What is the basis of our capacity to act morally? This is a question that has been discussed for millennia, with philosophical debate typically distinguishing two sources of morality: reason and sentiment. This collection aims to shed light on whether the human capacity to feel for others really is central for morality and, if so, in what way. To tackle these questions, the authors discuss how fellow feeling is to be understood: its structure, content and empirical conditions. Also (...) discussed are the exact roles that relevant psychological features - specifically: empathy, sympathy and concern - may play within morality. The collection is unique in bringing together the key participants in the various discussions of the relation of fellow feeling to moral norms, moral concepts and moral agency. By integrating conceptually sophisticated and empirically informed perspectives, Forms of Fellow Feeling will appeal to readers from philosophy, psychology, sociology and cultural studies. (shrink)

Hume and Smith advance different answers to the question of whether sympathy can ever be the foundation of the moral order. They hold contradictory views of sympathy, called here ‘the Fellow-Feeling Paradox’. For Hume, fellow-feeling tends to reverberate in society, leading to the socialization of the individual and even mob (collective) psychology. Hence, sympathy cannot be the foundation of the moral order. In contrast, for Smith, fellow-feeling develops into critical judgment of the emotions/actions, leading (...) to individual moral autonomy even self-command. Hence, sympathy can be the foundation of the moral order. This paper provides a resolution of the two answers. (shrink)

How do our feelings for others shape our attitudes and conduct towards them? Is morality primarily a matter of rational choice, or instinctual feeling? Joseph Duke Filonowicz takes the reader on an engaging, informative tour of some of the main issues in philosophical ethics, explaining and defending the ideas of the early-modern British sentimentalists. These philosophers - Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith - argued that it is our feelings, and not our 'reason', which ultimately determine how we judge what (...) is good or bad, right or wrong, and how we choose to act towards our fellow human beings. Filonowicz draws on contemporary sociology and evolutionary biology as well as present-day moral theory to examine and defend the sentimentalist view and to challenge the rationalistic character of contemporary ethics. His book will appeal to readers interested in both the history of philosophy and current ethical debates. (shrink)

Unusual among Western philosophers, Schopenhauer explicitly drew on Hindu and especially Buddhist traditions inhis moral philosophy. He saw plurality, especially the plurality of human persons, as a kind of illusion; in reality all is one, and compassionate acts express an implicit recognition of this oneness. Max Scheler retains the transcendence of self aspect of compassion but emphasizes that the subject must have a clear, lived sense of herself as a distinct individual in order for that transcendence to take place properly. (...) This feature is absent in the Buddhist tradition. Feminist philosophers of the early second wave built on this insight (only occasionally drawing it from Scheler) to recognize ways women are often not socialized to develop this distinctive sense of self, therefore harming their ability to engage in compassion and other forms of care for others. Iris Murdoch adds a Freudian-inspired (though Freud influenced Scheler also) pessimism about the ability of humans to keep their identities sufficiently distinct from the other to allow a clear view of the other, and thus real care and help to the other to take place. But in her later work, Murdoch explicitly recognizes and draws on the Buddhist tradition of oneness and transcendence of the self. Group solidarities can partake of aspects of Buddhist oneness and self-transcendence, for example the sense of fellowship in a social justice movement in which Blacks draw on a shared identity to experience connection, compassion, empathy, and solidarity with one another. But social justice movements also allow for a solidarity across racial lines, grounded in the shared commitment to justice, including justice for one of the groups in the solidarity community. (All these issues are powerfully portrayed in the 2014 film, Selma.) None of these solidarities, however, express the universalistic dimension of Buddhist oneness. (shrink)

This article presents an analysis of the role that the idea of fraternity plays in John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Many commentators, G.A. Cohen for example, have taken as their target the role of fraternity in understanding the difference principle. The article highlights the neglected connection between Rawls’s principle of fraternity and the role of sentiments in A Theory of Justice. I focus, in particular, on the third part of A Theory of Justice, which has received less attention in (...) the secondary literature. The main idea put forward is that, contrary to what his egalitarian critics contend, the Rawlsian conception of fraternity constitutes the most plausible version of this political ideal: one which is properly egalitarian. (shrink)

How do our feelings for others shape our attitudes and conduct towards them? Is morality primarily a matter of rational choice, or instinctual feeling? Joseph Duke Filonowicz takes the reader on an engaging, informative tour of some of the main issues in philosophical ethics, explaining and defending the ideas of the early-modern British sentimentalists. These philosophers - Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith - argued that it is our feelings, and not our 'reason', which ultimately determine how we judge what (...) is good or bad, right or wrong, and how we choose to act towards our fellow human beings. Filonowicz draws on contemporary sociology and evolutionary biology as well as present-day moral theory to examine and defend the sentimentalist view and to challenge the rationalistic character of contemporary ethics. His book will appeal to readers interested in both the history of philosophy and current ethical debates. (shrink)

This monograph is a systematic defence of the views of key figures in the 18th-century sentimentalist tradition. It aims to explain, to borrow Thomas Nagel's phrase, the very possibility of altruism in a way that engages with contemporary meta-ethics. The details of the account are primarily taken from the work of Francis Hutcheson, although the work of Shaftesbury also receives extended consideration. The author argues that the basis of our admiration for disinterested altruism is simply an innate human instinct, an (...) ‘affective sensitivity’ that is distinct from our capacity to reason. We instinctively seek our own happiness and instinctively approve of the disinterested altruism displayed by others. This affective sensitivity is distinctively valuable, essential for motivation and a crucial element in the justification of altruism. Filonowicz's defence of his central thesis is interleaved with his readings of the historical works that constitute, in his words, the ‘short and rather melancholic’ history of the sentimentalist school .The key philosophical question is what a Hutchesonian moral sense is supposed to be. The Hutchesonian conception seems an unhappy hybrid …. (shrink)

This study takes as its point of departure a question posed by Francis Hutcheson in An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, an important text of the Scottish Enlightenment. Hutcheson asked: “Whence arises this Love of Esteem, or Benevolence, to good Men, or to Mankind in general, if not from some nice Views of Self-Interest?” . As will be well known to readers of this journal, Hutcheson in his answer pointed to the workings of a (...) “moral sense,” arguing: “The Universality of this moral Sense, and that it is antecedent to Instruction, may appear from observing the Sentiments of Children, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain’d as soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest themselves on that side where Kindness and Humanity are found; and detest the Cruel, the Covetous, the Selfish, or the Treacherous. How strongly do we see their Passions of Joy, Sorrow, Love, and Indignation, mov’d by these moral Representations, even tho there has been no pains taken to give them Ideas of a Deity, of Laws, of a future State, or of the more intricate Tendency of the universal Good to that of each Individual!”. (shrink)

This monograph is a systematic defence of the views of key figures in the 18th-century sentimentalist tradition. It aims to explain, to borrow Thomas Nagel's phrase, the very possibility of altruism in a way that engages with contemporary meta-ethics. The details of the account are primarily taken from the work of Francis Hutcheson, although the work of Shaftesbury also receives extended consideration. The author argues that the basis of our admiration for disinterested altruism is simply an innate human instinct, an (...) ‘affective sensitivity’ that is distinct from our capacity to reason. We instinctively seek our own happiness and instinctively approve of the disinterested altruism displayed by others. This affective sensitivity is distinctively valuable, essential for motivation and a crucial element in the justification of altruism. Filonowicz's defence of his central thesis is interleaved with his readings of the historical works that constitute, in his words, the ‘short and rather melancholic’ history of the sentimentalist school.The key philosophical question is what a Hutchesonian moral sense is supposed to be. The Hutchesonian conception seems an unhappy hybrid …. (shrink)

This study takes as its point of departure a question posed by Francis Hutcheson in An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, an important text of the Scottish Enlightenment. Hutcheson asked: “Whence arises this Love of Esteem, or Benevolence, to good Men, or to Mankind in general, if not from some nice Views of Self-Interest?”. As will be well known to readers of this journal, Hutcheson in his answer pointed to the workings of a “moral (...) sense,” arguing: “The Universality of this moral Sense, and that it is antecedent to Instruction, may appear from observing the Sentiments of Children, upon hearing the Storys with which they are commonly entertain’d as soon as they understand Language. They always passionately interest themselves on that side where Kindness and Humanity are found; and detest the Cruel, the Covetous, the Selfish, or the Treacherous. How strongly do we see their Passions of Joy, Sorrow, Love, and Indignation, mov’d by these moral Representations, even tho there has been no pains taken to give them Ideas of a Deity, of Laws, of a future State, or of the more intricate Tendency of the universal Good to that of each Individual!”. (shrink)

When modern economists use the notions of sympathy or empathy, they often claim that their ideas have their roots in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, while sometimes complaining that Smith fails to distinguish clearly enough between the two concepts. Recently, Philippe Fontaine has described various forms of sympathy and empathy, and has explored their respective roles in Smith's work. My objective in this paper is to argue that Smith's analysis of how people's sentiments impinge on one another involves a (...) concept of fellow-feeling that is distinct from both sympathy and empathy. Unlike sympathy and empathy, fellow-feeling does not fit into the ontological framework of rational choice theory – which may explain why it tends to be overlooked by modern readers of Smith. (shrink)

In his 2016 book, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion, Paul Bloom argues that “if we want to be good caring people, if we want to make the world a better place, then we are better off without empathy.” I’ve specifically chosen this formulation of Bloom’s position because it gets at the issue I will most directly challenge him on - that we would, or even could, be better off without empathy. The position I will defend is that our (...) empathy plays an indispensable role in the development of our moral conscience, and an ongoing role in the cultivation of our moral concepts, that would be compromised by suppressing our empathy. On this understanding, I argue that we would generally be better served by cultivating our empathy to mitigate and overcome its shortcomings, rather than suppressing our empathy as Bloom recommends. (shrink)

Jenefer Robinson believes that feelings can play an important role in the critical evaluation of artworks. In this paper, I want to put some pressure on two important notions in her theory: emotional understanding and affective empathy. I will do this by focusing on the nature of self-conscious emotions. My strategy will be, firstly, to demonstrate the difficulty that Robinson’s two step theory of emotions has in accommodating higher cognitive emotional responses to art. Secondly, I will discuss how the tight (...) connection to the ‘self’ involved in self-conscious emotions makes it difficult to take the emotional perspective of another person as empathy requires. From here, I suggest that Peter Goldie’s feeling-towards and his critique of perspective-shifting may give a better understanding of the role of emotions in the appreciation of art, particularly in the case of reflective emotions. This issue will be explored through a discussion of the expression of autobiographical nostalgia in the work of the avant-garde filmmaker Jonas Mekas. (shrink)

This article examines ‘collective feelings’ by considering how ‘others’ create impressions on the surfaces of bodies. Rather than considering ‘collective feeling’ as ‘fellow feeling’ or in terms of feeling ‘for’ the collective, the article suggests that how we respond to others in intercorporeal encounters creates the impression of a collective body. In other words, how we feel about others is what aligns us with a collective, which paradoxically ‘takes shape’ only as an effect of such alignments. (...) The article considers different examples of racism in which a particular other is held in place by being aligned with other others. The ‘moment of contact’ is shaped by past histories of contact, which allows the proximity of a racial other to be perceived as threatening, at the same time as it re-shapes the bodies in the contact zone of the encounter. Feelings rehearse associations that are already in place, in the way in which they ‘read’ the proximity of others, at the same time as they establish the ‘truth’ of the reading. The article extends its analysis by showing that bodily proximity is not required to create the impressions of others, and offers an analysis of ‘collective feelings’ within virtual communities of global nomads. Proximity does not require physical co-presence: the collective can ‘surface’ through giving up on local attachments. The article concludes that collective feelings are not feelings that the collective ‘has’, as if the collective was a subject. Rather the collective is an effect of the impressions left by others on the surfaces of skins. (shrink)

This edited volume is the first in English that covers the philosophy of feeling and related topics in Japanese philosophy on Nishida Kitarō and fellow thinkers. Part I focuses on Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy of feeling, including, but not limited to, comparisons with Tanabe Hajime, Koyama Iwao, and provides coverage of Buddhist, moral and Chinese philosophy. Part II goes beyond Kitarō into topics such as Japanese aesthetics, Nietsche’s reception in Japan, and the philosophy of AI. This is a (...) comprehensive scholarly text on feeling in Japanese philosophy, aimed at researchers and students working in the field. (shrink)

The article analyzes the theological and historical preconditions of emigrant feelings among the Ukrainian Pentecostal believers. It is proved that the gospel narrative influences the way Christians of evangelical faith see their own life - as a "temporary earthly journey", determining, along with the unfavorable conditions for the confession of their own religious views in the Soviet era, the desire to emigrate to any non-socialist country. Under conditions of spiritual freedom, a transition from cosmopolitan to patriotic views is observed among (...) Pentecostal people, but it does not significantly affect the intensity of emigration due to socio-economic factors. Ukrainian immigrants-Pentecostals abroad have created their own communities and para-church structures and, while in search of their own identity, in every way the continue to support their fellow-believers in the Motherland. (shrink)

Receiving a diagnosis of autism in adulthood can be a life changing event, impacting identity, relationships, and mental health. A lack of post-diagnostic support has been highlighted by autistic adults, their allies, clinicians, and service providers. It can be a source of distress for autistic adults, reinforcing feelings of social isolation and rejection. Peer support could be a cost-effective, flexible, and sustainable model to provide community-based support for autistic adults. However, there is little research on the value of peer support, (...) despite calls from the autistic community. This qualitative study explored autistic experiences and needs post-diagnosis, identifying specific ways that peer support may benefit them, and exploring the limitations of peer support. Twelve autistic adults who had all received an autism diagnosis in adulthood completed a semi-structured interview focussing on the diagnostic experience, post-diagnostic support needed and provided, engagement with the autistic community, and post-diagnostic peer support. Thematic analysis of interview transcripts resulted in four themes: Mismatch in support needed and provided; Community connection; Flexible and personalised support; and Sustainability. Participants indicated that peer support may be a useful mechanism to support autistic adults’ post-diagnosis and offers unique opportunities not available through other support channels. Though informal peer support exists, it could be more sustainable and effective if well-supported and funded. (shrink)

In developing theologies and spiritualities of ecology, Christians can learn from the Nobel laureate Barbara McClintock and from process theology. That “feeling for the organism” of which McClintock speaks can be understood within a process context as a distinctive mode of spirituality. The feeling is an intuitive and sympathetic apprehension of another creature in a way which mirrors God’s own way of perceiving. It involves feeling the other creature as a fellow subject with intrinsic value. A (...) subjective capacity of this sort is by no means sufficient for a spirituality of ecology, but by all means necessary. (shrink)

In developing theologies and spiritualities of ecology, Christians can learn from the Nobel laureate Barbara McClintock and from process theology. That “feeling for the organism” of which McClintock speaks can be understood within a process context as a distinctive mode of spirituality. The feeling is an intuitive and sympathetic apprehension of another creature in a way which mirrors God’s own way of perceiving. It involves feeling the other creature as a fellow subject with intrinsic value. A (...) subjective capacity of this sort is by no means sufficient for a spirituality of ecology, but by all means necessary. (shrink)

Some critics argue that the types of psychiatric diagnosis found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and International Classification of Disease are superfluous and should be abandoned. These are known as categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses. To receive a categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnosis an individual need only exhibit some, rather than all, of the symptoms on the diagnostic criteria. Consequently, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses only associate an individual with a range of symptoms rather than specify which symptoms they (...) have. Drawing on Giere’s account of scientific models, I portray categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses as abstract models that guide the building of less abstract models. These models can specify which symptoms a particular individual has. Additionally, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses can guide investigation of symptoms towards difficult to spot symptoms, guide investigation towards changing symptoms, and guide investigation towards how symptoms manifest. These important roles mean categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses should not be abandoned. (shrink)

Psychiatric researchers typically assume that the modelling of psychiatric symptoms is not influenced by psychiatric categories; symptoms are modelled and then grouped into a psychiatric category. I highlight this primarily through analysing research domain criteria. RDoC’s importance makes it worth scrutinizing, and this assessment also serves as a case study with relevance for other areas of psychiatry. RDoC takes inadequacies of existing psychiatric categories as holding back causal investigation. Consequently, RDoC aims to circumnavigate existing psychiatric categories by directly investigating the (...) causal basis of symptoms. The unique methodological approach of RDoC exploits the supposed lack of influence of psychiatric categories on symptom modelling, taking psychiatric symptoms as the same regardless of which psychiatric category is employed or if no psychiatric category is employed. But this supposition is not always true. I will show how psychiatric categories can influence symptom modelling, whereby identical behaviours can be considered as different symptoms based on an individual’s psychiatric diagnosis. If the modelling of symptoms is influenced by psychiatric categories, then psychiatric categories will still play a role, a situation which RDoC researchers explicitly aim to avoid. I discuss four ways RDoC could address this issue. This issue also has important implications for factor analysis, cluster analysis, modifying psychiatric categories, and symptom based approaches. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 44-45.

Non language-using animals cannot have beliefs, because believing entails the ability to distinguish true from false beliefs and also the ability to distinguish changes in belief from changes in the world. For these abilities we need both the fixation of belief and counter-factual thought, for both of which language is necessary. The argument of the paper extends Davidson's argument to the same conclusion (which is found wanting). But denying beliefs to animals has no moral implications.

Non language-using animals cannot have beliefs, because believing entails the ability to distinguish true from false beliefs and also the ability to distinguish changes in belief from changes in the world. For these abilities we need both the fixation of belief and counter-factual thought, for both of which language is necessary. The argument of the paper extends Davidson's argument to the same conclusion. But denying beliefs to animals has no moral implications.

Critics who are concerned over the epistemological status of psychiatric diagnoses often describe them as being constructed. In contrast, those critics usually see symptoms as relatively epistemologically unproblematic. In this paper I show that symptoms are also constructed. To do this I draw upon the demarcation between data and phenomena. I relate this distinction to psychiatry by portraying behaviour of individuals as data and symptoms as phenomena. I then draw upon philosophers who consider phenomena to be constructed to argue that (...) symptoms are also constructed. Rather than being ready made in the world I show how symptoms are constructs we apply to the world. I highlight this with a historical example and describe methodological constraints on symptom construction. I show the epistemic problems with psychiatric diagnoses are also applicable to symptoms. Following this, I suggest that critics of psychiatric diagnoses should extend their criticism to symptoms or, if they still believe symptoms are relatively epistemologically unproblematic, should rethink their concerns over psychiatric diagnoses. (shrink)

Historians and sociologists of psychiatry often claim that psychiatric diagnoses are discontinuous. That is, a particular diagnoses will be described in one way in one era and described quite differently in a different era. Historians and sociologists often draw epistemic consequences from such discontinuities, claiming that truth is pluralistic, provisional and historicised. These arguments do not readily fit in with how analytical philosophers of science approach scientific realism. I show how the pessimistic meta induction does not capture the point which (...) historians and sociologists are making but scientific perspectivism seems to capture their point much better. I then highlight conceptual innovations which scientific perspectivists add. They demarcate between truth and objective reality, they specify which type of truth they endorse and they put down constraints on possible truths. This blocks an anything goes relativism which historians and sociologists can be in danger of falling into. I highlight my argument by discussing a discontinuous episode in the history of autism. I discuss three aspects of this discontinuity and show how scientific perspectivism can portray each aspect as non-trivially true. My argument shows that we can be scientific realists about autism even if we can formulate notions of autism in quite different ways. (shrink)

If Mary believes a bone is on the lawn, then she literally believes that, though her belief may be mistaken. But, if her pet Fido rushes up to what is in fact a bit of bone-shaped plastic, then Fido does not believe that there is a bone on the lawn. However, the best explanation for Fido’s behavior may be that he initially believed there was a bone on the lawn. Unless we are methodological or analytical behaviorists, the claim that we (...) can best explain the behavior of dumb animals by treating them as if they literally held beliefs subject to various rationality constraints is hardly surprising. I argue that this instrumentalism does not support the realist view that dumb animals are literally to be credited with beliefs. In particular, I focus on Davidson’s argument that a creature can have beliefs only if it can be the interpreter of the speech of another. Davidson’s argument, which has not won wide acceptance, is the most subtle examination to date of the relation between belief and language. I examine the premises of his argument, indicate two major criticisms, and attempt to defend his conclusion that dumb animals lack beliefs by adducing supporting arguments. (shrink)

Self-diagnosis in psychiatry is where individuals diagnose themselves rather than rely upon official diagnosticians to supply a psychiatric diagnosis. The accuracy of self-diagnosis is a contested topic. In this paper, I outline what arguments are needed to see self-diagnosis as accurate and how different approaches to self-diagnosis require different arguments. I show how different arguments are required to justify accuracy for an autistic individual judging they are autistic compared to non-autistic individuals judging they are not autistic. Different arguments are required (...) if a self-diagnosing individual accepts or rejects official diagnostic criteria. Finally, different arguments are required depending upon whether diagnoses are seen as objective entities, the product of theoretical virtues or practically useful groupings. All these approaches require unique arguments to justify the accuracy of self-diagnosis. Identifying the required arguments for different approaches is a stepping stone toward establishing whether those arguments and which of those arguments can be successfully justified. (shrink)

I suggest that the diagnosis that an individual self-diagnoses with can be influenced by levels of public awareness. Accurate diagnosis requires consideration of multiple diagnoses. Sometimes, different diagnoses can overlap with one another and can only be differentiated in subtle and nuanced ways, but particular diagnoses vary considerably in levels of public awareness. As such, an individual may meet the diagnostic criteria for one diagnosis but self-diagnoses with a different diagnosis because it is better known. I then outline a potential (...) negative consequence of this. Psychiatric diagnoses can grant access to what I call social resources, namely, political advocacy, campaigning for support, participating in scientific research, building diagnostic cultures, and opportunity for social interactions with people who have the same diagnosis. The strength of the social resources for a particular diagnosis can be made stronger when more people have that diagnosis. As such, inaccurate self-diagnosis can result in the social resources for one diagnosis being strengthened whilst not being strengthened in relation to another diagnosis in comparison to accurate diagnosis. This shows how inaccurate self-diagnosis can alter the distribution of social resources. We need to consider whether this is unfair to people who are diagnosed with less well-known conditions. (shrink)

In Consciousness Explained, Dennett systematically deconstructs the notion of consciousness, emptying it of its central and essential features. He fails to recognize the self?intimating nature of experience, in effect reducing experiences to reports or judgments that so?and?so is the case. His information?processing model of meaning is unable to account for semantics, the way in which speakers and hearers relate strings of symbols to the world. This ability derives ultimately from our animal nature as experiencers, though culturally supplemented in various ways. (...) But Dennett, while successful in rebutting Cartesianism about the mind, fails to take into account our natural history. He claims descent from Wittgenstein in his philosophy of mind, but he shows awareness only of Wittgensteinian's demolition of the private object of experience and overlooks the equally Wittgensteinian theme of humans as products of nature. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Grasswick’s theory of trust-building through knowledge-sharing across the scientific–lay divide. I apply this theory to the case of scientific–lay interactions in the development of marine protected areas (MPAs). This case-study not only supports Grasswick’s work, but suggests one friendly amendment to her theory. When it comes to trust-building through knowledge-sharing, the case of MPAs demonstrates that this sharing must be reciprocal.

Oscar Wilde remarked in The Picture of Dorian Gray that, ‘It is only the shallow people who do not judge by appearances.’ Over three centuries of natural science show that, at least as far as the study of the natural world is concerned, Wilde's epigram is itself shallow. Weber used the term ‘disenchantment’ to mean the elimination of magic from the modern scientific world view: the intellectual rationalisation of the world embodied in modern science has made it impossible to believe (...) in magic or an invisible God or gods, without a ‘sacrifice of the intellect’. (shrink)

The research reported in this paper set out to investigate ethics in the initial stages of construction projects. Briefing is the first real contact stage between the commissioner (client/employer) of a project — at this stage a potential project — and those involved in project realization — the designers and, subsequently, the constructors. It is well known that early decisions are of greatest impact and so, the importance of the initial contacts, communications and consequent decisions are paramount. Different project participants (...) are known to pursue individual objectives to varying degrees as well as possessing different perspectives and perceptions and operating/behaving in different ways. Hence, determination of the appropriate form, content etc. of a project is, inevitably, a matter of exercising value judgements and compromises and so, involves ethical considerations. A case study of a project through the briefing stage is reported and analysed, from initial contacts to scheme approval. It is apparent that a number of ethical concerns are manifest through the various actions of the major participants. (shrink)

The essays collected here do not constitute a philosophy of technology, in the sense which, for instance, Don Ihde requires. According to Ihde the philosopher of technology must reflectively analyse technology in such a way ‘as to illuminate features of the phenomenon of technology itself’. The contributors to this volume do not concern themselves with the essentiahst enterprise of defining technology; they more or less take it for granted that the reader is familiar with a variety of technologies such as (...) Information Technology, and proceed from there. Hence the title is the conjunctive one of Philosophy and Technolog . (shrink)