L’article cherche à contrer les critiques formulées à l’encontre de la théorie évolutionnaire de Hayek en mettant en évidence les apports des théories de la complexité. Cela permet tout d’abord de comprendre que la méthode de Hayek n’est pas un holisme mais un anti-réductionnisme. Cette méthode est constante chez l’auteur, que ce soit dans son approche du marché ou de l’évolution culturelle : il n’y aurait donc aucune incohérence dans sa pensée.De surcroît, la prise en compte de l’ignorance individuelle comme (...) des phénomènes d’émergence ne permet plus d’utiliser la théorie des jeux pour corroborer ou réfuter les explications dites de “ main-invisible ”. La théorie de l’évolution culturelle aurait donc une plus grande portée descriptive que celle qui lui est généralement conférée.This paper tries to respond to criticisms raised against Hayek’s evolutionary theory by highlighting the salient features of theories of complexity. This allows us first to understand that Hayek’s method is not holistic but anti-reductionist. This method permeates Hayek’s whole oeuvre, whether it be his theory of the market or his ideas about cultural evolution. Hence, there is no inconsistency in his thought. Furthermore, taking individual ignorance and the phenomena of emergence into account no long allows us to use game theory in order to corroborate or refute “invisible hand” explanations. The theory of cultural evolution would hence have a greater scope than that traditionally acknowledged. (shrink)

This article provides a summary of current knowledge about memory illusions. The memory illusions described here focus on the recall of imagined events that have never actually occurred. The purpose is to review theoretical ideas and empirical evidence about the reality-monitoring processes involved in memory illusions. Reality monitoring means deciding whether the memory has been perceptually derived or been self-generated (thought or imagined). A few key findings from the literature have been reported in this paper and these focus on internal (...) source-monitoring judgments which distinguish perceptual events from imagined events. Finally, the experimental paradigms used to shed light on processes occurring in the failure of reality monitoring in healthy subjects may be extended to an examination of the causes and the prevention of hallucinations in patients. (shrink)

Cette toute première édition critique de la version arabo-latine de la _Rhétorique_ d’Aristote réalisée par Hermann l’Allemand est accompagnée d’une étude complète de la tradition latine du texte, et présente les principes d’édition adoptés ici, qui prennent en compte la version arabe de la _Rhétorique_. This is the first critical edition of Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_ in its Arabo-Latin translation made by Hermann the German. It contains a full study of the latin tradition of the text, as well as the principles used (...) in the edition, which takes account of the Arabic version of the _Rhetoric_. (shrink)

Although developmental biology is an institutionalized discipline, no unambiguous account of what development is and when it stops has so far been provided. In this article, I focus on two sets of developmental molecular mechanisms, namely those underlying the heterochronic pathway in C. elegans and those involving Hox genes in vertebrates, to suggest a conceptual account of animal development. I point out that, in these animals, the early stages of life exhibit salient mechanistic features, in particular in the way mechanisms (...) of genetic regulation occur in the organism. Indeed, these stages are characterized by sequential and irreversible changes in gene expression taking place throughout the organism. A general definition of animal development based on these distinctive features implies that, at least for some animal species, development does not go on throughout the life of the animal, contrary to what has recently been claimed by some biologists and philosophers. Instead, in such species, development encompasses various events occurring sequentially at the beginning of life. (shrink)

Nous comparons les notions d’usage et de signification chez Ludwig Wittgenstein et Martin Heidegger. Contrairement à Jocelyn Benoist, nous pensons que l’analogie entre Wittgenstein et Heidegger n’est pas superficielle. La métaphysique de Heidegger explicite certaines présuppositions implicites de la seconde philosophie de Wittgenstein. Le pragmatisme naturaliste de Wittgenstein peut être théorisé. Notamment la notion wittgensteinienne d’usage, ou de jeu de langage, peut être comprise comme une pratique à la fois naturelle et normative régie par des règles. -/- Wittgenstein’s notions of (...) use and meaning are compared with the corresponding Heidegger’s ones. Unlike Jocelyn Benoist, we suggest that the analogy between Wittgenstein and Heidegger is not superficial. Heidegger’s metaphysics makes explicit some of the implicit presuppositions of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein’s naturalistic pragmatism can be theorized. In particular, Wittgenstein’s notion of use, or language game, can be understood as both natural and normative rule- governing practice. (shrink)

We consider a situation where an individual is facing an uncertain situation, but may costly alter his knowledge of the uncertainties. We study in this context how risk aversion may modify the individual search behavior. We consider a one-armed bandit problem (where one arm is safe and the other is risky) and study how the agent risk aversion can change the sequence of arms selected. The main result is that when the utility function is more concave, the agent has more (...) chances to select the safe arm. We also discuss how search is affected by risk aversion. (shrink)

We consider a situation where an individual is facing an uncertain situation, but may costly alter his knowledge of the uncertainties. We study in this context how risk aversion may modify the individual search behavior. We consider a one-armed bandit problem (where one arm is safe and the other is risky) and study how the agent risk aversion can change the sequence of arms selected. The main result is that when the utility function is more concave, the agent has more (...) chances to select the safe arm. We also discuss how search is affected by risk aversion. (shrink)

The Marx of Communism and the Marx of Structuralism. The article addresses the issue of the response within the French Communist Party to the structuralist and anti-humanist reading of Marx which Althusser formulated in the period leading up to May 1968. While structuralism was regarded by some as a marker of the avant-garde, to a number of communist intellectuals, and in particular those closest to the party leadership, it amounted to a “a philosophy of hopelessness”. e article thus examines the (...) context in which Althusser was declared to be heterodox in the early months of 1966, in particular at the convention of philosophers held in Choisy and at the meeting of the Communist Party central committee in Argenteuil. (shrink)

Theories of embodied cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear how to understand them. We offer several interpretations of embodiment, the most interesting being the thesis that mental representations in bodily formats (B-formats) have an important role in cognition. Potential B-formats include motoric, somatosensory, affective and interoceptive formats. The literature on mirroring and related phenomena provides support for a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition under the B-format interpretation. It is questionable, however, whether such a thesis can (...) be extended. We show the limits of embodiment in social cognition. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to the first universities and mendicant schools, where thousands of students began to converge during the thirteenth century. Logic played an unpreceded role in basic and higher education. A “Parisian logical model” of education was shaped at the University of Paris, adopted by mendicant Orders in their schools of logic, diffused in all disciplines, and progressively spread in Southern Europe. Medieval education became heavily based upon logical, and even “logician” practices, with the “syllogization” of exegetical, disputational, (...) and evaluation practices.The notion of logical skill conveniently captures this unique situation for the discipline of logic, as well as the way medieval thinkers conceived of logic as a universal, transdisciplinary method, a natural operation of the mind, a modality of knowledge, the very form of teaching and graduating, a “habitus,” a technique and a science.The divisions of Aristotelian logic, the “artificial logic,” were for the first time naturalized and projected on the very structure of human mind, which was thereby “logicalized” and ascribed a “natural logic.” A strong anthropological dimension was bestowed on logic. The discipline of logic was deemed a necessary instrument in the philosophical “perfection” and the Christian “reparation” of man as an intellectual creature by a group of logically skilled, professional philosophers and theologians, whereas men deprived of logical education were described as “logically disabled,” and stuck into inferior forms of humanity.The world of medieval intellectual elites displayed a variety of social uses of logic, beyond academic circles, especially in the performance of pastoral duties. The possible historical records of the social usefulness of logic are explored: for students, the majority in medieval universities, who left university without a degree, but with a solid logical education, for ordinary mendicant friars, dedicated to preaching and confession, who frequented logical schools, and for members of the parish clergy sent to the faculties of arts. (shrink)

The rediscovery of Aristotle’s works on syllogisms in the Latin world, especially the Sophistici Elenchi and then the Prior Analytics, gave rise to sophisticated views on the nature of syllogistic form and syllogistic matter in the thirteenth century. It led to debates on the ontology of the syllogism as studied in the Prior Analytics, i.e. the syllogism made of letters and the four logical constants a/e/i/o, with deep consequences on the definition of logic as a universal method for all sciences (...) and as a science itself. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Comme Elle Respire:Memory of Breath, Breath of MemoryFrédérique Berthet (bio)Translated by David F. Bell (bio)La poésie est un système de respiration, c'est fait pour mieux respirer.[Poetry is a respiration system, it's made for breathing better.]—Erri De Luca- Stop!- What?- I can hear you breathing!...- Stop!- Breathing?- Yes!—Paul Thomas AndersonLittle paper-fish cutouts have been placed on the ground, on the carpet.We're in the reassuring '70s stylishness of a doctor's office. (...) The carpet is soft and glistens like in interior decoration magazines, it's with it, in. We couldn't care less about what Dyson vacuum cleaners and "purifiers" boast they can eliminate several decades later: acarids, those microscopic domestic arthropods, human parasites (notably), and airborne vectors of infectious disease (colds, coughs, respiratory distress). No, in the spring of 1975, innocently and self-satisfyingly, the urbane doctor flaunts the opulent carpet with curly pile in his luxury apartment with its state-of-the-art waiting room.In this grand interior of a medical office, a man in a white coat plies his important trade. For example, that day a little girl is re-learning how to breathe. One might think that exhaling and inhaling is learned for life—je t'aime comme je respire, elle parle comme elle respire, il ment comme il respire1—from the very first cry at birth. But in fact, sometimes in life breathing gets stuck between the nasal cavity and the bronchial tubes, between the respiratory tract and the lungs. Progressively, imperceptibly, the organism is short of air, a malicious infection spreads and impairs [End Page 92] alveolar diffusion to the point of respiratory exhaustion: Is it serious, doctor? We must act quickly, very quickly. How to liquify what stopped up the system one day to the point of blocking it—the doctors know what to do.This doctor undertook long, arduous and learned studies. He knows functionally how a living being breathes, how a child lives organically. He can also re-teach the little girl what she no longer knows how to do: inhale, exhale using the full volume of the thoracic cage, regulating the ventilatory flow, solidifying the invisible membranes. In the child's family, everyone knows (and knows how to do) important things, but no one undertook extensive studies, much less studies of the aerial exchanges in the human body. This special knowledge possessed by the doctor (unless special means something else unspoken that would explain why this specific doctor was chosen rather than any other) surrounds him with a padding of respect that creates (and the little girl feels this) a sort of protective continuum between him and the walls within which he sees her, where he practices his kind of calm and slow urbane medicine. It's far from the formidable hospital she has just left, with its spherical apparatus next to the bed aspirating the red and yellow pleural liquid, the "treatment room" where the surgeon, the "butcher" as the nurses call him among themselves, manipulated the drain without anesthesia, with no regard for the child's suffering. The doctor, and his place in the elevated tower, even though they are not to be confused, make for a cozy reception space in which one is comfortable, even in passing.This doctor—who is, in truth, a massage-physiotherapist—is located in a designer high-rise building with a façade decorated by white, pointed features that manifest a will toward an architectural act. On the ground floor, the entrance hall is finished in dark-veined, clear brown marble, and the entry threshold between the exterior and interior is marked by large transparent glass panes that must be manipulated with care. The entrance hall has an intimidating sonority and a useless cold nudity from which one escapes in an elevator where one is surrounded by mirrors and gold buttons and in which one speeds upward silently toward floors, clouds.The designer high-rise is located at the outskirts, the outskirts of a city of recent Olympic stature, where several years earlier Olympic athletes were welcomed and trained to increase their respiratory capacity and... (shrink)

In this paper I build a case for considering the pioneering behaviourist philosopher Grace de Laguna as one of the grandmothers of analytic philosophy. I argue against the ‘Great Men’ narrative of analytic philosophy as composed of Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein and their followers, and in favour of a more inclusive ‘movement’ narrative of analytic philosophy as a broad and varied movement with an anti-idealist and naturalistic orientation aimed at fitting around novel development in the sciences, including Einsteinian physics and psychology. (...) I compare de Laguna’s prescient early views to Whitehead’s; both share an anti-idealist but also anti-atomist solution to the problem of perception, and both oppose the bifurcation of nature, with de Laguna expressing these views before Whitehead did. I conclude that while both opposed the narrower project of logical atomism, both count as ancestors of the wider analytic movement. (shrink)

We argue that Lewis would have rejected recent appeals to the notions of ‘metaphysical dependency’, ‘grounding’ and ‘ontological priority’, because he would have held that they’re not needed and they’re not intelligible. We argue our case by drawing upon Lewis’s views on supervenience, the metaphysics of singletons and the dubiousness of Kripke’s essentialism.

A new model of bioturbation has been developed to describe short term sediment reworking induced by macrobenthic communities. The design of the model had to consider the mixing processes, firstly, at the organism level, and secondly, at community level. This paper describes the mixing mode of the four types of bioturbators defined by the authors: the biodiffusors, the upward-conveyors, the downward-conveyors and the regenerators. The mathematical formulation of these sub-models consists of ordinary differential equations. They take into account the size (...) of the bioturbated zone, the output fluxes to the water column, tracer decay, physical mixing due to local currents and the type and intensity of the bioturbation processes. These sub-models make it possible to describe correctly the mixing events that have occurred in cores with each type of bioturbator. They also provide the basis for general bioturbation model, that will take into account the respective degrees of involvement of (i) the different bioturbation processes and their characteristics, (ii) the interference between the different processes, and (iii) make possible to predict the particle reworking in order to include it in studies of organic matter in early diagenesis. (shrink)

An odd dissensus between confident metaphysicians and neopragmatist antimetaphysicians pervades early twenty-first century analytic philosophy. Each faction is convinced their side has won the day, but both are mistaken about the philosophical legacy of the twentieth century. More historical awareness is needed to overcome the current dissensus. Lewis and his possible-world system are lionised by metaphysicians; Quine’s pragmatist scruples about heavy-duty metaphysics inspire antimetaphysicians. But Lewis developed his system under the influence of his teacher Quine, inheriting from him his empiricism, (...) his physicalism, his metaontology, and, I will show in this paper, also his Humeanism. Using published as well as never-before-seen unpublished sources, I will make apparent that both heavy-duty metaphysicians and neopragmatist antimetaphysicians are wrong about the roles Quine and Lewis played in the development of twentieth-century philosophy. The two are much more alike than is commonly supposed, and Quine much more instrumental to the pedigree of current metaphysics. (shrink)

The present discussion derives from a larger research project that concerns the medieval Latin translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. The translation was carried out by Hermann the German in Toledo in 1240. I am concerned here specifically with nine passages that are distributed over three chapters of the Commentary in which the Latin translation is sprinkled with transliterations based on Greek and Arabic terms. These transliterations, which are not glosses, can be understood on several levels, and (...) these, in turn, raise questions about the boundary between transliteration proper and translation that borrows from the source language a term which is then integrated into the Latin lexicon in the form of a calque or ‘loan translation’. Examining these transliterations makes it possible, first, to show that the translator does not follow a uniform method throughout the text, which could imply the existence of several translators or several collaborators with disti... (shrink)

When one contrasts pain with the classic five senses, discussions generally focus on vision, which is taken as the paradigmatic example of perception. An intentionalist might argue that if the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing bodily disturbances cannot be explained at the level of the content, it can be so at the level of the mode of presentation, and more particularly at the level of the structure of the spatial phenomenology of pain. Here I will argue that the spatial (...) phenomenology of pain shares some key features with touch by contrast to sight, but these similarities should not make us neglect major differences between these two types of bodily sensations. I shall then draw the consequences of these differences for the awareness of one’s body as one’s own. In brief, to fix the boundaries of the body that one experiences as one’s own, one must answer two questions: where does the body stop, and the rest of world start? and what matters for self-preservation? I will suggest that touch primarily answers the first question, whereas pain primarily answers the second question. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Boethii Daci Aliorumque Sophismata by Boethius of DaciaJulie Brumberg-ChaumontBoethius of Dacia. Boethii Daci Aliorumque Sophismata. Edited by Sten Ebbesen and Irène Rosier-Catach. Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, 9. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2021. Pp. 624. Hardback, 400.00 DKK.This volume offers a reliable and accurate scholarly edition of two collections of thirteenthcentury sophismata (logical and grammatical puzzles) contained in ms. Brugge, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek 509 (=B) and (...) ms. Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana 12 sin. 3 (=F). Taken together, these two collections constitute a set of twenty-three sophismata called "Sophismata Florentino-Brugensia" in the catalogue published by Sten Ebbesen and Frédéric Goubier (A Catalogue of Thirteenth-Century Sophismata [Paris: Vrin, 2010]). These sophismata were previously available only in partial editions. Specifically, the two versions of the sophisma "Omnis homo de necessitate est animal," previously both ascribed to Boethius of Dacia, were partially edited from F by Grabmann in 1940 and from B by Roos in 1962. Other sophismata in this collection have been previously edited by Ebbesen, but their editions should now be considered "obsolete," according to the editor himself (9). Each sophisma is identified by an S followed by a number (S1, S2, etc.). In turn, each sophisma deals with several issues or problems, each one of which is identified by a P followed by a number (P1, P2, etc.). The volume is very usefully completed by an index of explicit and implicit references to other works and an index of parallel passages, both compiled by Kristian Thomsen Purreskov (591–601). Finally, this edition is accompanied by a selective but still rich index of words, where special attention has been dedicated to the sophismata by Boethius of Dacia (603–24). All the material is presented in a clear and accurate way. There are only a few minor material errors (specifically, the running titles for problems in S4 are messy; at 33, "a*" should be read as "b*"; at 49, "S14" should be read as "S18").Sten Ebbesen is the sole editor of all sophismata except for the three that deal with grammatical subjects, for which Irène Rosier-Catach is the main editor, with Ebbesen serving as a coeditor.Concerning the authorship of each sophisma, Ebbesen follows the indications contained in F, but he also provides some independent discussions (24–26). Thus, he ascribes two sophismata to Boethius of Dacia, ten to Peter of Auvergne, one to an otherwise unknown Nicholas of Normandy, and the remaining ten to anonymous masters. They are listed in detail in the "Index sophismatum et problematum" (65–69).After a summary of the contents of the volume, Ebbesen's introduction contains five sections of different lengths: first, a history of the edition (7–9); second, a general description of the structure and functioning of sophismata (9–13); third, a description of the seven manuscripts used for the edition (14–22); fourth, a discussion about authorship (22–58); and fifth, an explanation of the principles of the edition (58–62). In the third section, Ebbesen provides a wealth of information about manuscripts, stemma codicum, and evaluations of variants, especially about the relationship between S and B for the sophismata contained in both manuscripts. In this regard, Ebbesen establishes that B and F are probably not two independent reportationes of the same oral disputation, that they had a common ancestor, and that they do not depend on one another (25–32). The fourth section, about authorship, demonstrates that the collection contained in F is earlier than that contained in B. One major result is that the text copied in B (S1B) ("Omnis homo de necessitate est animal") is not by Boethius of Dacia (35). Because of F priority, that manuscript is chosen as the main witness for those sophismata or parts of sophismata that are common to F and B.The second section makes an extremely significant historical and doctrinal contribution to the history of logic, particularly the history of logical practices and their textual records. [End Page 705] Three constitutive parts of a sophisma are identified: first, the sophismatic sentence itself; second, a brief disputation (called here corpus sophismatis) about the sophismatic sentence... (shrink)

En partie issu d’un colloque sur les « Effets de voix : la voix et les voix dans la pensée et la littérature romaines » qui s’est tenu en novembre 2014 à Lille, ce livre rassemble dix-huit contributions, classées selon quatre grandes catégories : I. Philosophie, II. Rhétorique et médecine, III. Acoustique, théâtre et littérature, IV. Linguistique, anthropologie, religion. Il comprend également une bibliographie (p. 385-423), un index des noms (p. 425-429), un index des passages cités (p. 431-...

Les présentes remarques se proposent d’observer la façon dont les noms propres ont été traités par Averroès dans son Commentaire moyen à l’Éthique à Nicomaque, rédigé à partir de la traduction arabe du traité aristotélicien, dont une seule copie unique existe aujourd’hui, conservée dans la bibliothèque Quaraouiyine de Fès. Perdu dans sa version originale arabe, ce Commentaire n’existe – à l’exception d’une trentaine de petits fragments – que dans sa traduction latine, réalisée en 1240 par Hermann l’Allemand, et dans sa (...) traduction hébraïque, achevée par Samuel de Marseille en 1340. Analyser l’attitude d’Averroès devant les noms propres de ENar, qui pour la plupart ont été translittérés par le traducteur arabe, entraîne par voie de conséquence un examen de la façon dont Hermann et Samuel ont à leur tour réagi face à des noms propres, dont ils ne connaissaient pas nécessairement les référents puisqu’ils appartiennent à une aire c... (shrink)

This is the first critical edition of Book X of the Latin version of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s _Nicomachean Ethics_. The text is accompanied by a French translation and explanatory notes, and is preceded by a study of the manuscript tradition and two studies on the Commentary itself. Cette première édition critique de la version latine du Commentaire d’Averroès à l’_Éthique à Nicomaque_, accompagnée d’une traduction française annotée, est précédée de l’examen de la tradition manuscrite du texte et de (...) deux études consacrée à ce Commentaire. (shrink)

In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric (‘‘you'') or an allocentric (‘‘he/ she/they'') stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental state of the other person (...) needs to be represented as independent from the self. We suggest here that people with Asperger syndrome suffer from a disconnection between a strong naı¨ve egocentric stance and a highly abstract allocentric stance. We argue that the currently used distinction between first-person and third-person perspective-taking is orthogonal to the distinction between an egocentric and an allocentric stance and therefore cannot serve as a critical test of allocentrism. (shrink)

Discrete supposition occurs whenever a discrete term, such as ‘Socrates‘, is the subject of a given proposition. I propose to examine this apparently simple notion. I shall draw attention to the incongruity, within a general theory of the semantic variation of terms in a propositional context, of the notion of discrete supposition, in which a term usually has a single semantic correlate. The incongruity comes to the fore in those treatises that attempt to describe discrete supposition as a sort of (...) personal supposition, although the same term cannot be in simple supposition in another propositional context, because it has no significate distinct from its suppositum. This shows a fundamental link between common signification, simple supposition and predicability, three notions that rely on the existence of a significate distinct and independent from the suppositum of the term. The connection is to be seen especially in William of Sherwood’s Introductiones, the only author of a terminist Summa who recognizes the existence of simple supposition for discrete terms. (shrink)

The rediscovery of Aristotle’s works on syllogisms in the Latin world, especially the Sophistici Elenchi and then the Prior Analytics, gave rise to sophisticated views on the nature of syllogistic form and syllogistic matter in the thirteenth century. It led to debates on the ontology of the syllogism as studied in the Prior Analytics, i.e. the syllogism made of letters and the four logical constants a/e/i/o, with deep consequences on the definition of logic as a universal method for all sciences (...) and as a science itself. (shrink)

Logic has long been seen as a natural and universal human ability, as much as a series of skills that only “sane,” “educated,” and “civilized” men can master. The volume investigates this tension. It explores how various logical skills have been established as social norms and have been attributed, or denied, to some actors or groups in different spaces throughout history. Written by historians, philosophers, and sociologists, and drawing on several case studies, it examines how these skills were defined, taken (...) as standards and identified in some individuals, while they were deemed missing in others. It studies how they have been mobilized in educational theories, practices, and policies. It examines the dynamics of valuation and implementation of these skills across different epochs, ranging from the Middle Ages until the present day. It specifies the different conceptions of logic underpinning these approaches, as well as their social and political stakes. This introduction presents the approach adopted by the editors of the volume. Such approach is based on the view that anthropology, sociology, and history share a common project. The editors explain how they wish to promote a historical sociology and anthropology of logic while addressing the issue of logical skills. The contributions to the volume are summarized in the last section of this introduction. (shrink)

The paper wishes to investigate the way Giles of Rome thought about logic: as a discipline, as a method, through an examination of the powers of logic, but also as a teaching subject. It tries to illuminate his views on logical education, and how he may have acted in favour of the latter as an Augustinian leader. It first offers a general presentation of the logical productions, from the 1270s to 1291. It then addresses the topic of logical education from (...) two viewpoints: by a look taken at Giles’ views on logic in the De regimine principum, and by a quick survey of the history of the teaching of logic in the studia of the Augustinian order from the mid-1280s on. The last section is dedicated to the philosophy and anthropology of logic. It tries to enlighten the originality of Giles’ s position, as a new departure taken from traditional theories regarding the absolute necessity of logic as a science, as an art, and as the underlying logic of all sciences, itself included. Rather than essentially necessary for any kind of philosophical endeavour, logic is presented a need for men, due to the fallible nature of his potential intellect. Rather than a science, it is described as a method for science which doesn’t use its more powerful instrument, i.e. the theory of scientific syllogism, since it proceeds in a non-demonstrative manner in the theory of demonstration. Logic and metaphysics are compared as respectively under and above special sciences. The last paragraph deals with the problem of the powers of logic in the context of metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

The paper wishes to investigate the way Giles of Rome thought about logic: as a discipline, as a method, through an examination of the powers of logic, but also as a teaching subject. It tries to illuminate his views on logical education, and how he may have acted in favour of the latter as an Augustinian leader. It first offers a general presentation of the logical productions, from the 1270s to 1291. It then addresses the topic of logical education from (...) two viewpoints: by a look taken at Giles’ views on logic in the De regimine principum, and by a quick survey of the history of the teaching of logic in the studia of the Augustinian order from the mid-1280s on. The last section is dedicated to the philosophy and anthropology of logic. It tries to enlighten the originality of Giles’ s position, as a new departure taken from traditional theories regarding the absolute necessity of logic as a science, as an art, and as the underlying logic of all sciences, itself included. Rather than essentially necessary for any kind of philosophical endeavour, logic is presented a need for men, due to the fallible nature of his potential intellect. Rather than a science, it is described as a method for science which doesn’t use its more powerful instrument, i.e. the theory of scientific syllogism, since it proceeds in a non-demonstrative manner in the theory of demonstration. Logic and metaphysics are compared as respectively under and above special sciences. The last paragraph deals with the problem of the powers of logic in the context of metaphysical knowledge. (shrink)

Dans ses Quaestiones super Metaphysicam, Geoffroy d’Aspall s’interroge sur la possibilité d’une nomination propre des individus substantiels en l’absence de forme et d’intellection singulières. Il offre une réponse noétique, fondée sur l’idée d’une connaissance intellectuelle indirecte du singulier par retour sur les phantasmes. Sur le plan sémantique, il défend l’existence de noms propres aux individus, mais reconnaît qu’ils ne sont pas proprement des noms, car leur imposition se fait directement à l’individu, sans la médiation d’une forme signifiée, de sorte qu’il (...) y a identité de l’appelé et du signifié. (shrink)

This contributed volume explores the ways logical skills have been perceived over the course of history. The authors approach the topic from the lenses of philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and history to examine two opposing perceptions of logic: the first as an innate human ability and the second as a skill that can be learned and mastered. Chapters focus on the social and political dynamics of the use of logic throughout history, utilizing case studies and critical analyses. Specific topics covered include: (...) the rise of logical skills problems concerning medieval notions of idiocy and rationality decolonizing natural logic natural logic and the course of time Logical Skills: Social-Historical Perspectives will appeal to undergraduate and graduate students, as well as researchers in the fields of history, sociology, philosophy, and logic. Psychology and colonial studies scholars will also find this volume to be of particular interest. (shrink)

In ‘Putnam’s Paradox’, Lewis defended global descriptivism and reference magnetism. According to Schwarz [2014], Lewis didn’t mean what he said there, and really held neither position. We present evidence from Lewis’s correspondence and publications which shows conclusively that Lewis endorsed both.

The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman’s theory. (...) I agree with him that mindreading is not a single system based on a single mechanism. And I admire his attempt to bring together the cognitive neuroscientific discovery of mirror system phenomena and the philosophical account of pretense within a unique theoretical framework of mental simulation. To do so, Goldman distinguishes two types of mindreading, respectively, based on low-level and high-level simulation. Yet, I wonder in what sense they are really two distinct processes. Here, I will confine myself largely to spelling out a series of points that take issue with the distinction between low-level and high-level mindreading. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse aux conditions de constitution d’un corpus d’écrits sociaux du point de vue de l’analyse de discours (AD) et s’interroge sur la résolution des difficultés liées à sa contextualisation et à son exploration automatique. Nous serons ainsi amenées à proposer une approche multidimensionnelle de la co(n)textualité, qui opère des va-et-vient entre les formes linguistiques et les extérieurs des textes.

One of the assets of the simulation theory, as defended by Alvin Goldman in many papers and in his book Simulating Minds, is its ability to explain egocentric bias, and more generally the priority of first‐person mindreading over third‐person mindreading (ascription of mental states to other people). This chapter argues, on the contrary, that the simulationist framework enables confusions between self and others that go both ways: taking one's beliefs for the other's beliefs (egocentric bias) and vice versa, taking the (...) other's beliefs for one's beliefs (altercentric bias). It sees how the risk of such confusion may be disadvantageous from an evolutionary perspective, questioning thus the evolutionary plausibility of the simulation theory. Egocentric errors have been taken as evidence of the priority of first‐person mindreading over third‐person mindreading, which seems in line with the simulation theory. Recent findings on altercentric bias have opened a new promising way to investigate the cognitive basis of third‐person mindreading. (shrink)