B. Russell, Foundations of logic 1903-05, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 4, Edited by Urquhart, A. with the assistance of Lewis, A. C. London and New York:Routledge, 1994, Hi+ 743 pp. £100.

According to the received view, Russell rediscovered about 1900 the logical definition of cardinal number given by Frege in 1884. In the same way, we are told, he stated and developed independently the idea of logicism, using the principle of abstraction as the philosophical ground. Furthermore, the role commonly ascribed in this to Peano was only to invent an appropriate notation to be used as mere instrument. In this paper I hold that the study of Russell's unpublished manuscripts and Peano's (...) (and disciples) writings (as part of a larger investigation only pointed out here) shows, on the contrary, that Russell obtained the method to transform definitions by abstraction into nominal definitions and the general logicist idea from Peano (and his school). The only original insight from Russell, the principle of abstraction, partially derived from Moore's early philosophy, was finally abandoned because it was not of practical use. (shrink)

Two unpublished contributions to meetings can be found in the Alfred Tarski Papers, at the University of California, Berkeley. The meetings took place in 1965, in Chicago and London, respectively....

In this article I try to show the philosophical continuity of Russell's ideas from his paradox of classes to Principia mathematica. With this purpose, I display the main results (descriptions, substitutions and types) as moments of the same development, whose principal goal was (as in his The principles) to look for a set of primitive ideas and propositions giving an account of all mathematics in logical terms, but now avoiding paradoxes. The sole way to reconstruct this central period in Russell (...) is to resort to unpublished manuscripts, which show the publications of these years to be the extremities of one same iceberg. Thus the logical problems (doubts about propositions, matrices and functions) are parallel to the ontological (the searching for genuine logical subjects) and methodological ones (the status of eliminative reduction). Paradoxes were the cause that the kind of (constructive) definition already applied by Russell, as an inheritance of Moorean analysis, obtained a new trait: ontological elimination, which, beginning with a ?no classes theory? and the theory of descriptions, led to a new theory of judgment (already present in manuscripts from 1906), ?incomplete symbols, and logical constructions. (shrink)

In this paper we briefly expose a project which could be summed up as ‘doing justice to Mario Pieri’. The main result of the project will be the publication of a book on him, in which we will mainl...

We hypothesize that under the predicted scenario of climate change epigenetically mediated environmental sex determination could become an epigenetic trap. Epigenetically regulated environmental sex determination is a mechanism by which species can modulate their breeding strategies to accommodate environmental change. Growing evidence suggests that epigenetic mechanisms may play a key role in phenotypic plasticity and in the rapid adaptation of species to environmental change, through the capacity of organisms to maintain a non‐genetic plastic memory of the environmental and ecological conditions (...) experienced by their parents. However, inherited epigenetic variation could also be maladaptive, becoming an epigenetic trap. This is because environmental sex determination can alter sex ratios by increasing the survival of one of the sexes at the expense of negative fitness consequences for the other, which could lead not only to the collapse of natural populations, but also have an impact in farmed animal and plant species. (shrink)

I expose and discuss here the different arguments Bradley used against the tenability of relations as genuine entities, as well as the corresponding arguments against predicates, both in metaphysical and logical terms, and this always in the framework of his semantic general ideas on judgment and truth. Also, I have found useful to try to find similar arguments in Frege, in order to show that, no matter how different their respective goals and methods may have been, both philosophers tried to (...) solve very similar problems regarding the nature of judgment and the role of relations in explaining its deep unity. Then I shall point out the multiple nature of the general problem involved, and finish with some reflections about its importance for analytical philosophers, especially for Russell. (shrink)

In this article I propose a new explanation of the relationship between Russell and ther first Wittgenstein. There are five main novelties in my interpretation; the use of all relevant unpublished manuscripts of Russell; the discovery of the first apparition of the “multiple theory of judgment” in a purely logical and unpublished context; the role of the Bradleian objection against relations in the evolution of the nation of form in both Russell and Wittgenstein; a general point of view to obtain (...) a common explanation of all the criticisms of Wittgenstein against Russell and of the abandonment to Theory of Knowledge; and the first account of the contribution of Whitehead to the progressive Russellian evolution from atomism to holism. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to show the development of some of the model-theoretic ideas which are clearly present in the main members of the Peano school (Peano himself, Burali-Forti, Pieri and Padoa) asa result of their conception of nominal definitions. Also, their semantic definition of logical consequence (Pieri, Padoa) is viewed as one of the outcomes of that conception. Some examples of their use of theexpression “nominal definition” are presented first. Second, the main advantages of this kind of definition, as (...) they saw them, are briefly explained, mainly in a philosophical context. Finally, already in the kernel of the paper, some of the details of the model-theoretic view itself are shown, first in Peano, then in Pieri and Padoa, including in both cases some study of their semantic definitions of logicalconsequence. (shrink)

This is an essay-review of C. Wade Savage and C. Anthony Anderson (editors), Rereading Russell: Essays in Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology, Volume XII of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989. The book is devoted to studying Russell's later philosophy, although the actual content concerns also Russell's early logical and epistemological writings. Here I study and criticize a group of contributions (mainly those by Hylton, Goldfarb, Cocchiarella, Pears and Demopoulos/Friedman) from a global and (...) methodological approach to Russell's whole philosophy I have developed in other publications. (shrink)

I expose and discuss here the different arguments Bradley used against the tenability of relations as genuine entities, as well as the corresponding arguments against predicates, both in metaphysical and logical terms, and this always in the framework of his semantic general ideas on judgment and truth. Also, I have found useful to try to find similar arguments in Frege, in order to show that, no matter how different their respective goals and methods may have been, both philosophers tried to (...) solve very similar problems regarding the nature of judgment and the role of relations in explaining its deep unity. Then I shall point out the multiple nature of the general problem involved, and finish with some reflections about its importance for analytical philosophers, especially for Russell. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that some of the most important ideas and symbolic devices that made Russell's theory of descriptions possible were already present in writings by Frege and especially Peano that Russell knew well. The paper contains a detailed comparison between the relevant parts of Russell's theory--including manuscripts recently published--and some of Frege and Peano's insights, as well as a discussion of numerous possible objections that could be posed to the main claim. Even if Russell was (...) not actually influenced by those insights, the parallelism is close enough to be worth analyzing, especially in the case of Peano, whose writings are not very well known. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to show the development of some of the model-theoretic ideas which are clearly present in the main members of the Peano school (Peano himself, Burali-Forti, Pieri and Padoa) asa result of their conception of nominal definitions. Also, their semantic definition of logical consequence (Pieri, Padoa) is viewed as one of the outcomes of that conception. Some examples of their use of theexpression “nominal definition” are presented first. Second, the main advantages of this kind of definition, as (...) they saw them, are briefly explained, mainly in a philosophical context. Finally, already in the kernel of the paper, some of the details of the model-theoretic view itself are shown, first in Peano, then in Pieri and Padoa, including in both cases some study of their semantic definitions of logicalconsequence. (shrink)

Traces the development of British philosopher Russell's (1872-1970) ideas on mathematics from the 1890s to the publication of his Principles of mathematics in 1903. Draws from Russell's unpublished manuscripts, correspondence, and published works to point out the influence of Hegel, Cantor, Whitehead, Peano, and others. No index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Shaughan La Vine, Understanding the Infinite.Cambridge, Massachussets :Harvard University Press, 1994, ix + 372 pp.£31.95/$47.95 B.Russell, Foundations of logic 1903‐05, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 4, Edited by Urquhart, A.with the assistance of Lewis, A.C.London and New York:Routledge, 1994, Hi+ 743 pp.£100 Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer, Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy.Introduction by Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer.Bristol, U.K.:Thoemmes Press, 1996. xvi + 383 pp.£48.00/$78.00 ; £16.95/$29.95 T.J.Holopainen, Dialectic & Theology in the Eleventh Century.Leiden:E.J.Brill, 1996. (...) vii+171pp.$78. (shrink)

The development of information and communication technologies offers innovative opportunities to establish business strategies focused on customer value co-creation. This situation is especially notable in the banking industry. e-Banking activities can support competitive advantages. However, the adoption of e-banking is not yet well-established among consumers. In this sense, the technology acceptance model is considered essential in studying consumer behavior applied to adopt a particular technology. According to the TAM model, this study analyses the factors which influence bank customers to adopt (...) e-banking to facilitate their banking services and support the process of value co-creation. Consequently, the authors examine five main aspects of the technology adoption model to provide a broad understanding of bank customers’ consumption of e-banking. A partial least squares structural equation modeling analysis is conducted to evaluate proposed relationships between factors and customers’ e-banking adoption. (shrink)

Francisco Rodríguez Consuegra acumula en su haber profesional una larga y reconocida trayectoria como especialista en Filosofía Analítica, en particular, como experto en la obra de Bertrand Russell y otros filósofos contemporáneos y como editor de un notable volumen que recoge los ensayos no publicados de Kurt Gödel. En el presente volumen reúne cinco ensayos de lo que el introductor denomina la filosofía técnica de Russell su filosofía de la lógica, del lenguaje y del conocimiento, inéditos hasta la fecha (...) en lengua castellana y los acompaña de un estudio introductorio en donde resalta convincentemente la unidad de su método filosófico utilizado y aclara la significación de su pensamiento en la filosofía contemporánea. Por lo que suponen para un mejor conocimiento de la filosofía de Russell del lector en lengua castellana, por el interés de las propuestas mismas de este autor, por la dificultad de acceder a las versiones originales de dichos ensayos y por la calidad del estudio introductorio que los presenta, Análisis filosófico [= AF] debe estar presente en nuestras bibliotecas universitarias y en las todos aquellos a quienes interese el pensamiento de Russell y, más en general, la Filosofía Analítica. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:222 Reviews A RUSCELLO ON RUSSELL I. GRATTAN-GUINNESS Faculty ofScience, Engineering and Mathematics Middlesex Polytechnic Enfield, Middlesex l!N3 4SF, England Michele di Francesco. Introduzione a Russell (I Filosofi, Vol. 53.) Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1990. Pp. viii, 200. 16,000 Lire. -. II Realismo analitico: logica, ontologia e significato nel primo Russell (Saggi, Vol. 28.) Milan: Guerini, 1991. Pp. 269. 30,000 Lire. Italy has long enjoyed a tradition of work (...) in the history of philosophy. Russell featured well recently in R. Simili, ed., L'Epistemologia di Cambridge I85O-I950 (1987), and here he is the leading figure in two books by an Italian scholar, who has just been appointed to the University of Palermo. The first book is a small-format volume in a series ofintroductory texts on philosophers; so Russell's social, educational and political writings are not treated, although a short biographical summary is furnished. While the centre of attention falls upon epistemological concerns, other aspects of Russell's philosophy are noted. A chronological line is followed, beginning with the idealist phase and proceeding to logicism and the early philosophy of language. Then comes logical atomism and the later doctrines through works such as The Analysis ofMindand The Analysis ofMatter to Human Knowledge (rather briefly handled). A very good survey and selection of Russell writings (including Papers) is given, followed by a fine classified bibliography of secondary literature; ~ut unfortunately no indexes then follow. Reviews 223 The second book, which belongs to a series of "essays" on scholarly subjects, is aimed at a more academic audience. As its title indicates, it is primarily concerned with the philosophical aspects of Russell's thought from his neo-Hegelian phase before 1910. After a quire lengthy thematic introduction, the chapters concentrate, in turn, upon Bradley and Frege; the MooreRussell reform; the ontology of propositions in The Principles; "significato", denotation and paradoxes there; the background to "On Denoting"; Meinong (with a welcome appendix on K. Twardowski, a figure normally known only to students of Polish thought); the theory ofdescriptions in "On Denoting "; and finally a general survey of the problem of meaning in analytic philosophy. As in the other book, no indexes are furnished, but the bibliography of secondary literature is very rich, and is well cited in the text (which is admirably parsimonious in the use of footnotes). However, there are some gaps in. the primary literature outside Russell. In particular, it is'a surprise that this Italian scholar says very little about Giuseppe Peano and his followers, and cites none of their works; for a major component of Russell's background is thereby not properly illuminated, and several important examples of the place of mathematical issues in Russell's developing philosophical programme are left unregistered (for example, why definite descriptions are preferred to indefinite ones in the first place). Among other quality books of this genre, one thinks most readily of J. Vuillemin, La premiere philosophie de Russell (1968), N. Griffin, Russell's Idealist Apprenticeship (1991), and F. A. Rodrfguez-Consuegra, The Mathematical Philosophy ofBertrand Russell (1991). All three recent authors have the advantage over. their distinguished French predecessor of the availability of the Russell Archives, and all have made effective use of the manuscripts. (However, nobody seems yet to have fully exploited the potential of Russell's correspondence.) The other two new volumes gain a certain edge over this one for their somewhat more extensive use of manuscripts, and the greater attention paid to mathematico-Iogical issues; but nevertheless,.the Italian public are basically well served by their compatriot with this book and its introductory predecessor.... (shrink)