For half a century, Ernest Fortin's scholarship has charmed and educated theologians and philosophers with its intellectual search for the best way to live. Written by friends, colleagues, and students of Fortin, this book pays tribute to a remarkable thinker in a series of essays that bear eloquent testimony to Fortin's influence and his legacy. A formidable commentator on Catholic philosophical and political thought, Ernest Fortin inspired others with his restless inquiries beyond the boundaries of conventional scholarship. With essays on (...) subjects ranging across philosophy, political science, literature, and theology Gladly to Learn and Gladly to Teach reflects the astonishing depth and breadth of Fortin's contribution to contemporary thought. (shrink)

For half a century, Ernest Fortin's scholarship has charmed and educated theologians and philosophers with its intellectual search for the best way to live. Written by friends, colleagues, and students of Fortin, this book pays tribute to a remarkable thinker in a series of essays that bear eloquent testimony to Fortin's influence and his legacy. A formidable commentator on Catholic philosophical and political thought, Ernest Fortin inspired others with his restless inquiries beyond the boundaries of conventional scholarship. With essays on (...) subjects ranging across philosophy, political science, literature, and theology Gladly to Learn and Gladly to Teach reflects the astonishing depth and breadth of Fortin's contribution to contemporary thought. (shrink)

ONE OF THE IDEAS TO WHICH LEO STRAUSS drew the attention of many readers in the last century is that of a difference between exoteric and esoteric philosophical writing. These terms can refer to different kinds of philosophical teaching, one kind intended for a general and the other kind for a more restricted audience. Indeed, it seems to be the case historically that it was Aristotle who first used one of the terms in such a sense, as will be discussed (...) below. (shrink)

WITHIN the last half century, the relations between the Catholic Church and liberal politics have shifted significantly. To say the least, no one is surprised today to read of Catholic socialists, liberation theologies, or Christian Democratic parties of Catholic inspiration in Europe and Latin America. Many factors contributed to this change, but few would deny a central role to the work of the French philosopher, Jacques Maritain.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RECONSIDERING AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGIAN FREDERICK J. CROSSON University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana IN A RECENT issue of this journal 1 Bruce Marshall argued that the position of Thomas Aquinas on faith and reasonin particular on the meaning of assertions about God-can be read as fundamentally convergent with that of the contemporary theologian, George Lindbeck. The claim is striking because, as Marshall acknowledges, the traditional reading of (...) Aquinas is quite different. Traditionally-Gilson is Marshall's example -it has been thought that the conclusion of a demonstration of God's existence or unity could be true, could correspond to reality, quite independently of the religious doctrines concerning the revealed mysteries of the Godhead. But Marshall argues that, in fact, the texts of Aquinas explicitly deny that the non-believer is really succeeding in talking about God at all. The claim is a challenging one, and one from which there seems much to learn, because it is not only bold-and so promises a significant shift in the traditional understanding of Aquinas's meaning-but confronts many of the texts which seem to warrant that traditional understanding. Even if his reading is wrong, which I believe it is, there is benefit in thinking through the reasons why it is wrong and in clarifying not only what Aquinas taught but also what is at issue. I propose to do three things: first, to state the interpretation which Marshall, enlarging on Lindbeck, wants to give of the 1 Bruce D. Marshall, "Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," The Thomist 53 (July 89) : 353-402. The article is followed by George Lindbeck, "Response to Bruce Marshall," 403-406. 481 482 FREDERICK J. CROSSON position of Aquinas on the possibility of natural knowledge of God; second, to examine several instances of Marshall's reading which are integral to his arguments but which I think are wrong, i.e., misconstrue the texts he is dealing with; third, to reflect briefly on one of the larger issues which seem to me involved in the questions here discussed, namely the commensurability of the teachings of the major religious traditions. I In Lindbeck's view,2 the propositions about God (or "the Ultimate Mystery") which religious doctrines assert can have " ontological truth " or correspond to reality only if the categories in terms of which those propositions are formulated are adequate to express that reality. This condition may be called the " categorial truth " of the doctrine, and " can thus be described as potential ontological truth,... a religion has this kind of truth when its ' categories ' are capable of being used to describe what is ultimately real" (359).3 The categorial truth of religious doctrine is thus a necessary condition for its teachings to be "ontologically true," i.e., to correspond to what is. But it is not a sufficient condition. The categories employed by the teachings must be used in the proper way: the composing and dividing of the categories (e.g., "Father," "person," "nature") must be a composing and dividing which asserts what, according to the religious doctrine, really is combined and separated. But for the utterances 4 of a believer to be ontologically true, they 2 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984). 3 Page numbers without other citation will be to Marshall's article; see note 1. 4 Lindbeck also seems to make it a necessary condition of " ontological truth" that the utterance be performative in J. L. Austin's sense. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 68 et pass. Since Marshall does not dwell on this in his article, I only note it here. For a brief but incisive criticism of this condition, see Paul Griffiths, "An Apology for Apologetics," Faith and Philosophy 5 (Oct. 1988) : 409-11. It may be that Lindbeck was led to stress utterances as the locus of truth, curious though that seems, because the alternative is to make what is uttered true, and that would be independent of the person's practice in a way that utterance seems not to be. AQUINAS AS POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGIAN 483 must also be consistent or cohere with the paradigmatic propositions of the religion, with its revealed... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REJOINDER TO BRUCE MARSHALL FREDERICK J. CROSSON University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, J.ndiana DISCUSSIONS HAVE to end sometime, and the differences in the reading of Aquinas by Bruce Marshall and myself will perhaps have sufficiently come into view if brief comments on several points are made. 1. In his second statement 1 Marshall seems to have shifted his argument. Originally he argued that a non-believer (e.g. a pagan (...) philosopher such as Aristotle) could not know or even properly refer to God.2 But in the subsequent statement, he seems to concede that, according to Aquinas, " That there is one God was known even by the philosophers, and is not a part of faith " and that " while some of the Gentiles knew God with respect to certain things which were knowable by reason, nevertheless they did not know him insofar as he is the Father...." (501; cf. 51213 ). Marshall seems now to hold that although that knowledge was possible at one time, it is not any longer: As Thomas reads Paul, then, the error (and specifically the idolatry) of the Gentiles overrides the knowledge of himself which God has given to them " from 1creation through the senses " ; in consequence the further possibility of this knowledge... is withdrawn by God. With regard to the Gentiles, including their sapientes-the philosophers with demonstrative arguments-the denial of knowledge overrides the initial ascription of it (512, my emphasis). 1 Bruce D. Marshall, " Thomas, Thomisms, and Truth", The Thomist 56 (1992) pp. 499-524. His original article was in ibid. 53 (1989), pp. 353-402. Page references in the text or footnotes without other citation will be to these articles. 2 " The person whose discourse does not cohere with the broader norms of Christian belief is not even talking about God, and so cannot possibly know or refer to him " (378-379), emphasis mine. 299 300 FREDERICK J. CROSSON I confess to a certain difficulty in understanding what "overrides " means here: cancels? contradicts? blots out? In any case, it seems that it was, at some time and for some non-Christian thinkers (e.g. Aristotle), possible to come to the knowledge of God's existence by reason, but that Marshall interprets Aquinas as saying that that knowledge is no longer even possible. 2. Marshall's general claim is that Aquinas must be read as holding a coherentist notion of revealed truth, so that a pagan and a Christian cannot mean the same thing the word ' God '. But Aquinas says exactly the opposite: Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the nature of God as he is in himself, but each knows him by some understanding (aliquam rationein ) of causality or excellence or remotion... Consequently a pagan can take this name God, when he says an idol is God, in the same way that a Catholic does in saying an idol is not God.3 3. Again and again, Marshall returns to the claim that, according to Aquinas, " In simple things any failure of knowledge (defectus cognitionis) is in fact a total lack of knowledge " (382) ;4 he cites the Commentary on John, in which Thomas declares... while it is possible for composite things to be known in part and to be unknown in part, if simple things are not grasped completely, they are not known (501). In Marshall's view, these claims about the knowledge of simple forms exclude the possibility of any adequation between the conclusion of a pagan philosopher's demonstration and the Divine esse: "... the defectus cognitionis of which Thomas speaks in II-II, 2, 2, ad 3, entails not a partial, but a total lack of corres:. pondence between the mind and God" (384). Marshall seems to read such statements as if they made the following objection: a Summa Theologiae I, q. 3, a. 10, ad 5: Dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque catholicus neque paganus cognoscit; sed uterque cognoscit earn secumdum aliquam rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis... Et secundum hoc in eadem significatione accipere potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum. (shrink)

Esoteric versus latent teaching -- The disclosure of hidden providence -- Show and tell: the concept of teaching in St. Augustine's De Magistro -- Philosophy and belief -- Cicero and the philosophy of religion -- Newman and Augustine: the narrative of conversion -- Proof and presence -- Hume's unnatural religion (some humean footnotes) -- Religion and natural law -- American reflections on a century of Catholic social teaching.

"Logic", one of the central words in Western intellectual history, compre hends in its meaning such diverse things as the Aristotelian syllogistic, the scholastic art of disputation, the transcendental logic of the Kantian critique, the dialectical logic of Hegel, and the mathematical logic of the Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell. The term "Formal Logic", following Kant is generally used to distinguish formal logical reasonings, precisely as formal, from the remaining universal truths based on reason. (Cf. SCHOLZ, 1931). A text-book (...) example of a formal-logical inference which from "Some men are philosophers" and "All philosophers are wise" concludes that "Some men are wise" is called formal, because the validity of this inference depends only on the form ofthe given sentences -in particular it does not depend on the truth or falsity of these sentences. (On the dependence of logic on natural language, English, for example, compare Section 1 and 8). The form of a sentence like "Some men are philosophers", is that which remains preserved when the given predicates, here "men" and "philosophers" are replaced by arbitrary ones. The form itself can thus be represented by replacing the given predicates by variables. Variables are signs devoid of meaning, which may serve merely to indicate the place where meaningful constants (here the predicates) are to be inserted. As variables we shall use - as did Aristotle - letters, say P, Q and R, as variables for predicates. (shrink)

Gödel's theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met.1 This I attempt to do.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 325 Recapitulations: Essays in Philosophy. By THOMAS PRUFER. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993. Pp. 112. $34.95 (cloth). Re-reading and pondering this little volume, it is hard not to remember John Milton's commendation of a good book as "the precious life-blood of a master-spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life." This is, indeed, the distillation of a life's intense reflection (...) on the central issues of philosophy, parceled out misleadingly in a collection of essaysmisleadingly, because (as the preface asserts) the collection is not a heap. It is not a heap or agglomeration, despite the essays having been published over a period of thirty years, partly because the author gathered them together, organized, and revised them before his untimely death, and partly because they are unified by the pervasiveness and centrality of the careful reflection on the inflections that philosophers have effected in the sense of the word "being" and the word "nature." Indeed, it might have been entitled Nature and Being or Physis kai Einai. The essays are arranged chronologically, from ancients to modems. In tracking their philosophical themes, the author is constantly and perceptively attentive to the form of the language in which thought comes to expression: to the form (and genre) of the texts and to the ways in which language is troped into philosophical uses. So the first essay is on "The Dramatic Form of Plato's Phaedo," and deals with the way the dialogue's narrative framework interacts with the dramatic discussion. And the last essay deals with the relation between structure and story in Waugh's Brideshead Revisited ("The Death of Charm and the Advent of Grace"). In between these are eleven essays on Oedipus and the Poetics, Aristotle, solitude and creation, nature in Epicurus and Hobbes, Augustine's Confessions, comparisons of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Leo Strauss, and studies of Hume, Husserl, and Heidegger. Most of them are brief: dense because condensed, shipped to essentials. They demand attentive reading, but they repay it. Three philosophers are foci or axes: Aristotle, Aquinas, and Heidegger. Aristotle serves as a foil, a reference point for the inflections that-in particular -Aquinas and Heidegger bring to the senses of "nature" and "being." In addition, Husserl serves as a foil for Heidegger, so that each illuminates the other. For Aristotle, although separate being-the noesis noeseos-is primary being, it is necessary that it not be the only sense of "being." It is necessary that "being" mean being in common to many and being in common with many. Separate being is part of the whole of what is. But, for Aquinas, although it is true that God is not the only sense of "being," it is meaningful 326 BOOK REVIEWS (though false) to say that "being" means not God and others but God alone. God cannot not be, but for creatures-even necessary creatures, those with no intrinsic potentiality not to be-their being is a gift, an act ofliberality and generosity by God. That means that God's necessity is utterly different from the necessity of necessary creatures, which not only can be annihilated but which form a whole with all other creatures, which are complemented and completed by other created beings. A greater whole is formed by what complements, but as Aquinas wrote: "Created good added to uncreated good does not result in something greater." Moreover, God's necessary nature, unlike that of the necessary nature of separate being, is not opposed to, does not exclude, the freedom to create. Nor is that freedom to create (or not to create) an indeterminacy or arbitrariness in God's nature. God does not act in order to gain what He lacks or does not have, but as willing to communicate what He has. As Prufer summarizes: For Aquinas the superahundant and therefore necessary and self-sufficient goodness of God is His freedom,... freedom that is free-of-and-for whether or not there be many others, freedom that is free.to be generous because, being self-sufficient, it need not be generous. One of the most interesting essays reflects on this understanding of God... (shrink)

This is a significant critical study of Husserl’s phenomenology and its transformations. The author studies the historical evolution of Husserl’s thought and its formal structure, and then attempts to measure its theoretical significance. He concludes that the Husserlian methodology is as such not ontological in the strict sense, and may therefore be considered an indispensable dimension of the critical process of the self-justification of a philosophy of being. The work ranges widely over the secondary literature and contains an excellent and (...) extensive bibliography, partially annotated. (shrink)

If there is any one man who is at the source of the current in contemporary philosophy which is the opposite of logical analysis, it is certainly Edmund Husserl. There is little doubt that his formative influence is far more important than, say, that of Kierkegaard, in the problematic of existentialism. And the frequency of the term “phenomenology” in writings on esthetics, ethics, social philosophy and a host of other disciplines is an indication of the more or less vague sense (...) of the original contribution which he made to modern thought. Yet there is an underlying paradox here: for it is logical analysis which appears to bear the banner of rationality and precision thinking, while many philosophers who derive more directly from Husserl seem to be grappling in a twilight region with the elusive meaning of human existence. But it was Husserl pre-eminently in our age who attempted to establish philosophy on a scientific basis through a rigorous analysis of logical categories and a theory of knowledge. Anyone who attempts to understand this tension in modern thought would do well to examine Husserl closely. (shrink)