"Al-Farabi of Baghdad (c. 870-950) is the first major representative of the medieval Arabic Aristotelianism which came to influence the Christian West so profoundly. In the Islamic world his writings on logic set the pattern for the future and virtually created Islamic philosophy. He is also important as a witness to the study of Aristotle in late antiquity, demonstrating a knowledge of Galen and the exegetical tradition of Porphyry. This translation is based on a fresh study of the Arabic (...) manuscripts. An introduction and notes make this intriguing document accessible to all for whom it contains important matter.Classicists, historians of philosophy and logic, medievalists, Arabists, students of Islamic thought."--. (shrink)
The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that Ibn Bāǧǧa’s commentaries on al- Fārābī’s logical writings reveal a perpetuation of al-Fārābī’s logic in Andalusia and that they also assist us in the recognition of the nature and achievement of this logic. Ibn Bāǧǧa’s Introduction or Eisagoge is a commentary on al-Fārābī’s introductory Letter and the Five Aphorisms, as well as subsequent logical treatises of al-Fārābī. Ibn Bāǧǧa, in agreement with al-Fārābī, presents logic as consisting of five syllogistic arts, (...) rhetoric, poetry, dialectic, sophistry and demonstration. These arts are constituted by both the form and matter of logic, the matter referring to the five syllogistic arts in which the form of logic is employed. Ibn Ḫaldūn later testifies to this comprehensive account of the five syllogistic arts articulated primarily by al-Fārābī but also in some measure by Ibn Sīnā, and says that, by his time, this account of the syllogistic arts had been replaced by a more limited a... (shrink)
We reconstruct as much as we can the part of al-Fārābī's treatment of modal logic that is missing from the surviving pages of his Long Commentary on the Prior Analytics. We use as a basis the quotations from this work in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides, together with relevant material from al-Fārābī's other writings. We present a case that al-Fārābī's treatment of the dictum de omni had a decisive effect on the development and presentation of Ibn Sīnā's modal logic. (...) We give further evidence that the Harmonisation of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle was not written by al-Fārābī. (shrink)
This article analyzes al-Fārābī's conception of the astronomical method by examining rarely studied texts such as the K. al-mūsīqā and K. al-burhān and by addressing key issues such as the subject matter of astronomy, the techniques used to derive the first principles of this science, the relation between astrology, astronomy, physics, and metaphysics, and the place of al-Fārābī in the Arabic astronomical tradition. The analysis indicates that al-Fārābī's theories combine material from the Greek astronomical tradition, especially Geminus, as well as (...) from the logical works of Aristotle, particularly the Posterior Analytics. Moreover, it enables us to view al-Fārābī as a link between the Greek astronomers on the one hand and Ibn Sīnā and Naşīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī on the other. (shrink)
In this dissertation we observe the diachronic development of certain vocabulary items which form the basis of discourse in Islamic philosophy in the Arabic language. Using a set of philosophical terms from al-Kindi, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina we analyze the use of each term, first individually and then comparatively. To examine philosophical terms in their natural setting, we will look at the philosophers' own definitions of these terms. Thus, we observe how definitions and their use change over two centuries, (...) both in the references made in definitions and in the words selected for their definientia. This development and the enduring effect of the philosophers' definitions in Islamic philosophy will form the focus of our study. ;This dissertation deals with the development of a technical philosophical vocabulary in the Arabic language; it is not primarily a hunt for the Hellenistic origin of the words or ideas. Prior to the translation of Greek philosophical texts into the Arabic language, Arabic lacked the vocabulary to speculate on these ideas. This was not an unusual state of affairs, as philosophy was not a discipline developed by the Arabic language writers prior to the translations of Greek philosophical texts. To speculate about metaphysics, philosophers need words for the objects of metaphysics: substance, cause and matter--terms which form the center of our study. ;An Arabic vocabulary was the tool the philosophers needed to discuss the concepts, ideas and premises brought to them by philosophy, an imported science, without a pre-existing vocabulary in Arabic. For purposes of this study we will focus on language as the tool of philosophy. (shrink)
A distinguished philosopher, a sophisticated scientist and a talented musician: the many achievements of the tenth-century Islamic thinker al-Farabi are carefully documented in this substantial new introduction to his life and works. Credited with introducing Neoplatonism to the Muslim world, al-Farabi is also acknowledged as the first great system builder of Islamic philosophy. His pivotal influence, not only on Islamic thought but also on western philosophy generally, is reflected in this stimulating study, which includes a survey of al- (...) class='Hi'>Farabi's influences on such major figures as al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina and Moses Maimonides. (shrink)
This volume constitutes an attempt at bringing together philosophies of time—or more precisely, philosophies on time and, in a concomitant way, history—emerging from Christianity’s and Islam’s intellectual histories. Starting from the Neoplatonic heritage and the voice of classical philosophy, the volume enters the Byzantine and Arabic intellectual worlds up to Ibn Al-Arabi’s times. A conscious choice in this volume is not to engage with, perhaps, the most prominent figures of Christian and Arabic philosophy, i.e., Augustine on the one hand and (...) Avicenna/Ibn Sina on the other, precisely because these have attracted so much attention due to their prominence in their respective traditions—and beyond. In a certain way, Maximus the Confessor and Ibn Al-Arabi—together with Al-Fārābi—emerge as alternative representatives of their two traditions in this volume, offering two axes for this endeavor. The synthesis of those approaches on time and history, their comparison rather than their mere co-existence, is left to the reader’s critical inquiry and philosophical investigation. (shrink)
Al-Fārābī's lost commentary on Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea is without doubt one of the most sorely missed lost works of the Islamic falāsifa. In part, this is because the commentary was in some respects a scandal, and scholars accordingly believe it may hold the key to resolving present-day disagreements on how to interpret al-Fārābī's views as expressed in his independent treatises. Perhaps al-Fārābī's most shocking or scandalous statement is that preserved by the Hispano-Muslim philosophers Ibn Bājja, Ibn Ṭufayl, and Ibn Rushd. (...) According to them al-Fārābī says in his commentary on Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea that happiness is to be achieved only in this life, not in the afterlife; that there is no happiness but political happiness; and that union with the active intellect – generally considered the highest goal of human existence by the philosophers – is impossible. This paper addresses the following questions: What exactly is the debate about? Why is the question of immortality or conjunction related to Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea? And why was it so controversial to say, in the context of the Ethica Nicomachea, that there is no happiness but political happiness? Although the bulk of al-Fārābī's commentary is still lost, I have discovered two quotations of it in Hebrew manuscripts. As I will argue in this paper, these newly-discovered quotations – which are included with an English translation in the appendix – can shed light on the mysteries concerning al-Fārābī's commentary. Résumé Le commentaire perdu d'al-Fārābī à l’ Ethique à Nicomaque d'Aristote est sans conteste, parmi les ouvrages perdus de philosophes islamiques, l'un de ceux dont on regrette le plus l'absence. Cela s'explique notamment par le caractère à certains égards scandaleux de ce commentaire, dont les spécialistes attendent dès lors qu'il recèle la clé pour résoudre les désaccords actuels quant à l'interprétation à donner aux idées formulées par cet auteur dans ses traités personnels. La thèse peut-être la plus choquante ou scandaleuse d'al-Fārābī est celle qui est préservée par les philosophes hispano-islamiques Ibn Bājja, Ibn Ṭufayl et Ibn Rushd: selon eux, il affirme, dans son commentaire à l’ Ethique à Nicomaque, que le bonheur ne saurait se réaliser qu'en cette vie et non dans l'au-delà, qu'il n'y a pas de bonheur autre que le bonheur politique, et que l'union à l'intellect agent – généralement tenue par les philosophes pour être la fin suprême de l'existence humaine – est impossible. Cet article traite les questions suivantes: quel est exactement l'enjeu de ce débat? Pourquoi les questions de l'immortalité et de la conjonction sont-elles liées à l’ Ethique à Nicomaque? Et en quoi était-il si problématique d'affirmer, en référence à cette œuvre, qu'il n'y a pas de bonheur autre que le bonheur politique? Même si le corps du commentaire d'al-Fārābī est encore perdu, j'en ai découvert deux citations dans des manuscrits hébreux. Comme je le soutiens ici, ces citations récemment découvertes – données dans l'appendice avec leur traduction anglaise – font un peu de lumière sur les mystères du commentaire d'al-Fārābī. (shrink)
Ibn Rušd devoted a certain number of works to Aristotle's Prior Analytics. In a series of opuscules written over a period of twenty years and following upon his Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, he faced a problem particular to the modal syllogism – that of the mood of the conclusion in mixed syllogisms. The problem can be stated as follows: At the beginning of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle established a formal deductive principle – that of universal attribution. Applied to (...) the modal syllogism, this principle is inadequate as stated. It is too general to be applied in a univocal manner in all modal syllogisms. To preserve a sense of coherence in Aristotle's declarations, the commentators had to interpret it. Presenting the interpretations of the commentators, primarily al-Fārābī and Alexander, on the basis of al-Fārābī's Large Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, Averroes criticizes them. Applied according to Alexander's interpretation, the principle of universal attribution is valid only for modal syllogisms one of whose premises is necessary and the other assertoric; according to al-Fārābī's interpretation, it is verified only when the minor premise is possible. Averroes proposes two preliminary solutions. Either this formal deductive principle must be applied differently according to the modal differences of the minor premises in mixed syllogisms or would be used in two ways, generally or in keeping with each mood. These solutions are not satisfactory, for they call into question the unity and universality of the principle of universal attribution as established by Aristotle. What is the utility, Averroes asks, of a principle which does not hold for all modalities or does not apply to all the premises when the Pr. An. ought to furnish formal and universal principles of deduction? And why did Aristotle define the principle of universal attribution without distinguishing its application according to each of the three modal premises? Returning at the end of his career to a literal exegesis of Aristotle's propositions and without harkening back to the earlier solutions, he proposes a theory of making the terms modal in order to save Aristotle's declarations with respect to the principle of universal attribution and the mood of the conclusion of mixed syllogisms. Though formally inadequate, this solution, which had a continued history, proposes a new way of looking at the classification of modal propositions. Ibn Rušd a consacré un certain nombre de travaux aux Premiers Analytiques d'Aristote. Dans une série d' opuscules consécutifs à son Commentaire moyen des APr. et dont la rédaction s'étale sur plus de vingt ans il s'est trouvé confronté à un problème spécifique à la syllogistique modale, celui du mode de la conclusion dans les syllogismes mixtes. Le problème peut se poser ainsi: Aristote a établi au début d' APr. un principe formel de déduction, le principe d'attribution universelle. Appliqué dans la syllogistique modale ce principe tel quel s'avère insuffisant. Sa généralité ne permet pas de l'appliquer de manière univoque dans tous les syllogismes modaux. Les commentateurs ont dû l'interpreter pour garder une cohérence aux declarations d'Aristote. Exposant les interpretations des commentateurs, principalement al-Fārābī et Alexandra, à partir du Grand commentaire d'al-Fārābī aux APr., Ibn Rušd les critique respectivement. Appliqué selon l'interpretation d'Alexandre, le principe d'attribution universelle n'est valable que pour les syllogismes modaux dont une des prémisses est nécessaire, l'autre assertorique; suivant l'interprétation d'al-Fārābī, il ne se vérifie que dans le cas où la mineure est possible. Averroès propose quant à lui d'abord deux premieres solutions. Ce principe formel de déduction aurait des conditions d'application differentes suivant les differences modales des prémisses mineures dans les syllogismes mixtes, ou aurait deux acceptions, l'une générale et l'autre propre a chaque modalité. Ces solutions ne sont pas satisfaisantes car elles mettent en cause l'unité et l'universalité du principe d'attribution universelle tel qu'Aristote l'a établi. Quelle est l'utilité, s'interroge Averroès, d'un principe qui ne se vérifie pas pour toutes les modalités ou qui ne s'applique pas à toutes les prémisses, dès lors que le traité des APr. doit fournir des principes formels et universels de déduction? Et pourquoi Aristote a-t-il défini le principe d'attribution universelle sans différencier son application selon chacune des trois premisses modales? Revenant a la fin de sa carriere a une exegese litterale des propos d'Aristote et sans rappeler les solutions précédentes, il propose une théorie de la modalisation des termes pour sauver la littéralité des déclarations d'Aristote relatives au principe d'attribution universelle et au mode de la conclusion des syllogismes mixtes. Bien que formellement insuffisante cette solution, qui a eu une postérité, propose une réflexion nouvelle sur la classification des propositions modales. (shrink)
The “lost” Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī treatises recently discovered in the Tehran codex Marwī 19 include a record of a philosophical debate instigated by the Ḥamdānid prince Sayf-al-Dawla. More precisely, Marwī 19 contains Yaḥyā’s adjudication of a dispute between an unnamed Opponent and Yaḥyā’s younger relative Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAdī (who also served as al-Fārābī’s assistant), along with Ibrāhīm's response to Yaḥyā’s adjudication, and Yaḥyā’s final word. At issue was a problem of Aristotelian exegesis: should “body” be understood as falling under the (...) category of substance or under the category of quantity? The unnamed Opponent argues that body is a species of substance; Ibrāhīm argues that technically speaking, body is a species of quantity, and hence an accident; and Yaḥyā judges that body is a species of substance, though for very different reasons than the Opponent gives. For the first time, the Arabic text of this exchange is edited and translated into English. Also provided is an Introduction that sets the debate in historical context, and discusses in particular the possible influence of John Philoponus. The debate is interesting and important not only because of the philosophical ramifications of the issues under discussion, but because it constitutes evidence of dialectical practice among Arabic-speaking philosophers from the middle of the 10th century. (shrink)
İdrak ve niteliği felsefenin en önemli problemlerinden biridir. İbn Sînâ hissî, hayalî, vehmî ve aklî olmak üzere dört farklı idrak mertebesi dillendirir. Buna göre insan nefsi nesnelerin suretlerini duyu yetileriyle algılar. Daha sonra bu suretleri hayal yetisine teslim eder. Akabinde akıl bu sureti barındırdığı maddî eklentilerden arındırarak aklî suretlerin oluşumu için gerekli zeminleri hazırlar. Daha sonra faal akıl insan nefsine aklî suretleri verir. İnsan zihninde duyularla algılanan bu kavramlardan başka kavramlar da vardır. Bu küllî kavramların yeri nesnel âlem değil öznel (...) âlemdir. İslam felsefesi geleneğinde Fârâbî ilk defa bu ayırımı yapar ve ma‘kūlleri birinci ve ikinci ma‘kūller diye iki kısma ayırır. İbn Sînâ da bu sınıflandırmayı benimser ve konu hakkında yeni açıklamalar getirir. İbn Sînâ, ikinci ma‘kūllerin sonraki dönemlerde yapılan felsefî ve mantıkî ayırımını her ne kadar dillendirmese de eserlerinden bu iki ma‘kūl türünün farklılığına teveccüh eder. Bu çalışmada İbn Sînâ felsefesinde idrak olgusunun gerçekleşme niteliği ele alınacak ve daha sonraki dönemlerde dillendirilen ikinci felsefî ma‘kūl anlamların İbn Sînâ felsefesindeki yeri açıklanacaktır. (shrink)
As is well known,taṣawwurandtaṣdīq,conceptualization and assent, are essential notions in the epistemology of Arabo-Islamic philosophy. Conceptualization amounts to the definition of an object of knowledge, and assent to the recognition,viasome kind of reasoning, that this definition is true. One of the authors who dealt with both topics in greatest depth was al-Fārābī, whoseoeuvreexerted a profound influence on Ibn Bājja. This article analyzes the materials ontaṣawwurandtaṣdīqfound in Ibn Bājja's notes regarding al-Fārābī's writings on logic and scientific method, namely the glosses toKitāb (...) al-Burhān. The analysis shows, on the one hand, that he understood perfectly the importance of both terms in al-Fārābī's construal of Aristotle's scientific method; and on the other, that he used them to deal with human thought processes. Indeed, conceptualization and assent were essential notions for Ibn Bājja, and underlie some of his best-known works.RésuméIl est bien connu que les notions detaṣawwur et detaṣdīq sont tout à fait centrales dans l’épistémologie de la philosophie arabo-islamique. La “conceptualisation” désigne la définition d'un objet de connaissance, et l’“assentiment” la reconnaissance de la véracité de la définition, par un raisonnement d'un certain type. Parmi les auteurs ayant traité ces deux thèmes le plus en profondeur figure al-Fārābī, qui a exercé sur Ibn Bājja une influence décisive. Cet article analyse les passages relatifs àtaṣawwurettaṣdīqdans les notes d'Ibn Bājja aux écrits de logique et de méthodologie scientifique d'al-Fārābī, en particulier ses gloses auKitāb al-Burhān. On montre ainsi qu'Ibn Bājja a parfaitement saisi l'importance de ces deux termes dans la lecture farabienne de la méthode scientifique aristotélicienne, et qu'il les a employés pour traiter de certaines activités mentales. En effet ces deux notions, centrales chez Ibn Bājja, sont à la base de certaines de ses œuvres les plus fameuses. (shrink)
This article lists the medical works written by Ibn Bājja, overviews those that have come down to us and studies the super-commentary of Galen's commentary to Hippocrates'Aphorisms. This text shows a deep influence of al-Fārābī, namely in a conception of medical experience which stems from the latter's construal of experience as the inductive process described by Aristotle inPosterior Analyticswhich brings the premises of demonstration. On this basis, Ibn Bājja advocated for a less scholastic, more empiric medicine, and his claim was (...) echoed by Ibn Rushd. There are some similarities between Ibn Bājja's text and Ibn Rushd'sK. al-Kulliyyāt fī al-ṭibbwhich suggest that the latter had readSharḥ fī al-Fuṣūl.This work gives moreover some evidence that human dissection could have been performed during Ibn Bājja's time.RésuméLe présent article propose la liste des œuvres médicales composées par Ibn Bājja, donne une présentation synthétique de celles qui nous ont été transmises et étudie le métacommentaire au commentaire de Galien sur lesAphorismesd'Hippocrate. Ce texte montre une influence profonde d'al- Fārābī, en particulier dans sa conception de l'expérience médicale, qui remonte à la façon dont ce dernier construit l'expérience comme le procédé inductif, décrit par Aristote dans lesSeconds Analytiques, produisant les prémisses de la démonstration. Sur cette base, Ibn Bājja défend la pertinence d'une médecine moins scolastique et plus empirique, une position dont Ibn Rushd se fera l'écho. Des similitudes entre le texte d'Ibn Bājja et leK. al-Kulliyyāt fī al-ṭibbd'Ibn Rushd suggèrent que celui-ci avait lu leSharḥ fī al-Fuṣūl. Cette œuvre, en outre, pourrait bien attester que la dissection humaine était pratiquée à l'époque d'Ibn Bājja. (shrink)
L'A. confronta due commenti su quello che nel mondo arabo viene considerato il primo libro della Metaphysica di Aristotele: alpha Elatton. Dopo averne delineato i contenuti e la penetrazione nel mondo arabo grazie alle traduzioni di Ustat e Ishaq ibn Hunayn, l'A. esamina due importanti commenti a quest'opera: Yahyá Ibn 'Adi, un commentatore cristiano della scuola di Baghdad e Averroè . I due autori leggono il testo in modo molto diverso: questo suggerisce una grande differenza tra Averroè e la scuola (...) di Baghdad, sebbene il filosofo andaluso abbia ammirato e seguito il lavoro di al-Farabi. In particolare è naturale il rifiuto da parte di Averroè di introdurre un'inchiesta puramente teologica nella trattazione, punto accettato invece da Ibn 'Adi, secondo il proposito di Averroè di rimarcare il fondamento fisico della metafisica, come è possibile comprendere soprattutto grazie alla lettura del Trattato. (shrink)
Originally published 1959. Ibn ‘Arabi is one of the most significant thinkers of Islam. Yet he is far less widely known in the Western world than Ibn Sina, Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd or even Al Farabi. This volume provides original interpretations and illustrations to some of Ibn ‘Arabi’s ideas, as well as including a number of his texts in English.
It has been repeatedly stated that Maximus the Confessor’s (c. 580–662) thought is of eminently philosophical interest, and his work has been approached from a philosophical point of view in a number of monographs. However, no dedicated collective scholarly engagement on Maximus the Confessor as a philosopher has been produced. Although Maximus’ treatises reflect a strong philosophical background, prior research has failed to determine with clarity his specific philosophical sources and predilections. Besides apologetic purposes, he referred occasionally to purely philosophical (...) topics, which are more adequate to reveal Maximus’ philosophical education and knowledge. Among these topics are representation and imagination, which have a significant role in epistemology. Maximus’ epistemology proves his dependence on ancient Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle, Stoicism and Alexandrian Neoplatonism. A few centuries later, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Al-Farabi (c.870—c.950), the founder of medieval Arabic philosophy, dealt with the same topics in his epistemology. Al-Farabi’s philosophy has been studied extensively and we have a good idea about his possible sources. There are several indications that Al-Farabi and Maximus the Confessor share common insights, for they resort to the same ancient Greek tradition. In this paper, I attempt to compare Maximus’ and Al-Farabi’s epistemology in order to reveal affinities and differences that permit us to analyze and assess Maximus’ philosophical education. (shrink)
The present volume offers a complete critical Arabic edition of Ibn Ṭumlūs' opus on logic, entitled _Compendium on Logic_. The text covers all the parts of “the expanded Organon”, as it was known from the time of al-Fārābī to that of Ibn Rushd. With an English and Arabic introduction, notes and indices.
Ibn Sīnā's celestial kinematics represents an important aspect of his cosmology but has up to now received little attention in the secondary literature. After a short overview of some key features of his cosmology, this article attempts to clarify the role played by the separate intellects, the celestial souls, and the celestial bodies in causing celestial motion. It challenges the common view that Ibn Sīnā adhered to the theory of ten separate intellects developed by al-Fārābī and attempts to reconstruct his (...) astronomical-metaphysical model on the basis of his main philosophical works. In addition, the article addresses the thorny question of how motion is transmitted from the intellectual to the physical plane, and it sheds light on the place of physics, metaphysics, and astronomy in Ibn Sīnā's cosmological method. Résumé La théorie avicenienne du mouvement des orbes célestes représente un aspect important de sa cosmologie qui n'a cependant pas encore été l'objet d'une étude approfondie. Cet article compte combler ce manque en fournissant une analyse des différents principes à l'origine du mouvement céleste, ainsi qu'une réflexion sur le rôle des disciplines astronomique, physique, et métaphysique dans les explications que fournit Ibn Sīnā à ce sujet. L'accent est mis sur le rapport des intelligences aux orbes et sur la problématique du passage de l'intellectif au physique, un moment charnière dans la cinématique avicenienne. En outre, l'étude remet en question l'adhésion d'Ibn Sīnā à la théorie farabienne des dix intelligences et entreprend une reconstitution de son modèle cosmologique. (shrink)
This study deals with Dominicus Gundissalinus’s discussion on metaphysics as philosophical discipline. Gundissalinus’s translation and re-elaboration of al-Fārābī’s Iḥṣā’ al-ʿulūm furnish him, in the De scientiis, a specific and detailed procedure for metaphysical analysis articulated in two different stages, an ascending and a descending one. This very same procedure is presented by Gundissalinus also in his De divisione philosophiae, where the increased number of sources –in particular, Avicenna– does not prevent Gundissalinus to quote the entire passage on the methods of (...) metaphysical science from the Iḥṣā’ al-ʿulūm, with some slight changes in his Latin translation. The analytical procedure herein proposed becomes an effective ‘metaphysical programme’ with regards to Gundissalinus’s onto-cosmological writing, the De processione mundi. The comparative analysis of this treatise with the procedure received by al-Fārābī shows Gundissalinus’s effort to follow and apply this metaphysical programme to his own reflection, in a whole different context from al-Fārābī’s and presenting doctrines quite opposed to the theoretical ground on which al-Fārābī’s epistemology is based, like ibn Gabirol’s universal hylomorphism. Nevertheless, thanks to the application of the ‘metaphysical programme’, one can effectively claim that Gundissalinus’s metaphysics is, at least in the author’s intentions, a well-defined metaphysical system. In appendix to this article the three Latin versions of al-Fārābī’s discussion on metaphysics are reported, e.g., Gundissalinus’s quotations in De scientiis and De divisione philosophiae, and Gerard of Cremona’s translation in his De scientiis. (shrink)
The first book consecrated to logic, written by an andalusian author is Ibn Hazm’s Kitªb al-taqrÌb li-Êadd al-manðiq (“Introduction to definition of logic”). Where, the author seeks to adapt the logic to the simple language of the jurists. Here it is pointed out how this important treatise can depend on the logical school of Bagdad.
The purpose of this essay is to examine two important treatises of the Islamic classical age in the light of utopian discourse. The works considered are the “philosophical novels” Risālat Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān f ī asrār al-ḥikmat al-mašriqiyya (Treatise of the Alive, son of the Awake, on the secrets of oriental wisdom) by Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 1185) and Risālat Kāmiliyya f ī al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya (Treatise of Kāmil on the Life of the Prophet) by Ibn al-Naf īs (d. 1288). Together with (...) the political writings of al-Fārābī, these works are among the first to be named when considering the possibility of an autonomous utopian tradition in Islam.1 Their relevance to the utopian category has already been shown by other scholars; .. (shrink)
Philosophy in the Islamic world emerged in the ninth century and continued to flourish into the fourteenth century. It was strongly influenced by Greek thought, but Islamic philosophers also developed an original philosophical culture of their own, which had a considerable impact on the subsequent course of Western philosophy. This volume offers new translations of philosophical writings by Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ghazali, Ibn Tufayl, and Ibn Rushd. All of the texts presented here were very influential and invite comparison with (...) later works in the Western tradition. They focus on metaphysics and epistemology but also contribute to broader debates concerning the conception of God, the nature of religion, the place of humanity in the universe, and the limits of human reason. A historical and philosophical introduction sets the writings in context and traces their preoccupations and their achievement. (shrink)
The notion of classifying sciences has a quite along past in the history of philosophy. The aim of this study is to set forth and analize Ibn al-ʿArabī’s classification of sciences at first, and then to make a comparison with al-Fārābī’s classification. Making such a comparison between Ibn al-ʿArabī, who is a unique representative of Islamic mystical thought, and al-Fārābī, who is a mighty representative of peripatetic Islamic philosophy, will conribute to seeing the epistemological views of sufism and classical Islamic (...) philosophy together. In the study, a descreptive and analytical method has been preferred and it has been reached to some important results by comparing the opinions of Ibn al-ʿArabī and al-Fārābī. In this context, it could be said that while Ibn al-ʿArabī constructs his classification according to the means of obtaining knowledge, al-Fārābī arranges his classification according to the knowledge itself. It is seen that al-Fārābī’s classification includes in details the first two groups, to wit, as Ibn al-ʿArabī calls, the rational sciences and the situational sciences, and excludes the mysterious sciences. On the other hand, Ibn al-ʿArabī makes room as well as for reason besides heart in his epistemology, both by mentioning the rational sciences and asserting that some of the intuitive sciences are in a rational characteristic. (shrink)
Like Plato, Aristotle uses dialectic to interpret and analyze ordinary discourse as well as to ascend to the first principles of philosophy and science. At the same time he says that it is intellect ( noûs ) that apprehends the first principle. With al-Fārābī and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), dialectic becomes relegated to dealing with ordinary language. For them demonstration in an ideal language from principles apprehended by the intellect suffices for the philosopher.
This book is an introduction to Islamic Philosophy, beginning with its Medieval inception, right through to its more contemporary incarnations. Using the language and conceptual apparatus of contemporary Anglo-American ‘Analytic’ philosophy, this book represents a novel and creative attempt to rejuvenate Islamic Philosophy for a modern audience. It adopts a ‘rational reconstructive’ approach to the history of philosophy by affording maximum hermeneutical priority to the strongest possible interpretation of a philosopher’s arguments while also paying attention to the historical context in (...) which they worked. The central canonical figures of Medieval Islamic Philosophy – al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, al-Ghazali, Averroes – are presented chronologically along with an introduction to the central themes of Islamic theology and the Greek philosophical tradition they inherited. The book then briefly introduces what the author collectively refers to as the ‘Pre-Modern’ figures including Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, and Ibn Taymiyyah, and presents all of these thinkers, along with their Medieval predecessors, as forerunners to the more modern incarnation of Islamic Philosophy: Political Islam. (shrink)
Al-Ghazzālī a toujours utilisé les travaux de ses prédécesseurs. Le Mi‘yār al-‘ilm fī fann, sorte de manuel de logique aristotélicienne adaptée au droit et à la théologie islamiques, contient ainsi une grande variété d’écrits avicenniens, du K. jusqu’à certaines parties du Šifā’. Mais quelques écrits farabiens, en particulier al-Qiyās et al-Maqūlāt, y sont mêlés. C’est la première et, à notre connaissance, la seule fois qu’al-Ghazzālī combine ainsi des éléments empruntés à ces deux grands maîtres.
Dâwûd al-Qarisî (Dâvûd al-Karsî) was a versatile and prolific 18th century Ottoman scholar who studied in İstanbul and Egypt and then taught for long years in various centers of learning like Egypt, Cyprus, Karaman, and İstanbul. He held high esteem for Mehmed Efendi of Birgi (Imâm Birgivî/Birgili, d.1573), out of respect for whom, towards the end of his life, Karsî, like Birgivî, occupied himself with teaching in the town of Birgi, where he died in 1756 and was buried next to (...) Birgivî. Better known for his following works on Arabic language and rhetoric and on the prophetic traditions (hadith): Sharḥu uṣûli’l-ḥadîth li’l-Birgivî; Sharḥu’l-Ḳaṣîdati’n-nûniyya (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Şarḥu’l-Emsileti’l-mukhtalifa fi’ṣ-ṣarf (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Sharḥu’l-Binâʾ; Sharḥu’l-ʿAvâmil; and Sharḥu İzhâri’l-asrâr, Karsî has actually composed textbooks in quite different fields. Hence the hundreds of manuscript copies of his works in world libraries. Many of his works were also recurrently printed in the Ottoman period. One of the neglected aspects of Karsî is his identity as a logician. Although he authored ambitious and potent works in the field of logic, this aspect of him has not been subject to modern studies. Even his bibliography has not been established so far (with scattered manuscript copies of his works and incomplete catalogue entries). This article primarily and in a long research based on manuscript copies and bibliographic sources, identifies twelve works on logic that Karsî has authored. We have clarified the works that are frequently mistaken for each other, and, especially, have definitively established his authorship of a voluminous commentary on al-Kâtibî’s al-Shamsiyya, of which commentary a second manuscript copy has been identified and described together with the other copy. Next is handled his most famous work of logic, the Sharhu Îsâghûcî, which constitutes an important and assertive ring in the tradition of commentaries on Îsâghûcî. We describe in detail the nine manuscript copies of this work that have been identified in various libraries. The critical text of Karsî’s Sharhu Îsâghûcî, whose composition was finished on 5 March 1745, has been prepared based on the following four manuscripts: (1) MS Kayseri Raşid Efendi Kütüphanesi, No. 857, ff.1v-3v, dated 1746, that is, only one year after the composition of the work; (2) MS Bursa İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, No.794B, ff.96v-114v, dated 1755; (3) MS Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri Efendi Arapça, No. 1752, ff.48v-58r, dated 1760; (4) MS Beyazıt Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt, No. 3129, ff.41v-55v, dated 8 March 1772. While preparing the critical text, we have applied the Center for Islamic Studies (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, İSAM)’s method of optional text choice. The critical text is preceded by a content analysis. Karsî is well aware of the preceding tradition of commentary on Îsâghûcî, and has composed his own commentary as a ‘simile’ or alternative to the commentary by Mollâ Fanârî which was famous and current in his own day. Karsî’s statement “the commentary in one day and one night” is a reference to Mollâ Fanârî who had stated that he started writing his commentary in the morning and finished it by the evening. Karsî, who spent long years in the Egyptian scholarly and cultural basin, adopted the religious-sciences-centered ‘instrumentalist’ understanding of logic that was dominant in the Egypt-Maghrib region. Therefore, no matter how famous they were, he criticized those theoretical, long, and detailed works of logic which mingled with philosophy; and defended and favored authoring functional and cogent logic texts that were beneficial, in terms of religious sciences, to the seekers of knowledge and the scholars. Therefore, in a manner not frequently encountered in other texts of its kind, he refers to the writings and views of Muhammad b. Yûsuf al-Sanûsî (d.1490), the great representative of this logical school in the Egyptian-Maghrib region. Where there is divergence between the views of the ‘earlier scholars’ (mutaqaddimûn) like Ibn Sînâ and his followers and the ‘later scholars’ (muta’akhkhirûn), i.e., post-Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî logicians, Karsî is careful to distance himself from partisanship, preferring sometimes the views of the earliers, other times those of the laters. For instance, on the eight conditions proposed for the realization of contradiction, he finds truth to be with al-Fârâbî, who proposed “unity in the predicative attribution” as the single condition for the realization of contradiction. Similarly, on the subject matter of Logic, he tried to reconcile the mutaqaddimûn’s notion of ‘second intelligibles’ with the muta’akhkhirûn’s notion of ‘apprehensional and declarational knowledge,’ suggesting that not much difference exists between the two, on the grounds that both notions are limited to the aspect of ‘known things that lead to the knowledge of unknown things.’ Karsî asserts that established and commonly used metaphors have, according to the verifying scholars, signification by correspondence (dalâlat al-mutâbaqah), adding also that it should not be ignored that such metaphors may change from society to society and from time to time. Karsî also endorses the earlier scholars’ position concerning the impossibility of quiddity (mâhiyya) being composed of two co-extensive parts, and emphasizes that credit should not be given to later scholars’ position who see it possible. According to the verifying scholars (muhaqqîqûn), it is possible to make definition (hadd) by mentioning only difference (fasl), in which case it becomes an imperfect definition (hadd nâqis). He is of the opinion that the definition of the proposition (qadiyya) in al-Taftâzânî’s Tahdhîb is clearer and more complete: “a proposition is an expression that bears the possibility of being true or false”. He states that in the division of proposition according to quantity what is taken into consideration is the subject (mawdû‘) in categorical propositions, and the temporal aspect of the antecedent (muqaddam) in hypothetical propositions. As for the unquantified, indefinite proposition (qadiyya muhmalah), Karsî assumes that if it is not about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a particular proposition (qadiyya juz’iyyah); but if it is about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyyah). This being the general rule about the ambiguous (muhmal) propositions, he nevertheless contends that, because its subject (mawdû‘) is negated, it is preferable to consider a negative ambiguous (sâliba muhmalah) proposition like “human (insân) is not standing” to be a virtually/potentially universal negative (sâliba kulliyyâh) proposition. He states that a disjunctive hypothetical proposition (shartiyya al-munfasila) that is composed of more than two parts/units is only seemingly so, and that in reality it cannot be composed of more than two units. Syllogism (qiyâs), according to Karsî, is the ultimate purpose (al-maqsad al-aqsâ) and the most valuable subject-matter of the science of Logic. For him, the entire range of topics that are handled before this one are only prolegomena to it. This approach of Karsî clearly reveals how much the ‘demonstration (burhân)-centered’ approach of the founding figures of the Muslim tradition of logic like al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ has changed. al-Abharî, in his Îsâghûjî makes no mention of ‘conversion by contradiction’ (‘aks al-naqîd). Therefore, Karsî, too, in his commentary, does not touch upon the issue. However, in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd Karsî does handle the conversion by contradiction and its rules. Following the method of Îsâghûjî, in his commentary Karsî shortly touches on the four figures (shakl) of conjuctive syllogism (qiyâs iqtirânî) and their conditions, after which he passes to the first figure (shakl), which is considered ‘the balance of the sciences’ (mi‘yâr al-‘ulûm), explaining the four moods (darb) of it. In his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd, however, Karsî handles all the four figures (shakl) with all their related moods (darb), where he speaks of fife moods (darb) of the fourth figure (shakl). The topic of ‘modal propositions’ (al-muwajjahât) and of ‘modal syllogism’ (al-mukhtalitât), both of which do not take place in the Îsâghûjî, are not mentioned by Karsî as well, either in his commentary on Îsâghûjî or in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd. Karsî proposes that the certainties (yaqîniyyât), of which demonstration (burhân) is made, have seven, not six, divisions. After mentioning (1) axioms/first principles (awwaliyyât), (2) observata/sensuals (mushâhadât), (3) experta/empiricals (mujarrabât), (4) acumenalia (hadthiyyât), (5) testata (mutawâtirât), and (6) instictives (fitriyyât), that is, all the ‘propositions accompanied by their demonstrations,’ Karsî states that these six divisions, which do not need research and reflection (nazar), are called badîhiyyât (self-evidents), and constitute the foundations (usûl) of certainties (yaqîniyyât). As the seventh division he mentions (7) the nazariyyât (theoreticals), which are known via the badîhiyyât, end up in them, and therefore convey certainty (yaqîn). For Karsî, the nazariyyât/theoreticals, which constitute the seventh division of yaqîniyyât/certainties, are too numerous, and constitute the branches (far‘) of yaqîniyyât. Every time the concept of ‘Mughâlata’ (sophistry) comes forth in the traditional sections on the five arts usually appended to logic works, Karsî often gives examples from what he sees as extreme sûfî sayings, lamenting that these expressions are so widespread and held in esteem. He sometimes criticizes these expressions. However, it is observed that he does not reject tasawwuf in toto, but excludes from his criticism the mystical views and approaches of the truth-abiding (ahl al-haqq), shârî‘â-observant (mutasharri‘) leading sufis who have reached to the highest level of karâmah. (shrink)
This article argues that a fragment from a lost treatise by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 925) is preserved in the Book on Morphology Kitāb al-Taṣrīf) by Ps-Ǧābir ibn Ḥayyān. Paul Kraus reached the conclusion that the collection to which this book belongs was written between the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century AD. This fragment represents the first attempt – to our knowledge – to analyze the logical structure of sign-based inference in Arabic, which is (...) known as istidlāl bi-al-šāhid ʿalā al-ġāʾib among theologians and philosophers. The author distinguishes between sign-inferences based on homogeneity (al-muǧānasa), course of habit (maǧrā al-ʿāda) and traces (āṯār). After providing a translation of the fragment, the first part of this paper argues that its author is Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. My argument is based on a comparison between this text and a passage from the Doubts About Galen, which is also by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī. I hypothesize that at least two other fragments from the same work or from different works by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī are preserved in the corpus attributed to Ps-Ǧābir. The second part of the paper aims to reconstruct Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s theory of sign-inference. In so doing, I show the historical influence that Hellenistic debates on sign-inference might have had on al-Rāzī, and I situate al-Rāzī’s theory in the context of the prominent use that the theologians of the kalām made of the istidlāl bi-al-šāhid ʿalā al-ġāʾib. To offer a more comprehensive reconstruction of al-Rāzī’s theory of sign-inference, this article compares the critical approach presented in the newly identified fragment with the epistemological framework outlined in the Doubts About Galen. Finally, this article shows that Abū Bakr al-Rāzī’s theory of sign-inference had a strong influence on al-Fārābī’s logical developments especially in his Epitome of the Prior Analytics, even if he does not acknowledge this intellectual debt. (shrink)
Pythagoras -- Confucius -- Heracleitus -- Parmenides -- Zeno of Elea -- Socrates -- Democritus -- Plato -- Aristotle -- Mencius -- Zhuangzi -- Pyrrhon of Elis -- Epicurus -- Zeno of Citium -- Philo Judaeus -- Marcus Aurelius -- Nagarjuna -- Plotinus -- Sextus Empiricus -- Saint Augustine -- Hypatia -- Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius -- Śaṅkara -- Yaqūb ibn Ishāq aṣ-Ṣabāḥ al-Kindī -- Al-Fārābī -- Avicenna -- Rāmānuja -- Ibn Gabirol -- Saint Anselm of Canterbury -- al-Ghazālī -- (...) Peter Abelard -- Averroës -- Zhu Xi -- Moses Maimonides -- Ibn al-'Arabī -- Shinran -- Saint Thomas Aquinas -- John Duns Scotus -- William of Ockham -- Niccolò Machiavelli -- Wang Yangming -- Francis Bacon, Viscount Saint Alban (or Albans), Baron of Verulam -- Thomas Hobbes -- René Descartes -- John Locke -- Benedict de Spinoza -- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz -- Giambattista Vico -- George Berkeley -- Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu -- David Hume -- Jean-Jacques Rousseau -- Immanuel Kant -- Moses Mendelssohn -- Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet -- Jeremy Bentham -- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel -- Arthur Schopenhauer -- Auguste Comte -- John Stuart Mill -- Søren Kierkegaard -- Karl Marx -- Herbert Spencer -- Wilhelm Dilthey -- William James -- Friedrich Nietzsche -- Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege -- Edmund Husserl -- Henri Bergson -- John Dewey -- Alfred North Whitehead -- Benedetto Croce -- Nishida Kitarō -- Bertrand Russell -- G.E. Moore -- Martin Buber -- Ludwig Wittgenstein -- Martin Heidegger -- Rudolf Carnap -- Sir Karl Popper -- Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno -- Jean-Paul Sartre -- Hannah Arendt -- Simone de Beauvoir -- Willard Van Orman Quine -- Sir A.J. Ayer -- Wilfrid Sellars -- John Rawls -- Thomas S. Kuhn -- Michel Foucault -- Noam Chomsky -- Jürgeb Gabernas -- Sir Bernard Williams -- Jacques Derrida -- Richard Rorty -- Robert Nozick -- Saul Kripke -- David Kellogg Lewis -- Peter (Albert David) Singer. (shrink)
There is no such thing as the cosmological argument. Rather, there are several arguments that all proceed from facts or alleged facts concerning causation, change, motion, contingency, or Hnitude in respect of the universe as a whole or processes within it. From them, and from general principles said to govern them, one is led to deduce or infer as highly probable the existence of a cause of the universe (as opposed, say, to a designer or a source of value). Such (...) arguments have a venerable history. A cosmological argument from heavenly motion to a ‘world soul’ is found in Plato’s Laws, bk. l0. This kind of argument is given extended elaboration and defense by Aristotle, both in the Physics (bks. 7-8) and the Metaphysics (hk. 12/lambda), where he argues for an ‘unmoved mover` from the existence of motion within the cosmos (again, primarily astronomical). Cosmological arguments abound in medieval Arabic philosophy. There are arguments to the existence of a necessary cause of the universe from the existence of contingent beings (due to the falsafa (‘philosophy’) scholars, a school heavily influenced by Greek thought) and arguments to the existence of a iirst cause of the universe from the temporal frnitude of the universe (due to the lcalarri (‘discourse’) scholars, a rival school of more traditional Qufanic theology) (Craig 1980: ch. 3). Defenders of the contingency argument include al-Farabi/Abu Nast (c.870—950), ibn Sina/Avicenna (980—lO3Y), and [bn Rushcl/Averroes (1i26e98). Supporters of what is now known as the kalam cosmological argument include al·lshrink)
This book is an extensive review & analysis of Aristotelian thought as received & adapted by such medieval commentators as Ammonius, Philoponus, Boethius, al-Farabi, Yahya ibn 'Adi, Avicenna, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Martin of Dacia, Simon of Faversham, John Duns Scotus, Peter of Spain, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham, & Giles of Rome. The discussions range from metaphysics to logic, linguistics, & epistemology, encompassing such topics as being, god, causation, actuality, potentiality, universals, individuation, signification, cognition, certainty, infallibility, error, ignorance, (...) analogy, grammar, interpretation, foundationalism, & the eucharist & transubstantiation. (shrink)
This article explores the relation of the Greek notion of essence to the political philosophy of Al-Farabi Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rush’d. It argues that their various conceptions of essence influence their attitudes towards religious tolerance within the regime.
In questo articolo verrà preso in esame il tema della prigionia dell’anima e della sua successiva liberazione, partendo da uno dei tre racconti visionari di Avicenna, intitolato Hayy Ibn Yaqzân e indagandone le fonti filosofiche. Si partirà dall’analisi del il mito della caverna di Platone e dell’interpretazione allegorica data ad esso dal filosofo al-Fārābī. Tenendo presente questa lettura, saranno sviluppate alcune riflessioni sull’oggetto e sul significato di questi racconti visionari: allegorie filosofiche sulla natura della conoscenza, allegorie religiose di carattere gnostico (...) sul tema della liberazione dell’anima dalla sua prigione terrena raffigurata dall’occidente e della sua conseguente salvezza, o un insieme di queste due possibili interpretazioni.Sebbene il focus del contributo sia l’opera avicenniana si terrà conto anche dello scritto successivo di Suhrawardī, contenutisticamente analogo, ma con finalità diverse.In this article I study the theme of imprisonment of the soul and its subsequent release, starting from one of the three visionary tales of Avicenna, entitled Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān. I start with the analysis of the possible sources of Islamic authors, such as the Plato’s myth of the cave and its allegorical interpretation given by the philosopher al-Fārābī.I develop some thoughts about the Avicenna’s possible objectives in writing the visionaries tales: 1. the philosophical allegories about the nature of knowledge, 2. the religious allegories with Gnostic character on the theme of the liberation of the soul from its earthly prison, represented by the West, and its consequent salvation, or 3. a combination of these two possible interpretations?The article focuses on Avicenna and the philosophical sources that could have inspired his tales, and taking into account Suhrawardī’s later writing, that has a similar content, but probably with different intentions. (shrink)
Collected in this volume are ten essays on Islamic philosophy, some of which have appeared before. The topics range from historical observations on the Islamic-European transmission of ideas to detailed examinations of Arabic developments in logic. The most comprehensive discussion of the latter concerns the theory of temporal modalities as found in Avicenna, al-Qazwini al-Katibi, et al. Of much wider interest is the inquiry into the Arabic concern with the notion of "existence." The author surprises the reader here by pointing (...) out that Al-Farabi was the first to deny that existence is an attribute; that Brentano's notion of "intentional inexistence" was anticipated by both Avicenna and Averroes; that certain teachings of al-Qazwini al-Katibi accord exactly with Russell's work concerning vacuous definite descriptions. The work as a whole provides considerable evidence for Rescher's thesis, fully articulated in the final essay, that "there is no such thing as an Arabic philosophy" but only "Greek philosophy carried forward in an Arabic-language setting." Indicative of this is the correspondence between Avicenna's formulation of the "logic of questions" and the Aristotelian table of categories. Another example is the commentary of Ibn al-Salah on Book II of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. More familiar is the syncretistic Arabic adaptation of the doctrines of Timaeus and De Caelo; this influence is discussed at length with respect to Al Kindi's cosmology. In summation, this author's work fills a number of gaps in the continuity of logical development from the Ancient-Medieval period to that of the early Renaissance.--W. S. (shrink)
In the Incoherence of the Philosophers, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali leveled a critique against twenty propositions of the Muslim peripatetic philosophers, represented chiefly by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. In the Fourth Discussion of this work, he rejects their claim to having proven the existence of God. The proof to which he objects is none other than the famous ‘argument from contingency.’ So why did the eminent theologian of Islamic orthodoxy reject an argument for God’s existence that ultimately became so historically (...) influential? I will show that the real targets of Ghazali’s objection are the philosophers’ doctrine of the pre-eternity of the world, and their denial of divine attributes. These two issues are linked in such a way that, only if the philosophers’ argument regarding the divine essence is sound, would they be able to prove that He exists while holding to the doctrine of the world’s pre-eternity. (shrink)
L'analisi dell'aristotelismo «platonizzante» nell'ambito della filosofia araba prima della sistemazione della Shifa di Avicenna, secondo cui Dio non avrebbe conoscenza dei particolari, consente all'A. di dimostrare come ci siano stati anche approcci platonici ad Aristotele , che non sono passati attraverso il filtro dei neoplatonici greci. L'altra cosa significativa è il fatto che all'interno della scuola di Baghdad vi sono modi diversi di intendere lo stato ontologico degli universali. L'A. tenta anche di ridimensionare la figura di al-Farabi all'interno della (...) scuola di Baghdad. I filosofi considerati sono al-Farabi, Yahya b. Adi e Ibn al-Tayyib. (shrink)
The Arabic philosophical fable _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _is a classic of medieval Islamic philosophy. Ibn Tufayl, the Andalusian philosopher, tells of a child raised by a doe on an equatorial island who grows up to discover the truth about the world and his own place in it, unaided—but also unimpeded—by society, language, or tradition. Hayy’s discoveries about God, nature, and man challenge the values of the culture in which the tale was written as well as those of every contemporary society. (...) Goodman’s commentary places _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _in its historical and philosophical context. The volume features a new preface and index, and an updated bibliography. “One of the most remarkable books of the Middle Ages.”—_Times Literary Supplement_ “An enchanting and puzzling story.... The book transcends all historical and cultural environments to settle upon the questions of human life that perpetually intrigue men.”—_Middle East__ Journal_ “Goodman has done a service to the modern English reader by providing a readable translation of a philosophically significant allegory.”—_Philosophy East and West_ “Add[s] bright new pieces to an Islamic mosaic whose general shape is already known.”—_American Historical Review_. (shrink)
The common notion of ‘immortality’ presupposes a ‘dualism’ of mind and body, with the former alone surviving death. Such eminent Muslim thinkers as al-Kindi, known as the Father of Muslim philosophy; al-Farabi called ‘The Second Teacher’; ibn Sina, that encyclopaedic genius of the Muslim world; and ibn Roshd, have all advocated a very strict kind of ‘dualism’, anticipating Descartes, the Father of modern philosophy, down to the present-day realist-idealists led by Professor H. D. Lewis of the University of London. (...) The dualistic position, however, made even Descartes realize the difficulty of explaining ‘interaction’, or for that matter any kind of relation, which we experience between mind and body in our everyday life - a problem which he and his followers found hard to solve. As every student of modern Western thought knows, Descartes resorted to –interactionism’, Spinoza took refuge in ‘parallelism7rsquo;, while Leibniz advocated ‘pre-established harmony’ implied in the position of Asharites. Iqbal argues against any such view, ‘I am inclined to think that the hypothesis of matter as an independent existence is perfectly gratuitous. It can only be justified on the ground of our sensations of which matter is supposed to be at least a part-cause other than myself’. Iqbal contends against the Cartesian hypothesis that ‘We cannot find any observable facts to show how and where exactly their interaction takes place, and which of the two takes the initiative’. Against both ‘parallelism’ and ‘pre-established harmony’ his contention is that they reduce ‘the soul to a mere passive spectator of the happenings of the body’. Thus, Iqbal rejects both ‘interactionism’ and ‘parallelism’ as unsatisfactory. (shrink)
This book brings together the study of two great disciplines of the Islamic world: law and philosophy. In both sunni and shiite Islam, it became the norm for scholars to acquire a high level of expertise in the legal tradition. Thus some of the greatest names in the history of Aristotelianism were trained jurists, like Averroes, or commented on the status and nature of law, like al-Fārābī. While such authors sought to put law in its place relative to the philosophical (...) disciplines, others criticized philosophy from a legal viewpoint, like al-Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyya. But this collection of papers does not only explore the relative standing of law and philosophy. It also looks at how philosophers, theologians, and jurists answered philosophical questions that arise from jurisprudence itself. What is the logical structure of a well-formed legal argument? What standard of certainty needs to be attained in passing down judgments, and how is that standard reached? What are the sources of valid legal judgment and what makes these sources authoritative? May a believer be excused on grounds of ignorance? Together the contributions provide an unprecedented demonstration of the close connections between philosophy and law in Islamic society, while also highlighting the philosophical interest of texts normally studied only by legal historians. (shrink)