We review the current state of play in the game of naturalizing content and analyse reasons why each of the main proposals, when taken in isolation, is unsatisfactory. Our diagnosis is that if there is to be progress two fundamental changes are necessary. First, the point of the game needs to be reconceived in terms of explaining the natural origins of content. Second, the pivotal assumption that intentionality is always and everywhere contentful must be abandoned. Reviving and updating Haugeland’s baseball (...) analogy in the light of these changes, we propose ways of redirecting the efforts of players on each base of his intentionality All-Star team, enabling them to start functioning effectively as a team. Only then is it likely that they will finally get their innings and maybe, just maybe, even win the game. (shrink)

Enactivists claim that social cognition is constituted by interactive processes and even more radically that there is ‘no observation without interaction’. Nevertheless, the notion of interaction at the core of the account has not yet being characterized in a way that makes good the claim that interactions actually constitute social understanding rather than merely facilitating or causally contributing to it. This paper seeks to complement the enactivist approach by offering an account of basic joint action that involves and brings with (...) it basic forms of mental understanding. The paper turns to theories of joint action rather than theories of perception as some enactivists have done :535–543, 2008; Thompson in J Conscious Stud 8:1–32, 2001), to gain insight into the kind of interactions that underpin our understanding of other minds, and in that way, supplement the interactionist-enactive account. In line with Enactivism, the paper argues that this kind of social understanding is practical rather than theoretical and that it is cognitively more basic and developmentally prior when compared to other ways we come to understand other minds. (shrink)

The paper presents two empirical cases of expert musicians—a classical string quartet and a solo, free improvisation saxophonist—to analyze the explanatory power and reach of theories in the field of expertise studies and joint action. We argue that neither the positions stressing top-down capacities of prediction, planning or perspective-taking, nor those emphasizing bottom-up embodied processes of entrainment, motor-responses and emotional sharing can do justice to the empirical material. We then turn to hybrid theories in the expertise debate and interactionist accounts (...) of cognition. Attempting to strengthen and extend them, we offer ‘Arch’: an overarching conception of musical interaction as an externalized, cognitive scaffold that encompasses high and low-level cognition, internal and external processes, as well as the shared normative space including the musical materials in which the musicians perform. In other words, ‘Arch’ proposes interaction as a multivariate multimodal overarching scaffold necessary to explain not only cases of joint performance, but equally of solo improvisation. (shrink)

This paper explicates Wittgenstein's vision of our place in nature and shows in what ways it is unlike and more fruitful than the picture of nature promoted by exclusive scientific naturalists. Wittgenstein's vision of nature is bound up with and supports his signature view that the task of philosophy is distinctively descriptive rather than explanatory. Highlighting what makes Wittgenstein's vision of nature special, it has been claimed that to the extent that he qualifies as a naturalist of any sort he (...) ought to be regarded as a liberal naturalist. We argue, in contrast, that focusing solely on the liberality of Wittgenstein's view of nature risks overlooking and downplaying the ways in which his philosophical clarifications can act as a platform for productively engaging with the sciences in their explanatory endeavors. We argue that Wittgenstein's vision of nature allows for a more relaxed form of naturalism in which philosophy can be a productive partner for scientific inquiry and investigation. Although this feature of Wittgenstein's vision of nature is not something that he himself emphasized, given his interests and concerns, it is an inspiring vision in an age in which philosophy must find its feet with and alongside the sciences. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Special Issue: ‘The Roots of Normativity. Developmental, Comparative and Conceptual issues’. The contributions collected in this volume aim to present a picture of contemporary accounts of normativity that integrate philosophy and developmental and comparative psychology and purport to provide the reader with new insights regarding a classical debate about what makes us human: being governed by norms and being able to orient ourselves in the light of them. This introduction presents a broad picture of the issues (...) at the heart of traditional discussions on normativity and lays out a set of conditions which a proper account of normativity should meet. In so doing the main common themes that unify these papers are brought to the fore. In particular, all of them share the idea that human-specific norms are themselves social. Once questions concerning the evolution of normative capacities and their development are considered, however, they pose - so it is argued - specific challenges to an account of normativity. While the traditional approaches fail to face such challenges, it is the main aim of the papers in this Special Issue to meet them. In concluding, a brief overview of each paper is provided. (shrink)

Intentionality in Interaction revisits some of the classical questions to be found in the original programme for second-personal studies as established in Thompson's 2001 JCS issue and sheds new light on them, witnessing the evolving dynamics of such a programme over the last decade. The contributions in this issue approach the questions of how persons share intentions, emotions, and experiences, of how interaction is shaped by and transforms affection, emotion, and cognition, and of how such interactions develop over time and (...) provide important insights into the development of human capacities in general, both in normal and pathological cases. In this introduction, we situate the special issue in the context of social cognition in general and second-personal studies in particular. We propose an outline of a new framework to approach questions regarding interaction and its development and evolution, a framework based on a novel understanding of interaction in terms of engagement between persons. (shrink)

Even if it appears quite evident that we live within society and as a consequence are bound together by shared norms and institutions, the nature of this relationship is a source of philosophical perplexity. After discussing the conditions of adequacy a conception of shared norms must accommodate, I discuss communitarian and interpretationist accounts of shared norms. I claim that they are problematic insofar as they fail to provide an adequate conception of the shared and binding character of social norms. Finally, (...) I argue that a different understanding of the shared character of norms follows from a correct understanding of the conditions of adequacy at stake. (shrink)

This paper introduces this special issue which is focused on its target paper - The Natural Origins of Content. The target paper has had a robust and considered set of fifteen replies; a literal A to Z of papers. This extended introduction explains the background thinking and challenges that motivated the target article's proposed research programme. It also provides a sneak peak preview and navigational aid to the special issue’s contents. Brief highlights of each commentary are provided and they are (...) grouped together under broad headings. We do not attempt to give detailed replies to these suggestions or answer the various critiques at this stage of the proceedings: that is for future work. (shrink)

Brandom is one of the main advocators of the idea that meaning is instituted within basic linguistic practices through mutual exchanges. The aim of this paper is to show that such framework cannot do the required job if the dynamics of mutual exchanges is understood in interpretational terms. After arguing that the interpretational framework does not work, the paper presents an alternative second-personal conversational model capable of meeting the challenge.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This paper introduces the special issue 'The point of view of shared agency', a collection of papers that develops, and critically assesses, a striking development in recent philosophy of mind, epistemology, and developmental psychology, that is, the fundamental reappraisal of the time-honoured distinction between a ‘first-person' and a ‘third-person perspective' on our mental lives. In recent years, the nature of the ‘second-person standpoint' has become a major focus of work across a range of disciplines. More recently, the idea of ‘first-person (...) plural knowledge', has received some attention, for example in considering knowledge of what ‘we are doing’ when we are doing things together. This collection explores collective agency, self-knowledge, and knowledge of other minds, from this plural and relational point of view. (shrink)

Este trabajo esboza una forma de justificar el principio estructurador central de una teoría veritista de la evaluación epistémica, en respuesta a críticas planteadas por Eleonora Cresto a mi defensa del veritismo frente a una serie de objeciones en el sentido de que no es capaz de explicar la naturaleza y el valor del entendimiento. La primera sección presenta el esbozo de justificación del núcleo de una teoría veritista; la segunda responde a críticas más específicas de Cresto. This paper sketches (...) a way to justify the central tenet of a veritistic theory of epistemic evaluation, in response to problems raised by Eleonora Cresto concerning my defense of veritism, against a series of objetions to the effect that veritistic epistemology is uncapable of explaining the nature and value of understanding. The first section presents the sketch of justification of the nucleus of a veritistic theory, the second responds to some of Cresto's more specific criticisms. (shrink)

En este texto se argumenta que la noción de interpretación desarrollada por Alberto Moretti en “La unidad proposicional” presenta algunos problemas filosóficos y metafilosóficos. Después de presentar las ideas centrales de la práctica interpretativa que defiende Moretti, se cuestionan en particular su incompatibilidad con un tratamiento naturalista de las capacidades de hablar e interpretar, que las entiende como capacidades naturales con historias filo y ontogenéticas, y el hecho de que se compromete con una posición inefabilista acerca de los fundamentos de (...) dicha práctica. Se argumenta que el abandono de la idea de que las capacidades intencionales siempre presuponen la manipulación de contenidos conceptuales, como postula la estrategia interpretativa, abre las puertas para un naturalismo acerca de las capacidades de hablar, nombrar e interpretar. Este naturalismo es además, pluralista respecto de los rasgos necesarios y/o suficientes que hacen de una práctica una práctica lingüística, y no inefabilista acerca de su fundamento. (shrink)

The publication of the revised edition of Place and Experience provides the occasion to discuss Malpas’ original account of place, and its role in a proper account of the central features of human...

Este trabajo explora las críticas de McDowell a la argumentación de Kripke en Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language y analiza su propuesta positiva, el ofrecimiento de un hecho semántico primitivo. Su idea es que el resultado escéptico alcanzado por Kripke resulta de no haber desechado la identificación entre significado e interpretación. Al contrario, el marco para dar cuenta de la noción de significado es la práctica: los hechos semánticos primitivos -elaborables a través de una semántica de condiciones de verdad- (...) son constituidos en la práctica comunitaria, y de ellos tenemos una captación individual. En mi opinión no sólo la crítica de McDowell a Kripke es errada, sino que su propuesta positiva presenta problemas fundamentales, tanto en su concepción de la normatividad como en sus aspectos epistémicos. El corolario de este trabajo será mostrar que el verdadero problema para una teoría semántica es la identificación del significado con cualquier tipo de hecho y no meramente la identificación del significado con la interpretación. This paper explores McDowell's criticisms to Kripke's argumentation in his Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, and analyses his positive proposal, that is, the offering of a primitive semantic fact. His idea is that the skeptical result reached by Kripke depends on not having discarded the identification between meaning and interpretation. On the contrary, the ITamework to explain the notion of meaning is the practice: the primitive semantic facts - that may be established by truth-values semantics - are constituted by the communitarian practice, and we get an individual insight of them. In my view, not only the criticism of McDowell to Kripke is erroneous, but also his positive proposal presents fundamental problems, in his conception ofnormativity as well as in his epistemic aspects. The conclusion of this paper will be to show how the real problem for a semantic theory is the identification ofmeaning with any kind of fact and not only the identification of meaning and interpretation. (shrink)

Mi objetivo en este artículo es analizar el alcance de las argumentaciones kripkensteinianas acerca de las reglas. Mi estrategia argumentativa será la siguiente: en primer lugar presentaré el argumento de Kripke y luego la objeción de Soames a este argumento: hay dos sentidos posibles en los que se utiliza el término “determinar”, como determinación epistémica y como determinación metafísica. Según Soames, esta distinción nos permite sostener, en contra de Kripke, que hay hechos que determinan metafísicamente el significado, aún si no (...) hay una determinación epistémica de los mismos. Objetaré esta salida al argumento cuestionando el postular una determinación metafísica que deja en un misterio las cuestiones epistémicas relativas a la semántica. Son precisamente estos rasgos los que el escéptico nos pide que expliquemos. Por lo tanto a continuación expongo una serie de alternativas que, asociadas con una posición metafísica, intentan dar cuenta del factor epistémico propio de la semántica. Argumentaré que todas estas alternativas, al postular hechos, dejan inexplicado dicho factor. De este modo intentaré mostrar que el resultado escéptico de la reflexión kripkensteiniana sigue en pie, ninguna teoría semántica que postule hechos para dar cuenta del factor epistémico, indisolublemente ligado a la conducta verbal, puede efectivamente hacerlo. (shrink)