Giorgio Prodi was an important Italian scientist who developed an original philosophy based on two basic assumptions: 1. life is mainly a semiotic phenomenon; 2. matter is somewhat a semiotic phenomenon. Prodi applies Peirce's cenopythagorean categories to all phenomena of life and matter: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. They are interconnected meaning that the very ontology of the world, according to Prodi, is somewhat semiotic. In fact, when one describes matter as “made of” Firstness and Secondness, this means that matter ‘intrinsically’ (...) implies semiotics. At the very heart of Prodi’s theory lies a metaphysical hypothesis which is an ambitious theoretical gesture that places Prodi in an awkward position with respect to the customary philosophical tradition. In fact, his own ontology is neither dualistic nor monistic. Such a conclusion is unusual and weird, but much less unusual in present time than it was when it was first introduced. The actual resurgence of various “realisms” make Prodi’s semiotic realism much more interesting than when he first proposed his philosophical approach. What is uncommon, in Prodi perspective, is that he never separated semiotics from the materiality of the world. Prodi does not agree with the “standard” structuralist view of semiosis as an artificial and unnatural activity. On the contrary, Prodi believed semiosis lies at the very bottom of life. On one hand, Prodi maintains a strong realist stance; on the other, a realism that includes semiosis as ‘natural’ phenomena. This last view is very unusual because all forms, more or less, of realism exclude semiosis from nature but they frequently “reduce” semiosis to non-semiotic elements. According to Prodi, semiosis is a completely natural phenomenon. (shrink)

Drawing on a wide range of texts - from philosophical ethology to classical texts, and from continental philosophy to literature - Cimatti creates a dialogue with Flaubert, Derrida, Temple Grandin, Heidegger as well as Malaparte and Landolfi explores what human animality looks like, with a particular focus on the work of Gilles Deleuze.

Prodi's semiotics theory comes into being to answer a radical question: if a sign is a cross-reference, what guarantees the relation between the sign and the object to which it is referring? Prodi rebukes all traditional solutions: a subject's voluntary intention, a convention, the iconic relation between sign and object. He refutes the fIrst answer because the notion of intention, upon which it is based, is, indeed, a fully mysterious entity. The conventionalist answer is just as unsatisfactory for it does (...) nothing but extends to a whole group that which cannot be explained for a single component; the iconic one, finally, is rejected toosince in this case the notion of "likeliness", as the basis of the concept of "iconicity", is not explained. Prodi's answer is to locate the model of semiotic relations in the figure of the circle. The circle is life, which is nothing else but an infinite chain of translation and recognition relations amidst ever more complex systems. The circle has neither a beginning nor an end. It has no foundation, no established rule. It holds no cause that cannot become, in turn, effect. Semiosis, then, is based upon life for life, itself, is intrinsically semiotic. We can put the world in signs, that is we can come to know it, because we, ourselves, are a part of that very worldthat through us is made known. Finally, what this implies is that being inside the circle of semiosis-life, an issue arises what is beyond that circle: that is both an aesthetic and a religious problem. (shrink)

Prodi's semiotics theory comes into being to answer a radical question: if a sign is a cross-reference, what guarantees the relation between the sign and the object to which it is referring? Prodi rebukes all traditional solutions: a subject's voluntary intention, a convention, the iconic relation between sign and object. He refutes the fIrst answer because the notion of intention, upon which it is based, is, indeed, a fully mysterious entity. The conventionalist answer is just as unsatisfactory for it does (...) nothing but extends to a whole group that which cannot be explained for a single component; the iconic one, finally, is rejected toosince in this case the notion of "likeliness", as the basis of the concept of "iconicity", is not explained. Prodi's answer is to locate the model of semiotic relations in the figure of the circle. The circle is life, which is nothing else but an infinite chain of translation and recognition relations amidst ever more complex systems. The circle has neither a beginning nor an end. It has no foundation, no established rule. It holds no cause that cannot become, in turn, effect. Semiosis, then, is based upon life for life, itself, is intrinsically semiotic. We can put the world in signs, that is we can come to know it, because we, ourselves, are a part of that very worldthat through us is made known. Finally, what this implies is that being inside the circle of semiosis-life, an issue arises what is beyond that circle: that is both an aesthetic and a religious problem. (shrink)

Is language an evolutionarily independent faculty from other cognitive capacities? In recent years two opposing views have clashed: the innatist view, of which linguist and philosopher Noam Chomsky is the main exponent, which answers in the affirmative; the constructivist-empiricist one according to which, on the other hand, language is but the ultimate evolution-complication of non-linguistic capabilities already present in non-human animals. This paper presents and comments on the position of the scientist and philosopher Giorgio Prodi (1928-1987) who avoids this contraposition (...) by thematising an original aesthetic area that would be at the origin of both animal and then human cognition as well as properly human language. Unlike the constructivist view, however, for Prodi such an original aesthetic field can only ground language because it is co-extensive with the original space of biosemiosis. Lastly, the theme of co-evolution is analysed, the only evolutionary mechanism capable, according to Prodi, to account for both the similarities and differences of human language compared to the forms of communication of non-human animals and plants. (shrink)

The tradition of Italian Thought – not the political one but the poetic and naturalistic one – finds in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze a way to enter into the new century, the century of immanence and animality. In fact, Deleuze himself remained outside the main philosophical traditions of his own time. The tradition to which Deleuze refers is the one that begins with Spinoza and ends with Nietzsche. It is an ontological tradition, which deals mainly with life and the (...) world rather than with the human subject and knowledge. Finally, the text sketches a possible dialogue between Deleuze and the poet-philosopher Giacomo Leopardi, one of the most important figures of Italian Thought. (shrink)

The Marcel Duchamp absolute gesture is such a gesture that inaugurates an escape movement from any Symbolic Order ; a gesture that, obviously, Duchamp does not stop play out, because each time he enacts it, this is a new gesture; there is no rule for the absolute gesture. In fact, if it existed it would not be absolute. Duchamp is such an ‘artist’ who is without work, then, because what matters is not art, but the making of one's existence something (...) unique. The absolute gesture consists in the making of art a form of life. (shrink)

That non-human animals show genuine aesthetic experiences is (yet?) controversial. On the contrary, it seems that there is no doubt that human animal can do it. In this paper, however, we ask whether Homo sapiens has actually the biological capacity to make a truly aesthetic experience. The starting point for this analysis is the most important characteristic of the human species, the innate faculty of language. If you take into account the relationship between human body/mind and language is not at (...) all obvious that Homo sapiens could really prove a genuine aesthetic experience. On the contrary, such an experience would be biologically available only to non-human animals. (shrink)

: According to the extended mind thesis, the human mind is not limited by the boundaries of the body. In this paper, we propose a description of human emotions based on two distinct theories, not usually considered together: Vygotsky’s historical-cultural psychology and Chomsky’s theory of language. Together these two perspectives allow us to construct a global theory of extended mind that considers emotions to be artificial entities that have a specific “biological” goal and are external to the body. In the (...) last short section, this model will be applied to the case of “artistic” human affect. Keywords Extended Mind; Language; Lev S. Vygotsky; Noam Chomsky; Human Emotions; Aesthetic Reaction Fuori dal corpo. Linguaggio, emozioni e arte nei diari di Vygotsky Riassunto: Secondo la tesi della mente estesa, la mente umana non è confinata entro i limiti del corpo. In questo lavoro, proponiamo una descrizione delle emozioni umane basata su due diverse teorie, che solitamente non vengono considerate assieme: la psicologia storico-culturale di Vygotsky e la teoria del linguaggio di Chomsky. Prese assieme queste due prospettive ci permettono di costruire una teoria globale della mente estesa che consideri le emozioni come entità artificiali che hanno uno specifico fine “biologico” e che tuttavia sono “esterne” rispetto al corpo. Nell’ultima breve sezione, questo modello sarà applicato al caso del peculiare affetto “artistico” umano. Parole chiave: Mente estesa; Linguaggio; Vygotsky; Chomsky; Emozioni umane; Reazioni estetiche. (shrink)

Domanda. Se il paziente sa quello che sta facendo, e lei sa perché lo sta facendo, perché interpretare quello che sta facendo anziché chiedergli perché lo fa? Bion. Questo è un altro mistero. Perché non trasferirlo direttamente da lui stesso a lui stesso? Perché è necessaria una persona esterna? Perché l’essere umano non può essere come un lombrico? Perché avere un partner? Perché non avere una vita sessuale con sé stessi senza altre seccature? Perché non si può avere una relazione (...) direttamente con sé stessi senza l’intervento di una specie di levatrice mentale o fisica? Pare che abbiamo bisogno di “rimbalzare” su un’altra persona, di avere qualcosa che rifletta indietro quello che diciamo prima che esso possa diventare comprensibile.Per sapere chi sono io devo chiederlo a te. Quindi la mia essenza è fuori di me. Tu, gli altri, siete il ‘mio’ segreto. La natura eccentrica dell’animale umano viene percorsa attraverso una riflessione sull’opera dello psicoanalista Wilfred Bion. Avendo in mente una domanda finale: se io sono tu, l’Io – propriamente - non esiste. Allora è un impostore? C’è un modo per essere io che non sia fittizio? (shrink)

[…]Per nostra tranquillità – gli animali non muoionoma crepano d’una morte per così dire più piatta,perdendo – vogliamo crederlo – meno sensibilità e mondo,uscendo – così ci pare – da una scena meno tragica.Le loro animucce mansuete non ci ossessionano la notte,mantengono la distanza,conoscono i mores. E così questo scarabeo morto sul viottolobrilla non compianto verso il sole.Basta pensarci per la durata di uno sguardo:sembra che non gli sia accaduto nulla di importante.L’importante, pare, r...

In this paper an aesthetics is proposed based on the De Martino concept of “crisis of presence”. If one takes such a terrifying notion seriously a very different idea of art can be experienced, an art suited in the apocalyptic time of the “end of the world”. An art that can only begin when the fear for the non-human and materic in us is set aside.

Drawing upon multiple research fields, this volume explores the affinities between the work of Marx and Wittgenstein, arguing that although they belong to two different philosophical traditions, their thinking can offer benefits across both political philosophy and philosophy of language.