In a behavioral study we analyzed the influence of visual action primes on abstract action sentence processing. We thereby aimed at investigating mental motor involvement during processes of meaning constitution of action verbs in abstract contexts. In the first experiment, participants executed either congruous or incongruous movements parallel to a video prime. In the second experiment, we added a no-movement condition. After the execution of the movement, participants rendered a sensibility judgment on action sentence targets. It was expected that congruous (...) movements would facilitate both concrete and abstract action sentence comprehension in comparison to the incongruous and the no-movement condition. Results in Experiment 1 showed a concreteness effect but no effect of motor priming. Experiment 2 revealed a concreteness effect as well as an interaction effect of the sentence and the movement condition. The findings indicate an involvement of motor processes in abstract action language processing on a behavioral level. (shrink)

With the rise and public accessibility of AI-enabled decision-support systems, individuals outsource increasingly more of their decisions, even those that carry ethical dimensions. Considering this trend, scholars have highlighted that uncritical deference to these systems would be problematic and consequently called for investigations of the impact of pertinent technology on humans’ ethical decision-making. To this end, this article conducts a systematic review of existing scholarship and derives an integrated framework that demonstrates how intelligent decision-support systems (IDSSs) shape humans’ ethical decision-making. (...) In particular, we identify resulting consequences on an individual level (i.e., deliberation enhancement, motivation enhancement, autonomy enhancement and action enhancement) and on a societal level (i.e., moral deskilling, restricted moral progress and moral responsibility gaps). We carve out two distinct methods/operation types (i.e., processoriented and outcome-oriented navigation) that decision-support systems can deploy and postulate that these determine to what extent the previously stated consequences materialize. Overall, this study holds important theoretical and practical implications by establishing clarity in the conceptions, underlying mechanisms and (directions of) influences that can be expected when using particular IDSSs for ethical decisions. (shrink)

Two decades ago, the introduction of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) sparked enthusiastic reactions. With implicit measures like the IAT, researchers hoped to finally be able to bridge the gap between self-reported attitudes on one hand and behavior on the other. Twenty years of research and several meta-analyses later, however, we have to conclude that neither the IAT nor its derivatives have fulfilled these expectations. Their predictive value for behavioral criteria is weak and their incremental validity over and above self-report (...) measures is negligible. In our review, we present an overview of explanations for these unsatisfactory findings and delineate promising ways forward. Over the years, several reasons for the IAT’s weak predictive validity have been proposed. They point to four potentially problematic features: First, the IAT is by no means a pure measure of individual differences in associations but suffers from extraneous influences like recoding. Hence, the predictive validity of IAT-scores should not be confused with the predictive validity of associations. Second, with the IAT, we usually aim to measure evaluation (“liking”) instead of motivation (“wanting”). Yet, behavior might be determined much more often by the latter than the former. Third, the IAT focuses on measuring associations instead of propositional beliefs and thus taps into a construct that might be too unspecific to account for behavior. Finally, studies on predictive validity are often characterized by a mismatch between predictor and criterion (e.g., while behavior is highly context-specific, the IAT usually takes into account neither situation nor domain). Recent research, however, also revealed advances addressing each of these problems, namely (1) procedural and analytical advances to control for recoding in the IAT, (2) measurement procedures to assess implicit wanting, (3) measurement procedures to assess implicit beliefs, and (4) approaches to increase the fit between implicit measures and behavioral criteria (e.g., by incorporating contextual information). Implicit measures like the IAT hold an enormous potential. In order to allow them to fulfill this potential, however, we have to refine our understanding of these measures, and we should incorporate recent conceptual and methodological advancements. This review provides specific recommendations on how to do so. (shrink)

Self-driving vehicles (SDVs) will need to make decisions that carry ethical dimensions and are of normative significance. For example, by choosing a specific trajectory, they determine how risks are distributed among traffic participants. Accordingly, policymakers, standardization organizations and scholars have conceptualized what (shall) constitute(s) ethical decision-making for SDVs. Eventually, these conceptualizations must be converted into specific system requirements to ensure proper technical implementation. Therefore, this article aims to translate critical requirements recently formulated in scholarly work, existing standards, regulatory drafts and (...) guidelines into an explicit five-step ethical decision model for SDVs during hazardous situations. This model states a precise sequence of steps, indicates the guiding ethical principles that inform each step and points out a list of terms that demand further investigation and technical specification. By integrating ethical, legal and engineering considerations, we aim to contribute to the scholarly debate on computational ethics (particularly in autonomous driving) while offering practitioners in the automotive sector a decision-making process for SDVs that is technically viable, legally permissible, ethically grounded and adaptable to societal values. In the future, assessing the actual impact, effectiveness and admissibility of implementing the here sketched theories, terms and the overall decision process requires an empirical evaluation and testing of the overall decision-making model. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have variously tried to characterize how-possibly explanations (HPEs) and distinguish them from how-actually explanations (HAEs). I argue that existing contributions to this debate have failed to pay attention to the different, but complementary, functions possibilities play in scientific explanations. To bring these functions to the fore, I introduce a distinction between what I call elucidating and embedding HPEs. While elucidating HPEs specify and demonstrate possible processes for a given research target, embedding HPEs demonstrate how the research target (...) fits into a space of suitably constrained possibilities. I specify both functions of HPE with reference to two case studies from origins-of-life research. I contrast my distinction with an alternative proposal by Wirling and Grüne-Yanoff (2024) to highlight that focusing on the functions, rather than types, of possibilities in explanation is better suited to account for key scientific practices. (shrink)

Care is among the most important concepts in healthcare. It is not only a descriptive concept, but it also conveys a normative orientation. Approaches to the ethics of care have shown that care can indeed be understood as an overarching normative concept that integrates different normative orientations. Nonetheless, determining what constitutes good care is usually a matter of finding reasonable compromises. In healthcare settings, a typical compromise involves finding a balance between optimal care for individuals on the one hand and (...) the institutional demands of providing care to many care receivers over long periods of time as well as the limits of what can legitimately be asked of individual care providers on the other. (shrink)

Warum ist eine moderne, in ihrem Selbstverständnis rationale Gesellschaft auf einen so okkult anmutenden Begriff wie den des Schicksals angewiesen? Franziska Rehlinghaus weist nach, dass der deutsche Schicksalsbegriff seit seiner Etablierung um 1650 ein zentraler Ausdruck epochenspezifischer Problemstellungen war, so dass man von der Neuzeit als einem fatalisierten Zeitalter sprechen kann. Dafür rekonstruiert sie erstmals den semantischen und den funktionalen Wandel sowie die Konjunkturen des Schicksalsbegriffs von der Aufklärung bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts.

The spread of unethical behavior in organizations has mainly been studied in terms of processes occurring in a general social context, rather than in terms of actors’ reactions in the context of their specific social relationships. This paper introduces a dynamic social network analysis framework in which this spread is conceptualized as the result of the reactions of perpetrators, victims, and observers to an initial act of unethical behavior. This theoretical framework shows that the social relationships of the actors involved (...) in an initial act impact in multiple ways the likelihood that unethical behavior spreads. It reveals furthermore that social relationships may change in the wake of unethical behavior, such that indirect negative consequences can arise for organizations. The proposed framework provides a basis for the development of a formal stochastic actor-oriented model of network dynamics which would enable simulations of the spread of unethical behavior. (shrink)

Research by academics, professional organizations, and businesses on ethics in the workplace often relies on surveys that ask employees to report how frequently they have observed others engaging in unethical behavior. But what do these frequencies in observer-reports say about the frequencies of committed unethical behavior? This paper is the first to address this question by empirically exploring the relationship between observer- and self-reports. Our survey research among the Swiss working population shows that for all 37 different forms of unethical (...) behavior investigated, observer-reports show higher frequencies than self-reports. Ratios of observer- to self-reports vary substantially among these forms, ranging from 1.46 for improperly gathering competitor’s confidential information to 6.4 for engaging in (sexual) harassment or creating a hostile work environment. The results indicate that researchers should not assume that the frequency in self-reports can generally be approximated by the frequency in observer-reports. Four possible explanations are presented for the differences in ratios, with recommendations for future research. (shrink)

Let K be an NIP field and let v be a Henselian valuation on K. We ask whether [Formula: see text] is NIP as a valued field. By a result of Shelah, we know that if v is externally definable, then [Formula: see text] is NIP. Using the definability of the canonical p-Henselian valuation, we show that whenever the residue field of v is not separably closed, then v is externally definable. In the case of separably closed residue field, we (...) show that [Formula: see text] is NIP as a pure valued field. (shrink)

I consider three questions concerning the relation of the good will to the moral worth of actions. (1) Does a good will consist simply in acting from the motive of duty? (2) Does acting from the motive of duty presuppose that one has a good will? (3) Does the fact that one has a good wilI entail that all of one’s duty-fulfilling actions have moral worth, even if they are not (directly) motivated by duty? I argue that while only persons (...) with a good will are capable of acting from the motive of duty, it does not follow either that a good will consists in acting from duty or that if one has a good will, all of one’s dutiful actions will be motivated by duty. Whereas the good will is constituted by the agent’s highest-order maxim (the moral law itself), moral worth is a function of the agent’s first-order maxims. (shrink)

The interdisciplinary series "Law & Literature" takes a systematic look at the correlation between literature and the law. The studies presented in this series analyze the complex interrelation between two cultural spheres which are not only at the basis of Western Culture and Society, but share in a common focus on texts. Bringing together contributions by jurists, historians of law, legal philosophers, and specialists in literary and cultural studies, this series reflects a trend in current inter- and transdisciplinary research which (...) has recently shown rapid growth both in Europe and the United States. (shrink)

John Locke's account of natural law, which forms the very basis of his political philosophy, has troubled many critics over time. The two works that shed light on Locke's theory are the early Essays on the Law of Nature and the Second Treatise of Government, published over 20 years later. Many critics have assumed that the early work presents a voluntarist approach to natural law and the second a rationalist approach, but the present analysis in this book shows that Locke's (...) theory is consistent. Both works present a concept of the law of nature that must be placed between voluntarism and rationalism. (Series: Polyptoton. Munster Collection, Academic Writings / Polyptoton. Munsteraner Sammlung Akademischer Schriften - Vol. 3). (shrink)

Atran & Norenzayan's (A&N's) analysis fits with other perspectives on evoked culture: Cultural beliefs might emerge simply from the fact that people share a common cognitive architecture. But no perspective on culture can be complete without incorporating the unstoppable role of communication. The evolutionary landscape of culture will be most completely mapped by theories that describe specifically how communication translates evolved cognitive canals into cultural beliefs.

Rawls’s theory of justice has been criticized for allowing individuals by their own voluntary choice to make themselves members of the ‘least advantaged’ class and thereby eligible, albeit undeservedly, for the benefits mandated by the Difference Principle. I argue, first, that this criticism overlooks the fact that the Difference Principle applies only to the lifetime expectations of representative persons and, second, that it is possible to implement the Difference Principle (and the social minimum) through policies that do not create work (...) disincentives or require making objectionable moral judgments about who is and who is not deserving of assistance. (shrink)

Virtues are standardly understood as (1) essentially dispositions to perform certain actions and (2) having only instrumental value as motives to fulfill moral duties which can be fulfilled by persons lacking the virtue because the duties mandate only certain act-types. The argument of this article is that the duties of beneficence, gratitude and self-respect cannot be stated in terms of obligatory act-types because they cannot be fulfilled (except in deficient form) by persons lacking the appropriate virtue; they are, rather, duties (...) to cultivate specific virtues which therefore cannot themselves be defined in terms of obligatory actions. (shrink)

Paulin J. Hountondji is one of the most important and controversial figures in contemporary African philosophy. His critique of ethnophilosophy as a colonial, exoticising and racialized undertaking provoked contentious debates among African intellectuals on the proper methods and scope of philosophy and science in an African and global context since the 1970s. His radical pledge for scientific autonomy from the global system of knowledge production made him turn to endogenous forms of practising science in academia. The horizon of his philosophy (...) is the quest for critical universality from a historical, and situated perspective. Finally, his call for a notion of culture that is antithetical to political movements focused on a single identitarian doctrine or exclusionary norms shows how timely his political thought remains to this day. This book gives a comprehensive overview of Hountondji’s philosophical arguments and provides detailed information on the historical and political background of his intellectual oeuvre. It situates Hountondji in the dialogue with his African colleagues and explores links to current debates in philosophy, cultural studies, postcolonialism and the social sciences. (shrink)

The common-sense view that reasons guide us in thought and action and that humans are essentially reason-responsive animals is increasingly under attack by defenders of what one can call the Rationalisation View, which emphasises that we typically rationalise actions and judgements that are based on intuition rather than reasoning. This article defends the former view of human Reason, partly by replying to prominent advocates of the latter, partly by proposing accounts of reflective reasoning and rationalisation that bring to light a (...) common, underappreciated feature: they both involve the capacity to see considerations as reasons. This capacity, the author conjectures, should be the starting point for investigating the faculty we call ‘Reason’, its evolutionary origin, and the (ir)rationality of different kinds of thought associated with it. (shrink)

Volume 23, Issue 2, June 2020, Page 146-159.