In this collection of essays, Franklin I. Gamwell offers a defense of transcendental metaphysics, especially in its neoclassical form, and builds a case for its importance as a tool for addressing abiding problems in morality and philosophical theology-including talk about God, human fault, moral decision, and the relationship of politics and religious freedom. In Part I, Gamwell argues against Kant and a wide range of contemporary philosophers, for the validity of transcendental metaphysics designated in the strict sense, i.e., as an (...) explication of the possible as such or existence as such, as the most general features or conditions all possible things have in common. He engages with Aquinas, Schleiermacher, Augustine, and Niebuhr to argue that neoclassical metaphysics, for which the divine whole is itself temporal or forever self-surpassing, provides a more coherent account of God than does classical metaphysics, for which the divine whole is completely eternal. In Part II, Gamwell looks at transcendental metaphysics designated in the broad sense, i.e., as an explication of possible subjectivity as such, as the most general features or conditions all possible subjects have in common. In particular, he takes up the moral opportunity that humans are presented with, and argues that the moral law depends on a comprehensive good, that is, a good defined metaphysically in the strict sense. He then offers an extended discussion of the relation between transcendental metaphysics (in the broad sense) and the meaning of religious freedom and explores Ronald Dworkin's view of the relationship between democracy and religion, the question of whether religious activities are properly exempted from generally applicable laws, and the constitutional debate about national and states' rights. (shrink)

Has moral relativism run its course? The threat of 9/11, terrorism, reproductive technology, and globalization has forced us to ask anew whether there are universal moral truths upon which to base ethical and political judgments. In this timely edited collection, distinguished scholars present and test the best answers to this question. These insightful responses temper the strong antithesis between universalism and relativism and retain sensitivity to how language and history shape the context of our moral decisions. This important and relevant (...) work of contemporary political and social thought is ideal for use in the classroom across many disciplines, including political science, philosophy, ethics, law, and theology. (shrink)

Habermas and Apel commonly defend a form of universal moral theory that is also postmetaphysical. Still, they differ with respect to both the character and the justification of a universal moral principle. Habermas denies and Apel asserts that this principle is a transcendental condition of life practice or human activity as such, and each criticizes the claims of the other. This paper argues that each is correct in his criticism of the other and, therefore, both are wrong. The contention between (...) them cannot be resolved within the post metaphysical conviction they have in common, and the reasons for this conclusion imply that a universal moral principle cannot be redeemed independently of metaphysics. (shrink)

Engaging in a dialogue with such major representatives of the dominant consensus as Kant, Habermas, and Rawls, and informed by the philosophical writings of ...

Many democratic citizens, including many Christians, think that separation of religion from the state means the exclusion of religious beliefs from the political process. That view is mistaken. Both democracy and Christian faith, this 2004 book shows, call all Christians to make their beliefs effective in politics. But the discussion here differs from others. Most have trouble relating religion to democratic discussion and debate because they assume that religious differences cannot be publicly debated. Against this majority view, this book argues (...) that Christian faith belongs in politics because it shares with democracy a full commitment to rational pursuit of the truth. The book then develops ideals of justice and the common good Christians should advocate within the democratic process and shows the difference they make for contemporary politics in the United States, focusing specifically on issues of abortion, affirmative action, and economic distribution. (shrink)

_Explores democracy with religious freedom and its dependence on theism._.

This is the most thorough philosophical analysis available of the principle of religious freedom. It draws on the thought of philosophers and political theorists (Rawls, Habermas, Murray, Rorty, Greenawalt, and Mead) rather than on the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

Persisting discussion, in both the academy and the wider public, about how democracy properly relates to religion is confused. All agree that religious freedom is required, but each of its two principal interpretations, separationist and religionist, commends itself by disclosing the other’s problems. Debate between the two is a standoff because both commonly assume that religions, in the sense protected by religious freedom, are or must be treated politically as immune to argumentative assessment. A third alternative is here proposed: religious (...) freedom presupposes that religions or comprehensive assessments answer a rationalquestion, and democracy is constituted as a full and free political discourse among them in order that governing decisions might be consistent with a validunderstanding of the common good. (shrink)

The incoherence is between Whitehead’s definition of “speculative philosophy” in the first section of Process and Reality's opening chapter which defines metaphysics as transcendental and important moments in later chapters of the book, where he asserts that metaphysical formulations are generalizations of empirical or contingent features. In explicating this inconsistency, the article attends to Whitehead’s definition of metaphysical in distinction from cosmological features, his understandings of the “aeroplane” metaphor, the ontological principle, and especially the initial aim. The article argues that (...) Whitehead’s account of these, and especially the initial aim, should be deleted from neoclassical metaphysics. (shrink)

Persisting discussion, in both the academy and the wider public, about how democracy properly relates to religion is confused. All agree that religious freedom is required, but each of its two principal interpretations, separationist and religionist, commends itself by disclosing the other’s problems. Debate between the two is a standoff because both commonly assume that religions, in the sense protected by religious freedom, are or must be treated politically as immune to argumentative assessment. A third alternative is here proposed: religious (...) freedom presupposes that religions or comprehensive assessments answer a rational question, and democracy is constituted as a full and free political discourse among them in order that governing decisions might be consistent with a valid understanding of the common good. (shrink)

Persisting discussion, in both the academy and the wider public, about how democracy properly relates to religion is confused. All agree that religious freedom is required, but each of its two principal interpretations, separationist and religionist, commends itself by disclosing the other’s problems. Debate between the two is a standoff because both commonly assume that religions, in the sense protected by religious freedom, are or must be treated politically as immune to argumentative assessment. A third alternative is here proposed: religious (...) freedom presupposes that religions or comprehensive assessments answer a rationalquestion, and democracy is constituted as a full and free political discourse among them in order that governing decisions might be consistent with a validunderstanding of the common good. (shrink)