Attempts to use Big Data to transform car insurance pricing in France have failed. Why? Three possible explanations are discussed: organisational and cognitive inertia, normative preventions, and deliberate strategy. This article finds that moral or political reluctance has played only a secondary role in the failure of telematics devices. More important has been the deployment of an experimental strategy that has resulted in the conclusion that in the short and medium term at least, the use of big data to rate (...) car insurance is not profitable. There are too many organisational and cognitive barriers to the smooth adoption of innovation. All insurers note they all arrived at this conclusion. An implicit consensus therefore remains to retain the old business model. (shrink)

Philosophisch gelangte Maine de Biran (1766-1824) über den Sensualismus von Condillac, Helvétius, La Mettrie und Cabanis hinaus, war dem Idealismus Kants und Fichtes zugeneigt und bereitete einen neuen Spiritualismus in der französischen Metaphysik vor. Seine Tagebuchaufzeichnungen zeigen ihn auch als Psychologen und politisch unorthodoxen Menschen.

In this paper, I examine Horkheimer and Adorno's original take on the idea of a critical anthropology, as they work it out in Dialectic of Enlightenment. In particular, I address a set of concerns that commentators have formulated against their view. I do so through a close examination of the first excursus of the book. In particular, I argue, first, that this excursus can be read as an investigation into the prototype of the self (Odysseus), understood as a mimetic model (...) of the self; second, that Horkheimer and Adorno see in Odysseus' cunning the model of reflectivity. (shrink)

A specter haunts the Tractatus de intellectus emendatione: eternity. It is a specter, for it never appears there in person, except at the end, in the genitive, that is to say, to determine another word – species. The search for eternal joy does not involve asceticism or contempt for what ascetics call the goods of this world. Eternity has therefore finally found its definition – and this definition links it closely to divine existence. Eternity plays a major and very complex (...) role. Eternity has therefore become a general characteristic of being and no longer the characteristic reserved for God. Where Spinoza is true to his own thought, and far from Descartes, he is so precisely with the instruments borrowed from Descartes, but completely transformed: the distinction between essence and existence, and the thesis of continued creation. (shrink)

Long undervalued in France, philosophical anthropology has played an essential role in Germany, helping to address some of the most important issues straddling philosophy and the social sciences: humanity's place in nature and in history; the individual and others; and relations between human groups.

Johnson-Laird's mental models theory claims that reasoning is a semantic process of construction and manipulation of models in working memory of limited capacity. Accordingly, both a deduction and a given interpretation of a premise would be all the harder the higher the number of models they require. The purpose of the present experiment was twofold. First, it aimed to demonstrate that the interpretation of if...then conditional sentences in children (third, sixth, and ninth graders) evolves as a function of the number (...) of models the children can produce. We proposed a theory of conditional reasoning development that hypothesises a developmental trend of three successive levels of interpretations underlain by one, two, and then three models, i.e. conjunctive, biconditional, and conditional respectively. Second, we aimed to show that these different levels correlate with working memory capacities: the higher the working memory span, the higher the number of models underlying the conditional interpretation. These two hypotheses were verified, supporting the mental models theory. The results are compared with the rival theory of mental logic. (shrink)

This article examines the development of instruments of knowledge in natural philosophy in early modern Europe. It argues that organum and habitus are the fitting concepts available to us in discussing the role played by instruments and machines in relation to the theory and practice of early modern natural philosophy. It investigates the notion of instrumentality examining the notion of instrument and practice during this period.

Summary At the beginning of the 1730s René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur published two long memoirs on a new type of thermometer equipped with a specially calibrated scale — known ever since as the Réaumur scale. It became one of the most common ‘standardized’ thermometers in Europe until the late nineteenth century. What made this thermometer so successful? What was it specifically? I will first argue that the real Réaumur thermometer as an instrument was a fiction, a ghost — an (...) idealized instrument. On paper, it was theoretically flawless. In reality, the standardized Réaumur thermometer was most likely never achieved. This article shows that its success was essentially due to a recontextualisation from theoretical natural philosophy — Réaumur's principle of uniformity — to: 1) the context of artisanal knowledge and practices and 2) the context of making and reporting in the Mémoires de l'Académie royale des sciences actual measurements done in the field (in Paris at the Observatory, in Provincial France, in the Colonies, and in the rest of Europe). Réaumur's thermometer was essentially a theoretical method to which was associated a particular scale. It was the instrument's reification for market consumption and fieldwork that gave this specific type of thermometer materiality and authority. Although most Réaumur thermometers ever made were strikingly different from one another, over time the thermomètre de Réaumur designation became a brand, a seal of approval born from customary artisanal practices and cultural habitudes. (shrink)

Through a detailed study of Spinoza's concept of 'experience', Moreau shows how Spinoza extends the power of reason to capture the singularity of individuals: their lives, languages, passions and societies.

Die Psychologie nimmt im Werk Christian Wolffs (1679-1754) eine zentrale Stellung ein. Sie begründet die Logik und die praktische Philosophie mit Naturrecht, Ethik, Politik und Ökonomik. Der vorliegende Band geht den vielfältigen Problemen nach, die sich mit Wolffs Konzeption einer rationalen und einer empirischen Psychologie einerseits, ihrer Grundlegungsfunktion innerhalb des Wolffschen Systems der Philosophie andererseits ergeben. Darüber hinaus stellt er die Psychologie Wolffs in den philosophie- und wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Kontext von der Scholastik bis zur kritischen Philosophie Immanuel Kants.

I examine Adorno's controversial claim that human rationality is inherently mimetic. To do so, I break this claim down into three puzzles and consider each in turn. The first puzzle originates in Adorno's assertion that in the course of human history the mimetic moment of human thought is melted together with the rational moment. So whereas, on his narrative, mimesis has become an intrinsic component of human rationality, it appears that we are oblivious to this state of affair and unable (...) to recognize the workings of mimesis in what we otherwise refer to as rationality. The second puzzle concerns the traditional metaphysical question regarding the possibility of knowledge. Adorno holds that the key to this question lies in the "mimetic moment of knowledge", which he characterizes as the moment of the elective affinity between the knower and the known. The third puzzle concerns his views on how the mimetic moment of thought plays out in our epistemic practices. As he puts it, "consciousness knows of its other as much as it resembles that other," which seems to entail that our very efforts to conceptualize objects somehow rely on imitative processes. I work out what I take to be the basics of Adorno's understanding of mimesis and use them to make sense of each puzzle. I argue that Adorno's insistence on the mimetic component of human rationality isn't meant to promote more mimetic modes of comportment, but a reflexive awareness of the extent to which our rational activities already rely on imitative processes, even those we view as embodying the strongest claims to the contrary. (shrink)

Résumé Charles Wolfe vient de publier Lire le matérialisme (ENS Éditions, 2020), où il esquisse une histoire des différentes formes de matérialisme, y compris le matérialisme vitaliste et les versions du XXe et du XXIe siècle. Pierre-François Moreau, auteur de la préface de l’ouvrage, entame ici une discussion sur les problèmes et les ressources d’une telle histoire.

Cet article veut contribuer à définir l’objet de la théorie dialectique. Afin d’y parvenir, il reconstruit le projet d’une théorie dialectique tel qu’il a pris forme au cours des années trente au sein de l’École de Francfort – dont on rappelle qu’elle s’est toujours voulue, depuis sa naissance à Francfort dans les années 30, et dans le contexte de la société allemande, une continuation et une reprise du marxisme et sur le plan spéculatif et sur le plan des sciences empiriques (...) – en prenant appui sur les protocoles de discussions qui eurent lieu en 1939 à l’International Institute for Social Research à New York et dont l’importance n’a jamais été pleinement reconnue. Je défends que le projet peut être lu à la lumière d’une déclaration de Marx et que les termes qu’il emploie suggèrent, paradoxalement, que l’on peut emprunter l’une ou l’autre de deux voies distinctes pour élaborer la théorie dialectique. Je montre ensuite ce qui motive Max Horkheimer à emprunter l’une de ces voies et Theodor W. Adorno à emprunter plutôt l’autre. Je montre enfin pourquoi, dans la confrontation de leur position, l’une des deux voies s’affirme sur l’autre et comment cela nous permet de discerner plus précisément la nature de l’objet de la théorie dialectique. (shrink)

The involvement of developing countries in international clinical trials is necessary for the development of appropriate medicines for local populations. However, the absence of appropriate structures for ethical review represents a barrier for certain countries. Currently there is very little information available on existing structures dedicated to ethics in western and central Africa. This article briefly describes historical milestones in the development of networks dedicated to capacity building in ethical review in these regions and outlines the major conclusions of two (...) workshops on this issue, which were held in September and October 2002 in Libreville, Gabon, and Paris, France. The workshops were the culmination of collaboration between the African Malaria Network Trust (AMANET) and the Pan African Bioethics Initiative (PABIN). They produced an update on ethics organizations with regard to mission, function, activities, members, and contact people, in eight countries within the regions discussed. As a result of the commitment of mandated delegates, a further prominent outcome followed these workshops: the creation of national structures, where none existed before, dedicated to the ethical review of clinical trials. (shrink)

Cet article propose un examen de la conception controversée de l’« antisémitisme politique » que développent Horkheimer et Adorno. En l’essence, ma lecture retrace leur appropriation critique de Freud. Je montre d’abord comment ils puisent dans Totem et tabou pour défendre qu’un interdit de la mimèsis, ou de l’imitation, est au cœur du processus des Lumières. Je montre ensuite comment ils s’appuient sur la conception freudienne de l’identification et de la formation du moi pour défendre que l’imitation est néanmoins ce (...) qui permet la formation du sujet et le processus des Lumières. Selon ma lecture, cette tension crée les conditions nécessaires à l’émergence de l’antisémitisme politique. (shrink)

That something is profoundly wrong with the way in which enlightenment has unfolded has widely been taken to be the main thrust of Dialectic of Enlightenment. In this paper, I propose to defend that to understand the book and shed light on some of its most puzzling features, one should rather take Horkheimer and Adorno's critical claim at face value: through their criticism they contend to have prepared a positive concept of enlightenment. How this can be so is the question (...) I want to answer. I defend that what we need is an account that works out the conceptual grounds on which their critique can operate. The focus of my attempt will consist in understanding what they mean when they assert that rationality is intrinsically social and how they conceive of rationality as being reflective at its core. (shrink)

Cet article veut contribuer à définir l’objet de la théorie dialectique. Afin d’y parvenir, il reconstruit le projet d’une théorie dialectique tel qu’il a pris forme au cours des années trente au sein de l’École de Francfort – dont on rappelle qu’elle s’est toujours voulue, depuis sa naissance à Francfort dans les années 30, et dans le contexte de la société allemande, une continuation et une reprise du marxisme et sur le plan spéculatif et sur le plan des sciences empiriques (...) – en prenant appui sur les protocoles de discussions qui eurent lieu en 1939 à l’International Institute for Social Research à New York et dont l’importance n’a jamais été pleinement reconnue. Je défends que le projet peut être lu à la lumière d’une déclaration de Marx et que les termes qu’il emploie suggèrent, paradoxalement, que l’on peut emprunter l’une ou l’autre de deux voies distinctes pour élaborer la théorie dialectique. Je montre ensuite ce qui motive Max Horkheimer à emprunter l’une de ces voies et Theodor W. Adorno à emprunter plutôt l’autre. Je montre enfin pourquoi, dans la confrontation de leur position, l’une des deux voies s’affirme sur l’autre et comment cela nous permet de discerner plus précisément la nature de l’objet de la théorie dialectique. (shrink)

Throughout the 1920s Heidegger's answer to the question of how to conceive of the phenomenon as a phenomenon has been the “formal indication,” that is a non-subsuming, non-generalizing type of discourse. Through a detailed interpretation of the sporadic explanations he gives on the matter, I try to point out some of the inconsistencies in his conception, and then work them out. I try to show in particular how Heidegger's emphasis on the method of phenomenology, which expresses his unrelenting desire to (...) let the phenomenon be seen in itself, led him to overlook the essential role of language in phenomenological analysis. (shrink)

Throughout the 1920s Heidegger's answer to the question of how to conceive of the phenomenon as a phenomenon has been the “formal indication,” that is a non-subsuming, non-generalizing type of discourse. Through a detailed interpretation of the sporadic explanations he gives on the matter, I try to point out some of the inconsistencies in his conception, and then work them out. I try to show in particular how Heidegger's emphasis on the method of phenomenology, which expresses his unrelenting desire to (...) let the phenomenon be seen in itself, led him to overlook the essential role of language in phenomenological analysis. (shrink)

Le constat que fait Spinoza dans le Traité de la réforme de l ’ entendement selon lequel on ne connaît ses parents que par ouï-dire fournit l’occasion de développer, à partir de l’exemple de la famille, la conception originale qu’offre le point de vue spinoziste sur les institutions. En reprenant une distinction que fait Julie Henry, on peut dire que la famille n’existe pas par nature, mais qu’elle est un effet naturel. L’univocité de la causalité et la diversité des causes (...) qui président à sa constitution permettent d’échapper à l’opposition nature – culture comme à toute tentative de réduire les phénomènes sociaux à des principes biologiques ou environnementaux. (shrink)

Un détail dans la Vie de Spinoza rédigée par Colerus a pu faire penser que l’auteur du Traité théologico-politique s’était, dans un dessin, représenté sous les traits de Masaniello le chef de l’insurrection de Naples en 1647. Est-ce compatible avec la critique des révolutions, et notamment du tyrannicide, que l’on croit pouvoir lire dans le Traité? En fait, l’analyse spinozienne des bouleversements des États est plus nuancée : l’indignation qui est à la base des révolutions peut être parfois conforme à (...) la Raison ; et le jugement porté sur le peuple est différent suivant qu’il s’agit d’une foule esclave animée par la crainte ou d’une multitude libre animée par l’espérance. (shrink)

Les études qui suivent abordent, de différents points de vue, les matériaux qui ont servi à l’élaboration du système spinoziste. Spinoza est, certes, un auteur qui cite peu ses prédécesseurs, sauf en quelques points névralgiques ; et quand il le fait, c’est souvent pour décrire un mouvement de pensée qui lui semble caractéristique plutôt que pour discuter avec un auteur précis. Les quelques exceptions (les stoïciens, Maïmonide, Descartes) confirment la règle : la critique singulière, accroché...

Un spectre hante l’Europe classique, l’antitrinitarisme – et sa variante la plus connue : le socinianisme. L’histoire commence par un double itinéraire européen, de l’Italie catholique et intolérante à la Suisse protestante et non moins intolérante, puis à la Pologne qui représente alors un havre de la liberté de conscience. Lelio Sozzini (1525-1562) s’était enfui de Sienne à Zurich en 1548, mais, traité d’hérétique par Calvin, il avait dû fuir de nouveau en Pologne. Dix ans plus tard, son ne..

In this paper, I examine Adorno’s controversial claim that human rationality is inherently mimetic. To do so, I break this claim down into three puzzles (the natural historical puzzle, the metaphysical puzzle, and the epistemic puzzle) and consider each in turn. The first puzzle originates in Adorno’s assertion that in the course of human history the mimetic moment of human thought “is melted together with the rational moment”. So whereas, on his narrative, mimesis has become an intrinsic component of human (...) rationality, it appears that we are oblivious to this state of affair and unable to recognize the workings of mimesis in what we otherwise refer to as rationality. The second puzzle concerns the traditional metaphysical question regarding the possibility of knowledge. Adorno holds that the key to this question lies in the “mimetic moment of knowledge”, which he characterizes as the “moment of the elective affinity between the knower and the known.” The third puzzle concerns his views on how the mimetic moment of thought plays out in our epistemic practices. As he puts it, “consciousness knows of its other as much as it resembles that other,” which seems to entail that our very efforts to conceptualize objects somehow rely on imitative processes. I work out what I take to be the basics of Adorno’s understanding of mimesis and use them to make sense of each puzzle. I argue that Adorno’s insistence on the mimetic component of human rationality isn’t meant to promote more mimetic modes of comportment, but a reflexive awareness of the extent to which our rational activities already rely on imitative (or immersive) processes, even those we view as embodying the strongest claims to the contrary. (shrink)

The involvement of developing countries in international clinical trials is necessary for the development of appropriate medicines fo.