Agrarianism, according to Paul B. Thompson, is an environmental philosophy focused on agriculture and the nurturing of food, fuel, and fiber. Agrarianism hopes to re-establish our fundamental connection to the land, helping us approach a tenable understanding of sustainability. Thompson enlists Albert Borgmann’s notion of “focal practices” to discuss farming and the culture of the table. With this comes a critique of “the device paradigm,” the modern technological way of life that alienates us from quotidian beauty, lifecycles and seasonality, (...) and vital place-based insights embedded in focal practices and obscures how techno-industrial capitalism limits our opportunities for rich, intimate experiences with our biotic communities. In this paper, the author will outline the contours of Thompson’s agrarian philosophy in light of Borgmann’s focal practices, noting the enduring wisdom in this position. But the author will evoke Sylvia Wynter’s critique of the hegemonic techno-industrial order of things to conjure alternative conceptions of decolonial agrarian futures (that will not foreground bucolic settler-colonial farms). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narcissism A Focal Point for Examining the Interrelatedness of Psychology and PhilosophyLydia Amir, PhD (bio)In a groundbreaking article, Aleksandar Fatic challenges the view that mental health is to be dissociated from morality or ethics. His argument targets cluster B personality disorders, such as Borderline and Narcissistic Personality Disorders, but focuses mainly on narcissistic disorders, whether diagnosed or not. Although these persons are not exempt of moral and legal (...) responsibility, they are diagnosed by and relegated to the mental health system, which is often ineffective in treating them. Fatic suggests that addressing their faulty morality is the best policy. In my commentary of his article, I further probe the viability and desirability of doing so. I point to narcissism as a focal point for examining the necessary impact of psychology and philosophy insofar as psychologists may be considered experts in emotions and philosophers in normative ethics. I question the interest in any ethics that does not also supply the means of its implementation and suggest that narcissists may have a morality of their own, ethical egoism.As psychiatrist Bennett Simon notes, Socrates did not inquire into the mental health field; his presence is missed as the questions, “what is mental illness?” and “what are psychiatry and psychiatrists?” are not addressed. It follows that it is up to us, as Simon attempts to do in the first chapter of Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece: The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry (1978), to define the psychiatrist’s proper area of professional competence (p. 28). That which makes matters even more confusing, he notes, is that psychiatrists are only one group of professionals who deal with the “mentally ill” and that they are “far from unanimous” about which problems “pertain to their particular sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). He thus lists a variety of problems which “a glance at both popular and professional literature…reveals that at one time or another, psychiatrists have claimed [End Page 169] (sometimes by public demand) for their proper sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). Among them is the issue that Fatic’s break grounding article tackles: “Psychiatrists at times consider it their proper task to deal with people who are excessively selfish and self-centered (narcissistic personality disorder)” (Simon, 1978, p. 29).Thus, Simon sees as a matter of controversy whether narcissism is a psychiatric issue, and defines the disorder in moral terms (“selfish,” “self-centered”). Fatic broadens the argument: he questions the validity of the psychological approach not only to narcissism as a personality disorder, but also to narcissistic traits, and the effectivity of this approach given that this is an area in which therapists usually do not have much success even if the patients look for help, which is rare. Fatic suggests that these personalities, either those with narcissistic traits or those with full-fledged narcissistic personality disorder, should be better understood (and maybe also addressed, although this point is not explicitly made) when viewed through moral lenses. In doing so, Fatic not only questions the validity of one form of personality disorder––still a controversial category––but re-kindles the view that correlates aspects of mental health with virtue, a view that was valid up until the nineteenth century and that made of philosophers (and priests) doctors of the soul.1That which made of philosophers’ teachings an important part of one’s life before the advent of scientific psychology has been often associated with this view, that the virtuous are also the healthy. Without going as far as to suggest that philosophers should teach virtue to narcissists, which could be a further argument in favor of the new field of philosophical practice and a broadening of its legitimate concerns, Fatic notes that moral categories are better suited to approach those who are plagued by narcissism.One way to explain the historical role that psychology played in relation to the traditional one upheld by morality is that psychology stepped in to explain the origins of failures in morality. If the narcissist is to be judged according to moral categories (a judgment that he necessarily fails in so far as right emotions as relevant to morality), what might be the consequences?Ascribing... (shrink)

This book focuses on yoga’s transcultural dissemination in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In the course of this process, the term “yoga” has been associated with various distinctive blends of mental and physical exercises performed in order to achieve some sort of improvement, whether understood in terms of esotericism, fitness, self-actualization, body aesthetics, or health care. The essays in this volume explore some of the turning points in yoga’s historico-spatial evolution and their relevance to its current appeal. The authors focus (...) on central motivations, sites, and agents in the spread of posture-based yoga as well as on its successive (re-)interpretation and diversification, addressing questions such as: Why has yoga taken its various forms? How do time and place influence its meanings, social roles, and associated experiences? How does the transfer into new settings affect the ways in which yogic practice has been conceptualized as a system, and on what basis is it still identified as (Indian) yoga? The initial section of the volume concentrates on the re-evaluation of yoga in Indian and Western settings in the first half of the twentieth century. The following chapters link global discourses to particular local settings and explore meaning production at the micro-social level, taking Germany as the focal site. The final part of the book focuses on yoga advertising and consumption across national, social, and discursive boundaries, taking a closer look at transnational and deterritorialized yoga markets, as well as at various classes of mobile yoga practitioners. (shrink)

A range of emergent studies have explored the idea of a renewed human-centered society, termed “Society 5.0,” and the role therein, of servant leadership. In this regard, in East Asian cultural contexts, existing scholarship does not yet provide sufficient theoretical and practical guidance for intercultural contexts, such as when a predominantly individualistic UK business culture interacts with generally collectivist Japanese culture. This is an important gap because if Society 5.0 is to be realized then a more in-depth intercultural contextual appreciation (...) and understanding are required. The study examines the UK/Japan setting and adopts a social constructivist epistemology and case study approach to illustrate dimensions of servant leadership (DSLs) manifesting in the lived experience of a UK business leader in Japan. Connections to business leader training are drawn and the importance of intercultural dyad specificity is highlighted. The study is also important because recent widespread exposure of various global corporate scandals creates a view that many business leaders care only for themselves or organizational profits, especially in individualistic-orientated societies. This original case study research herein commences the process of developing detailed and focal studies on underpinning drivers and raises hope that ethical behavior, as comprised in the DSLs, can potentially manifest in an individualistic UK/collectivist Japan intercultural dyad context. (shrink)

When the language-dominant hemisphere is damaged by a focal lesion, the brain may reorganize the language network through functional and structural changes known as adaptive plasticity. Adaptive plasticity is documented for triggers including ischemic, tumoral, and epileptic focal lesions, with effects in clinical practice. Many questions remain regarding language plasticity. Different lesions may induce different patterns of reorganization depending on pathologic features, location in the brain, and timing of onset. Neuroimaging provides insights into language plasticity due to (...) its non-invasiveness, ability to image the whole brain, and large-scale implementation. This review provides an overview of language plasticity on MRI with insights for patient care. First, we describe the structural and functional language network as depicted by neuroimaging. Second, we explore language reorganization triggered by stroke, brain tumors, and epileptic lesions and analyze applications in clinical diagnosis and treatment planning. By comparing different focal lesions, we investigate determinants of language plasticity including lesion location and timing of onset, longitudinal evolution of reorganization, and the relationship between structural and functional changes. (shrink)

Background The twenty first- century marked the exponential growth in the use of intelligent robots and artificial intelligent in nursing compared to the previous decades. To the best of our knowledge, this article is first in responding to question, “Can nurses in clinical practice ascribe responsibility to intelligent robots and artificial intelligence when they commit errors?”. Purpose The objective of this article is to present two worldviews (anthropocentrism and biocentrism) in responding to the question at hand chosen based on (...) the roles of the entities involved in the use of intelligent robots and artificial intelligence in nursing. Methods The development of this article was motivated by the immense discoveries, the current landscape, and nurses’ role in relation to advanced technologies in healthcare. The paper begins the discussion by situating the use of intelligent robots and artificial intelligence in nursing and healthcare and presenting its ethical and moral implications. Then, we presented the two worldviews: anthropocentrism and biocentrism which are used to respond to the task at hand. Results Anthropocentrism puts humans in the center in terms of moral standing and thus responsibility rests on them alone. Biocentrism declares that all creations deserve moral consideration and thus responsibility is equally allocated to all entities. Within these two worldviews, consensus development was offered to resolve these issues. Consensus provides clarity and democracy between and among the societies. Conclusions The findings of this article can be basis in (1) instituting mechanisms of robust peer review and a rigorous series of simulation before adopting or implementing intelligent robots and artificial intelligence in clinical practice; (2) education and training of highly specialized nurse practitioners who can be focal persons in responding to ethical and moral issues with regard to these advanced technologies; and (3) harmonization of robotics research, manufacturing, and clinical practice. (shrink)

Thick concepts provide a focal point for several important issues in ethical theory. Separatists argue that the descriptive and evaluative elements of a thick concept can be separated out. Non-separatists deny this and claim that there are no descriptive boundaries delimiting a thick concept. A common strategy for both camps in the debate has been an appeal to armchair intuitions of various everyday thick concepts. My alternative strategy consists in a closer study of the professional practice of risk (...) analysis. As a well-developed practice, it provides substantial material for analysis. Moreover, its central concepts of risk and safety are typically seen as scientific concepts fitting the separatist analysis. Still, I argue that there are several evaluative aspects in risk and safety ascription that are hard to account for on a separatist analysis. I consider three separatist strategies, and conclude that they all fail. The result is a corroboration of the general non-separatist thesis put forward by theorists such as John McDowell and Bernard Williams. (shrink)

Say that a ‘practical decision’ is a momentary intentional mental action of intention formation. According to what I’ll call the ‘Decisional Prior Intention Thesis’ (‘DPIT’), each practical decision is intentional at least partly in virtue of the representational content of some previously acquired intention. DPIT is entailed by the following widely endorsed thesis that I’ll call the ‘General Prior Intention Thesis’ (‘GPIT’): each intentional action is intentional at least partly in virtue of the representational content of some previously acquired intention. (...) Alfred Mele argues that a certain kind of case impugns DPIT. I defend DPIT from Mele’s argument by showing that his focal case is impossible. I then develop a new argument for an important portion of DPIT – viz., the thesis that, necessarily, if at t you decide to A, then just before t you have an intention whose representational content enables it to play an intentionality-grounding role relative to an act of deciding to A. The defense of DPIT and argument for the indicated portion of it jointly foreground and shed new light on the phenomenon of practical unsettledness – i.e. the felt unsettledness about what to do that precedes a practical decision. (shrink)

The disorientation experienced by those new to philosophy attests to the fact that philosophy is, essentially, a self-transformative focal practice requiring long training and renewed commitment, and this has implications for how we think about the use of technology in teaching philosophy. By examing Plato's famous critique of writing in his Phaedrus, Statesman, and Seventh Letter, we find that his account of philosophy as an epitēdeuma, or "focal practice," demonstrates why teaching philosophy is not a matter (...) of "content-delivery," but rather a process of reorienting the student toward the subject matter of philosophy. The implications of this for the debate over online instructional formats in higher education are then explored in some detail. (shrink)

What kinds of things can we be morally responsible for? Andrew Khoury offers an answer that includes (i) an argument for the impossibility of blameworthiness for overt action, and (ii) the assertion that “willings are the proper object of responsibility in the context of action”. After presenting an argument for the inconsistency of Khoury’s answer to our focal question, I defend the following partial answer that resembles, but differs importantly from, Khoury’s answer: one can be blameworthy for a practical (...) decision—that is, an essentially intentional momentary mental action of forming an intention to do something that resolves prior felt unsettledness about what to do. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo presenta la “inmanencia práctica” como clave de la ética que G. Deleuze elabora a partir de B. Spinoza y F. Nietzsche. La noción involucra tres tesis que manifiestan la reivindicación incondicional de la inmanencia y la crítica a toda trascendencia: valorización del cuerpo en detrimento de la conciencia; apelación a lo bueno y lo malo, en lugar del bien y el mal; y apología de la alegría e inocencia del devenir. Se sostiene que esta ética naturalista y (...) pluralista se apoya en criterios de valoración ligados a la vida como punto fundamental de apreciación, y se propone la creación de nuevas maneras de ser como medio de enfrentar al sistema del juicio moral sobre el que descansa el nihilismo. ABSTRACT The article presents ‘practical immanence’ as the key to the ethics developed by G. Deleuze on the basis of B. Spinoza and F. Nietzsche. This notion involves three theses that show the unconditional vindication of immanence and the critique of all transcendence: affirmation of the body over consciousness; appealing to the good things and the bad things rather than to good and evil; and the defense of the joy and innocence of becoming. The article argues that this naturalistic and pluralistic ethics is grounded in assessment criteria linked to life as the focal point of appreciation, and suggests the creation of new ways of being as a means to tackle the system of moral judgment on which nihilism is based. (shrink)

We expose some representations and practices related to the natural environment among Nahua peasants in a village located at the western boundary of Puebla and Guerrero states, in Mexico. Information was obtained by individual interviews and focal groups' work, following an open guide with ecological items considered as rooted in Mesoamerican cultures. The use of some local, vegetal resources, and the local perception of changes, mainly in the water availability, is documented. Survival strategies involve ancestral representations and material products, (...) and entail a high grade of pragmatism. “Natural environment” is framed in a local culture that involves relational and sacred dimensions, usually omitted in other approaches. Hence, for the Temalac peasants, there is no dissection, at an operative level, between “natural facts” and personal or social ones, being these often considered as determinant for the quality and accessibility of resources and weather conditions. We discuss the challenge for these elements posed by a growing migration rate and an increasing external influence. (shrink)

As we know, the category of practice is a focal point in Marxist philosophy. The revolutionary upheaval in philosophy carried out by Marxism involves the interpretation of the essence of practice and its role in the process of cognition. In the fifty years of the development of Soviet philosophy, much has been done to clarify the nature of this problem, to render it concrete and work it out. The development of Marxist philosophical thought in other countries has (...) also yielded much. (shrink)

The challenge of calling "balls and strikes": the curious case of Gould v. Roberts -- To flatlaw and beyond : appreciating multiple analytic dimensions -- The traditions of legal reasoning : developing analytical legitimacy despite substantive disagreement -- Rethinking the analytic tradition : text, context, hypertext, and subtext -- The challenge of text : the relationship of "is," "ought," and focal meaning -- The challenge of context : what "is" means in both facts and law -- The challenge of (...) hypertext : the struggle within "ought" of multiple perspectives on fundamental values -- The challenge of subtext : considering the judiciary's role in the "game" of legal life -- The right (or rights?) to privacy (or privacies?) -- The never-ending disagreements over statutory interpretation : the primacy of subtext. (shrink)

In 1646, Francesco Fontana (1580–1656) published his Novae Coelestium Terresriumque Rerum Observationes which includes discussions of optical properties of systems of lenses, e.g., telescope and microscope. Our study of the Novae Coelestium shows that the advance Fontana made in optics could not have been accomplished on the basis of the traditional spectacle optics which was the dominant practice at his time. Though spectacle and telescope making share the same optical elements, improving eyesight and constructing telescope are different practices based (...) on different principles. The production of powerful astronomical telescopes demanded objective lenses with much longer focal length and eyepiece lenses with much shorter focal length than the range of focal length of lenses used for spectacles, respectively. Moreover, higher standard of precision and purity of the glass was required. The transition from the practice by which optical components were chosen from ready-made spectacle lenses to lenses which were produced according to predetermined specifications (e.g., calculation of focal length) was anything but straight forward. We argue that Fontana developed the optical knowledge necessary for improving the performance of optical systems. Essentially, he formulated—based on rich practical experience—a set of rules of calculation by which optical properties of a lens system could be determined and adjusted as required. (shrink)

Mathematicians’ use of external representations, such as symbols and diagrams, constitutes an important focal point in current philosophical attempts to understand mathematical practice. In this paper, we add to this understanding by presenting and analyzing how research mathematicians use and interact with external representations. The empirical basis of the article consists of a qualitative interview study we conducted with active research mathematicians. In our analysis of the empirical material, we primarily used the empirically based frameworks provided by distributed (...) cognition and cognitive semantics as well as the broader theory of cognitive integration as an analytical lens. We conclude that research mathematicians engage in generative feedback loops with material representations, that they use representations to facilitate the use of experiences of handling the physical world as a resource in mathematical work, and that their use of representations is socially sanctioned and enabled. These results verify the validity of the cognitive frameworks used as the basis for our analysis, but also show the need for augmentation and revision. Especially, we conclude that the social and cultural context cannot be excluded from cognitive analysis of mathematicians’ use of external representations. Rather, representations are socially sanctioned and enabled in an enculturation process. (shrink)

This study adopts moral reasoning strategies to investigate why consumers support companies involved in ethical transgressions. Drawing on several cases of real multinationals publicly involved in tax avoidance practices, it aims to demonstrate that moral rationalization and moral decoupling depend not only on how consumers perceive the magnitude of the transgression, but also on their individual differences, such as political ideology and brand identification. A quantitative study with a sample of 3989 consumers of five different focal brands was employed (...) to test a set of hypotheses. Findings reveal that moral decoupling directly explains purchase intentions. However, rationalization only explains behavioral intentions if it leads to a reduction in the perceived immorality of the action. Furthermore, the study reveals significant differences across personal values. Left-leaning individuals tend to rationalize less and decouple more when they perceive that the magnitude of the transgression as egregious. Interestingly, consumers who are highly identified with the brand are less affected by the transgression and tend to be more supportive toward the brand by engaging in rationalization mechanisms. (shrink)

Philosophical understanding of experimental scientific practice is impeded by disciplinary differences, notably that between philosophy and sociology of science. Severing the two limits the stock of philosophical case studies to narrowly circumscribed experimental episodes, centered on individual scientists or technologies. The complex relations between scientists and society that permeate experimental research are left unexamined. In consequence, experimental fields rich in social interactions have received only patchy attention from philosophers of science. This paper sketches a remedy for both the symptom (...) and its root cause. An empirical study of social interactions in an established field of biomedicine grounds a robust account of success in experimental practice. The core idea is the concept of collaboration, of participants working together on a common project toward a shared goal. The interactive social integument of experimental research is both examined and enacted in a study integrating socio-historical research and philosophical investigation. The two approaches are used in concert to explicate the concept of scientific objectivity. Their joint explication of this contested epistemic ideal demonstrates that philosophical and sociological approaches can work together toward a social epistemology of scientific practice. The explication is in three stages. First, a minimal framework for investigating collaborative activities is established. Social action is understood and evaluated in terms of the connection between shared goals that participants hope to accomplish together, and the coordinated means by which they try to do so. This connection is explicated as participation, a relation mediating between a group and its members, which includes minimal constraints of instrumental rationality. Second, this framework is fleshed out via empirical study of scientific practices. The focal case examines the intersection of immunology and stem cell research in mid-20th century biomedicine, tracing the key social interactions within and among laboratory groups, as the field of blood stem cell research emerged in the 1960s and advanced throughout the next four decades. The study yields a robust empirical result. Participants consistently recognize two aspects of scientific success: construction of improved models of blood cell development, and formation of new boundaries among scientific groups. In the third and final stage, this result is generalized to other experimental episodes and shown to fit with recent accounts of models in scientific practice. The generalized result approximates a familiar normative view of scientific knowledge. An epistemic ideal of scientific objectivity in practice is then derived from this robust general result, using the minimal constraints on rational participation. The derivation is analogous to specification of ends in moral philosophy; given the means taken and assuming some hope of success, what must the goal of scientific inquiry be like? The aim of science so conceived corresponds to a classic conception of scientific objectivity: knowledge independent of epistemic criteria specific to particular persons or groups. This result weaves together sociological and philosophical accounts of science, explicating the epistemic ideal of objectivity in relation to social aspects of scientific practice. This undercuts the entrenched dualism between normative, vs. descriptive approaches to scientific knowledge. Socio-historical study of science does not deflate, but vindicates, scientific objectivity. Philosophy and sociology are recast as collaborating participants in articulating social epistemology of science. (shrink)

This article presents an interpretive phenomenological study that explores how physicians experience dilemmas of conscience in their day-to-day practice. Eighteen physicians of various ages and professional backgrounds were interviewed and asked to identify and discuss three instances when they experienced a dilemma of conscience. Preliminary findings from narrative analyses of these physician interviews suggest that dilemmas of conscience are ubiquitous, temporal and context-dependent; they cannot be reduced and understood as a focal phenomenon. Moral development appears to parallel acquisition (...) of medical knowledge; participants' specific concerns and their clinical contexts evolved as they gained experience and insight. Participants learned how to negotiate dilemmas of conscience through time, mistakes, examples, actualization, rehearsals and struggles. Remaining engaged in care, developing partnerships and protecting spaces for dialogue can help create practices of accountability when dilemmas of conscience occur. (shrink)

The influx of new groups into society, such as recently established religious groups whose practices differ from societal norms, may disturb relatively stable communities. This instability is exacerbated if these practices contravene long-held fundamental societal tenets, such as the protection of children. This situation now exists in Mexico, where the country's traditional Catholic and secular values clash with those of a religion introduced from the United States, Jehovah's Witnesses. The focal point for these clashes, as it has been elsewhere, (...) is in the bioethics arena. (shrink)

According to the care crisis in modern medicine, the existential needs of patients are not sufficiently satisfied. One idea is that to address the crisis physicians should be educated to be virtuous. This suggestion is helpful but incomplete. It does not take into account the part of (non-)human factors, including (medical) technologies. In particular, the paper focuses on online caring forums and argues that they are technological factors that can play the role of focal things, in which the members (...) gather together to do a care-related focal practice. Furthermore, we empirically study the online forums of Ninisite, a popular Persian website on pregnancy, childbirth, and parenting, and suggest that these forums shape focal practices that are helpful in alleviating the care crisis. (shrink)

It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered (...) odds. And even apart from this consideration, assigning probabilities to the options among which one is choosing is futile since such probabilities could be of no possible use in choice. The paper subjects these arguments to critical examination and suggests that, appearances notwithstanding, practical deliberation need not crowd outself-prediction. (shrink)

This volume presents a collection of refereed papers reflecting the state of the art in the area of over-constrained systems. Besides 11 revised full papers, selected from the 24 submissions to the OCS workshop held in conjunction with the First International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming, CP '95, held in Marseilles in September 1995, the book includes three comprehensive background papers of central importance for the workshop papers and the whole field. Also included is an introduction (...) by one of the volume editors together with a bibliography listing 243 entries. All in all this is a very useful reference book relevant for all researchers and practitioners interested in hierarchical, partial, and over-constrained systems. (shrink)

When our smartphones distract us, much more is at stake than a momentary lapse of attention. Our use of smartphones can interfere with the building-blocks of meaningfulness and the actions that shape our self-identity. -/- By analyzing social interactions and evolving experiences, Roholt reveals the mechanisms of smartphone-distraction that impact our meaningful projects and activities. Roholt’s conception of meaning in life draws from a disparate group of philosophers—Susan Wolf, John Dewey, Hubert Dreyfus, Martin Heidegger, and Albert Borgmann. Central to Roholt’s (...) argument are what Borgmann calls focal practices: dinners with friends, running, a college seminar, attending sporting events. As a recurring example, Roholt develops the classification of musical instruments as focal things, contending that musical performance can be fruitfully understood as a focal practice. -/- Through this exploration of what generates meaning in life, Roholt makes us rethink the place we allow smartphones to occupy in the everyday. But he remains cautiously optimistic. This thoughtful, needed interrogation of smartphones shows how we can establish a positive role for technologies within our lives. (shrink)

The paper focuses on Albert Borgmann’s philosophy of technology. We argue in support of Borgmann’s “Churchill principle” (“we shape our buildings, and afterwards they shape us”) as presented in Real American Ethics (RAE) (2006) by comparing it to findings within behavioral economics in general and to the “libertarian paternalism” of Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler in particular. According to our interpretation of it, the Churchill principle implies that because our material environment in fact influences our choices, this environment (...) can and should be rearranged so that we “automatically” will tend to make better decisions. Having defended the Churchill principle, we go on to discuss how this principle is related to Borgmann’s approach in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life (TCCL) (1984). In this earlier work, Borgmann suggests we reform technology by making room for focal practices, that is, meaningful practices in which we develop our skills and excellences. We argue that while these two works have different basic approaches—rearranging the material environment in RAE and developing certain skills and excellences in TCCL—they can and ought to be seen, not as mutually excluding, but as supplementing one another. Together they form a highly salient critique of technology that takes into consideration questions of the good life without becoming overly paternalistic. (shrink)

The paper focuses on Albert Borgmann’s philosophy of technology. We argue in support of Borgmann’s “Churchill principle” as presented in Real American Ethics by comparing it to findings within behavioral economics in general and to the “libertarian paternalism” of Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler in particular. According to our interpretation of it, the Churchill principle implies that because our material environment in fact influences our choices, this environment can and should be rearranged so that we “automatically” will tend (...) to make better decisions. Having defended the Churchill principle, we go on to discuss how this principle is related to Borgmann’s approach in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. In this earlier work, Borgmann suggests we reform technology by making room for focal practices, that is, meaningful practices in which we develop our skills and excellences. We argue that while these two works have different basic approaches—rearranging the material environment in RAE and developing certain skills and excellences in TCCL—they can and ought to be seen, not as mutually excluding, but as supplementing one another. Together they form a highly salient critique of technology that takes into consideration questions of the good life without becoming overly paternalistic. (shrink)

As mechanical devices become lighter, sleeker, and cheaper, the issue of technology in wilderness becomes an increasingly more important ethical concern because many high-tech luxuries or devices stand to separate the backcountry traveler from the very goals he or she hopes to actualize by recreating in wilderness. As recreationists, we need to determine which items are essential and which aredistracting, separating important “equipment” from needless “devices,” and exercising the self-control to carry only what we need. This process can be called (...) “responsible simplicity.” It is in the backcountry traveler’s best interest to exercise responsible simplicity, to choose only the devices necessary to actualize the telos, or goal, of one’s wilderness experience. A critique of the appropriateness of technology in the backcountry should entail examining devices in their context and also by their relationship to other technologies brought into the backcountry. From a virtue ethics standpoint, responsible simplicity can promote the integrity of wilderness recreation by providing oversight with regard to what goods are internal to the practice. It can also allow room for “wilderness” in our everyday lives in association with David Strong’s notion of “counterbalancing” and Albert Borgmann’s notions of “eloquent reality” and “focal practices.”. (shrink)

As mechanical devices become lighter, sleeker, and cheaper, the issue of technology in wilderness becomes an increasingly more important ethical concern because many high-tech luxuries or devices stand to separate the backcountry traveler from the very goals he or she hopes to actualize by recreating in wilderness. As recreationists, we need to determine which items are essential and which aredistracting, separating important “equipment” from needless “devices,” and exercising the self-control to carry only what we need. This process can be called (...) “responsible simplicity.” It is in the backcountry traveler’s best interest to exercise responsible simplicity, to choose only the devices necessary to actualize the telos, or goal, of one’s wilderness experience. A critique of the appropriateness of technology in the backcountry should entail examining devices in their context and also by their relationship to other technologies brought into the backcountry. From a virtue ethics standpoint, responsible simplicity can promote the integrity of wilderness recreation by providing oversight with regard to what goods are internal to the practice. It can also allow room for “wilderness” in our everyday lives in association with David Strong’s notion of “counterbalancing” and Albert Borgmann’s notions of “eloquent reality” and “focal practices.”. (shrink)

Over the last several decades, slow travel has been garnering increasing attention, especially with regards to the climate crisis and the many harms that result from global tourism. The defenders of slow travel claim that traveling slowly benefits not only the environment but also the local communities most affected by tourism, as well as the travellers themselves. This kind of defence, while seeming to be intuitively correct, is missing a sustained argument that explains why this is the case. In this (...) paper, we fill this explanatory gap by relying on philosopher Albert Borgmann’s theory of devices and focal practices to provide a theoretical ground for the claims made about traveling fast and slow. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a concept of “good food” by placing in dialogue Albert Borgmann’s notions of focal things and practices with the experiences of two Lumad groups in Mindanao, Philippines, the Manobos and the Blaans. The “availability” of contemporary food, resulting from the “device paradigm,” creates an atrophic existence rooted in social and material disengagement with food production. I argue that the experiences of these two Lumad groups offer rich examples of Borgmann’s focal practices that show (...) how to conceptualize good food in a technological world. This concept can be concretely realized through practices of food and technical democracy which institutionalize the values of the communalist and collectivist experiences of these Lumad groups. (shrink)

The zetetic turn in epistemology raises three questions about epistemic and zetetic norms. First, there is the relationship question: what is the relationship between epistemic and zetetic norms? Are some epistemic norms zetetic norms, or are epistemic and zetetic norms distinct? Second, there is the tension question: are traditional epistemic norms in tension with plausible zetetic norms? Third, there is the reaction question: how should theorists react to a tension between epistemic and zetetic norms? Drawing on an analogy to practical (...) philosophy, I develop a focal point view to resolve these motivating questions. On the focal point view, traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms answer different types of normative questions. There is nevertheless a familiar type of evaluative tension between traditional epistemic norms and zetetic norms, but this tension is an unavoidable feature of the normative landscape and not a sign that traditional epistemic norms need revision. But if traditional epistemic norms are not zetetic norms, then in what sense is zetetic epistemology a project for epistemologists? I conclude by articulating a sense in which some nontraditional epistemic norms are zetetic norms, and in which zetetic epistemology is an important part of the study of theoretical rationality. (shrink)