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  1.  58
    The narrative self.Fred Vollmer - 2005 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 35 (2):189–205.
    The aim of the present study is to evaluate the postmodern belief that selves are narrative constructions. Four theories, varying in degree of anti-realism, are presented and discussed. It is concluded that an attractive feature of the narrative approach is that it explains how we achieve a sense of unity. But the main idea, that selves are constituted or created by stories is problematic, like identifying footprints on the beach with the feet that made them.
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  2.  74
    Intentional action and unconscious reasons.Fred Vollmer - 1993 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (3):315-326.
  3.  27
    Intentional explanation and its place in psychology.Fred Vollmer - 1986 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16 (3):285–298.
  4.  17
    The control of actions by agents.Fred Vollmer - 1995 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (2):175–190.
  5.  37
    A theory of traits.Fred Vollmer - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):67 – 79.
    The aim of the present paper is to find a satisfactory way of understanding what traits are. As a starting point, two recent accounts of the nature of traits, the act frequency approach and the intention frequency approach, are presented and discussed. The act frequency approach is criticized for taking all traits to be behavioral dispositions, and for not offering any explanation of behavior. The intention frequency approach is criticized for being equally one-sided in regarding all traits as mental frequency (...)
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  6.  30
    Freedom and rationality.Fred Vollmer - 2004 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (2):167–177.
    The question discussed in the present paper is whether actions that are free can be thought of as rational. According to one view, no free action could be rational. According to another, all free actions must be rational. I argue that both these positions are false and that there is no necessary connection between freedom and rationality. Some free actions are rational, others are not.
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  7.  18
    How do I Move my Body?Fred Vollmer - 1998 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (4):369-378.
    What is it for me to do something is the question discussed in the present paper. It has been suggested that my doings are elicited by tryings, intentions, and other causal mechanisms. These theories do not offer any convincing analysis of what it is for me to act. Insight is sought by looking at some case studies involving temporary loss of the ability to move oneís body. What the case studies show, I conclude, is that when I move my body (...)
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  8. Notes on the Unconscious.Fred Vollmer - 2008 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (4):321-330.