Plato's Symposium, written in the early part of the 4th century BC, is set at a drinking party attended by some of the leading intellectuals of the day, including Aristophanes, the comic dramatist, Socrates, Plato's mentor, and Alcibiades, the brilliant but treacherous politician. Each guest gives a speech in praise of the benefits of desire and its role in the good and happy human life. At the core of the work stands Socrates' praise of philosophical desire, and an argument for (...) the superiority of the philosophical life as the best route to happiness. This edition provides an accessible and engaging new translation by M. C. Howatson, and a substantial introduction, by Frisbee C. C. Sheffield, which guides the reader through the various parts of the dialogue and reflects on its central arguments. A chronology and detailed notes on the participants help to set this enduring work in context. (shrink)

It is often held that Plato did not have a viable account of interpersonal love. The account of eros—roughly, desire—in the Symposium appears to fail, and, though the Lysis contains much suggestive material for an account of philia—roughly, friendship—this is an aporetic dialogue, which fails, ultimately, to provide an account of friendship. This paper argues that Plato's account of friendship is in the Phaedrus. This dialogue outlines three kinds of philia relationship, the highest of which compares favourably to the Aristotelian (...) notion of love for another ‘for their own sake’. In contrast to the account of eros in the Symposium, this gives Plato an account of interpersonal love that meets some of the requirements laid down by Gregory Vlastos for a satisfactory account of interpersonal love. (shrink)

In “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” Arendt explores whether there is a relationship between thinking and abstention from wrongdoing. Two propositions are used from Plato’s Gorgias to explore the normative dimension of thinking, conceived as internal dialogue between a two-in-one in the mind: that one should not be out of harmony with oneself and that it is better to suffer than do wrong. Arendt attempts to derives the second “moral” proposition from the first, a move which has been seen as weak. (...) This paper offers a new reading of the argument by bringing Arendt into closer dialogue with Plato. The argument is in fact grounded in the importance of plurality and relationality (to the thinking dialogue), and what is required to negotiate it: equality. Wrongdoers show a disdain for equality, and as such they are not collaboration-apt; so, there can be no collaborative dialogue with a wrongdoer. This generates the desired conclusion that if one is to think collaboratively and harmoniously (desired because the two exist in my one person), one should abstain from wrongdoing. (shrink)