In the closed wards of mental health institutions, moral decisions are made concerning the use of forced seclusion. In this article we focus on how these moral decisions are made and can be improved. We present a case study concerning moral deliberations on the use of seclusion and its prevention among nurses of a closed mental health ward. Moral psychology provides an explanation of how moral judgments are developed through processes of interaction. We will make use of the Social Intuitionist (...) Model of Jonathan Haidt that emphasizes the role of emotions, intuitions and the social context in moral judgments and reasoning. We argue that this model can help to explain social dynamics in the context of enforced seclusion. In the discussion we explore how moral psychology can be complemented with the normative perspective of dialogical ethics to develop strategies for improving psychiatric practices. We conclude that social processes play an important role in moral deliberations and that moral development can be fostered by bringing in new perspectives in the dialogue. Moral case deliberation provides a practical tool to systematically organize moral reflections among nurses on the work floor. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the moral status of agricultural biotechnology and, more specifically, genetically modified crops by employing the hubris argument. The old notion of hubris, given to us by the ancient Greeks, provides a narrative from which we can understand ourselves and technology. Ronald Sandler offers us an understanding of hubris he claims gives us a prima facie reason and a presumption against the use of GM crops. I argue that Sandler’s hubris argument fails for several reasons: Sander (...) and many others fail to have a proper understanding of agriculture as an inherently technological practice which is radically different from ‘nature’; the notions of control and manipulation which are central to the concept of hubris are difficult to understand and use in the context of agriculture; trying to establish a prima facie reason against GM crops runs into serious difficulty since many GM crops are profoundly different from each other; and even if we accept Sandler’s argument of hubris, it actually plays no role in the reasoning and evaluation of the moral status of different GM crops. (shrink)

Only by distinguishing corporate, moral, social and legal responsibility can GM know how to weigh and respond to its various responsibilities. Corporate responsibility stems from the ends for which the corporation is formed. In addition the corporation is responsible for meeting the moral demands that come from the moral law. The corporation is responsible for meeting legitimate social demands proposed by society. If society uses the law to express its demands, the demands yield legal responsibilities. Those demands that are social (...) but neither moral nor legal may not be legitimate demands that GM must respond to at all. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the controversy over genetically modified canola (GM canola) in Australia as an ontological politics, drawing on recent work in Science and Technology Studies that extends actor-network theory and its commitment to the contingency of reality. I examine three different and overlapping performances of GM canola: as an agronomic object, a risk object and a market object. I focus on how each performance effects similarities and differences between GM and conventional canola that are productive of ontological (...) distinctions that make GM canola controversial. I argue this analysis offers useful insights that are not revealed by more traditional explanations of controversy. (shrink)

Only by distinguishing corporate, moral, social and legal responsibility can GM know how to weigh and respond to its various responsibilities. Corporate responsibility stems from the ends for which the corporation is formed. In addition the corporation is responsible for meeting the moral demands that come from the moral law. The corporation is responsible for meeting legitimate social demands proposed by society. If society uses the law to express its demands, the demands yield legal responsibilities. Those demands that are social (...) but neither moral nor legal may not be legitimate demands that GM must respond to at all. (shrink)

As new biotechnologies are developed, the parallels with GM crops are often drawn. In this paper, I consider GM animals and contrast them with GM crops. I use a systems of innovation perspective to consider innovation, product markets and regulatory systems and suggest that whilst there are some parallels between GM crops and animals there are also clear differences. There are differences in the techniques used, the availability of single genes useful for transfer and the acceptability of 'failures'. Existing animal (...) breeding techniques are competitive with GM technologies and dissemination of GM animals into a population is difficult and time consuming. The structure of the industry is different between crops and livestock with large multinational companies largely absent in the production of farm livestock for breeding. Additionally animal welfare and ethical aspects are widely recognised as important in the context of GM animals, but the likely impacts of welfare and ethicsbased regulation on any GM animal production is not clear. All these differences are potentially important for the future trajectory of the technology. I also suggest that at present, the development of GM animals is being pulled in different directions by the opening up of technological possibilities and the emphasis on animal welfare and notions of animal integrity. (shrink)

This paper examines the scientific controversy over the yields of genetically modified [GM] crops as a case study in epistemologically deep disagreements. Appeals to “the evidence” are inadequate to resolve such disagreements; not because the interlocutors have radically different metaphysical views (as in cases of incommensurability), but instead because they assume rival epistemological frameworks and so have incompatible views about what kinds of research methods and claims count as evidence. Specifically, I show that, in the yield debate, proponents and opponents (...) of GM crops cite two different sets of claims as evidence, which correspond to two rival epistemological frameworks, classical experimental epistemology and Nancy Cartwright's evidence for use. I go on to argue that, even if both sides of the debate accepted Cartwright's view, they might still disagree over what counts as evidence, because evidence for use ties standards of evidence to what is sometimes called the “context of application.”. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the ethical justifiability of patents on Genetically Modified (GM) crops. I argue that there are three distinguishing features of GM crops that make it unethical to grant patents on GM crops, even if we assume that the patent system is in general justified. The first half of the paper critiques David Resnik’s recent arguments in favor of patents on GM crops. Resnik argues that we should take a consequentialist approach to the issue, and that the best (...) way to do so is to apply the Precautionary Principle, and that the Precautionary Principle, in this case, supports patents on GM crops. I argue that his argument in favor of a consequentialist treatment is invalid; his Precautionary Principle in any case appears to be incompatible with consequentialism; and his conception of reasonable precautions is too ill-defined to have any argumentative purchase. In the second half of the paper, I argue against GM crop patents, on three grounds. First, there is insufficient evidence to say whether allowing patents on GM crops will make research go faster than not having patents, whilst there is a good reason to think that, other things being equal, a society that allows patents on GM crops will be less just than one that does not. Second, even assuming that patents on GM crops will increase the pace of GM crop research, there is no social need to do so. Third, patents on GM crops will frequently have ethically unacceptable side effects. (shrink)