Stark variations exist in U.S. immigration enforcement. These variations have persisted even during the COVID-19 pandemic, when special measures that should have constrained variations were in place. This Article argues that variations in discretionary enforcement decisions based on resistance to national policies, bias, illegal tactics, or arbitrariness are unjust and should be curtailed. The Article first distinguishes between transparent sources of variation in immigration law and variations that stem from non-transparent, discretionary determinations. Within the category of discretionary determinations, the Article (...) argues that there are just and unjust variations. It contends that unjust variations raise serious constitutional concerns, weaken preemption doctrine, and require us to reconceptualize the immigration federalism debate to account for cooperative and uncooperative behavior within the federal government itself. Finally, the Article offers solutions to help limit unjust variations. (shrink)

On December 7,1999, a divided Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Nealis v. Baird that a claim may be brought under Oklahoma's wrongful death statute on behalf of a nonviable fetus born alive. The decision represents a departure from the traditional notion that “viability”—the ability of a fetus to sustain life outside the womb with or without medical assistance—is the standard for wrongful death recovery. In replacing the “viability” standard with a “live birth” standard, the majority maintained that live birth is (...) the “unassailable point at which legal rights must be said to attach to the human person. “ By holding a nonviable fetus a legal “person” for the purpose of a wrongful death claim, the court's decision emphasizes the limited application of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade that a fetus is not a person for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. (shrink)

On December 7,1999, a divided Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Nealis v. Baird that a claim may be brought under Oklahoma's wrongful death statute on behalf of a nonviable fetus born alive. The decision represents a departure from the traditional notion that “viability”—the ability of a fetus to sustain life outside the womb with or without medical assistance—is the standard for wrongful death recovery. In replacing the “viability” standard with a “live birth” standard, the majority maintained that live birth is (...) the “unassailable point at which legal rights must be said to attach to the human person. “ By holding a nonviable fetus a legal “person” for the purpose of a wrongful death claim, the court's decision emphasizes the limited application of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade that a fetus is not a person for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. (shrink)