v. 1. Psychological issues.--v. 2. Structural issues.--v. 3. Awareness and self-awareness.--v. 4. Clinical issues.

This book brings together several internationally known authors with conflicting views on the subject, providing a lively and informative overview of this...

Eye movements were recorded during the display of two images of a real-world scene that were inspected to determine whether they were the same or not . In the displays where the pictures were different, one object had been changed, and this object was sometimes taken from another scene and was incongruent with the gist. The experiment established that incongruous objects attract eye fixations earlier than the congruous counterparts, but that this effect is not apparent until the picture has been (...) displayed for several seconds. By controlling the visual saliency of the objects the experiment eliminates the possibility that the incongruency effect is dependent upon the conspicuity of the changed objects. A model of scene perception is suggested whereby attention is unnecessary for the partial recognition of an object that delivers sufficient information about its visual characteristics for the viewer to know that the object is improbable in that particular scene, and in which full identification requires foveal inspection. (shrink)

Relatively poor memory for dreams is important evidence for Hobson et al.'s model of conscious states. We describe the time-gap experience as evidence that everyday memory for waking states may not be as good as they assume. As well as being surprisingly sparse, everyday memories may themselves be systematically distorted in the same manner that Revonsuo attributes uniquely to dreams. [Hobson et al.; Revonsuo].

Rensink [Rensink, R. A. . Visual sensing without seeing. Psychological Science, 15, 27–32] has presented evidence suggesting visual changes may be sensed without an accompanying visual experience. Here, we report two experiments in which we monitored observers’ eye-movements whilst they searched for a difference between two simultaneously presented images and pressed separate response keys when a difference was seen or sensed. We first assessed whether sensing performance was random by collecting ratings of confidence in the validity of sensing and assessing (...) gaze location during sensing. Sensing was not random: fixation position and confidence ratings were different when a difference was present compared to catch trials. Furthermore, the uniformity of objects in the images and the type of difference appear to affect seeing and sensing differently, suggesting that these processes are dissociated. The possibility is discussed of a sensing mechanism that increases vigilance toward unconsciously registered differences, particularly changes to scene layout. (shrink)

Dienes & Perner argue that volitional control in artificial grammar learning is best understood in terms of the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge representations. We maintain that direct, explicit access to knowledge organised in a hierarchy of implicitness/explicitness is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain volitional control. People can invoke volitional control when their knowledge is implicit, as in the case of artificial grammar learning, and they can invoke volitional control when any part of their knowledge representation is implicit, (...) as can be seen by examining “feeling of knowing” phenomena. (shrink)

Removing attention from the saccade generation system should also remove the paradoxical loops that can occur with attention terminology. At least one such loop is still apparent in the current model, however. The benefits of an attention-free approach are assessed through comparison with a recent theory of attention (Logan 1996).

The essence of Baars’ paper is to propose nine functions for consciousness. By way of introducing these functions we are presented with a metaphor of a theatre, in which players act, operators set contexts behind the scenes, an unconscious audience provides specialised capabilities, and, of course, a bright spotlight of attention illuminates whatever is available to consciousness. The value of this metaphor is not entirely clear, with the separate ‘roles’ of the audience and of the operators behind the scenes being (...) particularly difficult to identify. Additionally, there may be a problem with idea that there is some kind of competition between actors who are seeking the spotlight of attention, for this suggests that the components of thought have volitions of their own. These would, indeed, be dangerous thoughts. Rather than attempting an analysis of the metaphor and its potential usefulness, this commentary will consider the nine functions of consciousness that have been proposed. (shrink)

The E-Z Reader 7 model is powerful but incomplete. When programming the saccade to the next word, we take into account the familiarity of the letter sequences at the beginning of that word. This landing position effect is well established, but is neglected in the model. A possible locus for the effect is suggested within the E-Z Reader framework.