Although appeals to human dignity became quite popular after the end of War World II in various moral and legal settings, the term retained an air of semantic indeterminacy, and scholars are of opposing minds concerning its usefulness and significance. In this essay I intend to offer a sketch of a “deflationary” account of human dignity – viewed as one moral value among many others – according to which it is conceived as the minimal respect we prima facie owe to (...) our own personality, as well as to the personality of everyone else without any restriction or exception. This account is accompanied by a justification, which does not presuppose the endorsement of a particular moral theory, and envisages dignity as a bulwark to counter the morally abhorrent consequences of many categorical and normatively tainted dichotomies western societies have created. (shrink)

In this essay I focus on the form of government defended by Marsilius of Padua in the first Discourse of Defensor pacis (1324). The interpretation of his overall account depends heavily on our understanding of the “major and valentior part” of the citizenry upon which all legislative and elective powers are bestowed. I argue that there is sufficient textual evidence to believe that the above term refers not to some small elite group but to the totality of citizens or the (...) overwhelming majority of them. I also argue that his imaginary polity meets all the necessary conditions that any political regime should meet in order for it to be characterised as an essentially democratic one. Thus, Marsilius deserves a more prominent position in the history of democratic ideas. (shrink)

Although democracy is in principle associated with popular rule, in practice it is best described as rule by elected elites. This form of government is not only wanting from a theoretical point of view, but it also no longer seems to meet the expectations of large segments of the citizenry. This book offers a blueprint for an alternative democratic model, democracy as popular sovereignty. Starting with the idea that the people, generously defined, are sovereign when they rule as equally valuable (...) and fully participating members of a self-governing collectivity, this model tries to describe the constitutional and institutional arrangements necessary to achieve a workable version of this idea in advanced democratic states. This implies among other changes a greater dose of direct democracy, the use of sortition and a different conception of representation. The overall argument developed combines insights, facts, and findings from normative political theory, empirical political science, democracy’s long history as well as from the recent burgeoning literature on participatory and deliberative democracy. (shrink)

Kantian moral humanism refers to Kant’s ingenious effort to conceive human beings as bearers of an intrinsic and non-negotiable value that is grounded on the fact that they are autonomous lawgivers in a kingdom of ends. However, the highly idealised character of his project and its metaphysical underpinnings render the association between man’s inner worth and autonomy problematic for the modern reader. In this essay we argue for a more down to earth moral humanism that still supports the above association (...) but through an alternative route. In our “moral image” introspection, interaction, and sympathy, conceived as a primitive emotion that motivates us to care for the good of other people, play a central grounding role. However, while we are now more certain about the soundness of the general moral framework concerning the justification of the inherent value of human beings, we are less confident about the obligations it generates. This is the price we pay as we descend from Kant’s orderly moral heaven to the messy reality of human affairs. (shrink)

Individuals who value personal autonomy and sympathize with others can be guided by a set of central obligations that are familiar to those sharing in the Western moral tradition. These obligations may not be applicable to every imaginable situation, but the informed determination to act upon them is necessary for combating serious and easily identifiable moral evils. This overall argument is called a post-Kantian moral image. Here, "moral image" is understood as a comprehensive pattern of ethical thought that retains a (...) high level of generality and imposes some order on our normative considerations. The characterization "post-Kantian" indicates that the proposed moral image is inspired by and draws upon Kant's practical philosophy. At the same time it avoids certain problematic Kantian positions and incorporates others that have been vehemently rejected by Kant— like the key role of emotion— in undertaking and justifying morality. (shrink)

Kantian moral humanism refers to Kant’s ingenious effort to conceive human beings as bearers of an intrinsic and non-negotiable value that is grounded on the fact that they are autonomous lawgivers in a kingdom of ends. However, the highly idealised character of his project and its metaphysical underpinnings render the association between man’s inner worth and autonomy problematic for the modern reader. In this essay we argue for a more down to earth moral humanism that still supports the above association (...) but through an alternative route. In our “moral image” introspection, interaction, and sympathy, conceived as a primitive emotion that motivates us to care for the good of other people, play a central grounding role. However, while we are now more certain about the soundness of the general moral framework concerning the justification of the inherent value of human beings, we are less confident about the obligations it generates. This is the price we pay as we descend from Kant’s orderly moral heaven to the messy reality of human affairs. (shrink)

In this essay instead of trying to deal with the dubious question whether Aristotle is a democratic or an oligarchic thinker, I try to investigate whether he has developed particular views that can be constructively engaged by modern democratic theory. I argue that we can locate a rough model of democracy in Aristotle (as well as in Isocrates) in which direct and representative democracy successfully converge and complement each other. This model is indispensable for reflecting on the nature and the (...) future course of contemporary liberal democracy. In addition, Aristotle was the first thinker who conceived the idea that democratic procedures may be epistemically valuable and he put forward two original arguments to that effect. The first of them, the summation argument, despite its ingenuity, does not seem to work, but the second, the user argument, can still serve as a starting-point for a plausible justification of popular sovereignty. (shrink)

Jeremy Bentham is a philosopher who deserves a prominent position in the history of democratic ideas. He not only thought popular rule as a vehicle for materializing his vision of utilitarian society, but also gave us a detailed picture of the basic institutions of the form of democratic governance he envisaged. It is also noteworthy that in hisradical system the people, who are the ultimate and undisputable source of all power, are protected from the authoritarian tendencies of state authorities not (...) by a bill of constitutional rights but by a set of enhanced democratic powers that enable them to exercise strict control over their elected representatives. In this essay we present an outline of his ?unusuallyliberal? theory of democracy based on recently published texts and studies as well as a brief assessment of its strong and weak points. (shrink)

After centuries of oblivion, the idea of using civic lotteries to select citizens to participate in major decision-making bodies has started gaining popularity among certain democratic theorists. Undoubtedly, this is an idea worth exploring, given the constantly rising dissatisfaction with the operation of major representative institutions. One should not, however, infer from this fact that any proposed sortition-based institutional arrangement is compatible with basic democratic principles. This article critically examines two such proposals: (a) that we should establish fully powered legislative (...) bodies consisting entirely of allotted citizens and (b) López-Guerra’s enfranchisement lottery, the gist of which is that voting rights should be granted only to a very small random sample of current electors, who will be subjected to a “competence-building process.” The article argues that both proposals run counter to the idea of rule by the people conceived as equally valuable and fully participating memb ers of a self-governing political entity. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to reconsider the very analogy between secondary qualities and moral values. It is argued that since the subject matter of moral evaluation are events and not objects, the function and the status of moral qualities should be understood only in terms of the olfactory and auditory qualities of events. This implies that the common comparison of moral values with colors is no longer possible.