Metaphysics and language: Quine, W. V. O. On the individuation of attributes. Körner, S. On some relations between logic and metaphysics. Marcus, R. B. Does the principle of substitutivity rest on a mistake? Van Fraassen, B. C. Platonism's pyrrhic victory. Martin, R. M. On some prepositional relations. Kearns, J. T. Sentences and propositions.--Basic and combinatorial logic: Orgass, R. J. Extended basic logic and ordinal numbers. Curry, H. B. Representation of Markov algorithms by combinators.--Implication and consistency: Anderson, A. R. Fitch on (...) consistency. Belnap, N. D., Jr. Grammatical propaedeutic. Thomason, R. H. Decidability in the logic of conditionals. Myhill, J. Levels of implication.--Deontic, epistemic, and erotetic logic: Bacon, J. Belief as relative knowledge. Wu, K. J. Believing and disbelieving. Kordig, C. R. Relativized deontic modalities. Harrah, D. A system for erotetic sentences. (shrink)

Philosophical ability, so that the principles chosen for formalization are not trivial or absurd.

Metaphysics is self-critical in a way and to an extent not to be found in any other field of study. This is an outcome of its extreme generality. Its subject-matter includes all subject-matters and hence all methodologies. Therefore metaphysics is also concerned with its own methodology. There is no more inclusive or more general study of methodology which might take upon itself the authority to criticize the methodology of metaphysics. Any such study would have to concern itself with all concepts (...) and subject-matters, and so would itself be simply metaphysics. Any general denial of metaphysics is itself a metaphysical theory, and therefore self-contradictory. (shrink)

Most traditional systems of metaphysics do not seem to assert that there are such things as propositions. This appears to me to be a defect in such systems, especially as each such system is really itself a class of propositions or a single complex proposition.