En este trabajo nos proponemos analizar y relacionar la temática del cuerpo en parte de la filmografía del director francés François Truffaut. Para esto, nos serviremos de dos obras cinematográficas: Los 400 Golpes y Jules et Jim, y repasaremos en ellas conceptos como el amor y la violencia vistos desde la perspectiva y dirección de este aclamado director, gran representante de la nueva ola francesa. Sin embargo, antes de comenzar con nuestra revisión, repasaremos la posibilidad de analizar filosóficamente (...) el cine para así, una vez defendida dicha posibilidad, hacer un recorrido a los films rastreando en ellos la utilización y presencia del concepto de cuerpo, siendo examinado desde la filosofía. Finalmente, este director nos parece adecuado traer a colación debido a su nivel artístico y filosófico según los temas tratados en sus trabajos, por lo que con este análisis realizaremos una discusión renovada y actual contribuyendo al debate filosófico y al estudio fílmico con sus conceptos utilizados. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is the intertextual relationship between the work of François Truffaut and that of Honoré de Balzac. It explores Balzac's influence on the shaping of Truffaut's voice and argues that Balzac's Human Comedy served Truffaut as a model for some of his cinematic innovations. This applies to Truffaut's total oeuvre, but particularly to his series of autobiographical films, “The Adventures of Antoine Doinel”: The 400 Blows (Les Quatre Cents Coups, 1959), Antoine (...) and Colette, Love at Twenty (Antoine et Colette, L'Amour à Vingt Ans, 1962), Stolen Kisses (Baisers Volés, 1968), Bed and Board (Domicile Conjugal, 1970), Love on the Run (L'Amour en Fuite, 1979). In examining Truffaut's “rewriting” of Balzac, I adopt—and adapt—the intertextual approach of Harold Bloom's theory of the “anxiety of influence.” My paper applies Bloom's concept of misreading to an examination of the relationship between Truffaut's autobiographical films, and Balzac's Human Comedy, both thematically and structurally. (shrink)

Diana Holmes and Robert Ingram _Francois Truffaut_ Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998 ISBN 0-7190-4553-3 hbk; 0-7190-4554-1 pbk 225 pp.

«Neither with you nor without you»Francois Truffaut, La femme d’à coté No one can deny that there is a problem between Wittgenstein and analytic philosophers. To put it mildly, there are tensions between Wittgenstein’s and Wittgensteinian styled reflections and the views and practice of a lot of contemporary analytic philosophers, such that they often seem to be strange bedfellows, when they are bedfellows at all. Of course we know that Wittgenstein did not get along very well with Russell, t...

The aim of this paper is to analyze the hermeneutical nature of the concept of the understanding-of-being that grounds Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. I first consider the merging between ontology and hermeneutics that takes place in Being and Time and then interpret the hermeneutical sections of Being and Time (§§ 31–32) in order to clarify the ontological scope of under­standing, interpretation, and meaning. This allows me to examine the three dimensions of the “understanding-of-being principle” (according to which our encounter with entities (...) is made possible by an understanding-of-being): the semantic, the ontological, and the transcendental. Finally, I try to make sense of the problematic use Heidegger makes of the concept of understanding for both the ontic encounter with entities and the ontological access to being. (shrink)

The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to (...) replace them with attitudes that resemble to some extent the attitudes we have towards pieces of fiction. But there is now a third theory on the market: conservationism, the view that we should keep holding moral beliefs, even though we know them to be false. (According to a fourth theory, ‘substitutionism’, we should modify the content of our moral claims in such a way that they become true.) Putting abolitionism (and substitutionism) aside, our aim is to assess the plausibility of conservationism as an alternative to the – relatively dominant – fictionalism that we find in the literature. Given the difficulty of finding a conservationist view that is both (i) plausible and (ii) not merely a terminological variant of fictionalism, we will argue that conservationism fails to constitute a plausible alternative to fictionalism, at least insofar as it purports to be an alternative view as to what we should do with our moral thoughts. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, the study of moral reasoning has been heavily influenced by Joshua Greene’s dual-process model of moral judgment, according to which deontological judgments are typically supported by intuitive, automatic processes while utilitarian judgments are typically supported by reflective, conscious processes. However, most of the evidence gathered in support of this model comes from the study of people’s judgments about sacrificial dilemmas, such as Trolley Problems. To which extent does this model generalize to other debates in which (...) deontological and utilitarian judgments conflict, such as the existence of harmless moral violations, the difference between actions and omissions, the extent of our duties of assistance, and the appropriate justification for punishment? To find out, we conducted a series of five studies on the role of reflection in these kinds of moral conundrums. In Study 1, participants were asked to answer under cognitive load. In Study 2, participants had to answer under a strict time constraint. In Studies 3 to 5, we sought to promote reflection through exposure to counter-intuitive reasoning problems or direct instruction. Overall, our results offer strong support to the extension of Greene’s dual-process model to moral debates on the existence of harmless violations and partial support to its extension to moral debates on the extent of our duties of assistance. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if materialism about consciousness is true, then the United States is likely to have its own stream of phenomenal consciousness, distinct from the streams of conscious experience of the people who compose it. Indeed, most plausible forms of materialism have to grant that a certain degree of functional and behavioral complexity constitutes a sufficient condition for the ascription of phenomenal consciousness – and Schwitzgebel makes a case to show that the United States (...) as a whole fulfills this condition. One way to avoid this counter-intuitive consequence of materialism about consciousness is to adopt what Schwitzgebel calls an “anti-nesting principle”: a principle that states that there can be no nested forms of phenomenal consciousness and that therefore a conscious whole cannot have parts that are themselves conscious. However, Schwitzgebel then proceeds in his paper to draw up various objections, notably based on thought experiments, in order to dismiss these kinds of “anti-nesting” principles. My aim in this paper is to present a version of a sophisticated anti-nesting principle that avoids Schwitzgebel’s objections. This principle is reasonable, intuitive, and as non-arbitrary as possible. Moreover, it can resist the objections mounted by Schwitzgebel against simple anti-nesting principles. This principle helps materialists avoid the implication that the United States has its own stream of consciousness, while granting consciousness to some entities which, in many cases, are intuitive instantiators of phenomenal consciousness. This principle therefore constitutes a way out for a materialist who wants to deny that the United States is conscious. (shrink)

Le but de cet essai est d'explorer une voie nouvelle par-delà les oppositions qui caractérisent l'athéisme et les philosophies de la transcendance. Est-il possible de dépasser ces oppositions apparemment inconciliables? Comment, à quelles conditions et dans quelles perspectives?

Resumen Es bien conocida esa extrañeza que desde la Antigüedad provocan, en relación con el quehacer filosófico, el gesto y el verbo cínicos; además de convocar intelectualmente en un modo moderno a esa escuela o esa manera de vivir filosóficamente, se cuestionará la noción de cultura y la de lo bello, para así provocar un ejercicio crítico del pensamiento y revelar la figuración viva y actual de un modo de filosofar artísticamente, por lo menos desde el verbo escrito en su (...) modalidad literaria y filosófica. Esa provocación se entenderá irónicamente en una doble figuración: la que opera, ciertamente, el cinismo al valorar una ascesis del cuerpo en su ponos frente a la institucionalización escolar de la filosofía, y la que operamos en tanto que el cinismo se vuelve un sujeto de la prueba crítica de nuestro pensamiento.The strangeness caused by the cynic gesture and verb is well known since ancient times regarding philosophical praxis. This paper will challenge, in cynical terms and according to his way ofliving and thinking, the notions of culture and beauty, but from a modern reading of such school, producing a critical thinking exercise. As a result, a current and lively mode of artistic philosophizing will be revealed, at least as written verb in a literary and philosophical way. This challenge can be ironically understood in two ways: the one that the cynics apply when valuing corporal ascesis in its ponos in contrast to institutionalized philosophy schooling; and the one that we apply when the cynicism becomes a subject of the critical proof of our thinking. (shrink)

This edited collection of essays brings together the leading experts in the field of cultural and philosophical studies to tackle many of the questions still being asked about Jean Francois Lyotard. Contributors include Barry Smart, John O'Neill and Victor J. Seidler with subjects ranging from Lyotard's writings on justice and politics of difference, on feminism, youth, judaism as well as a chapter devoted to his early writings.

Very few thinkers have traveled the heretical path that François Laruelle walks between philosophy and non-philosophy. For Laruelle, the future of philosophy is problematic, but a mutation of its functions is possible. Up until now, philosophy has merely been a utopia concerned with the past and only provided the services of its conservation. We must introduce a rigorous and nonimaginary practice of a utopia in action, a philo-fiction--a close relative to science fiction. From here we can see the double (...) meaning of the watchword, a tabula rasa of the future. This new destination is imposed by a specifically human messianism, an eschatology within the limits of the Man-in-person as antihumanist ultimatum addressed to the History of Philosophy. This book elucidates some of the fundamental problems of non-philosophy and takes on its detractors. (shrink)

The relationship between present-day philosophy and philosophy of the past is a fundamental issue for understanding today’s philosophical division between “analytical” and “continental” philosophy. However, the opposition doesn’t lie in the mere rejection or acceptation of philosophy’s history. In fact, both philosophical traditions conceive the possibility of a dialog with the great philosophers of the past. This paper first characterizes the relationships with past philosophy in both traditions and arguments in favor of the relevancy of philosophy’s history for philosophy.

The Postmodern explained to children : Correspondence 1982- 1985.

Heidegger’s critique addressed to philosophical anthropology often leads readers to forget the importance of the question of human beings in his writings. The recent publication of the Black Notebooks and some unpublished lectures shed new light on these philosophical problems and help us define more clearly what it would mean to develop the foundation of anthropological knowledge ontologically. This paper argues that while dealing with mythical existence and with the difference between animals and human beings, Heidegger seized the opportunity to (...) speculate on the ontological origins of ethical life. The paper concludes by showing how Sloterdijk’s attempt to “anthropologize” Heidegger fails to follow the demands of fundamental ontology. (shrink)

Trois rapports de la déontologie et du droit sont proposés pour saisir les relations, toujours ambiguës, entre ces deux champs normatifs. Ces rapports sont ici baptisés déontologies personnelle, professionnelle et publique. La première correspond à une morale privée, dont l’objectif est de garantir le bien commun, tandis que la deuxième renvoie à un corpus normatif spontané produit par une profession pour ses propres besoins, et la troisième consiste en une appropriation des deux autres par la puissance publique. La déontologie se (...) trouve donc désormais confondue avec le droit qui en déforme la vision originelle indifférente à la question disciplinaire, révélant ainsi l’actuelle moralisation du corpus juridique, lequel incarne un repère moral pour les individus. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to develop the notion of partial probability distributions as being more realistic models of belief systems than the standard accounts. We formulate the theory of partial probability functions independently of any classical semantic notions. We use the partial probability distributions to develop a formal semantics for partial propositional calculi, with extensions to predicate logic and higher order languages. We give a proof theory for the partial logics and obtain soundness and completeness results.

The aim of this article is to break down to its principal arguments the abundant material recently published in Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe related to a conference given in December 1932 on the principle of noncontradiction (PNC). I will first highlight the importance in phenomenology of a correct interpretation of the PNC and then explain Heidegger's general strategy toward logical principles during the 1920s. After showing that Heidegger's 1932 interpretation of the PNC still pertains to Being and Time's fundamental ontology, I will (...) present Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's Metaphysics Γ 3 and 4 that is the center of the conference. I will conclude by showing how the ontological significance of the PNC makes sense in the fundamental‐ontological context in which the understanding‐of‐being serves as the condition of possibility of our encounter with entities. (shrink)

When Heidegger takes the decision at the end of the 1920’s to « risk again the step into an authentic metaphysics », a very strong solidarity is already established between his philosophical project and that of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. This solidarity is testified in the recuperation Heidegger does of the idea – proper to Kant and Baumgarten – of a metaphysica naturalis. The « Metaphysics of Dasein » constitutes the last attempt – after the hermeneutics of facticity and (...) the fundamental ontology – to define philosophy starting from « human nature ». After this « step into metaphysics », Heidegger’s thought will dedicate its efforts to the well-known « Overtaking of metaphysics ». (shrink)

This text relates the evolution of the author’s posture as a researcher during the realization of his doctoral thesis and its link with the choice of an analytical approach. Incidentally, this narrative has the dimensions of an autobiographical research. This text illustrates how, within the framework of a thesis, the author implemented a slow evolutionary process of his researcher posture thanks to an analytical approach in writing mode. A return to handwritten writing, considered here as an analyst’s “trick of the (...) trade”, allowed the deployment of the thinking necessary for the conceptualization and transformation of his professional and personal « self » through a method of analysis taking place in five steps, from the transcription to the final writing of the report. (shrink)

Is that where western philosophy -- What is it to enter (a way of thought)? -- The elsewhere of China -- Thinking before or beside? -- The first sentence -- A first Chinese sentence -- Commentary -- Hebraic entry -- Hellenic entry -- Undoing our alternatives -- Where would the beginning begin? -- Neither God nor myth: what other possibility? -- When myth holds no interest, when God holds no monopoly -- Greek tool/Chinese formulation -- Translation -- Is there still (...) tradition? -- A shift of the truth. (shrink)

The author argues that being-thought, in keeping with the ‘intellectualist choice’ of the Greeks, has narrowed the thinkable to the question of whether something is or is not. The discourse-reason (logos) of the Greeks necessarily lends itself to construction and to its result, which is knowledge. Knowledge in turn trades the singular for generality, e.g. beautiful things for beauty. Because what it seeks is nowhere to be found in the world, such philosophy has located pure in-itself-ness in the beyond of (...) metaphysics, reducing life to metabolism, a shuttling between the extrema of lack and satiety. The Chinese language, because it lacks morphological markers, an imperative mood, and a verb ‘to be’, sidesteps ontology (being-thought) and thus hints at a more fruitful perspective on living, elucidating the notion of ex-istence as a way to provide an exteriority from which to examine living, in all its immediacy, without recourse to any metaphysical beyond. (shrink)

L’histoire et l’historicité constituent deux éléments d’une importance inestimable dans la construction de la phénoménologie heideggérienne. Le caractère historique de l’existence humaine, d’une part, représente incontestablement le point d’achoppement central de sa reprise de la méthode husserlienne et définit la teneur de cette phénoménologie aux accents herméneutiques. D’un autre côté, l’histoire pensée comme région ontologique et comme thème d’une science possible – cette question si se...

La lección de metafísica que imparte Heidegger durante el invierno de 1929/30 caracteriza el pensamiento metafísico como un pensamiento comprensivo, es decir, un pensamiento que “entiende” y que “incluye”. En este contexto, Heidegger busca definir con mayor precisión el vínculo que une su propia metafísica con la tradición moderna criticada unos años antes por “incluir”, precisamente, al sujeto humano en su propia elaboración. Es la ocasión para Heidegger de presentar un retrato mucho más matizado de su vinculación con la filosofía (...) moderna, retrato que pone de manifiesto lo que el Dasein ha heredado del sujeto moderno. (shrink)

Este texto consiste en un primer momento en una presentación general de la obra del Profesor Ramón Rodríguez García. Se presenta después el concepto de “interpretación fenomenológica” como problema central de la “hermenéutica fenomenológica” tal y como la entiende el Profesor Ramón Rodríguez García. Para terminar, se comenta una intervención del Profesor en el Congreso de los Diputados y los vínculos de los temas abordados con la hermenéutica fenomenológica.

Résumé L’imaginaire est une catégorie plastique qui renvoie à des conceptions préscientifiques, aux fictions politiques et juridiques, aux croyances religieuses, aux stéréotypes ou préjugés, sans se confondre avec tous ces objets. Notion imprécise et fourre-tout, l’imaginaire serait inutile pour saisir avec rigueur les objets du monde : il relèverait du subjectif et de l’insaisissable. Pourtant, l’imaginaire a bien un contenu, des structures et dévoile une visée de la conscience. En se fondant sur les écrits de Castoriadis, et notamment la distinction (...) imaginaire instituant et imaginaire institué, on propose d’utiliser cette notion comme un outil méthodologique d’analyse du droit. L’imaginaire n’est d’ailleurs pas étranger à la théorie du droit, principalement américaine, et notamment au sein de l’Université de Yale. Elle recoupe les préoccupations du courant des Cultural Legal studies, où l’on retrouve des auteurs tels que Paul Kahn, David Nelken, Austin Sarat et Jonathan Simon, etc. Le droit constituant une représentation du réel, l’usage de l’imaginaire doit chercher à saisir les significations profondes des normes juridiques, leur de manière de structurer notre pensée et les luttes qu’elles engendrent pour imposer des vérités toujours renégociables. (shrink)

This essay argues that the West could glimpse its own unthought-of by ‘de-ontologicalizing’ its thought, and that a fruitful way to do this is to draw on Chinese thought. In particular, the author develops herein the notion of between ( l’entre), which is less a locus than a dynamic passage between states or extrema. This contrasts with the (static) Western notion of Being, where a thing either is or is not. Unlike a thing, between has no being, no nature, no (...) properties. For the Greeks life was, similarly, an alternation of emptiness (desire or want) and fullness (satiety). Instead, life is in flux between those extrema. Accordingly, between is not an (ontological) intermediary but processual, like the through of the Tao. The author explores between in the Chinese conception of landscape as mountain(s)-water(s) and applies between to urban renewal, underscoring its value as a tool for the de-ontologizing of Western thought. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone evaluar la pertinencia de la lectura de la “relación ética” levinasiana propuesta por Jean-Luc Marion. El gesto levinasiano, que permite su despliegue en diversos sentidos, se sitúa en el corazón mismo del “momento francés de la fenomenología”.

What are emergencies and why do they matter? In this chapter (in its penultimate version), I seek to outline the morally significant features of the concept of emergency, and demonstrate how these features generate corresponding first- and second-order challenges and responsibilities for those in a position to do something about them. In section A, I contend that emergencies are situations in which there is a risk of serious harm and a need to react urgently if that harm is to be (...) averted or minimized. These conceptual features matter morally, since it is precisely to them that those who invoke emergencies to justify otherwise impermissible actions tend to appeal. The basic first-order challenge facing emergency responders is two-fold. It is, first, to identify how these features shape circumstances of action in ways that affect (or do not affect) which reasons for action and which corresponding courses of conduct are justifiably available to them. In situations when emergency responders are compelled to make authoritative determinations due to significant contestability and indeterminacies in the contours or materialization of the said features, their challenge is then also to make these determinations legitimately. In section B, I argue that second-order challenges having to do with the foreseeability of emergencies, the value(s) of exposure to them, and their preventability further compound the predicament of emergency responders. I conclude, in section C, by saying a few words about one last morally salient feature shared by many, though not all, emergencies considered in the chapter — namely, their public dimension. (shrink)