Some researchers have attributed deviations from selfish behavior to fairness. Violations of fairness theories, however, are observed in experimental dictator games with transfer rates greater than 1 (a transfer of x from the dictator yields an income of tx for the beneficiary, where x < tx): the dictator’s final income is less than the beneficiary’s. We theoretically propose that dictator giving also involves altruism, further supporting our claim with empirical evidence from four separate samples of dictator game experiments. Our nonlinear (...) specification allows the relative measurement of the independent motives in dictator behavior. (shrink)

Reciprocity is a decisive behavioural rule resulting in successful co-operation or deterrence. In this paper, a dynamic model is proposed, where reciprocity is described by changes in altruistic (or malevolent) ties. Multiple steady states may exist in one of which there may be general cooperation (solidarity) and the other being one of universal malice (war of each individual against all other individuals). We apply our theory to a number of examples, illustrating that the agents’ initial preferences determine whether a steady (...) state of solidarity, selfishness or malice will emerge. (shrink)

Trusting in someone's cooperation is often connected with the danger of being exploited. So it is important that signals are exchanged which make it probable enough that the potential partner is reliable. Such signals must be too expensive for partners who are planning to abuse the trust they are given but cheap enough for those who wish to initiate a long-term cooperation. In a game theoretical model, it is shown that such signals could consist of presents given before the partnership (...) starts. (edited). (shrink)

The issue of trust has recently attracted growing attention in research on work relations, capital – owner relations, cultural influences on the economic structures of different countries, and other topics. This paper analyzes a simple experiment on trust and the reward of trust. Mr A is endowed with DM 80. He decides to trust Ms B (and give her his money) or not. Ms B is able to double the sum of money (if she gets it) and can then decide (...) to give back as much as she likes. In an experiment, 76% of subjects A decided to trust. The average reward they received was DM 79.2 which is not significantly different from DM 80, the value of mistrust; nor was the average reward different from the average expectations of subjects A, i.e. a weak variant of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis is supported. In the paper we also look for differences between trusting and mistrusting A-subjects, for behavioral norms, and other determinants of rewards. (shrink)

The article analyses experimental “solidarity games” with two benefactors and one beneficiary. Depending on their motive for giving—e.g., warm glow, altruism, or guilt—the benefactors’ response functions are either constant, decreasing, or increasing. If motives interact, or if envy is a concern, then more complex (unimodal) shapes may emerge. Controlling for random utility perturbations, we determine which and how many motives affect individual decision making. The main findings are that the motives of about 75% of the subjects can be identified fairly (...) sharply, that all of the motives discussed in the literature co-exist in the population, and that for any given individual no more than two motives (out of six motives considered overall) are identified. We conclude that a unifying motive for solidarity cannot be derived even when we allow for individually heterogeneous parameterization: different subjects give for different reasons and all existing social preference theories are partially correct. (shrink)