The focus in this essay will be upon the paradoxes, and foremostly in set theory. A central result is that the librationist set theory £ extension \Pfund $\mathscr{HR}(\mathbf{D})$ of \pounds \ accounts for \textbf{Neumann-Bernays-Gödel} set theory with the \textbf{Axiom of Choice} and \textbf{Tarski's Axiom}. Moreover, \Pfund \ succeeds with defining an impredicative manifestation set $\mathbf{W}$, \emph{die Welt}, so that \Pfund$\mathscr{H}(\mathbf{W})$ %is a model accounts for Quine's \textbf{New Foundations}. Nevertheless, the points of view developed support the view that the truth-paradoxes and (...) the set-paradoxes have common origins, so that the librationist resolutions of the set theoretic paradoxes are at the same time resolutions of the truth theoretic paradoxes. Both the librationist resolutions of the set theoretic paradoxes and the truth theoretic paradoxes have non-trivial philosophical implications: librationist set theories have the consequence that there are no absolutely uncountable sets, and librationist truth theories allow the use of syntactical modalities in ways which circumvent limitations as those of \parencite{Montague1963}, and a truth predicate which is useful for more precise philosophical discourse. (shrink)

A metaphysical system engendered by a third order quantified modal logic S5 plus impredicative comprehension principles is used to isolate a third order predicate D, and by being able to impredicatively take a second order predicate G to hold of an individual just if the individual necessarily has all second order properties which are D we in Section 2 derive the thesis (40) that all properties are D or some individual is G. In Section 3 theorems 1 to 3 suggest (...) a sufficient kinship to Gödelian ontological arguments so as to think of thesis (40) in terms of divine property and Godly being; divine replaces positive with Gödel and others. Thesis (40), the sacred thesis, supports the ontological argument that God exists because some property is not divine. In Section 4 a fixed point analysis is used as diagnosis so that atheists may settle for the minimal fixed point. Theorem 3 shows it consistent to postulate theistic fixed points, and a monotheistic result follows if one assumes theism and that it is divine to be identical with a deity. Theorem 4 (the Monotheorem) states that if Gg and it is divine to be identical with g, then necessarily all objects which are G are identical with g. The impredicative origin of D suggests weakened Gaunilo-like objections that offer related theses for other second order properties and their associated diverse presumptive individual bearers. Nevertheless, in the last section we finesse these Gaunilo-like objections by adopting what we call an apathiatheistic opinion which suggest that the best concepts `God’ allow thorough indifference as to whether God exists or not. (shrink)

We show that a paraconsistent set theory proposed in Weber (2010) is strong enough to provide a quite classical nonprimitive notion of identity, so that the relation is an equivalence relation and also obeys full substitutivity: a = b -> F(b)). With this as background it is shown that the proposed theory also proves the negation of x=x. While not by itself showing that the proposed system is trivial in the sense of proving all statements, it is argued that this (...) outcome makes the system inadequate. (shrink)

We show that we in ways related to the classical Square of Opposition may define a Cube of Opposition for some useful statements, and we as a by-product isolate a distinct directive of being inviolable which deserves attention; a second central purpose is to show that we may extend our construction to isolate hypercubes of opposition of any finite cardinality when given enough independent modalities. The cube of opposition for obligations was first introduced publically in a lecture for the Square (...) of Opposition Conference in the Vatican in May 2014. -/- A COLORFUL ERRATUM: The article Cubes and Hypercubes of Opposition, with Ethical Ruminations on Inviolability, suffered a couple of mishaps when it was published in Logica Universalis, ISSN 1661-8297, 10(2-3), p. 373–376. The worst of them was that the colorful cube was printed in shades of grey, instead of decorating the sides with two transparent sides, and then a red, a yellow, a blue and a green side. The text of the article is not quite understandable because of this mishap, so I avail a colorfully updated version of the original article here. -/- . (shrink)

The paper provides some observations that support the view, such as with Nathan Salmon, that we have full substitutivity of coextensional names in belief contexts. Further, the paper notes some consequences for doxastic modalites in an induced Millian logic of belief.

We present a semi-formal foundational theory of sorts, akin to sets, named librationism because of its way of dealing with paradoxes. Its semantics is related to Herzberger’s semi inductive approach, it is negation complete and free variables (noemata) name sorts. Librationism deals with paradoxes in a novel way related to paraconsistent dialetheic approaches, but we think of it as bialethic and parasistent. Classical logical theorems are retained, and none contradicted. Novel inferential principles make recourse to theoremhood and failure of theoremhood. (...) Identity is introduced à la Leibniz-Russell, and librationism is highly non-extensional. Π 1 1 -comprehension with ordinary Bar-Induction is accounted for (to be lifted). Power sorts are generally paradoxical, and Cantor’s Theorem is blocked as a camouflaged premise is naturally discarded. (shrink)

In this dissertation I present a new solution to the renowned Gettier problem. My solution, which in a sense represents a defense of a rather traditional epistemological approach, is based upon a distinction between primary and secondary beliefs. I argue that primary beliefs are known if justified and true, whereas secondary beliefs are known if they are believed on the basis of a known primary belief. Much emphasis is put upon defending this approach against potential objections, but I also draw (...) some epistemological and semantical consequences pertaining to such issues as the nature of epistemological justification, the Lottery Paradox, philosophical skepticism and the semantics of belief contexts. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the use of diagrams in mathematical reasoning and puts forward examples where diagrams are useful. It is not suggested that diagrammatic reasoning is sometimes necessary to justify mathematical results, but rather that such reasoning in some cases may be useful in discovering new theorems or in their communication. The topic could to a large extent have been treated by psychological research, it seems. Some typos interfere with the presentation. In the references, the title of the article and (...) the page numbers of the article by Barwise and Etchemendy have been replaced by the information for the article by De Cruz. (shrink)

This article explores the respective roles that medical and technological cognitive enhancements, on the one hand, and the moral and epistemic virtues traditionally understood, on the other, can play in enabling us to lead the good life. It will be shown that neither the virtues nor cognitive enhancements (of the kind we have access to today or in the foreseeable future) on their own are likely to enable most people to lead the good life. While the moral and epistemic virtues (...) quite plausibly are both necessary and sufficient for the good life in theory, virtue ethics is often criticised for being elitist and unachievable in practice for the vast majority. Some cognitive enhancements, on the other hand, might be necessary for the good life but are far from sufficient for such an existence. Here it will be proposed that a combination of virtue and some cognitive enhancements is preferable. (shrink)

Kairos has been a key concept in medicine for millennia and is frequently understood as “the right time” in relation to treatment. In this study we scrutinize kairos in the context of diagnostics. This has become highly topical as technological developments have caused diagnostics to be performed ever earlier in the disease development. Detecting risk factors, precursors, and predictors of disease (in biomarkers, pre-disease, and pre-pre-disease) has resulted in too early diagnoses, i.e., overdiagnoses. Nonetheless, despite vast advances in science and (...) technology, diagnoses also come too late. Accordingly, timing diagnostics right is crucial. In this article we start with giving a brief overview of the etymology and general use of the concepts of kairos and diagnosis. Then we delimit kairos in diagnostics by analysing “too early” and “too late” diagnosis and by scrutinizing various phases of diagnostics. This leads us to define kairos of diagnostics as the time when there is potential for sufficient information for making a diagnosis that is most helpful for the person. It allows us to conclude that kairos is as important in diagnostics as in therapeutics. (shrink)

This article raises the question of whether bioethics qualifies as a discipline. According to a standard definition of discipline as “a field of study following specific and well-established methodological rules” bioethics is not a specific discipline as there are no explicit “well-established methodological rules.” The article investigates whether the methodological rules can be implicit, and whether bioethics can follow specific methodological rules within subdisciplines or for specific tasks. As this does not appear to be the case, the article examines whether (...) bioethics’ adherence to specific quality criteria (instead of methodological rules) or pursuing of a common goal can make it qualify as a discipline. Unfortunately, the result is negative. Then, the article scrutinizes whether referring to bioethics institutions and professional qualifications can ascertain bioethics as a discipline. However, this makes the definition of bioethics circular. The article ends by admitting that bioethics can qualify as a discipline according to broader definitions of discipline, for example, as an “area of knowledge, research and education.” However, this would reduce bioethics’ potential for demarcation and identity-building. Thus, to consolidate the discipline of bioethics and increase its impact, we should explicate and elaborate on its methodology. (shrink)

Frode Jakobsen søger i "Nietzsches kamp med den kristelige moral" at forstå den tyske filosof Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Det gør Jakobsen blandt andet med udgangspunkt i Nietzsches person, oplevelser, psyke, som han kombinerer med hans værker for at sammenfatte udviklingen i Nietzsches moralske tænken. Frode Jakobsen (1907-1997), dansk politiker, modstandsleder og forfatter. Medstifter af foreningen Dansk Studiering, som i 1943 blev omdannet til en illegal organisation, der spillede en stor rolle i modstandsbevægelsen under anden verdenskrig. I 1945 blev (...) han valgt for Socialdemokratiet, hvor han var MF indtil 1973. Jakobsen har desuden udgivet en række bøger, der fortæller om hans erindringer og erfaringer fra sine mange år i politik. (shrink)

By examining the history of universal history from the late Middle Ages until the early nineteenth century we trace the making of the global. Early modern universal history can be seen as a response to the epistemological crisis provoked by new knowledge and experience. Traditional narratives were no longer sufficient to gain an understanding of events. Inspired by recent developments in theory of history, the volume argues that the relevance of universal history resides in the laboratory of intense, diverse and (...) mainly unsuccessful attempts at thinking history and universals together. They all shared the common aim of integrating all time and space: assemble the world and keep it together."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

This book gives the reader an understanding of what consciousness is about, and of how to make conscious experiences more pleasant. It expands on a new theory that describes the evolutionary trajectory leading to conscious life forms. In short, the evidence suggests that consciousness first evolved some 300 million years ago as a consequence of the introduction of feelings. Feelings offer a strategy for making behavioural decisions. Besides playing a crucial role in the evolution of the human mind, they are (...) a key factor in regard to mental health and quality of life. Fortunately, the human brain is plastic. By exploiting available options for modulating the mind, it is therefore possible to impact on what sort of experiences the brain serves. More specifically, you can strengthen the capacity for positive feelings and reduce the sway of negative feelings. The text covers biological, neurological, psychological, and philosophical aspects of the mind. (shrink)

Based on author's thesis (Ph. D., University of Victoria, 2010).

Based on a modern reading of Aristotle’s theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By ‘virtual friendship’ we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A ‘traditional friendship’ is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label ‘genuine friendship’ and thus qualify as morally valuable. The (...) upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange. (shrink)

. Revisioning the Fifth Element. Can critical realism reconcile competence and Bildung for a more sustainable twenty-first-century education? Journal of Critical Realism: Vol. 18, Sustainability, Interdisciplinarity and Transformative change: A Critical Realist Response to the Crisis System, pp. 402-419.

Can we have objective knowledge of the world? Can we understand what is morally right or wrong? Yes, to some extent. This is the answer given by Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl. Both rejected David Hume’s skeptical account of what we can hope to understand. But they held his empirical method in high regard, inquiring into the way we perceive and emotionally experience the world, into the nature and function of human empathy and sympathy and the role of the imagination (...) in processes of intersubjective understanding. The challenge is to overcome the natural constraints of perceptual and emotional experience and reach an agreement that is informed by the facts in the world and the nature of morality. This collection of philosophical essays addresses an audience of Smith- and Husserl scholars as well as everybody interested in theories of objective knowledge and proper morality which are informed by the way we perceive and think and communicate. (shrink)

Background: This study is based on the ontological assumption about human interdependence, and also on earlier research, which has shown that patients in psychiatric hospitals and their relatives experience suffering and indignity. Aim: The aim of this study is to explore the experience of patients and relatives regarding respect for dignity following admission to a psychiatric unit. Research design: The methodological approach is a phenomenological hermeneutic method. Participants and research context: This study is based on qualitative interviews conducted with six (...) patients at a psychiatric hospital and five relatives of patients who experienced psychosis. Ethical consideration: Permission was given by the Regional Committee for Medical Research Ethics in Western Norway, the Norwegian Data Protection Agency and all wards within the hospital in which the patients were interviewed. Findings: The analysis revealed one main theme: ‘The significance of small things for experiencing dignity’ and four subthemes described as follows - ‘to be conscious of small things’, ‘being conscious of what one says’, ‘being met’ and ‘to be aware of personal chemistry’. Discussion and conclusion: Staff members seem not to give enough attention to the importance of these small things. Staff members need to explore this phenomenon systematically and expand their own understanding of it. (shrink)

Standard definitions of procrastination underscore the irrational nature of this habit, a critical criterion being that the procrastinating individual delays despite expecting to be worse off for the delay. However, an examination of more than 175 items in 18 procrastination scales reveals that they do not address such a forward-looking criterion. Consequently, scales run the risk of not separating maladaptive and irrational delays from other forms of delay. We propose that forward-looking considerations may not be the best way of operationalizing (...) the irrationality involved in procrastination and argue that scales should instead focus on past negative consequences of unnecessary delay. We suggest a new scale to measure such procrastination-related negative consequences and demonstrate that this scale, used separately or combined with established procrastination scales, performs better in predicting negative states and correlates to procrastination than established scales. The new scale seems to be helpful in separating trivial forms of unnecessary delay from maladaptive forms and hence represents a potentially valuable tool in research and clinical/applied efforts. (shrink)

We demonstrate how to validly quantify into hyperintensional contexts involving non-propositional attitudes like seeking, solving, calculating, worshipping, and wanting to become. We describe and apply a typed extensional logic of hyperintensions that preserves compositionality of meaning, referential transparency and substitutivity of identicals also in hyperintensional attitude contexts. We specify and prove rules for quantifying into hyperintensional contexts. These rules presuppose a rigorous method for substituting variables into hyperintensional contexts, and the method will be described. We prove the following. First, it (...) is always valid to quantify into hyperintensional attitude contexts and over hyperintensional entities. Second, factive empirical attitudes validate, furthermore, quantifying over intensions and extensions, and so do non-factive attitudes, both empirical and non-empirical , provided the entity to be quantified over exists. We focus mainly on mathematical attitudes, because they are uncontroversially hyperintensional. (shrink)

This is the first English edition of a major work by the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup (1905-81). It is the culmination of his critical engagement with Kierkegaardianism, which had begun almost 20 years earlier. In this text, Løgstrup focuses on four main themes in Kierkegaard: his understanding of Christ and thus of Christianity; his understanding of suffering in human existence; Christian vs. secular ethics; and Platonistic influences on Kierkegaard's position, which Løgstrup characterises as nihilistic. Løgstrup presents his (...) own alternative conception in response: that Christ revealed universal ontological ethical structures that put Christians and non-Christians on a par; that suffering is a basic human experience and so there is no such thing as a particular Christian suffering; that sovereign expressions of life such as trust, sincerity, and compassion are the fundamental phenomena of ethics that enable our lives to function, and are thus given as a gift of creation, not of faith; and finally that human existence as created is meaningful and holds value and so is not a Kierkegaardian 'nothingness' of mere relativity. As well as offering a classic and yet controversial critique of Kierkegaard, this text also develops Løgstrup's conception of the sovereign expressions of life, which was to become central to his later ethics, further deepening his distinctive understanding of the human condition. Here translated in full for the first time, it will now be possible for English-speaking readers to explore the issues that drew Løgstrup into his controversion with Kierkegaard. (shrink)

In this article we discuss what we call the deliberative division of epistemic labor. We present evidence that the human tendency to engage in motivated reasoning in defense of our beliefs can facilitate the occurrence of divisions of epistemic labor in deliberations among people who disagree. We further present evidence that these divisions of epistemic labor tend to promote beliefs that are better supported by the evidence. We show that promotion of these epistemic benefits stands in tension with what extant (...) theories in epistemology take rationality to require in cases of disagreement. We argue that the epistemic benefits that result from the deliberative division of epistemic labor can provide epistemic reason to maintain confidence in cases of disagreement. We then show that the deliberative division of epistemic labor constitutes a distinct kind of epistemic dependence. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss what we believe to be one of the most important features of near-future AIs, namely their capacity to behave in a friendly manner to humans. Our analysis of what it means for an AI to behave in a friendly manner does not presuppose that proper friendships between humans and AI systems could exist. That would require reciprocity, which is beyond the reach of near-future AI systems. Rather, we defend the claim that social AIs should be (...) programmed to behave in a manner that mimics a sufficient number of aspects of proper friendship. We call this “as-if friendship”. The main reason for why we believe that ‘as if friendship’ is an improvement on the current, highly submissive behavior displayed by AIs is the negative effects the latter can have on humans. We defend this view partly on virtue ethical grounds and we argue that the virtue-based approach to AI ethics outlined in this paper, which we call “virtue alignment”, is an improvement on the traditional “value alignment” approach. (shrink)

Abduction, deduction and induction are different forms of inference in science. However, only a few attempts have been made to introduce the idea of abductive reasoning as an extended way of thinking about clinical practice in nursing research. The aim of this paper was to encourage critical reflections about abductive reasoning based on three empirical examples from nursing research and includes three research questions on what abductive reasoning is, how the process has taken place, and how knowledge about abductive reasoning (...) based on the examples can inform nursing research and clinical practice. The study has a descriptive and explorative approach using a convenience sample of three empirical studies from nursing research. The three studies illustrate different ways to enter the abductive reasoning process in steps. They represent new caring models, which offer visual and cognitive maps for expanding nursing research, education and thus informing care. Therefore, we suggest that abductive reasoning may be beneficial for different ways of knowing and demonstrates scientific innovation to shed new light on health phenomena, which can help researchers and practitioners to gain a broader and deeper understanding of nursing care inquiry. However, more studies are needed to broaden this scope. (shrink)

This collection addresses metaphysical issues at the intersection between philosophy and science. A unique feature is the way in which it is guided both by history of philosophy, by interaction between philosophy and science, and by methodological awareness. In asking how metaphysics is possible in an age of science, the contributors draw on philosophical tools provided by three great thinkers who were fully conversant with and actively engaged with the sciences of their day: Kant, Husserl, and Frege. -/- Part I (...) sets out frameworks for scientifically informed metaphysics in accordance with the meta-metaphysics outlined by these three self-reflective philosophers. Part II explores the domain for co-existent metaphysics and science. Constraints on ambitious critical metaphysics are laid down in close consideration of logic, meta-theory, and specific conditions for science. Part III exemplifies the role of language and science in contemporary metaphysics. Quine’s pursuit of truth is analysed; Cantor’s absolute infinitude is reconstrued in modal terms; and sense is made of Weyl’s take on the relationship between mathematics and empirical aspects of physics. -/- With chapters by leading scholars, Metametaphysics and the Sciences is an in-depth resource for researchers and advanced students working within metaphysics, philosophy of science, and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

It is argued that geometrical intuition, as conceived in Kant, is still crucial to the epistemological foundations of mathematics. For this purpose, I have chosen to target one of the most sympathetic interpreters of Kant's philosophy of mathematics – Michael Friedman – because he has formulated the possible historical limitations of Kant's views most sharply. I claim that there are important insights in Kant's theory that have survived the developments of modern mathematics, and thus, that they are not so intrinsically (...) bound up with the logic and mathematics of Kant's time as Friedman will have it. These insights include the idea that mathematical knowledge relies on the manipulation of objects given in quasi-perceptual intuition, as Charles Parsons has argued, and that pure intuition is a source of knowledge of space itself that cannot be replaced by mere propositional knowledge. In particular, it is pointed out that it is the isomorphism between Kantian intuition and a spatial manifold that underlies both the epistemic intimacy of the most fundamental type of geometrical intuition as well as that of perceptual acquaintance. (shrink)

The degree of doxastic revision required in response to evidence of disagreement is typically thought to be a function of our beliefs about (1) our interlocutor’s familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments, and their intellectual capacities and virtues, relative to our own, or (2) the expected probability of our interlocutor being correct, conditional on our disagreeing. While these two factors are typically used interchangeably, I show that they have an inverse correlation in cases of disagreement about politically divisive propositions. (...) This presents us with a puzzle about the epistemic impact of disagreement in these cases. The most significant disagreements on (1) are the least significant disagreements on (2), and vice versa. I show that assessing the epistemic status of an interlocutor by reference to either (1) or (2) has uncomfortable consequences in these cases. I then argue that this puzzle cannot be escaped by claiming that we usually have dispute-independent reason to reject the significance of politically charged disagreement altogether. (shrink)

‘Information’ and ‘code’ originated as technical terms within linguistics and information theory but are now widely used in genetics and developmental biology. Against this background, it is examined if coded information distinguishes genes from other information carriers, i.e., whether there are genetic words or sentences by virtue of the genetic code, and, if so, whether they have any semantic content. It is concluded that there is no genetic language with semantic content, but that the genetic code still enables unique language-like (...) modes of transmission and interpretation of causal information. (shrink)

In this article we argue that the principle of need, on some interpretations, could be used to justify the spending of publically funded health care resources on cognitive enhancement and that this also holds true for individuals whose cognitive capacities are considered normal.The increased, and to an extent, novel demands that the modern technology and information society places on the cognitive capacities of agents, e.g., regarding good and responsible decision-making, have blurred the line between treatment and enhancement. More specifically, it (...) has shifted upwards. As a consequence, principles of need on their most reasonable interpretations can be used to support publically funded cognitive enhancement. At least this is so, if broader aims than curing and ameliorating diseases are included in the goals of health care. We suggest that it would be plausible to see health care as accepting such broader goals already today. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I suggest how a broadly Kantian critique of classical logic might spring from reflections on constructibility conditions. According to Kant, mathematics is concerned with objects that are given through ‘arbitrary synthesis,’ in the form of ‘constructions of concepts’ in the medium of ‘pure intuition.’ Logic, by contrast, is narrowly constrained – it has no objects of its own and is fixed by the very forms of thought. That is why there is not much room for developments within logic, as (...) compared to the progress in mathematics. Kant’s view of logic remains critical, though – through considerations that are effectively on the scope and limits of classical logic and which play a part in his transcendental idealism. The most important ones are to be found in his critique of the use of reductio ad absurdum proofs in metaphysics and his solutions to the ‘antinomies of pure reason.’ Arguably, these considerations carry over to mathematics as well – by way of ‘analogues’ to the antinomies – in particular in resolving infinity paradoxes. (shrink)