One way to detect, monitor and prevent adverse events with the help of Information Technology is by using ontologies capable of representing three levels of reality: what is the case, what is believed about reality, and what is represented. We report on how Basic Formal Ontology and Referent Tracking exhibit this capability and how they are used to develop an adverse event ontology and related data annotation scheme for the European ReMINE project.

In the last two decades we have witnessed considerable efforts directed towards making electronic healthcare records comparable and interoperable through advances in record architectures and (bio)medical terminologies and coding systems. Deep semantic issues in general, and ontology in particular, have received some interest from the research communities. However, with the exception of work on so-called ‘controlled vocabularies’, ontology has thus far played little role in work on standardization. The prime focus has been rather the rapid population of terminologies at the (...) level of fine detail. In this paper, we argue that more efforts are needed on the side of both research and standardization to ensure that the coding systems used in electronic healthcare records enjoy a semantics that is coherent with the semantics of the record. We propose realist ontology as a method to bring about this coherence by means of a robust system of top-level ontological categories. (shrink)

Is there ever any reason for a doctor to lie to a patient? In this paper, we critically review the literature on lying to patients and challenge the common notion that while lying is unacceptable, a related entity--'benevolent deception' is defensible. Further, we outline a rare circumstance when treating psychotic patients where lying to the patient is justified. This circumstance is illustrated by a clinical vignette.

INTRODUCTION: MOORE AND METAPHYSICS In the course of this book I will make frequent use of the word 'metaphysics'. Indeed I will maintain that that word ...

G.E. Moore’s argument in “Proof of an External World” seems to beg the question against the skeptic and to miss the point of the challenge posed by skeptical hypotheses. I propose an interpretation that frees the argument from both charges. Starting from a distinction between the way Moore understood his dialectical position against the idealist and the skeptic, I attempt to illuminate the conception of skepticism that lies behind his argument. I propose that the argument’s core is found (...) in a strong anti-Cartesian statement, even though its relevance for epistemology is to be found in its potential as a stance regarding justification which is closer to the problematic of Pyrrhonic skepticism. (shrink)

G. E. Moore identificou uma forma surpreendente de irracionalidade epistêmica. Wittgenstein a chamou “o Paradoxo de Moore”. Nenhum deles sabia, exatamente, do que estava falando. Mas, a vasta literatura sobre o problema se encarregou de mostrar sua importância. O que, no entanto, ainda não se havia notado, com suficiente clareza, é que o paradoxo está fortemente conectado a alguns dos debates mais fundamentais da agenda epistemológica contemporânea. Este artigo propõe uma resolução epistemológica ao problema e busca mostrar que (...) o paradoxo ameaça, de forma contundente, as teses de fecho dedutivo da racionalidade epistêmica e do conhecimento, inutilizando as manobras contextualistas pró-fecho. (shrink)

Dans la première partie de La Certitude (Certainty) sont analysées plusieurs assertions comme « Je suis debout », « Je porte des vêtements », « J'ai dans la main quelques feuilles de papier », etc. Moore insiste sur le fait que leur caractère contingent n'empêche pas que leur vérité soit connue. Il serait absurde de dire : « Je pense que je porte des vêtements mais il est possible que ce ne soit pas le cas. » Possibilité logique et (...) possibilité épistémique doivent être distinguées. Dans la seconde partie, jugeant sa position épistémique optimale, Moore pense pouvoir décider s'il sait ou non qu'il existe un monde extérieur. Il met alors en œuvre l'argument dit « de la certitude différentielle », mais en contraposant le modus ponens de son adversaire il commet une erreur qui met à mal l'ensemble de sa démarche. Son attaque de l'argument du rêve ne réussit pas davantage. Cependant la remarquable richesse conceptuelle de La Certitude compense ces erreurs. Dans cette présentation, nous montrons comment Moore aurait pu corriger celles-ci et aussi de quelle manière l'analyse « pré-suppositionnelle » de « S ne sait pas que p » génère le « Paradoxe de Moore ». Enfin, nous examinons la forme singulière de scepticisme à laquelle Moore veut se confronter. (shrink)

Dans la première partie de La Certitude (Certainty) sont analysées plusieurs assertions comme « Je suis debout », « Je porte des vêtements », « J'ai dans la main quelques feuilles de papier », etc. Moore insiste sur le fait que leur caractère contingent n'empêche pas que leur vérité soit connue. Il serait absurde de dire : « Je pense que je porte des vêtements mais il est possible que ce ne soit pas le cas. » Possibilité logique et (...) possibilité épistémique doivent être distinguées. Dans la seconde partie, jugeant sa position épistémique optimale, Moore pense pouvoir décider s'il sait ou non qu'il existe un monde extérieur. Il met alors en œuvre l'argument dit « de la certitude différentielle », mais en contraposant le modus ponens de son adversaire il commet une erreur qui met à mal l'ensemble de sa démarche. Son attaque de l'argument du rêve ne réussit pas davantage. Cependant la remarquable richesse conceptuelle de La Certitude compense ces erreurs. Dans cette présentation, nous montrons comment Moore aurait pu corriger celles-ci et aussi de quelle manière l'analyse « pré-suppositionnelle » de « S ne sait pas que p » génère le « Paradoxe de Moore ». Enfin, nous examinons la forme singulière de scepticisme à laquelle Moore veut se confronter. (shrink)

G. E. Moore identified a peculiar form of epistemic irrationality. Wittgenstein called it “Moore’s Paradox”. Neither of them knew exactly what he was talking about. And yet, the vast literature on the problem leaves no room for doubt: the paradox is deep; its resolution, elusive. But, up until now, we haven’t been in a position to appreciate its importance for contemporary epistemology. This paper puts forward an epistemological solution to the paradox. It also seeks to show that the (...) paradox yields counter-examples to deductive closure claims for both epistemic rationality and knowledge that are immune to contextualist pro-closure maneuvers. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has forced developmental researchers to rethink their traditional research practices. The growing need to study infant development at a distance has shifted our research paradigm to online and digital monitoring of infants and families, using electronic devices, such as smartphones. In this practical guide, we introduce the Experience Sampling Method – a research method to collect data, in the moment, on multiple occasions over time – for examining infant development at a distance. ESM is highly suited for (...) assessing dynamic processes of infant development and family dynamics, such as parent-infant interactions and parenting practices. It can also be used to track highly fluctuating family dynamics and routines. The aim of the current paper was to provide an overview by explaining what ESM is and for what types of research ESM is best suited. Next, we provide a brief step-by-step guide on how to start and run an ESM study, including preregistration, development of a questionnaire, using wearables and other hardware, planning and design considerations, and examples of possible analysis techniques. Finally, we discuss common pitfalls of ESM research and how to avoid them. (shrink)

Aquest treball explora la concepció de l'anàlisi de Moore tot relacionant-la amb la sevadefensa del sentit comú i el llenguatge ordinari com el seu vehicle d'expressió. La secció 1 estudiael paper que l'anàlisi representa en la seva filosofia, així com la seva importància perafrontar problemes filosòfics. La secció 2 descriu en què consisteix l'anàlisi segons Moore, discuteixels criteris que ha de satisfer una anàlisi correcta, i classifica els diferents tipus d'anà-lisi trobats en els escrits de Moore, alhora (...) que nega que se'ls pugui considerar lingüístics oconceptuals. La secció 3 aclareix les nocions de sentit comú i llenguatge ordinari, subratllantla preeminència d'aquell. La discussió es proposa de resoldre dues qüestions: a ) c o mes pot reconèixer una proposició del sentit comú, i b ) com es pot reconèixer si tal proposicióés vertadera. Finalment, ens concentrem en el paper concedit al sentit comú i/o llenguatgeordinari com a pedra de toc a l'hora d'acceptar o rebutjar arguments filosòfics. (shrink)

Aquest treball explora la concepció de l'anàlisi de Moore tot relacionant-la amb la sevadefensa del sentit comú i el llenguatge ordinari com el seu vehicle d'expressió. La secció 1 estudiael paper que l'anàlisi representa en la seva filosofia, així com la seva importància perafrontar problemes filosòfics. La secció 2 descriu en què consisteix l'anàlisi segons Moore, discuteixels criteris que ha de satisfer una anàlisi correcta, i classifica els diferents tipus d'anà-lisi trobats en els escrits de Moore, alhora (...) que nega que se'ls pugui considerar lingüístics oconceptuals. La secció 3 aclareix les nocions de sentit comú i llenguatge ordinari, subratllantla preeminència d'aquell. La discussió es proposa de resoldre dues qüestions: a ) c o mes pot reconèixer una proposició del sentit comú, i b ) com es pot reconèixer si tal proposicióés vertadera. Finalment, ens concentrem en el paper concedit al sentit comú i/o llenguatgeordinari com a pedra de toc a l'hora d'acceptar o rebutjar arguments filosòfics. (shrink)

Cet article est consacré aux arguments naturalistes mobilisés par Henry Sidgwick et par George Edward Moore dans l'analyse de l'utilité des règles morales ordinaires. Les hypothèses évolutionnistes d'arrière-plan et l'observation des conditions naturelles des interactions humaines typiques jouent un rôle décisif dans ce contexte, de même que l'attention spécifique aux limitations cognitives dans l'espèce humaine. Sur certains points, des analyses décisionnelles et économiques plus récentes viennent préciser des intuitions remarquables de ces auteurs et donnent un aperçu des rapports qui (...) se nouent entre des arguments philosophiques classiques et les approches économiques de l'information et de la décision. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, pretende-se analisar o que se quer dizer com “falácia naturalista” e saber se há bons argumentos para sustentarmos a existência de uma falácia desse tipo. Começaremos estudando o que Hume falou sobre o assunto; se realmente ele enunciou algo como uma “Lei” contra derivar um “dever-ser” de um “ser”. Depois da obra de Hume, passaremos à de Moore. Na obra de Moore, veremos se ele quer dizer com o termo o mesmo que dizemos atualmente. Analisadas as (...) obras dos dois autores, passaremos, por último, a estudar o que “falácia naturalista” e “derivar um dever-ser de um ser” quer dizer hoje. Concluiremos que não há bons argumentos para aceitarmos que o que esses termos denotam é de fato uma falácia. Abstract:In this work, our aim is to investigate the meaning of the term “naturalistic fallacy”, and if there are good arguments to sustain the existence of a fallacy of this kind. We will begin studying what Hume said about the matter; if he really enunciated something like a “Law” against deriving a “is” from a “ought”. In the next section, we will proceed to the the arguments brought by Moore, to see whether the meaning of term is the same for him and us. Having analyzed the works of the two authors, we will proceed, in the final section, to study what the terms “naturalistic fallacy” and “deriving an ought from an is” means today. Finally, we will conclude that there aren’t good arguments for us to accept that what these terms denote is in fact a fallacy. (shrink)

G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an (...) External World In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)

En s'appuyant surtout sur l'Essay on Philosophical Method (1933) et sur The New Leviathan (1942), cet article expose les principaux arguments qu'a employés R. G. Collingwood contre le recours au sens commun qu'opérait G. E. Moore. Selon The New Leviathan, le recours au sens commun comme à une protection contre le scepticisme ou l'idéalisme conduit à la « persécution des scientifiques » et à l'« obscurantisme ». On peut tenir ce point de vue pour exagéré. Toutefois, si l'on examine (...) la construction de l'argument du sens commun, la pertinence de la critique de Collingwood apparaît. Cela n'empêche pas Collingwood d'utiliser la notion de sens commun, compris comme un ensemble de croyances fondamentales. Il n'y a aucune contradiction en l'espèce, pourvu qu'on distingue la notion du sens commun de l'argument du sens commun. (shrink)

Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘ p and I do not believe that p ’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity to be (...) a form of irrationality, objects to this solution by arguing that it is circular and thus incomplete. This is because it must explain why Moorean beliefs are irrational yet, according to Chan, their grammatical third-person transpositions are not, even though the same proposition is believed. But the solution can only explain this asymmetry by relying on a formulation of the ground of the irrationality of Moorean beliefs that presupposes precisely such asymmetry. I reply that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the irrationality that the contents of Moorean beliefs be restricted to the grammatical first-person. What has to be explained is rather that such grammatical non-first-person transpositions sometimes, but not always, result in the disappearance of irrationality. Describing this phenomenon requires the grammatical first-person/non-first person distinction. The pragmatic solution explains the phenomenon once it is formulated in de se terms. But the grammatical first-person/non-first-person distinction is independent of, and a fortiori, different from, the de se /non- de se distinction presupposed by pragmatic solution, although both involve the first person broadly construed. Therefore the pragmatic solution is not circular. Building on the work of Green and Williams I also distinguish between the irrationality of Moorean beliefs and their absurdity. I argue that while all irrational Moorean beliefs are absurd, some Moorean beliefs are absurd but not irrational. I explain this absurdity in a way that is not circular either. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to present G.E. Moore’s view on Scepticism and certainty with reference to his papers “Defence of common sense” “Proof of an external world” and “Certainty”. In section I following Moore’s “Proof of an External World” the distinction between empirical objects like paper, human hand, shoes and socks and private objects like images in dreams, double images, after images, and toothache have been highlighted. It has been pointed out that according to Moore, (...) no example of private objects in place of “these are my two hands” could have successfully refuted scepticism; and that Moore does follow Kant’s definition of external objects in order to prove the existence of the external world. The second section emphasizes two points; i) the example of these are my two hands is not a frivolous activity and ii) Moore does recognize the point of Descartes’ dream argument at least to the extent that de does recognize that knowing that P is different from Proving that P. In section III Moore’s attribution of certainty to empirical propositions has been highlighted by responding to the remarks made by Wittgenstein and Malcolm against Moore. In Section IV following Moore’s certainty, a logical explanation of Moore’s thesis that contingent propositions can be certain has been carried out. In addition to that an explanation of how Moore has weakened the dream argument by finding it incoherent. Finally, it has been concluded that Moore’s refutation of scepticism is quite successful in so far as scepticism has no place in common sense. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Desire-based Reasons Model or the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then consider attempts to argue against the Model through its naturalism. I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is the indirect version of G. E. Moore’s (...) Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s more recent Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections in case the reduction they propose is tolerable. This, however, means that in order to see if the objections work, we must analyze the particular reductions proposed. Hence, though not knock down arguments as they were intended to be, the indirect OQA and TO may pose threat to the Model. (shrink)

Jean-Pierre Cléro, philosophe et traducteur d’œuvres philosophiques, signe à nouveau une traduction qui fait sortir d’un oubli relatif un texte utilitariste essentiel. Il choisit de présenter une œuvre de G.E. Moore : Ethique. D’autres écrits de G.E. Moore sur l’éthique sont plus connus du public éclairé, comme Principia Ethica ou The Elements of Ethics. Jean-Pierre Cléro fait ici le pari d’un texte jusqu’à présent jamais traduit et que G.E. Moore décrit lui-même comme be...

312 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:2 APRIL ~996 virtues of his subject, and by attempting to know Dilthey better than he knew himself, has surely issued a provocation to all those who thought Dilthey's hermeneutics a thing of the past. Rather, like the past itself, Dilthey comes to meet us. JOHN GERARD MOORE Emory University Avrum Stroll. Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994 . Pp. 196. Cloth, $35.oo. Avrum Stroll aims to (...) provide a "critical analysis" of the treatment of the epistemologi- cal issues to be found in three of G. E. Moore's papers and in Wittgenstein's notes On Certainty. In the first half of the book, Stroll concentrates on Moore's papers "A De- fence of Common Sense" , "Proof of an External World" , and "Certainty" . Stroll largely follows the view that in these papers Moore.. (shrink)

Este escrito considera y distingue dos objeciones que de ordinario se piensa que se dirigen contra una concepción ética realista: la falacia naturalista de G. E. Moore y la ley de Hume. Después de haber expuesto ambas objeciones, desplegado sus supuestos y consecuencias y respondido a todos ellos, concluye que es posible hoy sostener una ética realista. Se estructura a la manera de una cuestión disputada, dividida en seis artículos.