The DIALOG between Husserlian Phenomnnology and Analytic Philosophy is severely hampered by the fact that much of the secondary literrature on phenomenology fails to pay attention to certain subtile semantical distinctions which are basic for a clear understanding of epistemological issures. Some European Phenomenologists even take pride in their neglect of what they consider to be shallow scholastic quibbling. I hope to remedy this short-coming by outlining in this paper what I believe to be the keypoints of Husserl's theory of (...) perception and theory of meaning. My apprach will be developmental because contrary to popular belief phenomenology has not been revealed in ont instantaneous intuition; on the contrary Husserl's views developed and shifted constantly throughout his life. (shrink)

A clear understanding of the notion of phenomenological reduction is crucial for any evaluation of the claims of Husserlian phenomenology. The phenomenological reduction is said to be the distinctive step one has to take if one is to enter the realm of phenomenology proper. Husserl labored all his life to find the best way which would lead the nonphenomenologist into the new land which he thought he had discovered. Commentators have classified the ways discussed by Husserl under at least three (...) main headings: the Cartesian way, the way through psychology, and the way through ontology. In each of these ways, one is urged to perform a phenomenological reduction. But since the ways are different, the step also of the phenomenological reduction varies somewhat for each approach. Husserl and his interpreters tried hard to clarify these subtle distinctions, but up to now their ways of speaking have proven rather opaque, especially to philosophers accustomed to the standards of clarity of Analytic Philosophy. (shrink)

Brentano hat in seinen Analysen der Wahrnehmung zwei wichtige Punkte hervorgehoben: (a) daß die innere Wahrnehmung nur ein Bewußtsein "nebenbei" sei; und (b) daß die äußere Wahrnehmung ein räumlich Ausgedehntes (und nicht eine Idee) zum Objekt habe. Er ging aber nicht weit genug, sondern blieb dem Kartesianismus verhaftet, indem er die innere Wahrnehmung immer noch ein Erkennen nannte, und andererseits vom Objekt der äußeren Wahrnehmung sagte, daß es in Wahrheit gar nicht bestehe. Wenn man aber weiter geht und zugesteht, daß (...) die sogenannte innere Wahrnehmung gar kein eigentliches Erkennen ist, und daß es im Gegenteil die äußere Wahrnehmung ist, welche die Wirklichkeit erkennt, dann wird es unmöghch, sich in der Erkenntnistheorie mit Descartes auf unmittelbare untrügliche Evidenz zu berufen. Descartes bleibt aber insofern im Recht, als es trotz allem sinnvoll bleibt, zur Rechtfertigung von Erkenntnissen auf die sogenannte innere Wahrnehmung zu verweisen. (shrink)

Brentano hat in seinen Analysen der Wahrnehmung zwei wichtige Punkte hervorgehoben: (a) daß die innere Wahrnehmung nur ein Bewußtsein "nebenbei" sei; und (b) daß die äußere Wahrnehmung ein räumlich Ausgedehntes (und nicht eine Idee) zum Objekt habe. Er ging aber nicht weit genug, sondern blieb dem Kartesianismus verhaftet, indem er die innere Wahrnehmung immer noch ein Erkennen nannte, und andererseits vom Objekt der äußeren Wahrnehmung sagte, daß es in Wahrheit gar nicht bestehe. Wenn man aber weiter geht und zugesteht, daß (...) die sogenannte innere Wahrnehmung gar kein eigentliches Erkennen ist, und daß es im Gegenteil die äußere Wahrnehmung ist, welche die Wirklichkeit erkennt, dann wird es unmöghch, sich in der Erkenntnistheorie mit Descartes auf unmittelbare untrügliche Evidenz zu berufen. Descartes bleibt aber insofern im Recht, als es trotz allem sinnvoll bleibt, zur Rechtfertigung von Erkenntnissen auf die sogenannte innere Wahrnehmung zu verweisen. (shrink)

It is the aim of the present study to introduce the reader to the ways of thinking of those contemporary philosophers who apply the tools of symbolic logic to classical philosophical problems. Unlike the "conti nental" reader for whom this work was originally written, the English speaking reader will be more familiar with most of the philosophers dis cussed in this book, and he will in general not be tempted to dismiss them indiscriminately as "positivists" and "nominalists". But the English (...) version of this study may help to redress the balance in another respect. In view of the present emphasis on ordinary language and the wide spread tendency to leave the mathematical logicians alone with their technicalities, it seems not without merit to revive the interest in formal ontology and the construction of formal systems. A closer look at the historical account which will be given here, may convince the reader that there are several points in the historical develop ment whose consequences have not yet been fully assessed: I mention, e. g., the shift from the traditional three-level semantics of sense and deno tation to the contemporary two-level semantics of representation; the relation of extensional structure and intensional content in the extensional systems of Wittgenstein and Carnap; the confusing changes in labelling the different kinds of analytic and apriori true sentences; etc. Among the philosophically interesting tools of symbolic logic Lesniewski's calculus of names deserves special attention. (shrink)

After drawing attention to the basic importance of Goodman's workThe Structure of Appearance, this paper turns to a critical analysis of Goodman's claims concerning worldmaking. It stresses that Goodman's acceptance of a multiplicity of actual worlds doesnot involve the belief in an unknowable underlying reality; but that it is due to the non-mysterious fact that constructional systems allow for a multiplicity of disagreeing, right versions. However, from the point of view of truthmaker ontology, most worlds of constructional systems are not (...) genuine worlds; and so far it hasnot been shown that there are genuine truthmaker worlds that disagree.It is suggested that the construction of systems usually involves three conflicting aims: the logical, the ontological, and the psychological. Considering the current interest in cognitive psychology and phenomenology, the implications of the psychological aim, too, deserve to be reexamined. (shrink)

A philosopher who has mastered the standard two-valued propositional calculus and who is curious to find out what the systems of many-valued logic, strict implication and modal logic are all about, should reach for this small booklet from the series Monographs in Modern Logic It explains in a compact but remarkably lucid way the rationale of these non-standard logics and gives access to the literature of the field. There are numerous references to a selected bibliography, the most recent titles of (...) which are from 1965. But the reader is not only informed about the technical properties of these systems, he is also given a sound perspective in which to see their intuitive significance. It is characteristic that the author distinguishes on the very first page between a logic and a calculus associated with a logic. (shrink)

These books are telling examples which demonstrate that at least some contemporary philosophers have again attained the high level of ‘scholastic’ sophistication which was typical of men like Aristotle, Diodorus Cronus, Chrysippus, Aquinas or Ockham. It can even be said that in an important respect this classical level has been surpassed: Prior’s presentation of the different calculi of tense logic in Past, Present and Future documents the recent progress of symbolic formalization in a domain where the classics had to struggle (...) laboriously with Greek or Latin sentences. (shrink)

RésuméHeinrich Scholz et J.M. Bocheski ont affirmé que les lois de la logique formelle étaient en fait les lois les plus générates qui caractérisent les choses, les propriétés, les relations, les états de choses etc. D'autres confondent la logique et la théorie des ensembles. Mais ľ interpretation des quantificateurs qu'on trouve chez Leśniewski montre que la logique ne fait partie ni de ľ ontologie, ni des mathématiques.

When Russell argued for his ontological convictions, for instance that there are negative facts or that there are universals, he expressed himself in English. But Wittgenstein must have noticed that from the point of view of Russell's ideal language these ontological statements appear to be pseudo-propositions. He believed therefore that what these statements pretend to say, could not really be said but only shown. Carnap discovered a way out of this mutism: what in the material mode of speech of the (...) object language looks like a pseudo-proposition can be translated into a perfectly meaningful proposition in the formal mode of speech (in the metalinguistic mode of speech of the logical syntax of language). But is this ascent into the metalanguage necessary? Taking advantage of Lésniewski's logical system there exists another way outwe can expand the number of categories of our ideal language. But Leniewski's formulas raise another profound problem, the problem of semantical muteness (cf. W. G. Lycan Semantic Competence and Funny Functors Monist 64 (1979), 209–222). (shrink)