Results for 'First-person thought'

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  1. Fission, First Person Thought, and Subject-Body Dualism.Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):5-25.
    In “The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended” (PPR 2013), Martine Nida-Rümelin (NR) responded to my (PPR 2013) criticism of her (2010) argument for subject-body dualism. The crucial premise of her (2010) argument was that there is a factual difference between the claims that in a fission case the original person is identical with one, or the other, of the successors. I argued that, on the three most plausible interpretations of ‘factual difference’, the argument fails. NR (...)
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  2. First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation Between Recent Analytical Philosophy and Phenomenology.Dan Zahavi - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.
    The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.
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  3.  95
    First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.
  4. First-Person Thought and the Use of ‘I’.Komarine Romdenh-Romluc - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):145-156.
    The traditional account of first-person thought draws conclusions about this type of thinking from claims made about the first-person pronoun. In this paper I raise a worry for the traditional account. Certain uses of 'I' conflict with its conception of the linguistic data. I argue that once the data is analysed correctly, the traditional approach to first-person thought cannot be maintained.
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  5.  73
    The Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1795-1811.
    What determines the reference of first-person thoughts—thoughts that one would express using the first-person pronoun? I defend a model on which our ways of gaining knowledge of ourselves do, in much the way that our ways of gaining knowledge of objects in the world determine the reference of perceptual demonstrative thoughts. This model—the Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought—can be motivated by reference to independently plausible general principles about how reference is determined. But it (...)
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  6. First Person Thought.François Recanati - 2014 - In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassion & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. pp. 506-511.
    First person thoughts are the sort of thought one may express by using the first person ; they are also thoughts that are about the thinker of the thought. Neither characterization is ultimately satisfactory. A thought can be about the thinker of the thought by accident, without being a first person thought. The alternative characterization of first person thought in terms of first person sentences (...)
     
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    First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation Between Recent Analytical Philosophy and Phenomenology.Zahavi Dan - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.
    The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind, and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.
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  8.  11
    On Having the Same First Person Thought.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):566-587.
    Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; or else, maintain the shareability of first person thought or belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference. Here, the author will argue that this is, in fact, (...)
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  9.  15
    First Person Thoughts: Shareability and Symmetry.José Luis Bermúdez - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (4):629-638.
    Victor Verdejo’s paper ‘On Having the Same First Person Thoughts’ introduces an interesting and fruitful framework for applying the type-token distinction to first person thoughts. He draws a three-way distinction between types, instantiable types, and instantiated types, and uses that distinction to open up a conceptual space for the possibility of shareable first person thoughts. This note distinguishes two types of interpersonal shareability and argues that Verdejo’s suggestions about instantiable types can only secure shareability (...)
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  10.  57
    The Communication of First Person Thoughts.François Recanati - 1995 - In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 95-102.
    A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.
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  11. Recanati on Communication of FirstPerson Thoughts.Sajed Tayebi - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):210-218.
    In this paper, I will provide a counterexample to Recanati's account of first-person communication (1995, 2010, 2012). In particular, I will show that Recanati's constraints are not sufficient for the success of first-person communication. My argument against Recanati's account is parallel to Recanati's argument against neo-Russellian accounts, and shows that the same problem resurfaces even in the presence of linguistically encoded mode of presentation in a neo-Fregean framework of mental files.
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  12. Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern (...)
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  13. The Indexical 'I' the First Person in Thought and Language.I. Brinck - 1997 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of (...)
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  14.  28
    Lit From Within: First-Person Thought and Illusions of Transcendence.Léa Salje - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):735-749.
    Philosophical treatments of the self in a range of different traditions have positioned it outside the realm of ordinary worldly objects. This paper argues that part of the explanation for this seemingly widespread and persistent temptation to mystify the self is that the epistemic properties of I-thought are apt to give rise to an illusion of transcendence about their objects—that is, about ourselves.
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  15. Editorial Introduction/Shaun Gallagher First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Re-Flections on the Relation Between Recent Analytical Philosophy and Phenomenology/Dan Zahavi Philosophy and the 'Anteriority Complex'/Alan Murray.David McNeill - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:427-429.
  16. The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person Versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.
    Recent third person approaches to thought experiments and conceptual analysis through the method of surveys are motivated by and motivate skepticism about the traditional first person method. I argue that such surveys give no good ground for skepticism, that they have some utility, but that they do not represent a fundamentally new way of doing philosophy, that they are liable to considerable methodological difficulties, and that they cannot be substituted for the first person method, (...)
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    The First Person Perspective: Language, Thought, and Action.Pengbo Liu - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    What it is to have a first person perspective? How do we come to understand our own perspective in the world? How do we take into account other people's perspectives in our social and linguistic interactions? This dissertation is an exploration of these issues. But instead of approaching them in the abstract, it aims to shed light on these difficult questions through a series of case studies. First, I examine the role of the first person (...)
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  18.  94
    Bayes and the First Person: Consciousness of Thoughts, Inner Speech and Probabilistic Inference.Franz Knappik - 2017 - Synthese:1-28.
    On a widely held view, episodes of inner speech provide at least one way in which we become conscious of our thoughts. However, it can be argued, on the one hand, that consciousness of thoughts in virtue of inner speech presupposes interpretation of the simulated speech. On the other hand, the need for such self-interpretation seems to clash with distinctive first-personal characteristics that we would normally ascribe to consciousness of one’s own thoughts: a special reliability; a lack of conscious (...)
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  19.  11
    First Person: The Demand for Identification-Free Self-Reference.Andrea Christofidou - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223-234.
    I defend the thesis that identification-free self-reference is immune to error through mis-identification because even though self-reference and self-identification are distinct, they are not separable. This provides a critique and a reductio of Carol Rovane’s neo-Lockean analysis of ‘I’ in terms of a definite description, since no definite description or proper name can be substituted salva sensu or salva veritate for the singular term ‘I’. Furthermore, I distinguish between self-identification and self-ascription, and argue that even if there may be an (...)
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  20.  19
    Bayes and the First Person: Consciousness of Thoughts, Inner Speech and Probabilistic Inference.Franz Knappik - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2113-2140.
    On a widely held view, episodes of inner speech provide at least one way in which we become conscious of our thoughts. However, it can be argued, on the one hand, that consciousness of thoughts in virtue of inner speech presupposes interpretation of the simulated speech. On the other hand, the need for such self-interpretation seems to clash with distinctive first-personal characteristics that we would normally ascribe to consciousness of one’s own thoughts: a special reliability; a lack of conscious (...)
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  21. Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.
    In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue (...)
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  22.  89
    First Person: The Demand for Identification-Free Self-Reference.Andrea Christofidou - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):223-234.
    I defend the thesis that identification-free self-reference is immune to error through mis-identification because even though self-reference and self-identification are distinct, they are not separable. This provides a critique and a reductio of Carol Rovane’s neo-Lockean analysis of ‘I’ in terms of a definite description, since no definite description or proper name can be substituted salva sensu or salva veritate for the singular term ‘I’. Furthermore, I distinguish between self-identification and self-ascription, and argue that even if there may be an (...)
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  23. First Person is Not Just a Perspective: Thought, Reality and the Limits of Interpretation.Jocelyn Benoist - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 231--244.
     
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  24.  24
    First Person Authority and Singular Thoughts.Truls Wyller - 1994 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 48 (4):585 - 594.
  25. Commentary on Daniel Morgan, 'A Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought'.François Recanati - unknown
    This response was written for the Vth Online Consciousness Conference.
     
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  26.  9
    First-Person Authority and Singular Thoughts.T. Wyler - 1994 - Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie Forschung 48 (4):585-94.
  27. Second Person Thought.Jane Heal - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331.
    There are modes of presentation of a person in thought corresponding to the first and third person pronouns. This paper proposes that there is also thought involving a second person mode of presentation of another, which might be expressed by an utterance involving ‘you’, but need not be expressed linguistically. It suggests that co-operative activity is the locus for such thought. First person thought is distinctive in how it supplies reasons (...)
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  28.  97
    The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.
    I argue for the view that some we-thoughts are immune to error through misidentification (IEM) relative to the first-person plural pronoun. To prepare the ground for this argument I defend an account of the semantics of ‘we’ and note the variety of different uses of that term. I go on to defend the IEM of a certain range of we-thoughts against a number of objections.
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  29. On First-Person Authority.Jane Heal - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19.
    How are we to explain the authority we have in pronouncing on our own thoughts? A 'constitutive' theory, on which a second-level belief may help to constitute the first-level state it is about, has considerable advantages, for example in relieving pressures towards dualism. The paper aims to exploit an analogy between authority in performative utterances and authority on the psychological to get a clearer view of how such a constitutive account might work and its metaphysical presuppositions.
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  30.  28
    Pathologies of Thought and First-Person Authority.Michael Young - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):151-159.
    Insofar as psychiatrists and neurologists tend to the cognitive well-being of others, their work is interwoven with philosophical concerns and theoretical assumptions about the nature of the mind, its myriad functions, and the conditions governing its multiform pathologies. That the mind figures so prominently in their ordinary language attests to the wealth of insights that stands to be gained through a dialogue with philosophy. In one of the earliest efforts to taxonomize psychiatric medicine, Allgemeine Psychopathologie, Jaspers incisively remarks that "the (...)
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  31. Reason and the First Person.Tyler Burge - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
    The first part of the paper focuses on the role played in thought and action by possession of the firstperson concept. It is argued that only one who possesses the I concept is in a position to fully articulate certain fundamental, a priori aspects of the concept of reason. A full understanding of the concept of reason requires being inclined to be affected or immediately motivated by reasons—to form, change or confirm beliefs or other attitudes in (...)
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  32. First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology.Amie L. Thomasson - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 115-138.
    An account of the source of first-person knowledge is essential not just for phenomenology, but for anyone who takes seriously the apparent evidence that we each have a distinctive access to knowing what we experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation of the passing contents of one’s own mind, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. I argue, however, that (...)
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  33. What Does Language Tell Us About Consciousness? First-Person Mental Discourse and Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness.Neil Campbell Manson - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238.
    The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal's argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for "p" and "I think that p" differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars "I think" from playing one of its roles and thus is not a good test (...)
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  34. Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Dorit Bar-on & Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-35.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called “first-person privilege.” If I now said: “I have a headache,” or “I’m thinking about Venice,” I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing (...)
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  35. How Does First-Person Authority Over Thought Come Into Being in Jones' Myth「ジョーンズの神話」において思考に対する 一人称権威はいかにして成立するのか.Youhei Kanou - 2022 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 49 (2):75-86.
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  36.  87
    Avowals and First-Person Privilege.Dorit Bar-on & Douglas C. Long - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):311-335.
    When people avow their present feelings, sensations, thoughts, etc., they enjoy what may be called "first-person privilege." If I now said: "I have a headache," or "I'm thinking about Venice," I would be taken at my word: I would normally not be challenged. According to one prominent approach, this privilege is due to a special epistemic access we have to our own present states of mind. On an alternative, deflationary approach the privilege merely reflects a socio-linguistic convention governing (...)
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  37. First-Person Authority: Dualism, Constitutivism, and Neo-Expressivism.Dorit Bar-On - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):53-71.
    What I call “Rorty’s Dilemma” has us caught between the Scylla of Cartesian Dualism and the Charybdis of eliminativism about the mental. Proper recognition of what is distinctively mental requires accommodating incorrigibility about our mental states, something Rorty thinks materialists cannot do. So we must either countenance mental states over and above physical states in our ontology, or else give up altogether on the mental as a distinct category. In section 2, “Materialist Introspectionism—Independence and Epistemic Authority”, I review reasons for (...)
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  38. The Problem of First-Person Aboutness.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy (57):521-541.
    The topic of this paper is the question of in virtue of what first-person thoughts are about what they are about. I focus on a dilemma arising from this question. On the one hand, approaches to answering this question that promise to be satisfying seem doomed to be inconsistent with the seeming truism that first-person thought is always about the thinker of the thought. But on the other hand, ensuring consistency with that truism seems (...)
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  39.  79
    The First Person.James Cargile - 2019 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (1):23-38.
    Many languages have a first person singular subject pronoun (‘I’in English). Fewer also have a first person singular object pronoun (‘me’in English). The term ‘I’is commonly used to refer to the person using the term. It has a variety of other uses. A normal person is able to refer to theirself and think about their self and this is of course an important feature of being a person. For any person x, no (...)
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  40. First-Person Externalism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Modern Schoolman 84 (2/3):155-170.
    Ever since the 1970’s, philosophers of mind have engaged in a lively discussion of Externalism. Externalism is the metaphysical thesis that the contents of one’s thoughts are determined partly by empirical features of one’s environment. Externalism appears to clash with another plausible thesis—the epistemological thesis that one can have knowledge of one’s own thoughts, without evidence or empirical investigation. Many have argued that the conjunction of these theses is incompatible. I have argued elsewhere for their compatibility.1 Here I’ll just assume (...)
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  41. Two Kinds of First-Person-Oriented Content.Friederike Moltmann - 2012 - Synthese 184 (2):157 - 177.
    In this paper, I will argue that two kinds of first-person-oriented content are distinguished in more ways than usually thought and I propose an account that will shed new light on the distinction. The first kind consists of contents of attitudes de se (in a broad sense); the second kind consists of contents that give rise to intuitions of relative truth. I will present new data concerning the two kinds of first-person-oriented content, together with (...)
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  42. Disagreement and the FirstPerson Perspective.Gurpreet Rattan - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.
    Recently, philosophers have put forth views in the epistemology of disagreement that emphasize the epistemic relevance of the first-person perspective in disa- greement. In the first part of the paper, I attempt a rational reconstruction of these views. I construe these views as invoking the first-person perspective to explain why it is rational for parties to a disagreement to privilege their own opinions in the absence of independent explanations for doing so—to privilege without independent explanations. (...)
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  43.  88
    The Modern Corporation as Moral Agent: The Capacity for “Thought” and a “First-Person Perspective”.Kendy M. Hess - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1):61-69.
  44. Social Externalism and First-Person Authority.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):287 - 300.
    Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with (...)-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”. (shrink)
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  45. Evans and First Person Authority.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2009 - Abstracta 5 (1):3-15.
    In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans describes the acquisition of beliefs about one’s beliefs in the following way: ‘I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p.’ In this paper I argue that Evans’s remark can be used to explain first person authority if it is supplemented with the following consideration: Holding on to the content of a (...)
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  46.  67
    First-Person Investigations of Consciousness.Brentyn Ramm - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National University
    This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological preliminaries. In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel, 2011). I argue that the main (...)
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  47.  26
    First-Person Representations and Responsible Agency in AI.Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7061-7079.
    In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...)
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    Seeing Oneself Speak: Speech and Thought in First-Person Cinema.David Sorfa - 2019 - JOMEC Journal 13:104-121.
    Cinema struggles with the representation of inner-speech and thought in a way that is less of a problem for literature. Film also destabilises the notion of the narrator, be they omniscient, unreliable or first-person. In this article I address the peculiar and highly unsuccessful cinematic innovation which we can call the ‘first-person camera’ or ‘first-person’ film. These are films in which the camera represents not just the point-of-view of a character but is meant (...)
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    Subjectivity: Locating the First-Person in Being and Time.Steven Crowell - 2001 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 44 (4):433 – 454.
    It is often held that, in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger's account of intentionality makes no essential reference to the first- person stance. This paper argues, on the contrary, that an account of the first- person, or 'subjectivity', is crucial to Heidegger's account of intelligibility and so of the intentionality, or 'aboutness' of our acts and thoughts, that rests upon it. It first offers an argument as to why the account of intelligibility in Division I of (...)
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  50.  10
    First Person and Body Ownership.Sebastian Sanhueza Rodriguez - 2019 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 29 (2):230-237.
    Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and (...)
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