This article examines happiness as an activity, modeled on pleasure in NE 10, 1-5. Aristotle is not proposing a choice, but defining the formal nature of happiness. Contemplation, as the activity of wisdom, constitutes happiness in the strict and formal sense. It has all the attributes of happiness, highest, most continuous, most pleasant, most self-sufficient, leisured, and an end in itself. Practical virtues are formally secondary, as including elements outside the activity of the best part and having leisure as their (...) end. Thus, amusements, practical activities and contemplation are integrated in the life of the sage, the contribution of each formally defined. (shrink)

Plotinus’ account of matter in Ennead III 6[26] 11-15 serves two purposes. The terms, evil and ugly, present the negative side of matter’s causality, providing for the change characteristic of the sensible world and the possibility of ontological evil and privation as well as of moral evil among human beings. The receptacle and other images from Plato’s Timaeus present the positive side of this causality, matter as allowing for the presence of forms in the bodies of the sensible world. Plotinus (...) explicitly articulates the linguistic problem surrounding the nature of matter, since language is derived from the corporeal and thus needs constant correction when applied to matter as incorporeal. His use of language, thus, always has two phases, first, capturing the nature of matter as aptly as possible, and second, highlighting the difference between matter and the image, analogy, or metaphor used to help explain it. (shrink)

Volume 35 contains papers and commentaries presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during academic year 2018-19. Works: Commentary on _De Anima_, Nicomachean Ethics. Topics: Humean motivation, memory-oblivion & myth, final causality and ontology of life.

_Charts the stages of the history of friendship as a philosophical concept in the Western world._.

Ennead IV 5[29] has been poorly served by translators and commentators, misreporting what Plotinus wrote and, with these mangled results, asserting that this part of his treatise on the “Problems about the Soul” is merely a disjointed series of doxographical fragments with little compelling contribution to make. More careful translation and analysis reveal something strikingly different and original. First, he gives a cogent critique of the theories of Plato and Aristotle concerning the body between and the role of daylight. Second, (...) he substitutes his own account in terms of both sympathy and the principle of two acts, explaining vision both during the day as well as at night, notably deficient in previous accounts. Third, he derives some surprisingly original corollaries about the nature of light and the source of color. (shrink)

If it were permitted by the editors, my comment could be titled, Plotinus: Thinker of Radical Matter. I will attempt to present Plotinus’s complex view of matter in II 4[12], which examines the nature of matter as the substrate in relation to the corporeal, with the different relation of qualitative and quantitative qualities to bodies and matter, and the consequent difference in the application of privation, ugly and evil to matter. An examination of comments about matter as the principle of (...) evil contrary to the Good and as the cause of the weakness of the soul in I.8[51].6 & 14 do not introduce any radical change in Plotinus’s understanding of matter. Radical matter remains so precisely as formless. (shrink)

Zubiri presents a critique of modernism and return to phenomena in primordial apprehension. Only 'notes' are apprehended; as real they need to be repossessed by logos or reason, related to other notes in the field or unified as the world. Zubiri seeks to overcome the dualism of sensing and knowing and introducing transcendent objects. His target extends to ancient and medieval philosophy, charged with introducing the problem. So he reads Plato's Sophist as positing being, known independent of the senses, and (...) the genera, derived deductively from being. This misreads Plato, reducing him to Parmenides. Rereading Plato, using Zubiri's scheme, reveals 'primordial apprehension' in the Theaetetus, with logos and reason in the Sophist. Like Zubiri, Plato's goal is to reconnect language and reality as apprehended. Unlike Zubiri, Plato sees communication as human dialogue, not just a feature of apprehended 'notes.' /// A apreensão primordial de Zubiri constitui uma crítica posmoderna e um retorno ao fenómeno. Segundo ele, o que se apreende são apenas 'notas'; estas, porém, exigem ser reassumidas pelo logos ou pela razão, encontrando-se sempre em relação com outras no campo que lhes é próprio ou unificadas enquanto mundo. Zubiri pretende sobretudo superar o dualismo entre sentimento e inteligência associado com a introdução de objectos transcendentais. A sua crítica extende-se à filosofia antiga e medieval, pois que, segundo ele, aqui se iniciou esta problemática da transcendentali-dade. Zubiri lê o Sofista precisamente como se Platão procedesse aqui a uma afirmação do ser, conhecido independentemente dos sentidos, e dos géneros, dedutivamente derivados do ser. O artigo pretende mostrar ser esta uma falsa interpretação de Platão, reduzindo-o a Parménides e, por isso, sugere uma releitura de Platão, baseada num esquema zubiriano, de modo a se poder discernir seja a noção de "apreensão primordial" no Teeteto ou de logos e razão no Sofista. Finalmente, mostra ainda como, tal como Zubiri, a meta de Platão está no estabelecimento de uma conexão entre a linguagem e a realidade apreendida. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, mostra como, ao contrário de Zubiri, a comunicação em Platão é vista como um verdadeiro diálogo humano e não apenas como aspecto de uma simples 'nota.'. (shrink)

Moutsopoulos provides a rich reading of the Greek philosophical tradition in relation to Greek culture and history, from the classical world, through the Byzantine period, to the reestablishment of Greek independence in the early nineteenth century. His thesis concerns the particularity of Greek culture, which is captured in a sense of freedom that serves as the basis for the development of Greek philosophy, and its universal contribution, especially to European history, but now also on the global scene. This may sound (...) ambitious and tending toward oversimplification, but this collection of articles, published in various places over the last thirty years, provides a picture of Greek philosophy not often appreciated and over a span of time rarely considered. (shrink)