as Hume has claimed in the previous passage, (2) there is no motivation to perform an act ofpromise-keeping other than a sense ofduty, and if obligation and duty may be taken as equivalent, then we may conclude as before that (4) there is no motive to perform an act of promise-keeping that does not involve the mistaken apprehension that it is a duty. In his theory of the artificial virtues and vices, Hume considers "the three fundamental laws ofnature, thatofthestabilityofpossession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises" (T 526). It would seem, from the passages cited, that Hume must suppose that there is no real obligation to keep promises, but only a feigned obligation. And since the reasoning that Hume employs in the first ofthe passages that I have cited is explicitly identified with "that reasoning, which prov'd justice in general to be an artificial virtue" (T 518), it seems clear that he must also suppose that there is no real obligation to uphold stability of possession and its transference by consent—no real obligation to observe the other laws of justice or equity.3... (shrink)