Im 18. Jahrhundert bestand ein uberraschend grosses Interesse am Denker, Schriftsteller und Menschen David Hume (1711-1776), das die ganze Vielheit in den Voraussetzungen und Zielen der deutschen Aufklarung widerspiegelt. Zunachst standen die religionsphilosophischen Thesen Humes im Vordergrund; sie wurden durchweg abgelehnt und haufig nur polemisch zuruckgewiesen. Gerade als sich die Chance einer sachgerechteren Beurteilung Humes bot, revolutionierte Kant die gesamte Philosophie, und Hume wurde nur noch als der auslosende Faktor der Kantischen Metaphysikkritik gesehen. Die umstrittene Frage, wann und durch welches (...) seiner Werke Hume Kants dogmatischen Schlummer unterbrach, wird zur Entscheidung gebracht und damit zugleich eine neue These zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung prasentiert. In the 18th century there was a surprisingly large amount of interest in the thinker, author and human being David Hume (1711-1776), and this interest reflected the entire range of requirements and goals of the German Enlightenment. To begin with, the focus was on Humes theories of the philosophy of religion, theories which were rejected without exception and often only polemically repudiated. Just when there was a chance of having an objective assessment of Humes work, Kant revolutionized philosophy, and Hume was seen merely as the factor which triggered Kants metaphysics. The controversial question of when and in which of his works Hume interrupted Kant's dogmatic slumber is brought to a head, and thus at the same time a new theory pertaining to Kant's philosophical development is presented. (shrink)
The paper introduces the concept, of self-organisation as a concept which explains in a general way the emergence of order. It shows how this concept can be used to describe social dynamics, i.e. the mutual construction of social institutions and the social processes which are regulated by these institutions. The driving force of this mutual construction is called âcoping with uncertaintyâ. This concept is shown to be fruitful in the discussion of innovation networks, a new form of knowledge production.
Vorwort - O. Bayer: Johann Georg Hamann - Radikaler Aufklarer als Metakritiker - D. Berman: Hume and Collins: Two Ways of Lying Theologically - U. Dierse: Nachtrage zu G. F. Meiers Religionsphilosophie - K. Dusing: Schema und Einbildungskraft in Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft - J. Ecole: Des rapports de l'essence et de l'existence selon Wolff - E. J. Engel: Mendelssohn und Spinoza: Dankesschuld und Rettung - N. Hinske: Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft und der Freiraum des Glaubens. Zur Kantrezeption (...) des Jenaer Fruhkantianismus - H.-U. Hoche: Anthropologische Komplementaritat und die Einheit der Sache. Versuch einer skeptischen Losung eines skeptischen Zweifels - M. Hossenfelder: Der Liberalismus als Naturrecht im Anschluss an Kant - L. Kreimendahl: Hume uber das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodizee um 1748 - R. H. Popkin: Scepticism and Optimism in the Late 18th Century - H. Graf Reventlow: Vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit. Bibel und Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis H. S. Reimarus - W. Schneiders: Vernunft und Verstand - Krisen eines Begriffspaares - W. Schroder: Aporien des theologischen Liberalismus. Johann Lorenz Schmidts Pladoyer fur 'eine allgemeine Religions- und Gewissensfreyheit' - R. Specht: Sind einfache Ideen einfach und gegeben? - I. Strohschneider-Kohrs: Anmerkungen zu Lessings Selbstdeutungs-Bildern - W. Strube: Der Begriff des Erhabenen in der deutschsprachigen Asthetik des 18. Jahrhunderts - Bibliographie Gunter Gawlick 1956-1993. Zusammengestellt von U. Golembek. (shrink)
In this paper I shall venture into an area with which I am not very familiar and in which I feel far from confident; namely into phenomenology. My main motive is not to get away from standard, boring, methodological questions like those of induction and demarcation; but the conviction that a phenomenological account of the empirical basis forms a necessary complement to Popper's falsificationism. According to the latter, a scientific theory is a synthetic and universal, hence unverifiable proposition. In fact, (...) in order to be technologically useful, a scientific hypothesis must refer to future states-of-affairs; it ought therefore to remain unverified. But in order to be empirical, a theory must bear some kind of relation to factual statements. According to Popper, such a relation can only be one of potential conflict. Thus a theory T will be termed scientific if and only if T is logically incompatible with a so-called basic statement b, where b is both empirically verifiable and empirically falsifiable. In other words: T is scientific if it entails ¬b; where b, hence also ¬b, is an empirically decidable proposition. (shrink)
This edition of G. E. Moore's notes taken at Wittgenstein's seminal Cambridge lectures in the early 1930s provides, for the first time, an almost verbatim record of those classes. The presentation of the notes is both accessible and faithful to their original manuscripts, and a comprehensive introduction and synoptic table of contents provide the reader with essential contextual information and summaries of the topics in each lecture. The lectures form an excellent introduction to Wittgenstein's middle-period thought, covering a broad range (...) of philosophical topics, ranging from core questions in the philosophy of language, mind, logic, and mathematics, to illuminating discussions of subjects on which Wittgenstein says very little elsewhere, including ethics, religion, aesthetics, psychoanalysis, and anthropology. The volume also includes a 1932 essay by Moore critiquing Wittgenstein's conception of grammar, together with Wittgenstein's response. A companion website offers access to images of the entire set of source manuscripts. (shrink)
Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...) least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G. F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual belief-desire accounts need to be replaced. Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper. Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all. (shrink)
Some ways of defending inequality against the charge that it is unjust require premises that egalitarians find easy to dismiss—statements, for example, about the contrasting deserts and/or entitlements of unequally placed people. But a defense of inequality suggested by John Rawls and elaborated by Brian Barry has often proved irresistible even to people of egalitarian outlook. The persuasive power of this defense of inequality has helped to drive authentic egalitarianism, of an old-fashioned, uncompromising kind, out of contemporary political philosophy. The (...) present essay is part of an attempt to bring it back in. (shrink)
1. The present paper is a continuation of my “Self-Ownership, World Ownership, and Equality,” which began with a description of the political philosophy of Robert Nozick. I contended in that essay that the foundational claim of Nozick's philosophy is the thesis of self-ownership, which says that each person is the morally rightful owner of his own person and powers, and, consequently, that each is free to use those powers as he wishes, provided that he does not deploy them aggressively against (...) others. To be sure, he may not harm others, and he may, if necessary, be forced not to harm them, but he should never be forced to help them, as people are in fact forced to help others, according to Nozick, by redistributive taxation. (shrink)
While philosophers are often concerned with the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if not more, important – reliably making correct moral judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair sentences, government officials should decide on just laws, members of ethics committees should make sound recommendations, and so on. We want such agents, more often than not and as often as possible, to make the right decisions. The purpose of this paper (...) is to propose a method of enhancing the moral reliability of such agents. In particular, we advocate for a procedural approach; certain internal processes generally contribute to people’s moral reliability. Building on the early work of Rawls, we identify several particular factors related to moral reasoning that are specific enough to be the target of practical intervention: logical competence, conceptual understanding, empirical competence, openness, empathy and bias. Improving on these processes can in turn make people more morally reliable in a variety of contexts and has implications for recent debates over moral enhancement. (shrink)
Abstract G.A. Cohen has produced an influential criticism of libertarian?ism that posits joint ownership of everything in the world other than labor, with each joint owner having a veto right over any potential use of the world. According to Cohen, in that world rationality would require that wealth be divided equally, with no differential accorded to talent, ability, or effort. A closer examination shows that Cohen's argument rests on two central errors of reasoning and does not support his egalitarian conclusions, (...) even granting his assumption of joint ownership. That assumption was rejected by Locke, Pufendorf and other writers on property for reasons that Cohen does not rebut. (shrink)
Reminiscences of Peter, by P. Oppenheim.--Natural kinds, by W. V. Quine.--Inductive independence and the paradoxes of confirmation, by J. Hintikka.--Partial entailment as a basis for inductive logic, by W. C. Salmon.--Are there non-deductive logics?, by W. Sellars.--Statistical explanation vs. statistical inference, by R. C. Jeffre--Newcomb's problem and two principles of choice, by R. Nozick.--The meaning of time, by A. Grünbaum.--Lawfulness as mind-dependent, by N. Rescher.--Events and their descriptions: some considerations, by J. Kim.--The individuation of events, by D. Davidson.--On properties, by (...) H. Putnam.--A method for avoiding the Curry paradox, by F. B. Fitch.--Publications (1934-1969) by Carl G. Hempel (p. -270). (shrink)
Among the most outstanding discoveries of the last century is one that is not quite as momentous as the theory of relativity or cybernetics. It may even still be enigmatic. It has no one single author, it is not expressed in a single formula, conception, or invention. Nonetheless it is worth all the others combined.
Editor James Fetzer presents an analytical and historical introduction and a comprehensive bibliography together with selections of many of Carl G. Hempel's most important studies to give students and scholars an ideal opportunity to appreciate the enduring contributions of one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century.