The 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' is an encyclopaedia of philosophical topics promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate and published, in its third and last edition in 2006, by the Bompiani publishing house in Milan. The first edition of the 'Enciclopedia Filosofica' was promoted by the Centre for Philosophical Studies of Gallarate in the 1950s, seeing the light in 1957-58. A second edition, published by the Sansoni publishing house in Florence, was published in 1968-69 and reprinted in 1979. The third (...) and last edition, published by Bompiani in 2006, is intended to cover the whole of philosophical knowledge and related disciplines with over ten thousand entries edited by about a thousand academics, both Italian and non-Italian, and distributed in twelve volumes for a total of 12,496 pages. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to show that philosophical hermeneutics is particularly suited for facing problems of understanding among different cultural worlds. These issues are relevant even for legal interpretation that, now more than ever, is not up against culturally homogeneous societies and against legal systems shaped by a single source or by a steady hierarchy of sources. Therefore, philosophical hermeneutics’ approaches to intercultural dialogue can be useful to the present practice of legal interpretation, not by building new interpretative (...) methods, but by clarifying contexts which give significance to legal practice. The paths trodden by legal philosophical hermeneutics are devoted to the understanding of texts which have a paradigmatic feature for jurists’ work and to the identification of legal practice’s ends and values. These paths are complementary, not alternative. The historic consciousness and the practice reason are both essential for the discovery of legal meaning, within which legal interpretation articulates. (shrink)

L'auteur propose une doctrine de la méthode interprétative qui entend se démarquer tant de l'herméneutique de Gadamer que de celle de Betti.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate: 1) that the notions of positive and natural law are not incompatible; 2) that positive and natural law are two species of the same genus "law," conceived as an obligatory prescription; 3) that the obligatory force of both laws depends on a rational justification, discriminating juridical norms from mere impositions; 4) that the difference between those laws depends on the universality or the particularity of their justification.