This book introduces social scientists to the ideas of George Herbert Mead - one of the most original yet neglected thinkers of early twentieth century sociology. Mead is an exceptional case amongst sociological classics in that, until now, there has been no comprehensive reader of his work. As the first one-volume, comprehensive edited collection of Meadâes published and unpublished writing, this book fills this gap. It is the first to critically assess all of Mead's writings and draw out the aspects (...) that are central to his system of thought. The book is divided into three parts, comprising a total of 30 chapters - a third of which are published here for the first time. G.H. Mead: A Reader provides a unique and timely contribution to the understanding of this key theorist. It is essential reading for both undergraduate and postgraduate students in the fields of sociology, social psychology, philosophy of social science, social and cultural anthropology, and social and political theory. (shrink)
* Presents a broad survey of philosophical thought * Each chapter explores, and places in context, a major area of philosophical enquiry - including the theory of meaning and of truth, the theory of knowledge, the philosophies of mathematics, science and metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, moral and political philosophy, aesthetics, and religion * Annotated bibliographies for each chapter and indexes of names and subjects * Glossary of commonly-used philosophical terms * Chronological table of the history of philosophy from 1600 (...) `It is a fine achievement and deserves the warmest praise ... Anyone interested in learning what contemporary philosophical debate is about will find this book invaluable ... for a book of this size and quality of content the cover price is modest. Every public library as well as every university, college and school library should have a copy on its shelves.' - Times Higher Education Supplement `A stimulating collection.' - Reference Reviews. (shrink)
Since the publication of the first volume in 1993, the Routledge History of Western Philosophy has established itself as the most comprehensive chronological survey of the history of western philosophy available. The final volume is being published in March 1999, completing the history from its beginnings in the sixth century B.C. to the present. Key features of the series: * Includes in-depth discussion of all major philosophical developments and philosophers * Is compiled by prestigious editors leading an international team of (...) over 100 specialists giving wide-ranging, balanced coverage * Each volume contains an index, a detailed bibliography, a glossary of technical terms and a chronological table to set the philosophical developments in context * Each chapter is written by an acknowledged authority in the field * Provides an essential resource for students, teachers and researchers in philosophy. The Routledge History of Philosophy is available either as separate volumes or as a complete 10 volume set. For more details on the Routledge History of Philosophy please contact us at our London address. (shrink)
In several works on modality, G. H. von Wright presents tree structures to explain possible worlds. Worlds that might have developed from an earlier world are possible relative to it. Actually possible worlds are possible relative to the world as it actually was at some point. Many logically consistent worlds are not actually possible. Transitions from node to node in a tree structure are probabilistic. Probabilities are often more useful than similarities between worlds in treating counterfactual conditionals.
In "Realism and Reason" Hilary Putnam has offered an apparently strong argument that the position of metaphysical realism provides an incoherent model of the relation of a correct scientific theory to the world. However, although Putnam's attack upon the notion of the "intended" interpretation of a scientific theory is sound, it is shown here that realism may be formulated in such a way that the realist need make no appeal to any "intended" interpretation of such a theory. Consequently, it can (...) be shown that realism is immune to Putnam's criticism and that attempts at reformulating this criticism are not likely to meet with success. (shrink)