Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the dark side of monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics—dishonesty. Dishonesty, a risky prospect, involves cost–benefit analysis of self-interest. We frame good or bad barrels in the environmental context as a proxy of high or low probability of getting caught for dishonesty, respectively. We theorize: The magnitude and intensity of (...) the relationship between love of money and dishonest prospect may reveal how individuals frame dishonesty in the context of two levels of subjective norm—perceived corporate ethical values at the micro-level and Corruption Perceptions Index at the macro-level, collected from multiple sources. Based on 6382 managers in 31 geopolitical entities across six continents, our cross-level three-way interaction effect illustrates: As expected, managers in good barrels, mixed barrels, and bad barrels display low, medium, and high magnitude of dishonesty, respectively. With high CEV, the intensity is the same across cultures. With low CEV, the intensity of dishonesty is the highest in high CPI entities —the Enron Effect, but the lowest in low CPI entities. CPI has a strong impact on the magnitude of dishonesty, whereas CEV has a strong impact on the intensity of dishonesty. We demonstrate dishonesty in light of monetary values and two frames of social norm, revealing critical implications to the field of behavioral economics and business ethics. (shrink)

Monetary Intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the bright side of Monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics, frames money attitude in the context of pay and life satisfaction, and controls money at the macro-level and micro-level. We theorize: Managers with low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior will have high subjective well-being: pay satisfaction and (...) quality of life. Data collected from 6586 managers in 32 cultures across six continents support our theory. Interestingly, GDP per capita is related to life satisfaction, but not to pay satisfaction. Individual income is related to both life and pay satisfaction. Neither GDP nor income is related to Happiness. Our theoretical model across three GDP groups offers new discoveries: In high GDP entities, “high income” not only reduces aspirations—“Rich, Motivator, and Power,” but also promotes stewardship behavior—“Budget, Give/Donate, and Contribute” and appreciation of “Achievement.” After controlling income, we demonstrate the bright side of Monetary Intelligence: Low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior define Monetary Intelligence. “Good apples enjoy good quality of life in good barrels.” This notion adds another explanation to managers’ low magnitude of dishonesty in entities with high Corruption Perceptions Index. In low GDP entities, high income is related to poor Budgeting skills and escalated Happiness. These managers experience equal satisfaction with pay and life. We add a new vocabulary to the conversation of monetary intelligence, income, GDP, happiness, subjective well-being, good and bad apples and barrels, corruption, and behavioral ethics. (shrink)

Corruption involves greed, money, and risky decision-making. We explore the love of money, pay satisfaction, probability of risk, and dishonesty across cultures. Avaricious monetary aspiration breeds unethicality. Prospect theory frames decisions in the gains-losses domain and high-low probability. Pay dissatisfaction (in the losses domain) incites dishonesty in the name of justice at the individual level. The Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI, signals a high-low probability of getting caught for dishonesty at the country level. We theorize that decision-makers adopt avaricious love-of-money aspiration (...) as a lens and frame dishonesty in the gains-losses domain (pay satisfaction-dissatisfaction, Level 1) and high-low probability (CPI, Level 2) to maximize expected utility and ultimate serenity. We challenge the myth: Pay satisfaction mitigates dishonesty across nations consistently. Based on 6500 managers in 32 countries, our cross-level three-dimensional visualization offers the following discoveries. Under high aspiration conditions, pay dissatisfaction excites the highest- (third-highest) avaricious justice-seeking dishonesty in high (medium) CPI nations, supporting the certainty effect. However, pay satisfaction provokes the second-highest avaricious opportunity-seizing dishonesty in low CPI entities, sustaining the possibility effect—maximizing expected utility. Under low aspiration conditions, high pay satisfaction consistently leads to low dishonesty, demonstrating risk aversion—achieving ultimate serenity. We expand prospect theory from a micro and individual-level theory to a cross-level theory of monetary wisdom across 32 nations. We enhance the S-shaped Curve to three 3-D corruption surfaces across three levels of the global economic pyramid, providing novel insights into behavioral economics, business ethics, the environment, and responsibility. (shrink)

La interpretación estándar de la teoría humeana sobre la identidad personal suele aceptar dos tesis importantes: (T1) no existe un yo o mente dotada de simplicidad e identidad perfecta; (T2) Hume defiende una teoría metafísica específica acerca de la naturaleza del yo o de la mente, según la cual esta es solo un haz de percepciones. Se argumenta que ambas afirmaciones, son falsas. Su aceptación comprometería a Hume con una forma de dogmatismo epistémico y metafísico incompatible con su filosofía experimental.

McDowell (1994) proposed a philosophical theory about perceptual content -call it "conceptualism"- that states that in every case the content of a visual experience necessarily involves concepts that fully specify every single feature consciously and simultaneously available during the experience. I..

The estimation of causal effects is fundamental in situations where the underlying system will be subject to active interventions. Part of building a causal inference engine is defining how variables relate to each other, that is, defining the functional relationship between variables entailed by the graph conditional dependencies. In this article, we deviate from the common assumption of linear relationships in causal models by making use of neural autoregressive density estimators and use them to estimate causal effects within Pearl’s do-calculus (...) framework. Using synthetic data, we show that the approach can retrieve causal effects from non-linear systems without explicitly modeling the interactions between the variables and include confidence bands using the non-parametric bootstrap. We also explore scenarios that deviate from the ideal causal effect estimation setting such as poor data support or unobserved confounders. (shrink)

Algunos filósofos aseguran que las experiencias visuales que tenemoscuando percibimos son del mismo tipo ontológico que aquellasexperiencias que tendríamos si alucináramos de manera perfecta.Si en ambos casos hay un máximo común denominadorontológico —una experiencia del mismo tipo— es claro que losobjetos distales no constituyen de manera fundamental las experienciasque tenemos. Una de las razones utilizadas para adoptaresta interpretación es la posibilidad de producir una alucinaciónperfecta, es decir, una alucinación introspectivamente indiscriminablede una percepción, mediante la activación de las mismascausas neurofisiológicas cercanas (...) en el cerebro. En este artículoargumentaré que esta razón no es suficiente para aceptar las consideracionesanteriores. De hecho, sugeriré que existe una maneraalternativa de comprender la percepción como un fenómenonatural que sí otorga un rol constitutivo causal y no-causal a losobjetos distales. Si esto es así, las experiencias perceptuales sonfundamentalmente diferentes a las alucinaciones, a pesar de queno podemos discriminar introspectivamente entre ellas. (shrink)

La concepción fenomenológica del sentido común inspirada por James sostiene que atender es esencialmente un fenómeno mental consciente. Las implicancias filosóficas modales de esta tesis sobre la naturaleza de la atención son claras. No es posible atender una cosa, sin ser consciente de ella. Sobre la base de estudios clásicos en torno a patologías visuales como la vista ciega y a experimentos recientes con sujetos no patológicos, este artículo argumenta que la conclusión filosófica jamesiana acerca de la metafísica de la (...) atención es falsa. La evidencia sugiere que de hecho es posible atender objetos sin experimentarlos conscientemente. (shrink)

Muchos filósofos piensan que los contenidos perceptuales son siempre generales y que no deben especificarse utilizando términos singulares. Ellos creen que los objetos /propiedades distales no constituyen esencialmente los contenidos perceptuales. Argumentaré que esta estrategia es insatisfactoria al especificar contenidos e incapaz de dar cuenta de una intuición común, según la cual la veracidad de nuestras experiencias perceptuales no es algo evaluable con independencia de si percibimos o no. Finalmente, sugeriré una alternativa "singularista" en la que los objetos distales sí (...) entran en los contenidos, haciendo de las percepciones y las alucinaciones dos tipos de experiencia fundamentalmente diferentes. Many philosophers think that perceptual contents are always general and shouldn´t be specified using singular terms. They believe that distal objects and properties don't essentially constitute perceptual contents. I will argue that this strategy doesn't provide a satisfactory account of content specification and fails to make sense of the common-sense intuition that the veridicality of our perceptual experiences isn't something fully independent of whether we perceive or not. Finally, I will suggest an alternative "singularist" standpoint in which distal objects do enter into visual contents, making perceptions and hallucinations fundamentally different types of experiences. (shrink)

Muchos filósofos piensan que los contenidos perceptuales son siempre generales y que no deben especificarse utilizando términos singulares. Ellos creen que los objetos /propiedades distales no constituyen esencialmente los contenidos perceptuales. Argumentaré que esta estrategia es insatisfactoria al especificar contenidos e incapaz de dar cuenta de una intuición común, según la cual la veracidad de nuestras experiencias perceptuales no es algo evaluable con independencia de si percibimos o no. Finalmente, sugeriré una alternativa "singularista" en la que los objetos distales sí (...) entran en los contenidos, haciendo de las percepciones y las alucinaciones dos tipos de experiencia fundamentalmente diferentes. Many philosophers think that perceptual contents are always general and shouldn´t be specified using singular terms. They believe that distal objects and properties don't essentially constitute perceptual contents. I will argue that this strategy doesn't provide a satisfactory account of content specification and fails to make sense of the common-sense intuition that the veridicality of our perceptual experiences isn't something fully independent of whether we perceive or not. Finally, I will suggest an alternative "singularist" standpoint in which distal objects do enter into visual contents, making perceptions and hallucinations fundamentally different types of experiences. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta poner de relieve algunos de los principales desafíos que trae consigo la tarea de situar a Husserl en el debate entre conjuntivistas y disyuntivistas. Para ello, realizaremos un análisis crítico de la discusión desarrollada por Overgaard. Sobre la base de dicho análisis, expondremos tres desafíos: en primer lugar, el desafío de sistematizar apropiadamente las discrepancias fundamentales y los elementos en común entre las posiciones conjuntivista y disyuntivista; en segundo lugar, el desafío de utilizar con claridad y (...) precisión las nociones básicas en las que tradicionalmente se ha articulado el debate. Por último, abordaremos desafíos específicos relativos a la interpretación de la fenomenología de Husserl. (shrink)