HUME AND HIS FOLLOWERS HAVE TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO ESTABLISH THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES BY APPEALING SOLELY TO THE DEFINITIONS OF MIRACLE AND NATURAL LAW. HUME’S ARGUMENT TRADES UPON THAT PART OF THE DEFINITION OF MIRACLE WHICH PERTAINS TO THE NUMERICAL INSIGNIFICANCE OF MIRACULOUS EVENTS. HE DID NOT REALIZE THAT THE LARGE NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NON-REPEATABLE IRREGULAR EVENTS AND REPEATABLE REGULAR ONES LOGICALLY CANNOT BE USED AS A CRITERION BY WHICH TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENTIAL STATUS OF NUMERICALLY SMALL NON-REPEATABLE IRREGULAR EVENTS. (...) USING A SIMILAR STRATEGY, THE CONTEMPORARY HUMEAN APPEALS TO PART OF THE DEFINITION OF NATURAL LAW, TO THE IDEA OF ITS ESSENTIAL GENERALITY. WHETHER "ESSENTIALLY GENERAL" IS TAKEN TO MEAN AN INTRINSIC NATURAL NECESSITY OR A NECESSITY IMPUTED TO NATURE, IN NEITHER CASE CAN THE LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF MIRACLES BE ESTABLISHED. (shrink)

This paper uses a short dialogue between a determinist and a free-will advocate as a basis for exploring some of the elements of circular reasoning which have for centuries kept alive one of the classical debates of philosophy, the freedom-versus-determinism debate. The chronic circularity which infests both sides of the debate arises from a procedural asymmetry in the argument, which in turn is produced by the different metaphysical commitments of the debaters.

In order to show that opposition to capital punishment cannot be both moral and entirely unconditional, Hugo Bedau proposes a fantasy–world scenario in which the execution of a murderer restores his murder victim to life. Were such a world to exist, argues Bedau, the death penalty would then be morally right. The aim of this article is to show that Bedau's argument is mistaken, largely because capital punishment in his fantasy world would not be an instrument of perfect restitution, as (...) he thinks, but instead would be an instrument of unfair restitution. Two attempts are made to repair Bedau's fantasy–world argument, but neither of them is found to be successful. Consequently his fantasy world does not successfully provide the conditions under which opposition to capital punishment morally would have to cease. However, because capital punishment is morally wrong in his fantasy world it does not follow that it is morally wrong in this world. (shrink)

Some have argued that because factually meaningful assertions must be falsifiable, putative theistic assertions such as “God loves us” are not meaningful because they are not falsifiable. It is further suggested that every attempt to make a factually significant theistic assertion founders on the same shoal of falsifiability.

THE TWO-FOLD PURPOSE OF THIS DISCUSSION IS: (1) TO CRITICIZE THE FIRST THREE OF HUME�S REASONS FOR REJECTING AS UNRELIABLE THE HISTORICAL RECORDS OF MIRACLES; (2) TO DRAW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION WHICH CHALLENGES THE "A PRIORI" JUDGEMENT THAT AUTHENTIC MIRACLE REPORTS CANNOT FORM A RELIABLE PART OF HISTORY. HUME FAILED TO REALIZE THAT THE NATURALISTIC EXPLAINABILITY OF AN EVENT SAID TO BE A MIRACLE IS NOT LOGICALLY IMPLIED BY ITS ACCURATE DESCRIPTION.

Causal slippery slope arguments with moral conclusions are sometimes stronger than we think. Their strength may be missed either by overlooking the problems of human nature which support the arguments or, upon seeing the problems, by underestimating their influence upon human behaviour. This article aims to correct the oversight and the misjudgement by looking in some detail at four interrelated problems of human nature which have a direct bearing upon moral causal slope arguments.

Nearly three decades have passed since Antony Flew first issued his now famous falsification challenge: ‘What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?’ The purpose of the question is to challenge the sophisticated believer to describe a state of affairs in which a basic putative theistic assertion like ‘God exists’ would be false. If the believer admits that he cannot provide such a description (...) then, Flew would argue, he is admitting that at least his putative theistic assertion is compatible with every state of affairs; consequently it is factually meaningless. The reason for this is that every factually significant assertion must deny that some describable state of affairs obtains. To illustrate, just as when we draw a circle we simultaneously draw in and draw out two particular areas, so when we state a fact we simultaneously deny a fact. Here is the difficulty, Flew would say, in which the sophisticated believer puts himself when he uses putative theistic assertions: factually he denies nothing, hence factually he asserts nothing. (shrink)

The charge of homophobia, indiscriminately made in a large part of our Western culture today, is ill conceived, illogical and false. This sweeping charge may be pictured as a triangle of informal logical fallacies. The more prominent side, the one which the general public encounters first, is what I shall call the fallacy of turning the tables: the rhetorical device of making the source of criticism the object of criticism. The other side of the charge is the fallacy of equivocation. (...) The boundary of the term ‘homophobia’ is made so elastic that it can stretch around, not just phobias, but every kind of rational fear as well; and not just around every kind of fear, but also around every critical posture or idea that anyone may have about the practice of homosexuality. At the base of the charge, and undergirding the other two fallacies, is the fallacy of begging the question. A commitment to the complete acceptability of the practice of homosexuality enables its proponents to ‘know’ beforehand that all criticisms against it must originate in the defective psychology of the critic. (shrink)

In this article I shall aim at showing that there exists beneath the surface of many why-questions about human behaviour a nest of deterministic assumptions which can preclude their ever being truly answered. A symptom of the presence of these underlying assumptions can be observed in an explanation-seeking dialogue in which the questioner persistently tries to discover ‘why’ a certain human behaviour occurred. He repeats his why-question until he gets the type of answer he wants, but in the process he (...) effectively reasons in a circle. If the repeated questioning with its implied circular reasoning becomes chronic, then the questioner will beg the question with regards to the answer he desires and consequently run the risk of missing the truth. (shrink)