This paper discusses Aristotle’s statement (Metaph. A 9, 991a8-9) that both Anaxagoras and Eudoxus claimed that things are the result of a mixture of original elements, in relation to Plato’s metaphysics. Eudoxus used this immanentistic thesis to reform one central component of Plato’s Theory of Form, that is the “participation”. The first part of the paper analyzes some Anaxagorean aspects in Plato’s metaphysics, showing that Plato shares with Anaxagoras the “Transmission Theory of Causality” (as called by Dancy), but he refuses (...) its immanentistic version. The second part interprets Hip. Maj. 301b2-301c2 as a refusal of a immantestic interpretation of verbs like prosgivgnomai and kosmei'tai. It is also rejected Morgan’s thesis according to which Hippias supports an aware mereological metaphysical theory. The third part contests that Phaed. 100-106 is a defense of an immanentistic metaphysics abandoned by Plato in his later works. The meaning of the expression to; ejn hJmi'n does not include a mereological approach to the causality. In Plato’s metaphysics there is no strong contradiction between transcendence and immanence. The fourth part shows that the Parmenides refuses any immanentistic version of the relationship between Forms and things. Lastly, I will argue that from a Platonic point of view the only acceptable version is the separated interpretation of Transmission Theory of Causality. (shrink)

Scopo della presente nota è discutere alcuni aspetti del contributo del Prof. Smith circa Virgilio e l'ambiguità. La nota è divisa in tre parti: a) una discussione dell'ambiguità degli enti empirici in Platone; b) una riconsiderazione del frammento 26 di Eraclito, alla luce di alcune osservazioni di H.G. Gadamer; c) un breve confronto tra il Polidoro virgiliano e il dantesco Pier Delle Vigne circa la natura perturbante della loro trasfigurazione ultramondana.