Many naive realists endorse a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable halucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper I consider (...) and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston. (shrink)

Many naive realists are inclined to accept a negative disjunctivist strategy in order to deal with the challenge presented by the possibility of phenomenologically indistinguishable hallucination. In the first part of this paper I argue that this approach is methodologically inconsistent because it undercuts the phenomenological motivation that underlies the appeal of naive realism. In the second part of the paper I develop an alternative to the negative disjunctivist account along broadly Meinongian lines. In the last section of this paper (...) I consider and evaluate a somewhat similar but rival view of hallucination developed by Mark Johnston. (shrink)

Idealist philosophers have traditionally tried to defend their views by appealing to the claim that nonmental reality is inconceivable. A standard response to this inconceivability claim is to try to show that it is only plausible if one blurs the fundamental distinction between consciousness and its object. I try to rehabilitate the idealistic argument by presenting an alternative formulation of the idealist’s basic inconceivability claim. Rather than suggesting that all objects are inconceivable apart from consciousness, I suggest that it is (...) impossible to conceive of any such object as genuinely existent. This thesis is lent credence by the fact that only in reflective self-consciousness is existence a phenomenological datum. Not only is it the case that we are not ever aware of an object as existing, we do not have a clear understanding of what it would be like to have such an awareness. If this is true, then we have reason to believe that while consciousness exists, the objects of consciousness cannot exist. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking centre stage in economic growth and business operations alike. Public discourse about the practical and ethical implications of AI has mainly focussed on the societal level. There is an emerging knowledge base on AI risks to human rights around data security and privacy concerns. A separate strand of work has highlighted the stresses of working in the gig economy. This prevailing focus on human rights and gig impacts has been at the expense of a closer (...) look at how AI may be reshaping traditional workplace relations and, more specifically, workplace health and safety. To address this gap, we outline a conceptual model for developing an AI Work Health and Safety (WHS) Scorecard as a tool to assess and manage the potential risks and hazards to workers resulting from AI use in a workplace. A qualitative, practice-led research study of AI adopters was used to generate and test a novel list of potential AI risks to worker health and safety. Risks were identified after cross-referencing Australian AI Ethics Principles and Principles of Good Work Design with AI ideation, design and implementation stages captured by the AI Canvas, a framework otherwise used for assessing the commercial potential of AI to a business. The unique contribution of this research is the development of a novel matrix itemising currently known or anticipated risks to the WHS and ethical aspects at each AI adoption stage. (shrink)

Widely adopted as a textbook, Issues and Alternatives in Educational Philosophy has been a classic in its field for more than a quarter of a century. As a survey of philosophic issues relevent to the educational profession, it highlights the relationship between philosophic starting points and educational outcomes - between theory and practice. -- from back cover.

Idealist philosophers have traditionally tried to defend their views by appealing to the claim that nonmental reality is inconceivable. A standard response to this inconceivability claim is to try to show that it is only plausible if one blurs the fundamental distinction between consciousness and its object. I try to rehabilitate the idealistic argument by presenting an alternative formulation of the idealist’s basic inconceivability claim. Rather than suggesting that all objects are inconceivable apart from consciousness, I suggest that it is (...) impossible to conceive of any such object as genuinely existent. This thesis is lent credence by the fact that only in reflective self-consciousness is existence a phenomenological datum. Not only is it the case that we are not ever aware of an object as existing, we do not have a clear understanding of what it would be like to have such an awareness. If this is true, then we have reason to believe that while consciousness exists, the objects of consciousness cannot exist. (shrink)

George Knight's "Philosophy and Education" has been a classic in its field for more than a quarter of a century. New features of this revised and updated fourth edition make it of even greater usefulness in the educational philosophy classrooms of a new century. These include an all-new chapter on the Christian teacher in the public school setting; "Points to Ponder" study questions at the end of each chapter; new material addressing the latest relevant issues, including the rise of the (...) home school movement, and the relation of the Intelligent Design debate to Christian educational philosophy; a fresh, new text design, including call-out highlights of major themes; and an updated bibliography and references. (shrink)

Thomas Talbott has recently argued in this journal that the three propositions 1) God wills universal salvation 2) God has the power to produce universal salvation and 3) some persons are not saved are inconsistent. I contend that this claim is only true if God has no overriding purposes that would place restrictions on the means God uses to achieve God’s ends. One possible example of such an overriding purpose would be God’s aim to produce the most good. I end (...) by suggesting that while God’s purpose of universal salvation does render the achievement of this end probable, it is by no means necessary. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the denial of middle knowledge and emphasis on human freedom characteristic of open theism makes the traditional concept of hell even more morally problematic than it would otherwise be. But these same features of open theism present serious difficulties for the view that all will necessarily be saved. I conclude by arguing that the most promising approach for open theists is to adopt a version of contingent, as opposed to necessary, universalism. (Published Online April (...) 7 2006). (shrink)