Abstract: A current debate in semantics and pragmatics is whether all contextual effects on truth-conditional content can be traced to logical form, or 'unarticulated constituents' can be supplied by the pragmatic process of free enrichment. In this paper, I defend the latter position. The main objection to this view is that free enrichment appears to overgenerate, not predicting where context cannot affect truth conditions, so that a systematic account is unlikely (Stanley, 2002a). I first examine the (...) semantic alternative proposed by Stanley and others, which assumes extensive hidden structure acting as a linguistic trigger for pragmatic processes, so that all truth-conditional effects of context turn out to be instances of saturation. I show that there are cases of optional pragmatic contributions to the proposition expressed that cannot plausibly be accounted for in this way, and that advocates of this approach will therefore also have to appeal to free enrichment. The final section starts to address the question of how free enrichment is constrained: I argue that it involves only local development or adjustment of parts of logical form, any global developments being excluded by the requirement for the proposition expressed to provide an inferential warrant for the intended implications of the utterance. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thought and communicated (...) is typically enriched relative to what is said. We show that situationalism dispenses with free enrichment both at the level of what is said (proposition expressed) and of what is thought (mental level). According to situationalism, an alleged underdetermined utterance can, pace minimalism, be true in one situation while false in another, and two people using the same alleged underdetermined sentence can be characterized, pace contextualism, as having said the same thing. (shrink)

It is commonly held that all truth-conditional effects of context result from a pragmatic process of value-assignment that is triggered (and made obligatory) by something in the sentence itself, namely a lexically context-sensitive expression (e.g. an indexical) or a free variable in logical form. Such a process has been dubbed ‘saturation'. It stands in contrast to so called ‘free' pragmatic processes, which are supposed to take place for purely pragmatic reasons — in order to make sense of what (...) the speaker is saying. For example, the pragmatic process through which an expression is given a nonliteral (e.g. a metaphorical or metonymical) interpretation is context-driven: we interpret an expression nonliterally in order to make sense of the speech act, not because this is dictated by the linguistic materials in virtue of the rules of the language. The dominant view, then, is that no free pragmatic process can affect truth-conditions — such processes can only affect what the speaker means (but not what she says). But there is a dissenting position, according to which free pragmatic processes can take place locally and interact with semantic composition, thereby affecting truth-conditions. Three such processes have been discussed in the literature : pragmatic enrichment, predicate transfer, and loosening/broadening. Sometimes ‘pragmatic enrichment' is used as a cover term for these modulation processes because, on a certain understanding, they all result from ‘enriching' the logical representation which is the output of the translational phase of semantic interpretation. The paper presents an overview of this research area. (shrink)

Some formal properties of enriched systems of Lambek calculus with analogues of conjunction and disjunction are investigated. In particular, it is proved that the class of languages recognizable by the Lambek calculus with added intersective conjunction properly includes the class of finite intersections of context-free languages.

It is well known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes are acknowledged as such if we have intuitions telling us that things should be different. The aim of this paper is to introduce a paradox-free deontic action system by (i) identifying the basic intuitions leading to the emergence of the (...) paradoxes and (ii) exploiting these intuitions in order to develop a consistent deontic framework, where it can be shown why some phenomena seem to be paradoxical and why they are not so if interpreted in a correct way. (shrink)

The main aim of the present paper is to show that the recently developed dialogical approach to Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory, called Immanent Reasoning, provides the means for distinguishing François Recanati’s process of free enrichment and saturation, meets his own objections against perspectives based on unarticulated constituents and opens a new venue to pragmatic modulation, where the speaker-receiver interaction is integrated into the notion of enrichment. In such a setting enrichment operates on proof-objects that make fully (...) articulated event-propositions true. The point is that distinguishing what makes a proposition true from the proposition made true offers a simple and clean way to avoid conflating the contextual elements that enrich a proposition with the proposition itself. Such a framework abounds in means for expressing reference structures such as anaphora, including time and/or location reference. Furthermore, the notion of dependent types of CTT and the associated formation rules allow for a straightforward analysis of composition of meaning at work in Recanati’s cases concerning occasion meaning as determined by context. The brand of dialogical contextualism, grounded on the play-level, advocated herewith is not a form of propositional syncretism. The framework offers a straightforward response to the failure of third excluded in some instances of faultless disagreement without giving up the notion of propositional content. More generally, this suggests an alternative way to tackle the interface pragmatics semantics underlying the notion of pragmatic modulation by integrating into the interface the dialogical game of asking and giving reasons. (shrink)

Gödel logic is the extension of intuitionistic logic by the linearity axiom. Symmetric Gödel logic is a logical system, the language of which is an enrichment of the language of Gödel logic with their dual logical connectives. Symmetric Gödel logic is the extension of symmetric intuitionistic logic. The proof-intuitionistic calculus, the language of which is an enrichment of the language of intuitionistic logic by modal operator was investigated by Kuznetsov and Muravitsky. Bimodal symmetric Gödel logic is a logical (...) system, the language of which is an enrichment of the language of Gödel logic with their dual logical connectives and two modal operators. Bimodal symmetric Gödel logic is embedded into an extension of Gödel–Löb logic, the language of which contains disjunction, conjunction, negation and two modal operators. The variety of bimodal symmetric Gödel algebras, that represent the algebraic counterparts of bimodal symmetric Gödel logic, is investigated. Description of free algebras and characterization of projective algebras in the variety of bimodal symmetric Gödel algebras is given. All finitely generated projective bimodal symmetric Gödel algebras are infinite, while finitely generated projective symmetric Gödel algebras are finite. (shrink)

It is argued that genuinely subsentential phrases, such as a discourse-initial utterance of “From France” to indicate the provenance of an item, provide evidence for the reality of the pragmatic process of free enrichment. I consider recent attempts to treat such discourse-initial fragments as linguistic ellipsis of some kind while accommodating the difference between these cases and accepted types of ellipsis such as sluicing and gapping. I claim that the mechanisms they posit to save an ellipsis story have (...) no role in an account of performance. An argument against the enrichment approach from the indeterminacy of the content of subsentential utterances is discussed, and refuted, and it is shown how this indeterminacy is accommodated in a contextualist pragmatic theory. (shrink)

Despite creating vast inequalities and propping up reactionary world regimes, capitalism has many passionate defenders—but not because of what it withholds from some and gives to others. Capitalism dominates, Todd McGowan argues, because it mimics the structure of our desire while hiding the trauma that the system inflicts upon it. People from all backgrounds enjoy what capitalism provides, but at the same time are told more and better is yet to come. Capitalism traps us through an incomplete satisfaction that compels (...) us after the new, the better, and the more. Capitalism's parasitic relationship to our desires gives it the illusion of corresponding to our natural impulses, which is how capitalism's defenders characterize it. By understanding this psychic strategy, McGowan hopes to divest us of our addiction to capitalist enrichment and help us rediscover enjoyment as we actually experienced it. By locating it in the present, McGowan frees us from our attachment to a better future and the belief that capitalism is an essential outgrowth of human nature. From this perspective, our economic, social, and political worlds open up to real political change. Eloquent and enlivened by examples from film, television, consumer culture, and everyday life, Capitalism and Desire brings a new, psychoanalytically grounded approach to political and social theory. (shrink)

This article offers an understanding of the normative basis of unjust enrichment. It begins by considering whether the right at stake in cases of unjust enrichment fits within a Kantian conception of right that treats free agency as the sole aspect of the person commanding respect. It argues that it does not because, in cases of unjust enrichment, recovery does not depend on finding a violation of the plaintiff's bare freedom to choose. The article then argues (...) that unjust enrichment vindicates the plaintiff's right of self-determination—the realization of the capacity to live from self-chosen ends—when the laws of property and contract threaten to undermine it. This resolves the puzzles of unjust enrichment law that remain mysterious on other accounts, such as how the plaintiff can have a right to recovery even though property has been effectively transferred to the defendant, why the plaintiff may recover even though the defendant has been purely passive and has committed no wrong, and why unjust enrichment fails to exhibit the structure of corrective justice. (shrink)

This article looks at the film A Clockwork Orange (Kubrick 1971) through the lenses of the free will debate. The main argument proposed is that the film exemplifies a view of free will that I call polythetic. This view says that free will needs to be understood as containing several criteria that allow us to see an action as more or less free, but none of the characteristics is essential for an action to be classified as (...) free. In this view, free will is not an on or off function, but should be understood on a spectrum. A Clockwork Orange illustrates this view. This story is a philosophical work of fiction. As the story progresses, the main character, Little Alex, is free in certain aspects and not others, touching on several important and different elements of free will. The film’s story is an ideal way to illustrate the idea of free will as something we can have more or less of, rather than something we have or do not have. The film is seen as a philosophical work in that it illustrates a polythetic view of free will, and the traditional philosophical discussions on free will can also be used to enrich the understanding of the film. (shrink)

The books’ goal is to answer the question: Do the weaknesses of value-free economics imply the need for a paradigm shift? The author synthesizes criticisms from different perspectives (descriptive and methodological). Special attention is paid to choices over time, because in this area value-free economics has the most problems. In that context, the enriched concept of multiple self is proposed and investigated. However, it is not enough to present the criticisms towards value-free economics. For scientists, a bad (...) paradigm is better than no paradigm. Therefore, the author considers whether value-based economics with normative approaches such as economics of happiness, capability approach, libertarian paternalism, and the concept of multiple self can be the alternative paradigm for value-free economics. This book is essential reading to everyone interested in the current state of economics as a discipline. (shrink)

Obtaining informed consent from patients is a moral and legal duty and, thus, a key legitimation for medical treatment. The pivotal prerequisite for valid informed consent is decision-making capacity of the patient. Related to the question of whether and when consent should be morally and legally valid, there has been a long-lasting philosophical debate about freedom of will and the connection of freedom and responsibility. The scholarly discussion on decision-making capacity and its clinical evaluation does not sufficiently take into account (...) this fundamental debate. It is contended that the notion of free will must be reflected when evaluating decision-making capacity. Namely, it should be included as a part of the appreciation-criterion for decision-making capacity. The argumentation is mainly drawn on the compatibilism of Harry Frankfurt. A solution is proposed which at the same time takes the notion of free will seriously and enriches the traditional understanding of decision-making capacity, strengthening its justificatory force while remaining clinically applicable. (shrink)

No one denies that in his research the historian, whether consciously or not, guides himself by already acquired knowledge of reality past and present that has undergone certain interpretation. It is usually said that he possesses a certain "view of the world." a certain understanding of the historical process, a certain theory , i.e., conceptions from which he cannot detach himself in the course of his research. Some regard this situation as a kind of "inevitable evil" inherent primarily in the (...) social sciences and demand "pure," "objective" research, i.e., for historical research, that it not be guided by anything but the sources actually employed. There are others who are not disturbed by this situation, for they recognize that "pure" research does not exist even in the natural sciences. And if they make certain demands in this regard, it is not for elimination of the researcher's particular standpoint, guided by the knowledge already acquired, but rather enrichment and perhaps qualitative reconstruction of the knowledge he employs in his research. This knowledge is treated in the given case as a kind of governing mechanism in the process of research. The proponents of both points of view strive for a particular goal: attainment of research results as adequate to reality as possible in a given field, with the only difference that they suggest different paths for attainment of this goal. It may even be stated that these standpoints are not debatable, for adherents of the second point of view will undoubtedly agree that in order to enrich and perhaps reorganize the knowledge used in the research it is necessary to eliminate from it elements of low quality, i.e., speculative, unsupported knowledge that impedes the research. Adherents of the former point of view, however, would not maintain too extreme a position if the knowledge they want to eliminate proves to be scientific knowledge, i.e., confirmed knowledge or, to put it differently, true knowledge. Naturally, this does not mean that no differences exist between these viewpoints. (shrink)

_Nomad Citizenship_ argues for transforming our institutions and practices of citizenship and markets in order to release society from dependence on the state and capital. It changes Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of nomadology into a utopian project with immediate practical implications, developing ideas of a nonlinear Marxism and of the slow-motion general strike. Responding to the challenge of creating philosophical concepts with concrete applications, Eugene W. Holland looks outside the state to analyze contemporary political and economic development using the ideas (...) of nomad citizenship and free-market communism. Holland’s nomadology seeks to displace capital-controlled free markets with truly free markets. Its goal is to rescue market exchange, not perpetuate capitalism—to enable noncapitalist markets to coordinate socialized production on a global scale and, with an eye to the common good, to liberate them from capitalist control. In suggesting the slow-motion general strike, Holland aims to transform citizenship: to renew, enrich, and invigorate it by supplanting the monopoly of state citizenship with plural nomad citizenships. In the process, he offers critiques of both the Clinton and Bush regimes in the broader context of critiques of the social contract, the labor contract, and the form of the state itself. (shrink)

In this paper we present a sequent calculus for propositional dynamic logic built using an enriched version of the tree-hypersequent method and including an infinitary rule for the iteration operator. We prove that this sequent calculus is theoremwise equivalent to the corresponding Hilbert-style system, and that it is contraction-free and cut-free. All results are proved in a purely syntactic way.

This essay presents a point of view for looking at `free will', with the purpose of interpreting where exactly the freedom lies. For, freedom is what we mean by it. It compares the exercise of free will with the making of inferences, which usually is predominantly inductive in nature. The making of inference and the exercise of free will, both draw upon psychological resources that define our ‘selves’. I examine the constitution of the self of an individual, (...) especially the involvement of personal beliefs, personal memories, affects, emotions, and the hugely important psychological value-system, all of which distinguish the self of one individual from that of another. The foundational position that adopted in this essay is that all psychological processes are correlated with corresponding ones involving large scale neural aggregates in the brain, communicating with one another through wavelike modes of excitation and de-excitation. Of central relevance is the value-network around which the affect system is organized, the latter, in turn, being the axis around which is assembled the self, with all its emotional correlates. The self is a complex system. I include a brief outline of what complexity consists of. In reality all systems are complex, for complexity is ubiquitous, and certain parts of nature appear to us to be ‘simple’ only in certain specific contexts. It is in this background that the issue of determinism is viewed in this essay. Instead of looking at determinism as a grand principle entrenched in nature independent of our interpretation of it, I look at our ability to explain and to predict events and phenomena around us, which is made possible by the existence of causal links running in a complex course that set up correlations between diverse parts of nature, in this way putting the stamp of necessity on these events. However, the complexity of systems limits our ability to explain and to predict to within certain horizons defined by contexts. Our ability to explain and predict in matters relating to acts of free will is similarly limited by the operations of the self that remain hidden from our own awareness. The aspects of necessity and determinism appear to us in the form of reason and rationality that explain and predict only within a limited horizon, while the rest depends on the complex operation of self-linked psychological resources, where the latter appear as contingent in the context of the exercise of free will. The hallmark of complex systems is the existence of amplifying factors that operate as destabilizing ones, along with inhibiting or stabilizing factors as well that generally limit the destabilizing influences to local occurrences, while preserving the global integrity of a system. This complex interplay of destabilizing and stabilizing influences lead to the possibility of an enormous number of distinct modes of behavior that appear as emergent phenomena in complex systems. Looking at the particular case of the self of an individual that guide her actions and thoughts, it is the operation of our emotions, built around the psychological value-system, that provide for the amplifying and inhibiting factors mentioned above. The operation of these self-linked factors stamps our actions and thoughts as contingent ones that do not fit with our concepts of reason and rationality. And this is what provides the basis of our idea of free will. Free will is not ‘free’ in virtue of exemption from causal links running through all our self-based processes - ones that remain hidden from our awareness, but is free of what is perceived to be ‘reason and rationality’ based on knowledge and the common pool of beliefs and principles associated with a shared world-view. When we speak of the choice involved in an act of exercise of free will what we actually refer to is the commonly observed fact that various different individuals of a similar disposition respond differently when placed under similar circumstances. In other words, free will is ‘free’ precisely because it is not subject to constraints of a commonly accepted and shared set of principles, beliefs, and values. While it is possible that, in an exercise of free will, the self-linked psychological resources are brought into action when a number of alternatives are presented to the self by the operation of the ingredients of a commonly shared world-view, it seems likely that, that set of alternatives is not of primary relevance in the final response that the mind produces, since the latter is primarily a product of the operation of the self-based psychological resources. What is of greater relevance here is the operation of emotion-driven processes, guided by the psychological value-system based on the activity of the so-called reward-punishment network in the brain. These processes lead the individual to a response that appears to be free from the shackles of determinism precisely because their mechanisms, which are hidden from us, do not conform to commonly accepted and shared rules and principles. In contrast, inductive inference is a process that is based on the ‘cognitive face’ of self, where the self-based psychological resources play a supportive role to the commonly shared world-view of an individual. There is never any freedom from the all-pervading causal links representing correlations among all objects, entities, and events in nature. In the midst of all this, the closest thing to freedom that we can have in our life comes with self-examination and self-improvement. The possibility of self-examination appears in the form of specific conjunctions between our complex self-processes and the ceaseless changes of scenario in our external world. This actually makes the emergent phenomenon of self-examination a matter of chance, but one that keeps on appearing again and again in our life. Once realized, self examination creates possibilities that would not be there in the absence of it, and these possibilities include the enhancement of further self-enrichment and further diversity in the exercise of our free will. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 411-412 [Access article in PDF] Deborah Achtenberg. Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2002. Pp. xiii + 218. Paper, $20.95.Deborah Achtenberg argues that, for Aristotle, virtue is a disposition to respond to situations with the appropriate emotions, where emotions are understood as perceptions of the value (...) of particulars. To perceive the value of a particular is to perceive that particular as a limit; some limits enable what they limit to be more fully what it is, while other limits do the opposite. My activity in writing this review, for example, is "limited" both by the rules of grammar and by my computer's tendency to crash frequently; one kind of limit enriches my activity, while the other hinders and threatens it (hence Achtenberg's subtitle). An enabling limit is a telos or end; something is a telos of yours if it connects you to a larger context that in some way fulfills or completes you.Achtenberg's interpretation enables her to steer Aristotle clear of a number of persistent false dichotomies. For example: is the doctrine of the mean an uninspiring counsel to do the middling thing, or a vacuous counsel to do whatever one ought to do? Neither, says Achtenberg; rather, it is Aristotle's way of insisting on the flexibility of the virtuous person's [End Page 411] responses. Is Aristotle siding, then, with Odysseus, who suppressed his emotions in order to suit his actions to the demands of the occasion, as against Achilles, who stubbornly followed his emotions regardless of circumstance? No, that dichotomy falls as well: the virtuous person has flexible emotional (not just behavioral) responses, and so can be as adaptable as Odysseus yet as sincere as Achilles.Does Aristotle's ethics have a metaphysical foundation, or is it autonomous? Achtenberg dissolves that dichotomy by distinguishing two different ways in which Aristotle takes ethics to be an "imprecise" science. First, ethics and metaphysics are both imprecise, because they share a common subject-matter (final causation) that is an analogical equivocal and so indefinable. Second, ethics is less precise than metaphysics because ethics can establish that, but not explain why, its claims are true. Metaphysics can explain the why of ethics, but for practical purposes the why is not necessary; so metaphysics is explanatorily but not epistemically prior to ethics.How can Aristotle's particularist-sounding denial that the virtuous person needs rules be reconciled with his insistence that the virtuous person follows a logos? Must we play down the logos passage, or instead conclude that Aristotle is a rule-theorist after all? Once again, neither: in this context, Achtenberg suggests, logos means "analogy," not "rule." Since goodness is an analogical equivocal, perceiving goodness means perceiving analogies. Being transcategorial, these analogies are not definable or codifiable, so the rule-theorists are wrong; but we are grasping something common to all good things, so the particularists are wrong too.Let me close with a couple of criticisms. Once the notion of an enabling limit has been established, Achtenberg seems to accept as unproblematic the inference to the legitimacy of paternalistic legislation: citizens are more free, not less, for being subjected to such coercion. Now on a view that regarded persons primarily as moral patients or recipients, it might be reasonable enough to elide in this way the difference between imposing limits on oneself and having them imposed by external compulsion; but it is harder to see how forcibly imposed limits could be constitutive of a life's being happier when happiness is defined, with Aristotle, as a self-generated activity.I think Achtenberg also fails to catch one false dichotomy. She contrasts Aristotle's theory, which seeks to increase and enhance emotional awareness, with the Stoic theory (as represented by Marcus Aurelius), which seeks to decrease or suppress such awareness. The contrast seems to me misleading. Both Aristotle and the Stoics agree that moral maturation involves... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 411-412 [Access article in PDF] Deborah Achtenberg. Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2002. Pp. xiii + 218. Paper, $20.95.Deborah Achtenberg argues that, for Aristotle, virtue is a disposition to respond to situations with the appropriate emotions, where emotions are understood as perceptions of the value (...) of particulars. To perceive the value of a particular is to perceive that particular as a limit; some limits enable what they limit to be more fully what it is, while other limits do the opposite. My activity in writing this review, for example, is "limited" both by the rules of grammar and by my computer's tendency to crash frequently; one kind of limit enriches my activity, while the other hinders and threatens it (hence Achtenberg's subtitle). An enabling limit is a telos or end; something is a telos of yours if it connects you to a larger context that in some way fulfills or completes you.Achtenberg's interpretation enables her to steer Aristotle clear of a number of persistent false dichotomies. For example: is the doctrine of the mean an uninspiring counsel to do the middling thing, or a vacuous counsel to do whatever one ought to do? Neither, says Achtenberg; rather, it is Aristotle's way of insisting on the flexibility of the virtuous person's [End Page 411] responses. Is Aristotle siding, then, with Odysseus, who suppressed his emotions in order to suit his actions to the demands of the occasion, as against Achilles, who stubbornly followed his emotions regardless of circumstance? No, that dichotomy falls as well: the virtuous person has flexible emotional (not just behavioral) responses, and so can be as adaptable as Odysseus yet as sincere as Achilles.Does Aristotle's ethics have a metaphysical foundation, or is it autonomous? Achtenberg dissolves that dichotomy by distinguishing two different ways in which Aristotle takes ethics to be an "imprecise" science. First, ethics and metaphysics are both imprecise, because they share a common subject-matter (final causation) that is an analogical equivocal and so indefinable. Second, ethics is less precise than metaphysics because ethics can establish that, but not explain why, its claims are true. Metaphysics can explain the why of ethics, but for practical purposes the why is not necessary; so metaphysics is explanatorily but not epistemically prior to ethics.How can Aristotle's particularist-sounding denial that the virtuous person needs rules be reconciled with his insistence that the virtuous person follows a logos? Must we play down the logos passage, or instead conclude that Aristotle is a rule-theorist after all? Once again, neither: in this context, Achtenberg suggests, logos means "analogy," not "rule." Since goodness is an analogical equivocal, perceiving goodness means perceiving analogies. Being transcategorial, these analogies are not definable or codifiable, so the rule-theorists are wrong; but we are grasping something common to all good things, so the particularists are wrong too.Let me close with a couple of criticisms. Once the notion of an enabling limit has been established, Achtenberg seems to accept as unproblematic the inference to the legitimacy of paternalistic legislation: citizens are more free, not less, for being subjected to such coercion. Now on a view that regarded persons primarily as moral patients or recipients, it might be reasonable enough to elide in this way the difference between imposing limits on oneself and having them imposed by external compulsion; but it is harder to see how forcibly imposed limits could be constitutive of a life's being happier when happiness is defined, with Aristotle, as a self-generated activity.I think Achtenberg also fails to catch one false dichotomy. She contrasts Aristotle's theory, which seeks to increase and enhance emotional awareness, with the Stoic theory (as represented by Marcus Aurelius), which seeks to decrease or suppress such awareness. The contrast seems to me misleading. Both Aristotle and the Stoics agree that moral maturation involves... (shrink)

In this paper, we explore digitally fabricated aesthetic enhancements and modifications of the body as well as digitally fabricated fauna habitats. We will address how we utilize speculative works through our bio inspired digitally fabricated designs via two of our most recent projects: {skin} D.E.E.P. and in silico et in situ. Through these two projects we explore cultural implications of the intersection of technology and biologically inspired art/design. Technology has provided an ever increasing amount of data which has facilitated the (...) way data can be used in aesthetic explorations. Technology can redefine the human experience by enhancing our senses, experiences, and forms of expression. In our work {skin} D.E.E.P., we explore these ideas via augmentation through wearables and biomimetic expressions on the skin through digitally fabricated prosthetics. {skin} D.E.E.P. employs temporary biomimetic skin patterns via wearable 3D printed exoskeletons. The first series of this work mimics the patterns and textures of animal skin via ephemeral impressions onto human skin. Taking inspiration from shedding snakeskin, we shed the outer layer by removing the 3D printed prosthesis. The epidermis retains the negative imprint of the prosthetic mimicking the look of serpent skin. The dermis reestablishes the smooth form of the human skin as it heals itself within the hour, erasing the ephemeral imprint, symbolically representing rebirth and renewal. Investigating the ephemeral aesthetic of textured patterns on human skin will not by any means provide a solution to an engineering problem, yet acts as a larger philosophical basis to conduct a discussion about the possibilities of blending bio inspired designs. The manifestation of data into physical form occurs via digital fabrication in our most recent series in silico et in situ: fauna habitats in the age of voxels, where we aim to create a new ecosystem for animals and to potentially augment their habitat. The habitats include pollinator waterers, spider habitats and turtle basking platforms. This project pushes forward with a new piece—the development of a 20-foot avian sculpture that will solely exist to support the habitat of the Chimney Swift species. The Chimney Swift is a near-threatened bird species in the US. in silico et in situ investigates the interplay of art, nature and technology by contextualizing sculptural works and placing these sculptures into nature. The project serves as a breeding ground for a larger dialogue about nature, culture, human intervention, design art and technology. Providing the artwork in the public sphere, barrier free in nature, fosters this discourse. (shrink)

Managerialism is not mere ideology, a concatenation of ideas subsisting in an epiphenomenal superstructure (Überbau) that mirrors economic relations (Base) and masks interests, but a set of practices that, as an extreme manifestation of human resources management (HRM), seeks to constitute the life-world (Lebenswelt) of participants in many sectors of society. Increasingly, it is those at the extremes of elite wealth and marginal poverty who may fall outside its remit and become free to think beyond its parameters. As inheritor (...) of personnel management, HRM as practice and ideology fills a societal vacuum and comes to exercise the power of totalizing social construction. In an integral performance culture the Performative Absolute emerges in the imaginary; it is an immanent sublime that instantiates and regulates the social being of the individual. This apotheosis of the 'manager's right to manage' overrides boundaries between public and private spheres and dissolves the separation of powers. As 'human resource', the employee is subject to living sacrifice; this is an oblation that demands ethical and theological critique. (shrink)

Combinatory logic (Curry and Feys 1958) is a “variable-free” alternative to the lambda calculus. The two have the same expressive power but build their expressions differently. “Variable-free” semantics is, more precisely, “free of variable binding”: it has no operation like abstraction that turns a free variable into a bound one; it uses combinators—operations on functions—instead. For the general linguistic motivation of this approach, see the works of Steedman, Szabolcsi, and Jacobson, among others. The standard view in (...) linguistics is that reflexive and personal pronouns are free variables that get bound by an antecedent through some coindexing mechanism. In variable free semantics the same task is performed by some combinator that identifies two arguments of the function it operates on (a duplicator). This combinator may be built into the lexical semantics of the pronoun, into that of the antecedent, or it may be a free-floating operation applicable to predicates or larger chunks of texts, i.e. a typeshifter. This note is concerned with the case of cross-sentential anaphora. It adopts Hepple’s and Jacobson’s interpretation of pronouns as identity maps and asks how this can be extended to the cross-sentential case, assuming the dynamic semantic view of anaphora. It first outlines the possibility of interpreting indefinites that antecede non-ccommanded pronouns as existential quantifiers enriched with a duplicator. Then it argues that it is preferable to use the duplicator as a type-shifter that applies “on the fly”. The proposal has consequences for two central ingredients of the classical dynamic semantic treatment: it does away with abstraction over assignments and with treating indefinites as inherently existentially quantified. However, cross-sentential anaphora remains a matter of binding, and the idea of propositions as context change potentials is retained. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhat three words come to your mind in response to “happiness”? Using a free-association task [cf. Nelson, D. L., McEvoy, C. L., & Dennis, S.. What is free association and what does i...

Located at the intersection of philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of biology, this thesis aims to provide a novel approach to understanding the strong continuity between life and mind. This thesis applies the Free Energy Framework, predictive processing and the conceptual apparatus from ecological psychology to reveal different manners in which the organizational processes and principles underlying life have been enriched so as to result in cognitive processes. By using these anticipatory cognitive frameworks this thesis unveils different forms (...) of cognition at work in surprising places and considers how such expressions of cognition are ultimately driven by various forms of environmental complexity. Importing the concepts of affordances, environmental information and perceptual medium from ecological psychology into predictive processing and the Free Energy Framework, an empirically grounded account of cognition as an anticipatory process that allows living systems to adapt to various degrees of uncertainty in their environments at distinct and yet overlapping timescales is argued for. In doing so, this thesis attempts to identify both the explanatory limits of ecological coupling accounts of perception and action, and the possible environmental conditions under which the predictive brain evolved from its decentralized non-neural predecessors as a solution to uncertainty. In contributing to a novel approach to constraining the mind, the various concepts deployed in both philosophy and cognitive science are sharpened, furthering the current debate on what cognition is and how it is related to life. (shrink)

Since the 1990s there have been a number of government and market led initiatives to improve the welfare of layer hens in the United Kingdom, Australia and the USA. The focus of these regulatory and market initiatives has been a shift away from the dominant battery-cage system to enriched cages, barn/aviary and free-range production systems. Government regulations have played an important role in setting some minimum welfare standards and the banning of battery cages in the UK and in some (...) US states. However the commodification and market segmentation of higher welfare standards has also seen the growth in production and demand of cage-free and free-range eggs in all three countries. This paper maps and compares the developments in government regulation and market segmentation of layer-hen welfare in the UK, Australia and the USA. The role of labelling and certification in facilitating commodification and market segmentation will be examined, including the public controversies and legal conflicts over egg labelling. The key state, market and civil society actors in each country will also be identified, and their role in driving or resisting higher standards examined, including the increasingly influential role of animal welfare organizations and food corporations. (shrink)

A review of the evolution of the ethical foundations of free enterprise reveals the essentially utilitarian ethical foundation prevailing today. To enrich those foundations the article attempts to establish the ethical validity of free transactions by relating them to the basic principle of interpersonal ethics: the Golden Rule. The validity of the transactional ethic is presented as an articulation of freedom in a valid social and economic context.

In order to enrich global corporate culture, a distinction must be made between the economic ideology of free trade and the moral ideology of fair trade. GATT has failed to make this distinction. Its sole ethos of free trade is only applicable among developmentally equivalent nations, and has been used by TNCs as a means for attaining their commercial ends in the third world. GATT''s lack of commitment to an objective of fair trade necessitates its replacement. This article (...) suggests a replacement in the form of a network of trade organizations. The network takes the form of a hub-and-spoke arrangement, in which the hub would be the Global Trade Organization, and the spokes would each represent Regional Trade Organizations. (shrink)

For much of the last 50 years, a key platform animating public sector reform in Canada and elsewhere has been that efficiency and effectiveness can be achieved by adapting private sector financial management methods and practices. We argue that the recent re-establishment of the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) of Canada represents a key element of a program of strengthening financial accountability that has emerged within the Canadian Federal Government. Although this program is longstanding and is associated Canada’s implementation (...) of new public management initiatives, it has recently drawn particular sustenance from the sponsorship scandal in Canada. We demonstrate that the reincarnated OCG, re-established amid a rhetoric of “modernization” and of “strengthening” accountability, has a wide-ranging mandate to enhance financial and audit controls, create financial standards, nurture professional development, and oversee government spending. We explore some of the consequences of this development and of the broader financial accountability mechanisms introduced in response to the Sponsorship scandal within the Canadian public sector. (shrink)

In mammalian cells, a complex network of signaling pathways tightly regulates a variety of cellular processes, such as proliferation and differentiation. New insights from one of the most‐important signaling cascades involved in oncogenesis, the Ras–Raf–MAPK pathway, suggest that the subcellular localisation and assembly of signaling modules of this pathway is crucial to control the biological response. This commonly requires membrane targeting events that are mediated by adaptor/scaffold proteins. Of particular interest is the translocation and complex formation of GTPase‐activating proteins (GAPs), (...) such as p120GAP, at the plasma membrane to inactivate Ras. Recent studies indicate that one member of the annexin family, annexin A6 acts as a targeting protein for p120GAP. This review discusses how annexin A6 modulates the involvement of negative regulators of the Ras–Raf–MAPK pathway contributing to Ras inactivation. BioEssays 28: 1211–1220, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This is a tale of two social structures, health care and education. Both systems are undeniably critical to our social fabric, and even to our national prosperity. Both systems also provide services that are uniquely personal and vital to individual well-being. And both systems are now widely perceived as being in “crisis,” as needing “fundamental reform.”At the same time, there are fundamental differences in the ways the two sectors are organized and understood. Health care is essentially a system of private (...) relationships; education a system of public responsibilities. Although each system is extraordinarily complex and contains elements that defy neat categorization, by highlighting the contrasting visions and structures of the two, one gleans useful insights both into the distinctive failings of each and into potential directions for reform. (shrink)

This is a tale of two social structures, health care and education. Both systems are undeniably critical to our social fabric, and even to our national prosperity. Both systems also provide services that are uniquely personal and vital to individual well-being. And both systems are now widely perceived as being in “crisis,” as needing “fundamental reform.”At the same time, there are fundamental differences in the ways the two sectors are organized and understood. Health care is essentially a system of private (...) relationships; education a system of public responsibilities. Although each system is extraordinarily complex and contains elements that defy neat categorization, by highlighting the contrasting visions and structures of the two, one gleans useful insights both into the distinctive failings of each and into potential directions for reform. (shrink)

The aim of UK-REACH (“The United Kingdom Research study into Ethnicity And COVID-19 outcomes in Healthcare workers”) is to understand if, how, and why healthcare workers (HCWs) in the United Kingdom (UK) from ethnic minority groups are at increased risk of poor outcomes from COVID-19. In this article, we present findings from the ethical and legal stream of the study, which undertook qualitative research seeking to understand and address legal, ethical, and social acceptability issues around data protection, privacy, and information (...) governance associated with the linkage of HCWs’ registration data and healthcare data. We interviewed 22 key opinion leaders in healthcare and health research from across the UK in two-to-one semi-structured interviews. Transcripts were coded using qualitative thematic analysis. Participants told us that a significant aspect of Big Data research in public health is varying drivers of mistrust—of the research itself, research staff and funders, and broader concerns of mistrust within participant communities, particularly in the context of COVID-19 and those situated in more marginalised community settings. However, despite the challenges, participants also identified ways in which legally compliant and ethically informed approaches to research can be crafted to mitigate or overcome mistrust and establish greater confidence in Big Data public health research. Overall, our research indicates that a “Big Data Ethics by Design” approach to research in this area can help assure (1) that meaningful community and participant engagement is taking place and that extant challenges are addressed, and (2) that any new challenges or hitherto unknown unknowns can be rapidly and properly considered to ensure potential (but material) harms are identified and minimised where necessary. Our findings indicate such an approach, in turn, will help drive better scientific breakthroughs that translate into medical innovations and effective public health interventions, which benefit the publics studied, including those who are often marginalised in research. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 586-628.