This article sets forth and discusses the Ithaca Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Section 1 presents the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and the measurement problem. Section 2 sketches Everett's interpretation as a preamble to IIQM. Section 3 sets out IIQM's central claim: it is possible to make sense of quantum mechanics by taking as the proper subject of physics the correlations among subsystems. Section 4 introduces a theorem of quantum mechanics, the SSC theorem, which supports this claim. Section 5 contends (...) that at least two problems exist with IIQM, and one serious objection against it. Section 6 discusses a strategy based on relational probabilities to go around the objection. /// Este artículo presenta y discute la Interpretación de la Mecánica Cuántica de Ithaca. La sección 1 expone el formalismo estándar de la mecánica cuántica y el problema de la medición. La sección 2 bosqueja la interpretación de Everett como preámbulo a la IIQM. La sección 3 plantea la tesis central de la IIQM: es posible dar sentido a la mecánica cuántica tomando como sujeto propio de la física las correlaciones entre subsistemas. La sección 4 expone el teorema SSC de la mecánica cuántica que sustenta esta tesis. En la sección 5 se sostiene que existen al menos dos problemas con la IIQM, y una seria objeción en su contra. Para sortear esta objeción, la sección 6 discute una estrategia basada en probabilidades relacionales. (shrink)

The literature on physicalism often fails to elucidate, I think, what the word physical in physical ism precisely means. Philosophers speak at times of an ideal set of fundamental physical facts, or they stipulate that physical means non-mental , such that all fundamental physical facts are fundamental facts pertaining to the non-mental. In this article, I will probe physicalism in the very much tangible framework of quantum mechanics. Although this theory, unlike “ideal physics” or some “final theory of non-mentality”, is (...) an incomplete theory of the world, I believe this analysis will be of value, if for nothing else, at least for bringing some taste of physical reality, as it were, back to the debate. First, I will introduce a broad characterization of the physicalist credo. In Sect. 2, I will provide a rather quick review of quantum mechanics and some of its current interpretations. In Sect. 3, the notion of quantum non-separability will be analyzed, which will facilitate a discussion of the wave function ontology in Sect. 4. In Sects. 5 and 6, I will explore competing views on the implications of this ontology. In Sect. 7, I will argue that the prior results, based on a thoroughly realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, support only a weak version of non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)

I defend a pragmatist reinterpretation of Sellars’s famous manifest-scientific distinction. I claim that in order to do justice to this important distinction we must first recognize, despite what philosophers—including, arguably, Sellars—often make of it, that the distinction does not draw an epistemological or metaphysical boundary between different kinds of objects and events, but a pragmatic boundary between different ways in which we interact with objects and events. Put differently, I argue that the manifest-scientific distinction, in my view, can be best (...) understood, not as a metaphysical distinction between apparent and real objects and events, or an epistemological distinction between perceptible and imperceptible objects and events, but rather as a distinction, which is not necessarily rigid over time, between distinct ways in which we collectively deal, in practice, with objects and events. (shrink)