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  1. Conceptos de cognoscibilidad.Jan Heylen & Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2023 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 23:287-308.
    Many philosophical discussions hinge on the concept of knowability. For example, there is a blooming literature on the so-called paradox of knowability. How to understand this notion, however? In this paper, we examine several approaches to the notion: the naive approach to take knowability as the possibility to know, the counterfactual approach endorsed by Edgington (1985) and Schlöder (2019) , approaches based on the notion of a capacity or ability to know (Fara 2010, Humphreys 2011), and finally, approaches that make (...)
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  2.  34
    Understanding Attributions: Problems, Options, and a Proposal.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2021 - Theoria 88 (3):558-583.
    In this paper, I give an overview of different models of understanding attribution and advance a contextualist account of understanding attribution. Whereas other contextualist accounts make the degree in which the epistemic states of the relevant agents satisfy certain invariant conditions context-sensitive, the proposed account makes the conditions themselves context-sensitive.
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    ¿Es cartesiano el “teatro cartesiano” de Dennett?: Un análisis crítico desde el trialismo y el ens per se.Rodrigo Alfonso González Fernández & Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2024 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 41 (1):143-153.
    Este artículo examina cómo la separabilidad y unidad mente-cuerpo resultan clave para poner de manifiesto lo inapropiado del “teatro cartesiano”, metáfora creada por Daniel Dennett para criticar la experiencia consciente unificada en Descartes. La primera sección introduce al problema de la separabilidad cartesiana. La segunda examina cómo mente y cuerpo, separables mediante lo concebible según Descartes, resultan ser cosas metafísicamente distintas. La tercera enfatiza como separables no implica separados. La última sección enfatiza el argumento de la dis-analogía del piloto y (...)
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  4.  33
    Going ballistic: The dynamics of the imagination and the issue of intentionalism.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    Do we have control over the content of our imaginings? More precisely: do we have control over what our imaginings are about? Intentionalists say yes. Until recently, intentionalism could be taken as the received view. Recently, authors like Munro & Strohminger (2021) have developed some arguments against it. Here, I tentatively join their ranks and develop a new way to think about the way in which imaginings develop their contents that also goes against intentionalism. My proposal makes use of what (...)
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  5. Epistemic Projects, Indispensability, and the Structure of Modal Thought.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):611-638.
    I argue that modal epistemology should pay more attention to questions about the structure and function of modal thought. We can treat these questions from synchronic and diachronic angles. From a synchronic perspective, I consider whether a general argument for the epistemic support of modal though can be made on the basis of modal thoughs’s indispensability for what Enoch and Schechter (2008) call rationally required epistemic projects. After formulating the argument, I defend it from various objections. I also examine the (...)
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    An epistemic argument for evolutionary dispositions.Cristina Villegas & Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2024 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 39 (1):89-108.
    The use of dispositions has been put into question many times in the philosophical literature, especially with regards to how dispositional attributions can be justified. Yet, dispositions are an important part not only of our everyday talk but also of our scientific practices. In this paper, we develop an argument that infers the epistemic justification of dispositional talk from itsindispensability for carrying out basic epistemological projects, and we apply it to the use of dispositions in evolutionary biology. For doing this, (...)
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  7.  61
    Mistakes as revealing and as manifestations of competence.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3289-3308.
    The final chapter of Elgin’s defends the claim that some mistakes mark significant epistemic achievements. Here, I extend Elgin’s analysis of the informativeness of mistakes for epistemic policing. I also examine the type of theory of competence that Elgin’s view requires, and suggest some directions in which this can be taken.
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  8. Agentive Modality and the Structure of Modal Knowledge.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2021 - Dissertation,
    This thesis develops a theory about the structure of modal judgment and knowledge. Arguing in favour of pluralism about the source of modal knowledge, it focuses on the questions of the varieties of modal judgment and their relations, the function of modal judgment and the scope of modal knowledge. It offers a hypothesis about the development of the framework of modal knowledge, grounding it on the capacity to evaluate temporal judgments, from which the capacity to evaluate alternatives comes from, and (...)
     
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  9.  22
    J. Adam Carter. Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy & The Future of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2022, 159 pp. [REVIEW]Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2023 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 80:319-321.
    ¿Trae la posibilidad de mecanismos de mejoramiento cognitivo, como por ejemplo la posibilidad de implantar creencias en la mente de personas, preguntas nuevas a la epistemología? En este corto volumen, J. Adam Carter propone que sí. En particular, Carter argumenta que obliga a que consideremos la necesidad de una condición adicional en nuestras caracterizaciones del concepto de conocimiento: además de ser una forma de creencia verdadera justificada, que satisface una condición anti-Gettier, como aceptan la mayoría de los enfoques contemporáneos (en (...)
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