We introduce a notion of description for infinite sequences and their sets, and a corresponding notion of complexity. We show that for strict process machines, complexity of a sequence or of a subset of Cantor space is equal to its effective Hausdorff dimension.

Demonstrates the significance of the concepts of madness and death for the history of philosophy.

This dissertation traces the themes of madness and death from Plato to twentieth century European philosophy. By focusing on the writings of Plato, Hegel, Heidegger and Foucault, this work tries to articulate the way in which philosophy relies on the themes of madness and death to define itself. Madness and death are not simply topics within philosophy, but they are the "other" of philosophical discourse. In this respect madness and death are instances of negativity. Negativity plays a significant role in (...) the constitution of philosophical discourse. Thus far from being marginal topics within philosophy, madness and death prove to be related to many contemporary philosophical problems, such as subjectivity, the metaphysics of presence, the relationship between the body and language, and finally the question of ethics. ;The first chapter concentrates on Plato's Phaedo and Phaedrus. For Plato, philosophy is defined as a preparation of death and as a kind of madness. Through a close reading of these texts, this chapter establishes the constitutive roles of madness and death for philosophy. ;The second chapter concentrates on Hegel's notion of madness in the Encyclpaedia, and his understanding of death in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This chapter establishes that Hegel's approach to negativity ultimately remains a cognitive one, and incapable of thinking the question of negativity in a radical fashion. ;The third and fourth chapters focus on Heidegger in order to articulate a more radical thinking of negativity. The notion of death in Being and Time, and that of madness in Heidegger's later writings characterize Heidegger's non-cognitive understanding of negativity that cannot be reduced to a content of thought. ;The final chapter focuses on the debate between Foucault and Derrida on madness and ultimately attempts to question the radicality of both Hegel's and Heidegger's notions of negativity. ;The conclusion tries to connect the questions of madness and death to that of ethics. The radicalization of the question of ethics in twentieth century continental philosophy presupposes and requires a rethinking of the question of alterity. This work gestures towards such a rethinking. (shrink)

The modern conception of an atomistic subject constituting itself by excluding and dominating its other(s) remains insufficient for rethinking a "postcolonial subject" despite its merits in explaining the historical relationship between the Western subject and the Oriental other. Hegel seems to offer a promising alternative to this model. For Hegel, the construction of the subject does not take place in terms of the exclusion and oppression of, but in terms of a dialectical relationship to, its other, hence Hegel's model of (...) subjectivity appears to be useful in rethinking the relation between the colonizer and the colonized in terms of mutual recognition and interdependent constitution. However, this appearance is misleading. In fact, the Hegelian model of the subject is the source of problems concerning the relation between self and other in general, and between the colonizer and the colonized in particular. Not only does Hegel attribute the possibility of the dialectical movement to a particular kind of subject (European), but his model of subjectivity reduces difference to opposition, and thereby obviates the possibility of rethinking a difference between the colonizer and the colonized. This paper tries to justify this observation through a discussion of Hegel's understanding of race as articulated in the third section of the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. I argue that Hegel's understanding of race in the context of the natural soul allows one to draw inferences concerning his general conception of subjectivity and dialectics. Accordingly, this paper claims that rather than providing an alternative model for postcolonial subjectivity, Hegel's notion of the subject grounds the colonial model itself. (shrink)

The modern conception of an atomistic subject constituting itself by excluding and dominating its other(s) remains insufficient for rethinking a "postcolonial subject" despite its merits in explaining the historical relationship between the Western subject and the Oriental other. Hegel seems to offer a promising alternative to this model. For Hegel, the construction of the subject does not take place in terms of the exclusion and oppression of, but in terms of a dialectical relationship to, its other, hence Hegel's model of (...) subjectivity appears to be useful in rethinking the relation between the colonizer and the colonized in terms of mutual recognition and interdependent constitution. However, this appearance is misleading. In fact, the Hegelian model of the subject is the source of problems concerning the relation between self and other in general, and between the colonizer and the colonized in particular. Not only does Hegel attribute the possibility of the dialectical movement to a particular kind of subject (European), but his model of subjectivity reduces difference to opposition, and thereby obviates the possibility of rethinking a difference between the colonizer and the colonized. This paper tries to justify this observation through a discussion of Hegel's understanding of race as articulated in the third section of the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. I argue that Hegel's understanding of race in the context of the natural soul allows one to draw inferences concerning his general conception of subjectivity and dialectics. Accordingly, this paper claims that rather than providing an alternative model for postcolonial subjectivity, Hegel's notion of the subject grounds the colonial model itself. (shrink)

In his essay “The Crisis in the Teaching of Philosophy” Derrida writes “Philosophy would repeat itself and would reproduce its own tradition as the teaching of its own crisis and as the paideia of self-critique in general. This paideia goes hand in hand, and there is nothing fortuitous about this, with what I will call without taking it lightly, an imperialist self-confidence of philosophy.” In a properly Derridean fashion these lines are haunting for me. What is “imperialist” about philosophy; the (...) self-confidence? Is the confidence imperialist or is it the entire content of the philosophical tradition? Is there something colonial about not only dominating other disciplines and assigning them their regional ontologies, but also about the very discourse of philosophy itself? Of course, this very question presupposes there is such a thing as a “philosophical discourse” that has an identity which is itself a philosophical question. Is there such a thing as identity? If philosophy does not have this discursive identity, is it the crisis that is imperialist, crisis in the sense of constantly being separated from itself, always not having an identity or “never having an identity”? Perhaps in a different yet admittedly still problematic way, does philosophy dominate, colonize, thinking itself, both culturally and conceptually. Derrida continues his essay by forging an alliance between decolonization and deconstruction. It is a curious alliance because it both endorses and rejects philosophy (in a properly philosophical fashion): “If, like philosophy and the deconstruction of the philosophical, decolonization is interminable, it is because it cannot be effective either as simple mode of reappropriation or as a simple mode of opposition or overturning.” (Derrida 2002, 103). (shrink)

This book analyzes the concept of democracy and its practical application in the twenty-first century from a philosophical and postcolonial perspective.

The essays in Fanon and the Decolonization of Philosophy all trace different aspects of the mutually supporting histories of philosophical thought and colonial politics in order to suggest ways that we might decolonize our thinking. From psychology to education, to economic and legal structures, the contributors interrogate the interrelation of colonization and philosophy in order to articulate a Fanon-inspired vision of social justice. This project is endorsed by his daughter, Mireille Fanon-Mendès France, in the book's preface.

Zusammenfassung In den letzten Jahren haben Debatten über die Themenbereiche Vegetarismus und Veganismus auch in der Türkei an Bedeutung gewonnen. Von der islamischen Akzeptanz vegetarischer und veganer Lebensstile bis zur Frage nach dem Tierwohl werden ernährungsbezogene Themen häufig in den Medien diskutiert. Weniger bekannt ist, dass schon in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts führende Intellektuelle und Literat*innen sich mit Vegetarismus aus ethischer, religiöser und ideologischer Perspektive auseinandergesetzt haben. Interesse für indische Religionen, neuheidnische Strömungen und alternative Lebensweisen, rechte Ideologien und (...) islamischer Reformismus sind einige der intellektuellen und politischen Entwicklungen, die zu diesen Auseinandersetzungen geführt haben. Durch die Betrachtung von Hasan Ferit Cansevers und Asaf Halet Çelebis kritischen Ansätzen gegenüber dem Monotheismus und ihres aktiven Vegetarismus wird es möglich, über eine Geschichte der Religionen in der späten osmanischen und frühen republikanischen Türkei nachzudenken, die über die Untersuchung der Vielfalt innerhalb des Islams, des Status der christlichen und jüdischen Minderheiten und des Aufstiegs der säkularen Ideologien hinausgeht. Die Untersuchung der Ernährungsnormativität bietet im Falle der Türkei die Möglichkeit, zu einer anderen Geschichte der Religionen in der Türkei beizutragen. (shrink)

Fanon and the Decolonization of Philosophy explores the range of ways in which Frantz Fanon's decolonization theory can reveal new answers to perennial philosophical questions and new paths to social justice. The aim is to show not just that Fanon's thought remains philosophically relevant, but that it is relevant to an even wider range of philosophical issues than has previously been realized. The essays in this book are written by both renowned Fanon scholars and new scholars who are emerging as (...) experts in aspects of Fanonian thought as diverse as humanistic psychiatry, the colonial roots of racial violence and marginalization, and decolonizing possibilities in law, academia, and tourism. In addition to examining philosophical concerns that arise from political decolonization movements, many of the essays turn to the discipline of philosophy itself and take up the challenge of suggesting ways that philosophy might liberate itself from colonial—and colonizing—assumptions. -/- This collection will be useful to those interested in political theory, feminist theory, existentialism, phenomenology, Africana studies, and Caribbean philosophy. Its Fanon-inspired vision of social justice is endorsed in the foreword by his daughter, Mireille Fanon-Mendès France, a noted human rights defender in the French-speaking world. -/- Contributions by Anna Carastathis; Nigel C. Gibson; Lewis R. Gordon; Peter Gratton; Ferit Güven; Mireille Fanon Mendès-France; Marilyn Nissim-Sabat; Olúfémi Táíwò; Mohammad H. Tamdgidi; Chloë Taylor and Sokthan Yeng. (shrink)