This work is, in large part, a series of refutations; it is also the author's Ph.D. thesis. First to be refuted is Russell's vicious circle principle as a general remedy for the solution of the paradoxes. The author rejects the classification of paradoxes into syntactic and semantic, since in his view there are no purely syntactic paradoxes. The distinction in logic between the uninterpreted syntactical aspect of a system and the system when given a determinate interpretation is held to be (...) untenable. Tarski's distinction between object-language and meta-language and his concept of semantically closed language are considered irrelevant for the solution of the Liar paradox. The author claims that the usual versions of the Liar paradox have the same structure as the Barber paradox, viz., [S ↔ ~S]. The author solves the Liar paradox by pointing out that it does not have a proper reference. Cantor's diagonal argument for the indenumerability [[sic]] of the real numbers is labeled as unsatisfactory. Since the diagonal number is dependent upon the real numbers in the constructed list, the author claims that this makes the diagonal number to be of a different nature and status than the real numbers in the list; thus we have what the author calls the dependence fallacy. The author also refuses to accept Cantor's nested interval proof of the indenumerability [[sic]] of the real numbers. Within the proof, two infinite sequences are constructed, each of which converges to a limit. Because the proof does not give a "definite rule of convergence," the author is not satisfied that the infinite sequences converge. Also rejected is Cantor's theorem. Other paradoxes analyzed are the Berry, Richard, heterological, "Richardian", Russell, Cantor, and Burali-Forti paradoxes.--T. G. N. (shrink)
This work is an introductory textbook for deductive logic being primarily concerned with truth-functional logic, but also containing an introduction to syllogisms with the application of Venn diagrams, an introduction to quantification theory, and a brief discussion of axiom systems. Harrison employs six logical operators in his truth-functional calculus, including both inclusive and exclusive disjunction. The six operators are initially defined by truth tables, but in the natural deduction presentation negation and conjunction are taken as primitive and the other connectives (...) are defined in terms of these two. The conditional and indirect methods of proof are included with the approach being essentially the same as that given in Copi’s Symbolic Logic. Categorical statements and syllogisms are analyzed from both hypothetical and existential viewpoints. The treatment of quantification theory includes two-place predicates and employs the four standard rules for generalization and instantiation. The book contains an abundance of explanations, examples, and exercises. Selected answers, usually for the odd numbered problems, are given in an appendix.—T. G. N. (shrink)
This book is an introductory logic text of moderate difficulty which contains added topics not usually found in an introductory book. The book has two parts--basic logic and advanced logic. The basic logic contains propositional logic through conditional proofs, syllogistic logic, the fundamentals of set theory and their application to both syllogistic and non-syllogistic inferences along with the use of Venn and Carroll diagrams, and concludes with predicate logic using the rules for Universal Instantiation, Existential Instantiation, Universal Generalization, and Existential (...) Generalization. The part on advanced logic begins by extending the predicate logic to identity, descriptions, and relations. A presentation of modal logic includes C. I. Lewis' modal systems S3, S4, and S5; modal logic with quantification; epistemic, doxastic, and deontic modalities; and mixed modalities. A chapter on the logic of ordinary language considers analytic statements, empty expressions, and equivalence and implication in ordinary language. The author also discusses "tools of analysis" such as definition, the theory of meaning, probability theory, and scientific inference. Each chapter concludes with a section entitled "Philosophical Applications" or "Philosophical Difficulties." One of these sections contains the author's version of Hartshorne's modal proof of Anselm's ontological argument. Answers are provided for the even-numbered exercises.--T. G. N. (shrink)
This volume offers to the English-speaking world a collection of important works by the eminent twentieth century logician, Jan Lukasiewicz, many of which are here translated into English for the first time. This edition differs significantly from the Polish edition which appeared in 1961—containing ten logic papers not appearing there and omitting articles primarily of interest to the Polish reader. In addition to writing in Polish, Lukasiewicz also published works in French, English, and notably in German, and sometimes translated his (...) own works from one language to another. One of the most valuable works on the history of logic is Lukasiewicz’ paper, "On the History of the Logic of Propositions". Lukasiewicz points out the difference between the two basic areas of formal logic, the logic of propositions and the logic of terms, undifferentiated before the development of modern mathematical logic. The understanding of this distinction leads Lukasiewicz to trace the history of propositional logic back to its original development by the Stoics, its further development by the medieval Scholastics, and its axiomatization by Gottlob Frege. The status of mathematical logic is discussed in various works. The most basic system is propositional logic, upon which depend the other logical disciplines and also mathematics. Mathematical logic, also called logistic, is independent of philosophy and espouses no philosophical viewpoint. Early in his career, Lukasiewicz refers to mathematical logic as the logic of algebra and uses mathematical symbolism to represent logical propositions. Later he introduces what we now call "Polish notation," in particular, "Cpq" for "if p, then q" and "Np" for "it is not the case that p" for the primitive functions, eliminating the need for punctuation. He adopts the symbols Π and Σ for quantification from Charles S. Peirce, and also brings to light the almost unknown fact that it was Peirce who invented the matrix method in 1885. The paper, "Investigations into the Sentential Calculus", written by Lukasiewicz and Tarski embodies the results of a decade of research on the sentential calculus initiated by Lukasiewicz at the University of Warsaw systematically compiling the contributions of five logicians: Lindenbaum, Sobocinski, Wajsberg, Tarski, and Lukasiewicz. The approach is metalogical and depends heavily upon set theoretic concepts; it covers both the matrix and axiomatic methods. One of the problems that preoccupied Lukasiewicz was that of determinism, which led to his development of three-valued logic. A proposition such as "I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of next year" is neither true nor false; a third truth value is needed, one which Lukasiewicz calls "the possible." Another area to which Lukasiewicz contributed is modal logic, proving that modal logic cannot be two-valued. Lukasiewicz’ analysis and axiomatization of Aristotle’s syllogistic is not included in the present volume since an English edition by Lukasiewicz on this topic is available. We have here briefly touched upon a few of Lukasiewicz’ numerous achievements in logic; the best means of appreciating them is to read his works.—T. G. N. (shrink)
Improving Your Reasoning is an expanded version of Chapter 10 of the author's larger work, Principles of Logic. The first chapter of Improving Your Reasoning is a general survey of arguments--deductive and inductive, valid and invalid, syllogistic and nonsyllogistic--and serves as an introduction for the rest of the book which deals only with fallacies. The types of fallacies are divided by chapter into the following principal categories: begging the question, pseudoauthority, irrelevant appeals, confusion, faulty classification, political fallacies, and inductive fallacies. (...) Each of these categories is further divided into a comprehensive range of sub-categories, with each sub-category presented in a short and easily understandable section. For example, inductive fallacies are divided into hasty generalization, accident, false cause, gambler's, faulty analogy, central tendency, misleading percentages, and misleading totals. Problems and answers are provided. This book may be used as a supplementary text for introductory logic.--T. G. N. (shrink)
This paperback is a programed text designed for teaching introductory logic, either in conjunction with a standard text based upon traditional logic or as a do-it-yourself supplement for students taking courses stressing symbolic logic. The student learns logical theory by answering a variety of short answer, objective type exercises. The correct answer is given directly below each question or exercise, and the student is required to cover the answer while working the exercise; the purpose of this immediate access to the (...) answer is to enable the student to determine quickly whether or not he comprehends the material. The content of the book concentrates primarily upon categorical statements, presenting both the existential and hypothetical interpretations of the square of opposition, but unfortunately continues to promulgate the historically inaccurate terminology of "Aristotelian" and "Boolean." [Categorical statements were first expressed as existential statements by Franz Brentano in 1874.] Categorical statements not in standard form are standardized, e.g., "No roaches feel despair" is standardized by being rewritten as "No roaches are entities who feel despair." In addition to considering the logical relations of opposition with respect to A, E, I, O statements, these same relations are extended to non-categorical statements, e.g., "George Washington did not die in Europe" and "George Washington did not die in Asia" are subcontraries, while "There is philosophical activity on Venus" and "There is philosophical activity in the universe" are alterns. Determining validity of syllogisms is based upon the distribution of terms, and also by the use of Venn diagrams. The traditional figures and moods of the syllogism are ignored, as is the distinction between major and minor terms, with these latter two being lumped together as end terms. Immediate inferences and non-syllogistic arguments are treated by Venn diagrams. One-, two-, three- and four-term Venn diagrams are utilized throughout a substantial part of the book.--T. G. N. (shrink)
Open peer commentary on the article “Making Sense and Meaning: On the Role of Communication and Culture in the Reproduction of Social Systems” by Raivo Palmaru. Upshot: The author addresses implications arising from socializing observer-dependent heuristics. Above all, Palmaru’s terminology is called into question since its conceptual deficiencies with regard to the relation between an observing system and its environments cause naturalistic fallacy. The author’s reply espouses a concise reanalysis of the complementary relations of fundamentally incomparable domains, namely the observer (...) and the social system. (shrink)
Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, later founder and President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, studied philosophy in the University of Vienna from 1872 to 1876, where he came under the powerful influence of Franz Brentano. We survey the role of Brentano’s philosophy, and especially of his ethics, in Masaryk’s life and work.