Results for 'False belief'

999 found
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  1.  11
    False-belief task know-how: Author.Alan Jurgens - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.
    This paper assumes that success on false-belief tasks requires a kind of folk psychological know-how, i.e. gradable knowledge how to perform skilful social cognitive acts. Following Ryle, it argues the folk psychological know-how required for success on a false-belief task cannot be reduced to conceptual knowledge as this would lead to an infinite regress. Within the skilled performance literature, Intellectualists have attempted to solve Ryle’s regress by appealing to automatic mechanisms similar in kind to some Theory-of-Mind (...)
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  2.  92
    Knowledge, False Belief, and Reductio.Matt Leonard - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Recently, a number of cases have been proposed which seem to show that – contrary to widely held opinion – a subject can inferentially come to know some proposition p from an inference which relies on a false belief q which is essential. The standard response to these cases is to insist that there is really an additional true belief in the vicinity, making the false belief inessential. I present a new kind of case suggesting (...)
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  3. Useful false beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
  4. False-belief understanding and the phenomenological critics of folk psychology.Mitchell Herschbach - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.
    The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a 'folk psychology', that we understand and can interact with other people because we appreciate their mental states. Recently, however, philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the scope of the folk psychological account and argued for the importance of 'online', non-mentalistic forms of social understanding. In this paper I critically evaluate the arguments of these phenomenological critics, arguing that folk psychology plays a larger role in human (...)
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  5. Early false-belief understanding in traditional non-Western societies.H. Clark Barrett, Tanya Broesch, Rose M. Scott, Zijing He, Renee Baillargeon, Di Wu, Matthias Bolz, Joseph Henrich, Peipei Setoh, Jianxin Wang & Stephen Laurence - 2013 - Proceedings of the Royal Society, B (Biological Sciences) 280 (1755).
    The psychological capacity to recognize that others may hold and act on false beliefs has been proposed to reflect an evolved, species-typical adaptation for social reasoning in humans; however, controversy surrounds the developmental timing and universality of this trait. Cross-cultural studies using elicited-response tasks indicate that the age at which children begin to understand false beliefs ranges from 4 to 7 years across societies, whereas studies using spontaneous-response tasks with Western children indicate that false-belief understanding emerges (...)
     
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  6. Useful False Beliefs.Peter Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-63.
  7.  55
    The Misinformation Age: How False Beliefs Spread.Cailin O'Connor & James Owen Weatherall - 2019 - New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press.
    "Why should we care about having true beliefs? And why do demonstrably false beliefs persist and spread despite consequences for the people who hold them? Philosophers of science Cailin O’Connor and James Weatherall argue that social factors, rather than individual psychology, are what’s essential to understanding the spread and persistence of false belief. It might seem that there’s an obvious reason that true beliefs matter: false beliefs will hurt you. But if that’s right, then why is (...)
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  8.  64
    False-belief understanding in infants.Renée Baillargeon, Rose M. Scott & Zijing He - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):110-118.
  9.  51
    False-belief understanding in infants.Zijing He Renée Baillargeon, Rose M. Scott - 2010 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):110.
  10.  39
    False-Belief Understanding and Social Competence.Janet Wilde Astington - 2003 - In B. Repacholi & V. Slaughter (eds.), Individual Differences in Theory of Mind: Implications for Typical and Atypical Development. Hove, E. Sussex: Psychology Press.
  11.  94
    Matched False-Belief Performance During Verbal and Nonverbal Interference.James Dungan & Rebecca Saxe - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (6):1148-1156.
    Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child’s theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we (...)
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  12.  35
    Costly false beliefs: What self-deception and pragmatic encroachment can tell us about the rationality of beliefs.Melanie Sarzano - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):95-118.
    Melanie Sarzano | : In this paper, I compare cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment and argue that confronting these cases generates a dilemma about rationality. This dilemma turns on the idea that subjects are motivated to avoid costly false beliefs, and that both cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment are caused by an interest to avoid forming costly false beliefs. Even though both types of cases can be explained by the same belief-formation (...)
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  13. Inherence of False Beliefs in Spinoza’s Ethics.Oliver Istvan Toth - 2016 - Society and Politics 10 (2):74-94.
    In this paper I argue, based on a comparison of Spinoza's and Descartes‟s discussion of error, that beliefs are affirmations of the content of imagination that is not false in itself, only in relation to the object. This interpretation is an improvement both on the winning ideas reading and on the interpretation reading of beliefs. Contrary to the winning ideas reading it is able to explain belief revision concerning the same representation. Also, it does not need the assumption (...)
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  14. False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):520-541.
    False beliefs and misleading evidence have striking similarities. In many regards, they are both epistemically bad or undesirable. Yet, some epistemologists think that, while one’s evidence is normative (i.e., one’s available evidence affects the doxastic states one is epistemically permitted or required to have), one’s false beliefs cannot be evidence and cannot be normative. They have offered various motivations for treating false beliefs differently from true misleading beliefs, and holding that only the latter may be evidence. I (...)
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  15. From False Beliefs to True Interactions: Are Chimpanzees Socially Enactive?Sarah Vincent & Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - In Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. pp. 280-288.
    In their 1978 paper, psychologists David Premack and Guy Woodruff posed the question, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” They treated this question as interchangeable with the inquiry, “Does a chimpanzee make inferences about another individual, in any degree or kind?” Here, we offer an alternative way of thinking about this issue, positing that while chimpanzees may not possess a theory of mind in the strict sense, we ought to think of them as enactive perceivers of practical and (...)
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  16. What does the False Belief test test?Marco Fenici - 2011 - Phenomenology and Mind 1:197-207.
    The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Many scholars claim that children master beliefs when they are able to pass the false belief test, around their fourth year of life. However, recent experiments show that children implicitly attribute beliefs even earlier. The dispute does not only concern the empirical issue of discovering children’s early cognitive abilities. It also depends on the kind of capacities that we associate to the very (...)
     
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  17.  74
    Knowledge-how and false belief.Keith Harris - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1845-1861.
    According to a prominent account of knowledge-how, knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. A related view has it that to know how to perform an action is for it to seem to one that a way to perform that action is in fact a way to do so. According to a further view, knowledge-how is a species of objectual knowledge. Each of these intellectualist views has significant virtues including, notably, the ability to account for the seemingly epistemic dimensions of (...)
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  18.  5
    False-Belief Tests and Understanding Others: Comment on Gallagher's 'The Problem with 3-Year-Olds'.A. Montes Sanchez - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):187-190.
  19. Epistemic Norms, the False Belief Requirement, and Love.J. Spencer Atkins - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (3):289-309.
    Many authors have argued that epistemic rationality sometimes comes into conflict with our relationships. Although Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller argue that friendships sometimes require bad epistemic agency, their proposals do not go far enough. I argue here for a more radical claim—romantic love sometimes requires we form beliefs that are false. Lovers stand in a special position with one another; they owe things to one another that they do not owe to others. Such demands hold for beliefs as (...)
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  20. Responsibility and False Beliefs.Peter Vallentyne - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Justice and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    An individual is agent-responsible for an outcome just in case it flows from her autonomous agency in the right kind of way. The topic of agent-responsibility is important because most people believe that agents should be held morally accountable (e.g., liable to punishment or having an obligation to compensate victims) for outcomes for which they are agent-responsible and because many other people (e.g., brute luck egalitarians) hold that agents should not be held accountable for outcomes for which they are not (...)
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  21.  60
    False belief and the refusal of medical treatment.R. Faden & A. Faden - 1977 - Journal of Medical Ethics 3 (3):133-136.
    May a doctor treat a patient, despite that patient's refusal, when in his professional opinion treatment is necessary? This is the dilemma which must from time to time confront most physicians. An examination of the validity of such a refusal is provided by the present authors who use the case history of a patient refusing treatment, for cancer as well as for a fractured hip, to evaluate the grounds for intervention in such circumstances. In such a situation the patient is (...)
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  22. The developmental paradox of false belief understanding: a dual-system solution.L. C. De Bruin & A. Newen - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3).
    We explore the developmental paradox of false belief understanding. This paradox follows from the claim that young infants already have an understanding of false belief, despite the fact that they consistently fail the elicited-response false belief task. First, we argue that recent proposals to solve this paradox are unsatisfactory because they (i) try to give a full explanation of false belief understanding in terms of a single system, (ii) fail to provide psychological (...)
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  23.  60
    Reasonology and False Beliefs.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (1):91-118.
    Whereas some philosophers view all reasons for action as psychological states of agents, others—objective favourers theorists—locate the overwhelming majority of reasons for action outside the agent, in items that objectively favour courses of action. (The latter may count such psychological states as a person's belief that demons dance in his kitchen as a reason for him to seek psychiatric help.) This article explores options that objective favourers theorists have regarding cases in which, owing significantly to a false (...), an agent performs an action for which there is no objective favourer. Topics addressed include whether such theorists, including Jonathan Dancy himself, should accept Dancy's thesis that 'intentional, deliberate, purposeful action is always done for a reason' and whether there are two different concepts of reasons for action, one geared to action-evaluation and the other to action-explanation. (shrink)
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  24. Autonomy and false beliefs.Suzy Killmister - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):513-531.
    The majority of current attention on the question of autonomy has focused on the internal reflection of the agent. The quality of an agent’s reflection on her potential action (or motivating desire or value) is taken to determine whether or not that action is autonomous. In this paper, I argue that there is something missing in most of these contemporary accounts of autonomy. By focusing overwhelmingly on the way in which the agent reflects, such accounts overlook the importance of what (...)
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  25.  97
    Plato on False Belief: Theaetetus 187-200.John Ackrill - 1966 - The Monist 50 (3):383-402.
    The paradox that there can be no such thing as falsity is treated by Plato in a number of places. As exploited in the early dialogue Euthydemus it appears to rest on a simple equivocation. A false statement would be one that stated what is not, but to state what is not is to state nothing; so a false statement would in fact be a non-statement, no statement at all.
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  26.  30
    Linguistic Practice and False-belief Tasks.Matthew Van Cleave - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (3):298-328.
    Jill de Villiers has argued that children's mastery of sentential complements plays a crucial role in enabling them to succeed at false-belief tasks. Josef Perner has disputed that and has argued that mastery of false-belief tasks requires an understanding of the multiplicity of perspectives. This paper attempts to resolve the debate by explicating attributions of desires and beliefs as extensions of the linguistic practices of making commands and assertions, respectively. In terms of these linguistic practices one (...)
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  27. False Belief in the "Theaetetus".Gail Fine - 1979 - Phronesis 24 (1):70 - 80.
  28. False beliefs and naive beliefs: They can be good for you.Roberto Casati & Marco Bertamini - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):512-513.
    Naive physics beliefs can be systematically mistaken. They provide a useful test-bed because they are common, and also because their existence must rely on some adaptive advantage, within a given context. In the second part of the commentary we also ask questions about when a whole family of misbeliefs should be considered together as a single phenomenon.
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  29.  25
    False belief understanding goes to school: On the social-emotional consequences of coming early or late to a first theory of mind.Chris E. Lalonde & Michael J. Chandler - 1995 - Cognition and Emotion 9 (2-3):167-185.
  30. Linguistic practice and false-belief tasks.Matthew van Cleave & Christopher Gauker - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (3):298-328.
    Jill de Villiers has argued that children's mastery of sentential complements plays a crucial role in enabling them to succeed at false-belief tasks. Josef Perner has disputed that and has argued that mastery of false-belief tasks requires an understanding of the multiplicity of perspectives. This paper attempts to resolve the debate by explicating attributions of desires and beliefs as extensions of the linguistic practices of making commands and assertions, respectively. In terms of these linguistic practices one (...)
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  31.  20
    False Belief Reasoning in Adults with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder: Similarities and Differences.Monika Sommer, Katrin Döhnel, Irina Jarvers, Lore Blaas, Manuela Singer, Victoria Nöth, Tobias Schuwerk & Rainer Rupprecht - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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  32. Hypotheses that attribute false beliefs: A two‐part epistemology.William Roche & Elliott Sober - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (5):664-682.
    Is there some general reason to expect organisms that have beliefs to have false beliefs? And after you observe that an organism occasionally occupies a given neural state that you think encodes a perceptual belief, how do you evaluate hypotheses about the semantic content that that state has, where some of those hypotheses attribute beliefs that are sometimes false while others attribute beliefs that are always true? To address the first of these questions, we discuss evolution by (...)
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  33. Pragmatic Development and the False Belief Task.Evan Westra - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):235-257.
    Nativists about theory of mind have typically explained why children below the age of four fail the false belief task by appealing to the demands that these tasks place on children’s developing executive abilities. However, this appeal to executive functioning cannot explain a wide range of evidence showing that social and linguistic factors also affect when children pass this task. In this paper, I present a revised nativist proposal about theory of mind development that is able to accommodate (...)
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  34.  7
    Pragmatics in the False-Belief Task: Let the Robot Ask the Question!Jean Baratgin, Marion Dubois-Sage, Baptiste Jacquet, Jean-Louis Stilgenbauer & Frank Jamet - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    The poor performances of typically developing children younger than 4 in the first-order false-belief task “Maxi and the chocolate” is analyzed from the perspective of conversational pragmatics. An ambiguous question asked by an adult experimenter (perceived as a teacher) can receive different interpretations based on a search for relevance, by which children according to their age attribute different intentions to the questioner, within the limits of their own meta-cognitive knowledge. The adult experimenter tells the child the following story (...)
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  35.  45
    What Do False-Belief Tests Show?Pierre Jacob - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):1-20.
    In a paper published in Psychological Review, Tyler Burge has offered a unified non-mentalistic account of a wide range of social cognitive developmental findings. His proposal is that far from attributing mental states, young children attribute to humans the same kind of internal generic states of sensory registration that biologists attribute to e.g. snails and ticks. Burge’s proposal deserves close attention: it is especially challenging because it departs from both the mentalistic and all the non-mentalistic accounts of the data so (...)
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  36.  44
    False belief understanding and “cool” inhibitory control in 3-and 4-years-old Italian children.Francesca Bellagamba, Elsa Addessi, Valentina Focaroli, Giulia Pecora, Valentina Maggiorelli, Beatrice Pace & Fabio Paglieri - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  37. Ignorance, false belief, and unconscious desire.Robert G. Olson - 1957 - Journal of Philosophy 54 (15):466-474.
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  38.  29
    Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.
  39. Navigating beyond “here & now” affordances—on sensorimotor maturation and “false belief” performance.Maria Brincker - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research. A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief (FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we navigate (...)
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  40.  11
    False belief and emotion understanding in monozygotic twins, dizygotic twins and non-twin children.Joane Deneault, Marcelle Ricard, Thérèse Gouin Décarie, Pierre L. Morin, Germain Quintal, Michel Boivin, Richard E. Tremblay & Daniel Pérusse - 2008 - Cognition and Emotion 22 (4):697-708.
  41.  52
    Knowledge, False Belief, and Dialectic In Plato.Larry W. Miller - 1978 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 27:125-151.
  42. Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief.Avram Hiller - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (1):7-19.
    Richard Feldman and William Lycan have defended a view according to which a necessary condition for a doxastic agent to have knowledge is that the agent’s belief is not essentially based on any false assumptions. I call this the no-essential-false-assumption account, or NEFA. Peter Klein considers examples of what he calls “useful false beliefs” and alters his own account of knowledge in a way which can be seen as a refinement of NEFA. This paper shows that (...)
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  43.  18
    Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding.Jiushu Xie, Him Cheung, Manqiong Shen & Ruiming Wang - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (4):1179-1206.
    This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective taking such as false belief reasoning may also involve EET because of what has been widely reported in the embodied cognition literature, showing that our processing of abstract, propositional information (...)
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  44.  26
    Epistemically flawless false beliefs.Kate Nolfi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309.
    A starting point for the sort of alethic epistemological approach that dominates both historical and contemporary western philosophy is that epistemic norms, standards, or ideals are to be characterized by appeal to some kind of substantively normative relationship between belief and truth. Accordingly, the alethic epistemologist maintains that false beliefs are necessarily defective, imperfect, or flawed, at least from the epistemic perspective. In this paper, I develop an action-oriented alternative to the alethic approach, an alternative that is inspired (...)
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  45. Responsibility and False Beliefs.Peter Vallentyne - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
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  46.  12
    Culturally embedded schemata for false belief reasoning.Leda Berio - 2020 - Synthese (Special Issue: THE CULTURAL EVOL):1-30.
    I argue that both language acquisition and cultural and social factors contribute to the formation of schemata that facilitate false belief reasoning. While the proposal for an active role of language acquisition in this sense has been partially advanced by several voices in the mentalizing debate, I argue that other accounts addressing this issue present some shortcomings. Specifically, I analyze the existing proposals distinguishing between “structure-oriented” views :1858–1878, 2007; de Villiers in Why language matters for theory of mind. (...)
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  47. What does the so-called False Belief Task actually check?Hanoch Ben-Yami, Maya Ben-Yami & Yotham Ben-Yami - manuscript
    There is currently a theoretical tension between young children’s failure in False Belief Tasks (FBTs) and their success in a variety of other tasks that also seem to require the ability to ascribe false beliefs to agents. We try to explain this tension by the hypothesis that in the FBT, children think they are asked what the agent should do in the circumstances and not what the agent will do. We explain why this hypothesis is plausible. We (...)
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  48.  3
    Processing False Beliefs in Preschool Children and Adults: Developing a Set of Custom Tasks to Test the Theory of Mind in Neuroimaging and Behavioral Research.Joanna Wysocka, Karolina Golec, Maciej Haman, Tomasz Wolak, Bartosz Kochański & Agnieszka Pluta - 2020 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 14.
  49.  6
    Seeing Is Believing: Formalising False-Belief Tasks in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Thomas Bolander - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. Springer. pp. 207-236.
    In this paper we show how to formalise false-belief tasks like the Sally-Anne task and the second-order chocolate task in Dynamic Epistemic Logic. False-belief tasks are used to test the strength of the Theory of Mind of humans, that is, a human’s ability to attribute mental states to other agents. Having a ToM is known to be essential to human social intelligence, and hence likely to be essential to social intelligence of artificial agents as well. It (...)
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  50.  65
    The Problem of False Belief and the Failure of the Theory of Descriptions.Max Rosenkrantz - 2016 - Theoria 82 (1):56-80.
    In this article I argue that Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgment is a continuation of the campaign against Frege and Meinong begun in “On Denoting” with the theory of descriptions. More precisely, I hold that the problem of false belief, to which the multiple-relation theory is presented as a solution, emerges quite naturally out of the problem context of “On Denoting” and threatens to give new life to the theories Russell purports to have laid to rest there, and (...)
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