Tarski's theory of truth brings out the question of whether he intended his theory to be a correspondence theory of truth and whether, whatever his intentions, his theory is, in fact, a correspondence theory. The aim of this paper is to answer both questions. The answer to the first question depends on Tarski's relevant assertions on semantics and his conception of truth. In order to answer the second question Popper's and Davidson's interpretations of Tarski's truth theory are examined; to this (...) end both Tarski's definition of truth in terms of satisfaction and the T-sentences are taken into account. (shrink)

v. 1. El tiempo histórico de Mario Hernández Sánchez-Barba -- v. 2. Generaciones y mentalidades. Estudios de teoría de la Historia.

Oscar Pistorius was born without fibulas and had both legs amputated below the knee when he was 11 months old. A business student at the University of Pretoria, Pistorius runs with the aid of carbon-fibre artificial limbs and is the double amputee world record holder in the 100, 200 and 400 metres events.1“I don’t see myself as disabled,” says Oscar, “There’s nothing I can’t do that able-bodied athletes can do.”2 But then the question is: do prosthetic limbs simply (...) level the ground for Pistorius—“Blade-runner”, compensating for his disability, or do they give him an unacceptable advantage? As Jeré Longman nicely put it: is he disabled, or too-abled?3Athletics’ world governing body, the International Association of Athletics Federations , shares the latter opinion, and assigned to German Professor Brüggemann the task of monitoring Oscar’s performances and analysing the information. According to his study, Pistorius’ limbs use 25% less energy than able-bodied athletes to run at the same speed.4 On the strength of these findings, on 14 January 2008 the IAAF ruled …. (shrink)

CONTENIDO: Fenomenología / Daniel Herrera Restrepo / - La hermenéutica y su naturaleza analógica: necesidad de una hermenéutica analógica / Mauricio Beuchot / - La filosofía analítica / Margarita M. Valdés / - Filosofía de la ciencia en el siglo XX / Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz / - El liberalismo en la segunda mitad del siglo XX / Jesús Antonio Serrano Sánchez / - Filosofía y cultura / Dora Elvira García G. / - Filosofía e interculturalidad en América Latina: intento (...) de introducción no filosófica / Raúl Fornet-Betancourt. (shrink)

This paper discusses the predicament of Oscar Pistorius. He is a Paralympic gold medallist who wishes to participate in the Olympics in Beijing in 2008. Following a brief introductory section, the paper discusses the arguments that could be, and have been, deployed against his participation in the Olympics, should he make the qualifying time for his chosen event (400m). The next section discusses a more hypothetical argument based upon a specific understanding of the fair opportunity rule. According to this, (...) there may be a case for allowing Pistorius to compete even if he should fail to make the official qualifying time. The final part of the paper reviews the situation at the time of writing and offers some assessment of the strategy of the IAAF in responding to it. It is argued below that the proper focus for assessment of Pistorius's eligibility to compete should not be on whether his blades lead to his having an unfair advantage over his competitors, but instead should focus on whether what he does counts as running. (shrink)

In 1934, Oscar Reutersvärd drew what is generally acknowledged to be the first impossible triangle. Over the course of his lifetime, Reutersvärd created thousands of impossible figures, three of which would later adorn a series of Swedish postage stamps. But despite his enormous, inventive output, Reutersvärd is not widely known. Instead, impossible figures are popularly associated with M. C. Escher—three of whose more famous works include impossible figures—and the mathematical physicist Roger Penrose, who published the first academic article about (...) impossible figures in 1958 after independently discovering the impossible triangle. For Escher and Penrose, however, impossible figures were merely a passing interest. And while Penrose was concerned primarily with the mathematics of impossible figures and Escher integrated them into familiar human scenes, Reutersvärd’s abstract, minimalistic renderings express a fascination with the figures themselves. Free of adornment, they attract and command the eye, and exhibit a strange and peculiar beauty. -/- In this chapter, I investigate why we find impossible figures so visually compelling. In other words, my concern here is the specifically aesthetic appeal of impossible figures. Mathematicians and logicians have studied them for their mathematical and logical properties (Mortensen 2010), psychologists for what they reveal about the visual system (Gregory 1997, chap. 10), and philosophers in part for what they tell us about the limits of the imagination (Elpidorou 2016, 11), but we value them mainly as things to look at. This is what I want to understand. -/- I will work in three stages, using three methods. First, I will define the domain of investigation. What exactly is an impossible figure? Answering this question requires a form of conceptual analysis and raises a variety of interesting philosophical issues. Second, I will ask about the experience of looking at impossible figures. Here I will proceed by introspection—a first-person study of my own experience. Finally, I will appeal to results from experimental psychology to develop an empirically-grounded hypothesis about the visual appeal of impossible figures. If things go well, we will learn something not only about impossible figures, but about ourselves, and how and why we look at visual art in general. (shrink)

Experimental studies show that some corvids, apes, and rodents possess a common long-term memory system that allows them to take goal-directed actions on the basis of absent spatiotemporal contexts. In other words, evidence supports the hypothesis that Episodic Memory —far from being uniquely human— has evolved as a cross-species meaning making system. However, within this zoosemiotic breakthrough, neurocognitive studies now struggle characterizing the relations between teleological factors and phenomenological factors that would account for the episodic behavior displayed by these living (...) beings. Within such field, this paper identifies four epistemological gaps —the ‘Nagelian’, ‘de Waalian’, ‘Chomskyan’, and ‘semiotic’ gaps—, making a case for the need of a future biosemiotic model of Alloanimal Episodic Memory to come into the equation. As a whole, I conclude that experimental developments in AEM research, and philosophical advancements in biosemiotics could converge through the concept of semiosis. Introducing the latter would account for animal episodic agency as a causal influence and continuity between the above relations, outclassing the reductionist and Cartesian separation between ‘external’ bodily behavior and ‘internal’ computational operations. (shrink)

Fern Logan’s collection of photographic portraits documents the emergence of the African American artist into mainstream American art. The Artist Portrait Series captures sixty significant artists from the late twentieth century.

This book examines the human ability to participate in moments of joint feeling. It presents an answer to the question concerning the nature of our faculty to share in what might be called episodes of collective affective intentionality. The proposal develops the claim that our capacity to participate in such episodes is grounded in an ability central to our human condition: our capacity to care with one another about certain things. The author provides a phenomenologically adequate account of collective affective (...) intentionality that takes seriously the idea that feelings are at the core of our emotional relation to the world. He details a form of group emotional orientation that relies on the fact that the participating individuals have come to share a number of concerns. Readers will learn that at the heart of a collective affective intentional episode, one does not merely find a set of shared concerns, but also a particular mode of caring. In the end, the argument presented in this monograph makes plausible the idea that the emotions through which humans participate in moments of affective intentional community express our nature. In addition, it shows that the debate on collective affective intentionality also permits us to better understand the relationship between two conflicting philosophical pictures of ourselves: the idea that we are essentially social beings and the claim that we are creatures for whom our personal existence is an issue. Thus, aiming at an elucidation of the nature of our ability to feel together, the book offers a detailed account of what it is to situationally express our human nature by caring about something in a properly joint manner. (shrink)

The central questions in this study are: What does Kant consider the essence of the dispute between Rationalists and Realist Empiricists which he titles the “Second Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas?” Why does he believe it supports such wider aims of the Critical Philosophy as: showing the impossibility of a Transcendental Realist explanation of the spatiotemporal world, which amounts to an indirect proof of Transcendental Idealism ; being the only means for detecting the transcendental illusion which leads to Transcendental Realism (...) and convincing us to give it up ); demonstrating the defeat of theoretical reason in its highest aim – the systematization of knowledge under one concept – thus turning us toward practical reason as the only venue where reason's demand for the unconditioned can be satisfied? (shrink)